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This thesis addresses the question of divine action in the mind: Is human consciousness a 
uniquely nonphysical causal joint wherein divine intentions meet natural realities without 
contravening lawlike physical processes? It is argued that consciousness is not uniquely spiritual 
but wholly natural (and possibly physical). However, this need not lead to the conclusion that 
divine action in the mind does not occur. Rather, this thesis argues that noninterventionist causal 
joint programs (such as those privileging the mind as uniquely open to divine action) are both 
scientifically implausible and theologically insufficient, resting on questionable metaphysical 
presuppositions that are not necessitated by either theology or the natural sciences. By discarding 
the God-nature model implied by contemporary noninterventionist divine action theories, one is 
freed up to explore theological and metaphysical alternatives for understanding divine action in 
the mind (and elsewhere). It is argued that a theologically robust theistic naturalism offers a more 
compelling vision of divine action in the mind than that offered by standard causal joint theories. 
By affirming that to be fully natural is to be involved with God’s active presence, one is then free 
to affirm divine action not only in the human mind, but throughout the natural world. 
This thesis is divided into two parts. Part One engages with the scientific and philosophical 
literature surrounding human consciousness, and uses debates about the nature of the mind to 
offer a sustained analysis and critique of what is termed the “standard model” of divine action. It 
is argued that the noninterventionist, incompatibilist model of divine action that has spurred the 
development of various causal joint theories is scientifically and theologically insufficient, and 
that this is seen particularly clearly in recent theories locating (and constraining) divine action in 
the emergent human mind. Chapter 2 analyses the contemporary divine action scene, arguing 
that the standard model presumes noninterventionism, incompatibilism, and a high view of the 
laws of nature. However, the God-world relationship implied by this model is theologically 
insufficient. Chapter 3 examines Philip Clayton’s divine action theory, which locates divine 
action in the emergent human mind and is the latest manifestation of the causal joint model 
described in Chapter 2. After using emergence theory itself to critique Clayton’s approach, the 
thesis then examines the philosophy and science of consciousness, in Chapters 4 and 5. It is 
suggested that a physicalist understanding of the mind is a well-supported position. 
Part Two of the thesis reframes divine action in the mind within an explicitly theological 
framework. The thesis does this by analysing what is termed the “theological turn” in divine 
action debates – the recent tendency to react against standard causal joint theories by rejecting 
the idea that science can say anything about how and whether divine action occurs. Proponents 
of the theological turn instead understand divine action from explicitly theological perspectives, 
affirming compatibilist models in which God is seen to work in, through, and with natural 
processes – precisely because God is never absent from nature in the first place. Such an 
approach allows theologians to accept physicalist explanations of the mind, precisely because all 
the natural world is necessarily involved with God. Chapter 6 introduces this theological turn by 
exploring various versions of naturalism, ultimately suggesting that neither philosophy nor 
science mandates the sort of metaphysical naturalism assumed not only by those who deny 
divine action, but (ironically) noninterventionist divine action theorists as well. Chapters 7, 8, and 
9 then introduce, compare, and contrast three different versions of strong theistic naturalism: 
Thomism, panentheistic naturalism, and pneumatological naturalism. While each of these 
explicitly theological frameworks is distinctive, they share an affirmation of the intimate 
relationship between God’s immanent, active presence in the natural world, and suggest the 
naturalised mind as a relatively intense locus of divine action, as human minds actively participate 
in and with God. It is concluded that the participatory ontology supported by these theistic 
naturalisms does, after all, suggest the mind as a locus of intensified divine action – but for very 
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At any given moment, untold numbers of individuals around the world find themselves 
experiencing something that has been attested throughout human history: the conscious 
experience of divine activity, both within their own minds and elsewhere in the world. Prayer, 
meditation, worship, music, art, contemplation, even theological thinking – these are just a few 
of the avenues through which religious believers have sought either interaction with God or 
God’s action in specific circumstances. Indeed, Christian scriptures and tradition portray a God 
who, while transcendent, is also immanent in the natural world – continually responsive to 
humans and the rest of creation, often to dramatic effect. Yet at the same moment, physicists, 
cosmologists, mathematicians, biologists, and cognitive scientists (to name just a few) in 
laboratories and research centres around the world are increasingly discovering the sorts of 
verifiable, predictable, and empirical mechanisms that would account for the same phenomena 
experienced by religious believers as divine activity.  
 
 
The seemingly competitive nature of the explanatory marketplace is nothing new, and the divine 
action problem has only become more acute as modern science has progressed. In recent 
decades, the question of divine action has crystallised into what has become known as the 
“causal joint problem”: if an uncreated, transcendent God interacts with nature to bring about 
specific, responsive actions, then at some point divine intentions must meet physical processes. 
But how, the question goes, are we to envision the gritty details of this divine-physical 
interaction, when contemporary science has been so extraordinarily successful at discovering the 
lawlike regularities that make our universe possible? In answer to this, many in the science-and-
religion field have sought scientifically identifiable, seemingly underdetermined causal joints in 
which God might act in accordance with the laws of nature. However, such causal joint theories 
(involving, for example, quantum mechanics or chaos theory) can be strongly critiqued as being 
scientifically implausible and theologically insufficient. This has left divine action theorists 
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pondering whether divine action scholar Nicholas Saunders’ diagnosis may be correct, that “the 
strong sense of divine action which forms our theological inheritance is simply untenable in the 
light of our modern understanding of the natural sciences”1 – in short, that “contemporary theology is 
in crisis.”2  
  
 
One approach to divine action that has yet to receive the sustained scrutiny levied against 
quantum divine action theories (for example) has to do with the human mind. Specifically, many 
find it easier to accept the possibility of divine action in consciousness than in more seemingly 
physical areas of the natural world. The most prominent proponent of this approach has been 
philosopher Philip Clayton, who argues that the emergent human mind may be uniquely open to 
divine action, insofar as consciousness is fundamentally unexplainable via scientific 
methodology. If the mind is uniquely nonphysical and spiritual, then divine-human interaction 
can take place without the violation of any laws of nature – or so the story goes.  
 
 
This thesis offers a sustained argument that not only is Clayton’s mind-based causal joint 
proposal scientifically implausible and theologically insufficient (analogous to Saunders’ 
treatment of quantum divine action theories), but that the proposal clearly demonstrates the 
faulty metaphysical presuppositions underlying causal joint theories more generally. In order to 
develop a robust theology of divine action that fully accounts for scientific knowledge and 
methodology, the underlying assumptions of what I call the “standard model” (or “standard 
causal joint model”) of divine action must be challenged. While this aspect of the thesis is 
admittedly deconstructive and critical, my intention is not to deny the reality of divine activity in 
the mind or elsewhere – I do not agree with Saunders’ conclusions regarding theology’s 
apparently dismal prospects. Rather, I suggest that by first critiquing the theological and 
philosophical presuppositions on which standard causal joint models are based, science-and-
religion theorists are then freed up to explore various versions of theistic naturalism (as I will 
define it below). Indeed, as will be discussed, a “theological turn” is already evident in science-
and-religion, with theology-driven models replacing scientifically-based causal joint programs. 
These theistic naturalisms seek not to confine divine action to any particular physical space, but 
to theologically reframe the concept of nature itself, and what it means to be properly natural. 
                                                            
1 Nicholas Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), xiii. 
2 Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science, 215.  
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Within the metaphysical frameworks of theistic naturalisms, divine action in the mind is indeed 
plausible, and may even be a site of particularly intense experiences of divine action (or divine-
human interaction), but for very different reasons than those supposed by Clayton. My specific 
research questions (and answers) are discussed below, but first it is helpful to discuss the context 
in which this project is located.   
 
1.2 Context: Divine Action and the “Standard” Causal Joint Model 
 
The quest to articulate an intellectually robust account of God’s activity in the world is a 
perennial pursuit, with religious thinkers over the centuries attempting to bring their 
contemporary knowledge of the natural world into contact with theological thinking.3 
Unfortunately, a full historical synopsis of this endeavour lies beyond the scope of this thesis; 
however, it is important to note that these dual knowledge-seeking endeavours – involving both 
spiritual and natural truths or realities – are not a strictly modern phenomenon. This being 
noted, the focus and scope of this thesis is confined to contemporary proposals in the science-
and-religion field that explicitly attempt to make divine action align with current scientific 
knowledge. In other words, one focus of this thesis is the so-called causal joint – that theoretical 
space wherein divine intentions meet physical realities, but in a way that does not undermine the 
laws of nature.4 The hope for causal joint proposals is that they will allow for theological 
affirmations of divine action in a world that is governed by identifiable physical mechanisms and 
regularities: if divine action is located in areas of the natural world that are somehow open to 
such supernatural action, then religious believers and thinkers can claim to take seriously the 
success of the scientific endeavour, even while they uphold the theological affirmation of God-
nature interaction.  
 
 
A helpful focal point for this divine action discussion is the so-called “Divine Action Project” 
(DAP), a multi-year collaborative project co-sponsored by the Center for Theology and the 
                                                            
3 For one helpful examination of the history of science-and-religion, see John Hedley Brooke, Science and 
Religion: Some Historical Perspectives, The Cambridge History of Science Series (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991). 
4 The term “causal joint” was coined by theologian Austin Farrer, though Farrer himself was extremely 
pessimistic about the possibility of humans ever positively identifying such a causal nexus. He writes, “The causal 
joint (could there be said to be one) between God’s action and ours is of no concert in the activity of religion; the 
very idea of it arises simply as a byproduct of the analogical imagination.” Austin Farrer, Faith and Speculation: An 
Essay in Philosophical Theology (London: A. & C. Black, 1967), 66. 
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Natural Sciences (CTNS) and the Vatican Observatory.5 Due to its prolonged timeframe (lasting 
well over ten years) and the impressive array of scholars (including such pioneering figures as 
Bob Russell, Arthur Peacocke, Ian Barbour, and John Polkinghorne), conferences, research 
fields, and publications involved, the DAP has been enormously influential in determining the 
scope and parameters of divine action theories in the science-and-religion field. While the DAP 
did not exclude nontheistic thinkers or those who reject intentional divine action (see 
philosopher Wesley Wildman’s helpful article for the methods, contributors, and outputs 
involved6), and while a wide range of divine action theories and theologies were proposed, 
something of a consensus set of commitments resulted from the Project. First, DAP participants 
were concerned with seeking maximum “traction” between science and theology,7 or as Wildman 
explains it, “formal and informal logical connections that yield both intelligibility and potential 
for correction and improvement.”8 While theoretically such a traction-seeking endeavour might 
give equal weight to both science and theology, it is important to note that specific proposals 
within the DAP tended to submit theological affirmations to scientific scrutiny – rather than the 
other way around. That is, the DAP was highly motivated to demonstrate divine action as 
scientifically credible; this commitment was (and is) a direct cause of the many resultant causal 
joint theories.  
 
 
A second important feature of the DAP was its assumption that divine activity can be 
categorised into three distinct subtypes: general divine action (GDA), special divine action 
(SDA), and miracles. GDA was taken to indicate “the creation and sustaining of all reality insofar 
as this does not necessarily presume any specific providential divine intentions or purposes,” and 
SDA was considered to be “specific providential acts, envisaged, intended, and somehow 
brought about in this world by God.”9 Miracles, on the other hand, received surprisingly little 
attention, as they did not seem to align easily with the DAP’s commitment to maximum traction 
between science and religion (more on this below). In any case, it is clear that these distinctions 
were vital not only for the development of the DAP, but for the science-and-religion field more 
broadly. Indeed, Wildman explains that “the DAP succeeded in stabilizing terminology that is 
key for understanding theories of divine action”; by classifying divine actions in this way, 
                                                            
5 Wesley Wildman uses this label in his helpful survey article; for a useful list of the DAP’s publications, see 
endnote #2 of Wesley Wildman, “The Divine Action Project, 1988-2003,” Theology and Science 2, no. 1 (2004): 31-75. 
6 Wildman, “The Divine Action Project,” 35. 
7 Described by Philip Clayton in Philip Clayton, Adventures in the Spirit: God, World, Divine Action, ed. 
Zachary Simpson (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2008), 53-54. 




scholars might more precisely identify specific problems and solutions regarding theological 
affirmations and physical processes.10 However, while one might be sympathetic to the 
intentions driving such a classification, it is also the case that this terminology actually serves to 
shape – rather than simply to reflect – divine action theories. In other words, what may have been 
a useful distinction for practical and theoretical purposes has now solidified into a conventional 
wisdom that may actually hinder theological creativity and real progress in divine action theology 
(this will be discussed throughout this thesis). 
 
In any case, it is clear that the DAP (as well as those scholars subsequently influenced by the 
Project) focused its collective attention on special divine action: intentional, specific divine 
activity envisioned as occurring in and through natural processes. In one sense, this seems an 
obvious strategic choice. After all, GDA is generally equated with God’s providential sustenance 
of physical regularities; far from being a “hands on” class of divine action, this is the sort of 
divine “activity” that even a deist could affirm. There is a sense in which GDA can be equated 
with the laws of nature – thus, GDA as generally understood is a rather uninteresting category of 
divine action for those seeking to explore the dynamic interaction between a divine agent and the 
natural world.11 On the other end of the spectrum, miracles were largely (though not completely) 
ignored by the DAP, presumably because of the received definition participants seemed to 
associate with the category. That is, a miracle is often considered – almost by definition, 
following Hume – to be “a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, 
or by the interposition of some invisible agent.”12 So long as miracles are defined as outright 
violations of the laws of nature, seeking maximum traction between science and theology would 
seem a pointless activity. Admittedly, interventionist, miraculous divine action has been, and 
continues to be, widely affirmed by religious believers. As the Westminster Confession of Faith 
states, “God, in His ordinary providence, makes use of means, yet is free to work 
without, above, and against them, at His pleasure.”13 One would thus be forgiven for assuming 
                                                            
10 Ibid., 35.  
11 As will be discussed in Part 2 of this thesis, this dismissal of GDA may be premature; it is merely the 
case that GDA as generally conceived would seem to be altogether distinct from specific, responsive, special divine 
action.  
12 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. 
Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902), 115f. 
13 The Westminster Confession of Faith, 3rd ed. (Lawrenceville, GA: Committee for Christian Education and 
Publications, 1990), 5.3. 
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that the distinctions between GDA, SDA, and miracles that occur “without, above, and against” 
natural means are necessary in any divine action theology (more on this in coming chapters).  
 
It is evident, then, that SDA was the clear theoretical focus of the DAP. Arguably, the most 
significant and influential figure in the DAP was physicist and theologian Robert John Russell, 
whose noninterventionist objective divine action (NIODA) model has become almost 
synonymous with the DAP.14 That is, the DAP’s treatment of SDA focused on divine action that 
did not abrogate natural processes, and that was not merely a subjective interpretation of 
otherwise physical or law-governed events. As Russell summarises, “we can now understand special 
providence as the objective acts of God in nature and history, to which we respond, and we can understand these 
acts in a noninterventionist manner consistent with science.”15 At least partially due to the DAP, the 
contemporary divine action discussion has thus been centred, to a significant extent, on the 
question of how God acts objectively in nature without intervening in the laws of nature. Related 
to this is a final commitment evidenced by many in the DAP: that is, to incompatibilism, or the 
idea that either God or natural processes can be responsible for any specific event, but not both. 
Wildman explains that “incompatibilists adopt the strategy of showing that the physical world is 
indeterministic, because this is a necessary condition for non-interventionist SDA. This leads to 
strong interest in gaps, especially uncloseable gaps, in the world’s causal nexus.”16 In other 
words, DAP participants were incompatibilists by virtue of their insistence that any single event 
can only be identified as divine action if there is not also a natural, physical explanation for that 
event. This incompatibilist commitment motivates the search for scientifically identifiable, 
underdetermined causal joints wherein God can act without violating laws of nature. There is 
thus an important connection between causal joint theories, noninterventionism, and 
incompatibilism.  
 
As I will argue in Chapter 2 and throughout this thesis, it is evident that the contemporary divine 
action debate, largely shaped by the DAP, is shaped and determined by several overlapping 
debates – often implicitly assumed by theorists. Specifically, three of the most significant points 
                                                            
14 There are, of course, a great many DAP contributors who would not explicitly subscribe to Russell’s 
NIODA model. However, its general features are quite consistent with the overarching themes and commitments 
arising from the DAP.  
15 Robert J. Russell, “Does the ‘God Who Acts’ Really Act? New Approaches to Divine Action in Light of 
Science,” Theology Today 54, no. 1 (1997): 45.  
16 Wildman, “The Divine Action Project,” 40.  
23 
 
of contention in divine action theories today involve 1) interventionism versus 
noninterventionism, 2) compatibilism versus incompatibilism, and 3) descriptive versus 
prescriptive interpretations of the laws of nature. As I will argue in coming chapters, the general 
approach to divine action taken by the DAP (and followed by countless others influenced by the 
Project) is marked by a commitment to noninterventionist, incompatibilist divine action that 
presumes (often unwittingly) a prescriptive or ontological interpretation of the laws of nature. 
This general approach is what I will call the “standard model of divine action.” I do not, of 
course, mean that this approach should be normative in science-or-religion, that it has been the 
dominant approach throughout history (it has not), or even that it is the dominant approach 
among religious believers today (this would be highly unlikely). Rather, by the “standard model” 
I mean only that approach articulated by the DAP (and understood as I have defined it) that has 
become prevalent over the last several decades in the science-and-religion field. 
 
The DAP has come under significant criticism in recent years, and the paradigmatic example of 
this has been Nicholas Saunders’ Divine Action and Modern Science. While Saunders’ arguments will 
be explored in the next chapter, his methodology is worth noting here, as it is analogous to my 
argument and method in Part One of this thesis. Specifically, Saunders takes specific causal joint 
proposals (quantum divine action is the most prominent, but chaos theory and alternative 
proposals are also addressed), and meticulously analyses them on the basis of their relative 
scientific merits. In a sense, then, Saunders endeavours to “play the game” of causal joint 
theories, treating them as if they are as rigorously scientific as purported by their advocates. In so 
doing, Saunders effectively demonstrates that causal joint theories (such as those promoted by 
DAP participants) often fail to live up to expectations when examined from the viewpoint of the 
natural sciences. Thus, he highlights the dangers of identifying divine action with any particular 
causal joint – namely, that such causal joint theories often crumble under the pressure of 
scientific, philosophical, and even theological analysis. In fact, Saunders applies the sort of 
painstaking analytical method to selected causal joint theories that I will apply to the emergent 
mind divine action proposal (Chapters 3-5).  
 
Moreover (and this is why I mention him here), Saunders demonstrates the vital importance of 
applying divine action theories to specific test cases. It is remarkably easy to build a coherent, 
consistent divine action model that works well at an abstract theoretical level. As they say, 
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however, “the devil is in the details,” and a robust theory of divine action requires an attention to 
scientific specificity that may make many philosophers and theologians uncomfortable. 
Nevertheless, I suggest that scientific scrutiny is a necessary price to pay for divine action 
theories – most specifically those identifiable as noninterventionist causal joint models. This 
need not be construed as unduly harsh or unrealistic, for proponents of the DAP and the 
standard model of divine action explicitly acknowledge scientific plausibility as something of a 
self-imposed litmus test.17 In any case, Saunders’ approach is something of a template for the 
sort of scientific and philosophical scrutiny I apply in this thesis to Philip Clayton’s emergent 
mind proposal. While this thesis is not solely deflationary, a robust critique of the model that 
privileges the mind as uniquely open to divine action is a significant element of the thesis’ 
contribution to the science-and-religion field. It is to the current academic climate surrounding 
the theology and science of the mind that I now turn.  
 
1.3 Context: Mind-Brain, Soul, and Human Spirituality 
 
Though this thesis addresses divine action in general, its core contribution is more specific; that 
is, my intention is to specifically address divine action in the human mind. My rationale for 
focusing on consciousness is threefold. First, as mentioned in the previous section, this is 
partially a methodological choice. Far too often, divine action debates occur solely in the realm 
of abstract philosophical or theological theory. While theorising and abstracting are necessary for 
these sorts of discussions, one risks becoming so general and scientifically untouchable that a 
divine action theory ceases to be falsifiable or rigorously engaged with the very scientific 
literature it purports to value. By applying divine action theories to specific test cases, it becomes 
possible to highlight the theories’ relative strengths and weaknesses. While lengthy and 
meticulous critiques have been levied against quantum and chaos divine action theories, for 
example, such rigorous analysis has not yet been applied to models involving the mind. Thus, 
this thesis addresses a gap in divine action research insofar as it critiques the causal joint model 
as applied to the seemingly nonphysical mind. 
 
 
                                                            
17 As Wildman explains, “The DAP was strongly committed to maximizing traction in the different ways 
that each subproject demands, because traction increases the credibility of theological proposals.” The idea is that 
scientific credibility is necessary for the theological credibility. Wildman, “The Divine Action Project,” 38. 
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A second reason for focussing on the mind involves the common assumption (even in science-
and-religion) that the mind is something “more than” the brain, and that this is a theologically 
necessary feature of reality. There exists a real and persistent theological resistance to the 
naturalisation – or even physicalisation – of consciousness, though (as will be discussed) there 
may be good philosophical and scientific support for at least considering the possibility that the 
mind just is the brain-body-environment system. Insofar as causal joint theorists and others in 
science-and-religion assume that the mind is inherently unexplainable in scientific terms (and 
even, like Clayton, actively use the nonphysical mind in their understandings of divine action), 
this area is woefully under-researched. Indeed, those science-and-religion scholars who do deal 
with consciousness often assume that the mind is, in some (often unstated) way, nonphysical or 
somehow “more than” the brain-body. This is most obviously the case in discussions of 
emergence and consciousness – these will be a major focus in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. In any case, 
insofar as the mind is theologically assumed to be inherently nonphysical or immune to scientific 
explanation, consciousness remains one of the last theologically acceptable “gaps” that 
theologians (and others) assume science will never be able to explain. Indeed, it is evident that 
this privileging of consciousness as nonphysical or spiritual is linked to a marked interiorisation 
of divine action. That is, insofar as the science-and-religion field has sought to locate divine 
action in ontologically underdetermined gaps in the laws of nature, a nonphysical mind has 
seemed remarkably attractive as an appropriate space for divine action. After all, if consciousness 
is not subject to the physical laws of nature, then one can affirm divine action as a phenomenon 
interior to the human person, and which does not violate these physical laws of nature. Indeed, 
Clayton argues that “no physical laws are broken if there is an exchange of information between 
a divine source and conscious human agents.”18 In contrast to this God-of-the-gaps thinking, this 
thesis will urge a sort of theological audacity in actually welcoming the naturalisation of the mind. 
Far from defensively disregarding scientific accounts of consciousness as reductionist, 
materialist, or as “nothing-buttery,” the thesis instead embraces the physicality of the embodied 
mind, and explores (in Part Two) various theological frameworks that insist upon the physical as, 
in a sense, always more than physical.  
 
A third reason for this thesis’ focus on consciousness involves the vital role that the mind indeed 
plays in accounts and experiences of divine action. At least within Christian theology, the mind 
                                                            
18 Philip Clayton, “Natural Law and Divine Action: The Search for an Expanded Theory of 
Causation,” Zygon 39, no. 3 (2004): 630. 
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has generally been treated as a locus of God-human interaction. Insofar as one understands God 
to be personal and relational, and consciousness to be what enables humans to know, 
experience, and respond, then it makes a sort of intuitive sense that the mind would be 
particularly important for an account of divine action. In fact, mental interactions with God 
would seem to be so common and normal for religious believers that they often go unremarked 
in divine action theologies. For example, prayer, contemplation, intercession for physical healing, 
meditation, and participation in communal worship are all explicitly conscious events in which 
religious believers claim to be actually communicating with God, and even – crucially – being 
acted upon in some way. Church tradition speaks of prevenient grace drawing people to God 
before they are even aware of their spiritual needs, with the Council of Trent affirming that 
“God touches the heart of man by the illumination of the Holy Ghost,” and describing how one 
might pray, “Convert us, O Lord, to thee, and we shall be converted.”19 The Bible speaks of a 
God who “is at work in you, enabling you both to will and to work for his good pleasure,”20 and 
the Gospel of Luke affirms that when Jesus was with his disciples, he “opened their minds so 
they could understand the Scriptures.”21 These are just a few of the great many textual 
affirmations of divine action in human minds; in fact, it is dangerous to highlight even these few, 
as this would seem to ignore all the other traditional, biblical, and experiential accounts of divine-
human interaction. The point here is that this thesis focuses on the mind precisely because it is 
such an important site of divine action, traditionally and experientially speaking.  
 
Moreover – and this is significant – divine action in the mind is often overlooked as being 
somehow less noteworthy or more scientifically plausible than other more seemingly physical 
instances of divine action. In other words, it is common to assume that a physical healing, for 
example, requires an account of how God could intervene in the laws of nature; the same 
scrutiny, however, is not often applied to claims that one has heard from God in some way, or 
experienced an answer to prayers for peace or comfort, or that God has been revealed to a 
person in an illuminating way. Clayton, for example, admits that his divine action model (which 
restricts divine action to the human mind) “makes it much more difficult to conceive a divine 
influence on rocks or other purely physical systems apart from the laws and initial conditions 
                                                            
19 The Council of Trent: Session 6, Chapter 5, in Christian Doctrine: A Reader, ed. Lindsay Hall, Murray Rae, 
and Steve Holmes (London: SCM Press, 2010), 192. Also see John Wesley’s sermon, “On Working Out Our Own 
Salvation,” in John Wesley, The Works of the Rev. John Wesley (London: Thomas Cordeux, 1811). 
20 Philippians 2:13 (New Revised Standard Version). 
21 Luke 24:45 (NRSV). 
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established by God at creation.”22 And yet, as will be extensively argued, to the extent that the 
mind is dependent on (or even synonymous with) the brain-body system, even experiences of 
mental divine action require an account of how God interacts with physical processes. In other 
words, one goal of this thesis is to prevent science-and-religion scholars from being “let off the 
hook,” as it were, when it comes to divine action in the mind. While divine action in 
consciousness is a vital part of Christian tradition, theology, and experience, it may be no less 
physical than a more obviously dramatic instance of divine action.  
 
At this point, a brief word about the theological and philosophical histories of the mind is 
warranted. The question of how to understand human ontology is a question stretching back 
thousands of years, with prominent thinkers in every era weighing in on the appropriate divisions 
of the human person. Mind, body, and spirit, monism, dualism, and trichotomy – debates about 
what makes a human a human show no signs of ceasing, and a univocal consensus is absent even 
(or perhaps especially) among theologians and others in science-and-religion. A full discussion of 
the rich history of theological anthropology is unfortunately impossible within this thesis, nor is 
it entirely germane to the specific focus on divine action in the mind. That is, while the historical 
debates are fascinating and important, they are not directly necessary for rigorous discussion of 
current philosophical and scientific research on mind or consciousness. While it may seem 
inadvisable to ignore the prominent historical figures involved (Plato, Aristotle, Thomas 
Aquinas, and Descartes come to mind), the scholarly literature on these thinkers is sizable and 
readily available. I therefore assume knowledge of the history of the debates under discussion, so 
that this thesis is better placed to delve deeply into current theories and questions – thereby 
enhancing the impact of this work on the field more broadly.  
 
Additionally, a word on terminology and scope is important. Even a cursory foray into the 
mind/body/soul debate will reveal significant confusion over terminology; this is perhaps 
understandable given the complex philosophical and theological history surrounding these 
terms.23 What seems clear is that in the contemporary debate, “mind” has become virtually 
                                                            
22 Clayton, Adventures in the Spirit, 198.  
23 For a useful introduction to the key issues surrounding the mind, soul, and theological anthropology, see 
Warren S. Brown, Nancey C. Murphy, and H. Newton Malony, Whatever Happened to the Soul?: Scientific and Theological 
Portraits of Human Nature, Theology and the Sciences (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1998). Also see Joel B. 




synonymous with “soul.” There are historical reasons for this, not least of which is the post-
Enlightenment awareness that some of the functions typically associated with human spirituality 
and the soul (e.g., memory and emotions) might be susceptible to scientific explanations – and 
therefore better thought as problems of mind-body interaction. Science writer Kenan Malik 
explains this well:  
The difficulty in finding a common language in which to talk of the immortal soul and 
the body-machine led many 17th and 18th-century natural philosophers to speak 
increasingly of the ‘mind’ rather than of the ‘soul.’ The mind was not simply a synonym 
for the soul in a more mechanistic language. Rather, those aspects of the soul’s 
relationship with a world that were amenable to naturalistic explanations – memory, 
perception, emotions and so on – were recast as problems of the mind. This 
transformation helped minimise conflict between theologians and natural philosophers: 
the soul eventually became the domain purely of theology, while natural philosophers 
developed the ‘science of mind.’ But it did not resolve the underlying problem of how to 
talk about an immaterial entity using a language developed for describing machines. It 
simply transformed the terms of that problem: the question of how the transcendental 
soul acted upon the physical body became replaced by the question of how the 
immaterial mind could arise out of fleshy matter. It still remains a central question for the 
science of mind.24 
In other words, the theological category of the soul, and the philosophical or scientific category 
of the mind (depending on one’s views), have become practically and virtually interchangeable – 
the same sorts of questions about the mind or soul plague theology and philosophy, respectively, 
though the intellectual contexts are different. It is fascinating to note the ways in which 
philosophers and theologians work constructively with the ideas of soul and mind, without 
always recognising the dangers inherent in such an equation of terms (this will be discussed in 
depth in later chapters). For example, philosopher Richard Swinburne insists that “I now consist 
of two parts – my soul (the essential part) and my body (a non-essential part), each of them 
separate substances. My physical properties are mine in virtue of belonging to my body; and 
since – given the metaphysical possibility of disembodiment in which I continue to possess pure 
mental properties – mental properties are mine in virtue of belonging to my soul.”25 Whatever 
one thinks of Swinburne’s substance dualism, it is interesting to note that for him, the mind is 
the soul and the soul is the mind. In one way, this conflation of soul and mind makes intuitive 
sense – it is difficult to imagine what the soul would be if it were not equivalent to the mind. In 
any case, I bring up this terminological issue by way of explanation: because of the ubiquitous 
conflation of soul and mind, I will bracket out “soul language” for the duration of this thesis. 
                                                            
24 Kenan Malik, Man, Beast and Zombie: What Science Can and Cannot Tell Us about Human Nature (London: 
Phoenix, 2001), 37. 
25 Richard Swinburne, Mind, Brain, and Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 170. 
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Readers can assume that arguments involving the mind or consciousness can be equally applied 
to traditional notions of the soul: namely, in regards to personal existence after death, personal 
knowledge and experience of God, and, importantly, God-mind interaction. The rationale for 
adopting the language of mind and consciousness (rather than soul language) is that this 
facilitates rigorous engagement with the philosophy of mind and the natural and cognitive 
sciences.  
 
Thus, this thesis will bracket out soul language, as well as historical excurses on human 
anthropology. Caveats aside, however, it is worth mentioning the basic tension at the heart of 
this thesis’ focus on divine action in the mind. On one hand, Christian theology has long 
assumed that the mind or soul is somehow distinct from the body. It should be noted that the 
Bible itself is anything but univocal on this point, and that while an immaterial soul may seem to 
be a basic affirmation of Christianity, there is much within the Bible to suggest a more holistic, 
unified picture of the human person: “It is a recurring misinterpretation of the Bible that it 
implies a distinction between material body and immaterial soul or spirit.”26 One theologian 
concludes that “we can say that in our times, under the influence of Biblical research, a fairly 
general consensus of opinion has arisen among theologians. They are increasingly conscious of 
the fact that the Biblical view…never loses sight of the unity of the whole man.”27 Similarly, 
biblical scholar Joel Green asserts that “the dominant view of the human person in the New 
Testament is that of ontological monism, such notions as ‘escape from the body’ or 
‘disembodied soul’ falling outside the parameters of New Testament thought.”28 At the very 
least, there is room – on biblical grounds – to deny the necessity of a disembodied soul. 
Moreover, many Christian thinkers have held more nuanced views about embodiment. For 
example, Aquinas held a complex view of the body-soul relationship; while he did affirm the 
post-death survival of a disembodied soul as a special act of God, he was also insistent that the 
soul should not be thought of as normally ontologically separate from the body – indeed, Aquinas 
thought of the soul as the form of the body.29 Biblical and theological exceptions 
                                                            
26 Leslie Stevenson, David L. Haberman, and Peter Matthews Wright, Twelve Theories of Human Nature, 6th 
ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 123.  
27 G.C. Berkouwer, Man: The Image of God, trans. Dirk Jellema, Studies in Dogmatics (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1962), 200. 
28 Joel B. Green, “‘Bodies—That is, Human Lives’: A Re-examination of Human Nature in the Bible,” in 
Whatever Happened to the Soul?: Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature, ed. Warren S. Brown, Nancey C. 
Murphy, and H. Newton Malony, Theology and the Sciences (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1998). 
29 It has been widely noted that Aquinas may be inconsistent on the question of body-soul unity or 
distinction. That is, “Aquinas retained (with dubious consistency) an element of Platonism, saying that although the 
resurrection involves re-creation of the human being as a living body, a union of body and soul, nevertheless the 
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notwithstanding, however, it is fair to say that the notion of an immaterial soul has been a 
dominant feature of Christian thinking. Many would agree with John Calvin that “indeed, from 
Scripture, we have already taught that the soul is an incorporeal substance.”30 Even in a time 
when contemporary science has clearly demonstrated the mind’s involvement with the brain-
body, Swinburne’s dualistic insistence remains prevalent: “The soul is the essential part of the 
human – what makes me me. It is the part to which the mental life of humans pertains – it is the 
soul which thinks and feels and chooses. Soul and body interact. Bodily states often cause soul 
states, and soul states often cause bodily states. This view is known as substance dualism.”31 As 
will be demonstrated in coming chapters, various versions of “soft” dualism abound which, 
while paying lip service to scientific insights on the brain-mind connection, yet insist that the 
mind is somehow more than the physical body. As mentioned, there are strong theological 
motivations for this: the immortality of the soul, intercessory prayer, personal revelation of 
God’s existence and presence, and experience of divine action might all appear dependent on the 
nonphysicality of the mind.  
 
On the other hand, theologians are becoming increasingly sensitive to the naturalising tendencies 
of the various sciences. As evidenced by the DAP’s commitment to “maximum traction,” many 
in science-and-religion (and theology more broadly) actively engage with scientific knowledge 
and, at the very least, attempt to avoid theological contradictions of scientific claims.32 When it 
comes to the human mind, this task becomes rather difficult indeed – not least because there is 
such disagreement among scientists and philosophers about the nature of consciousness. 
Granted, there is much that is agreed upon. For example, it is clear that at the very least, mental 
experiences have neural correlates in the brain. Every feeling, thought, and action at least has a 
neural correlate that corresponds to the subjective experience. This is nothing new; scientists 
have known for years that sight, personality traits, fear, anger, love, religious experience, and 
music (just to name a few) are at least accompanied by specific patterns of neural activity which 
are predictable, identifiable, and testable. Similarly, it has long been known that what happens in 
                                                            
soul has a separate existence between death and resurrection.” Stevenson, Haberman, and Wright, Twelve Theories of 
Human Nature, 158. 
30 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, translated by Ford Lewis Battles, vol. 1, 
The Library of Christian Classics (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1960), 192. 
31 Richard Swinburne, “Soul, Nature, and Immortality of the Soul,” in The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edward Craig (New York: Routledge, 2005), 982. 
32 Many in science-and-religion align themselves with one or another category from Iain Barbour’s four-
fold typology: conflict, independence, dialogue, or integration. While there exist healthy debates about 
independence, dialogue, and integration, few who are actually working in the field would adopt a conflict model. For 
more on Barbour’s influential typology, see Ian Barbour, When Science Meets Religion (London: SPCK, 2000). 
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the brain affects subjective experience. The celebrated story of Phineas Gage is still instructive, 
highlighting the fact that brain injury can have permanent and dramatic effects on one’s speech, 
emotions, and even personality.33 In fact, the correlations and even causal effects between brain 
activity and mental experience are becoming so well-studied and identifiable that many 
philosophers and scientists suggest that mere correlation does not accurately describe the 
relationship between brain and mind. Some would go so far as to agree with physicist and 
biologist Francis Crick that “‘You,’ your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your 
ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will are in fact no more than the behaviour of 
a vast assembly of nerve cells… As Lewis Carroll’s Alice might have phrased it: ‘You’re nothing 
but a pack of neurons.’”34  
 
This quote from Crick represents the most militantly reductionist school of thought when it 
comes to the mind, and there are many philosophers, theologians, and even scientists who would 
disagree with him. These critics would argue that the various brain sciences are exceedingly good 
at identifying correlations between brain activity and the mind, but that correlation does not 
equal causation. All of this will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, but the important point here is 
that there exists a good deal of disagreement about consciousness even outside of science-and-
religion. Not a small part of this disagreement involves the question of whether consciousness 
itself is a philosophical or scientific problem. The upshot of such scholarly disagreement is that 
science-and-religion has not often been pushed or motivated to work constructively with 
physicalist perspectives on the mind. Indeed, the lack of consensus on what consciousness is 
seems to give theologians license to affirm views that amount to a soft dualism, recognising at 
least nominal dependence of the mind on the brain while still insisting on a mental “something 
more.” My argument throughout this thesis will be that there are theological resources and 
frameworks available that not only warrant the acceptance of physicalist approaches to the mind, 
but also serve to problematise views that link divine-human interaction with a nonphysical mind.  
 
                                                            
33 Phineas Gage was a 19th century railroad worker who experienced traumatic brain injury when a steel rod 
was driven through his skull, destroying a significant portion of his left frontal lobe. While Gage survived the 
accident and retained his cognitive abilities, his personality and character were reportedly altered to a high degree. 
See Stuart Butler, “Gage, Phineas,” in The Oxford Companion to the Mind, ed. Richard L. Gregory (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), accessed 6 June, 2017, http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/ 
9780198662242.001.00 01/ acref-9780198662242-e-359.  
34 Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul (New York: Touchstone, 1994), 3. 
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1.4 Context: The Theological Turn and Theistic Naturalism 
As stated, much of this thesis is deconstructive in nature: my goal, in part, is to critique the 
version of the causal joint thesis that locates divine action in the nonphysical mind. This 
deflationary aim challenges not only the standard causal joint model, but also the theological 
tendency to affirm the mind as nonphysical or somehow “more than” the body. I would even 
suggest that the thesis’ most significant contribution to the field lies in its affirmation that 
physicalist explanations for the mind can be theologically affirmed. However, achieving this goal 
(of undermining causal joint models and theologically affirming the physicality of the mind) is 
dependent on a more constructive argument involving what I call the “theological turn” in 
science-and-religion. The theological turn, as I will define it, can be taken to indicate the trend in 
divine action theology that eschews causal joint models altogether, instead reframing divine 
action and, indeed, nature itself, in theological, metaphysical frameworks. As will become clear, 
representatives of the theological turn argue that only by questioning the metaphysical 
assumptions undergirding standard models of divine action can a theologically adequate, 
compatibilist model of divine action be developed. The reverse is also true: only by embracing a 
more theologically robust model of the God-nature relationship can standard causal joint models 
be rendered theologically unnecessary. In short, the theological turn (and, in particular, a robust 
theistic naturalism) may provide much-needed alternatives to scientifically implausible and 
theologically insufficient causal joint models.  
 
The theological turn in science-and-religion, and particularly in divine action theology, is perhaps 
best described as a reaction to the metaphysical assumptions implicit in standard 
noninterventionist, incompatibilist causal joint models. As will be discussed in the next chapter, 
the standard causal joint approach presumes that nature is, by default, autonomous and self-
sufficient apart from God’s ongoing, active presence. Similarly, the laws of nature are generally 
treated as having prescriptive, ontological status, which in turn establishes the parameters within 
which divine action might lawfully occur. Within this presumption of autonomy, divine action 
from the “outside,” as it were, is almost inevitably viewed as aberrant and in need of justification: 
“It is as if for God to act in the world, something in the world has to move over to make room 
for God to act.”35 It is almost as if God and natural processes are competing with each other, 
and God is only able to act within specific undetermined natural processes. The clear assumption 
                                                            
35 Andrew Porter, By the Waters of Naturalism: Theology Perplexed Among the Sciences (Eugene, OR: Wipf and 
Stock Publishers, 2001), 2. 
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in the standard causal joint model is that the sciences are the final arbiters not only of what is 
true about nature, but of what God can do in nature. This common assumption in science-and-
religion has led to all the various ways that scholars have sought to harmonise theological 
affirmations with scientific knowledge; the expectation is that one must not “question the 
‘science’ side of the conversation, and in particular, one not ruin the party by calling into 
question the governing naturalistic assumptions of science.”36 For their part, of course, causal 
joint theorists would argue that they are merely attempting to take scientific knowledge seriously 
and to recognise empirical knowledge as God-given and to be respected when one develops, say, 
a theory of divine action. After all, seeking traction on such issues as divine action would seem to 
be the raison d'être of the science-and-religion field, and “to argue that God works against the 
laws of nature, or suspends them temporarily, would make the concept of God inconsistent.”37 
Asserting that God acts in a way that seems at odds with the laws of nature, then, would seem to 
undermine much of what the field is about. Causal joint theorists would thus assert that they are 
acting in good faith when they require divine action to conform to scientific knowledge. A more 
generous assessment would be that causal joint theorists are trusting that scientific knowledge is 
from God; therefore, divine action must not contradict what has been revealed by the “book of 
nature.”  
 
In any case, standard divine action theorists attempt to affirm SDA and scientific knowledge at 
the same time; philosopher Taede Smedes asserts that “contrary to what we might expect, the 
context in which the contemporary dialogue takes place is very much determined by scientistic 
presuppositions.”38 It is perhaps ironic, then, that those in the theological turn dismiss these 
theories as both theologically insufficient and scientifically implausible. Indeed, the theological 
turn is marked by the assertion that causal joint theories are entirely wrongheaded, and that 
standard divine action theorists are seeking scientific answers to theological questions. In other 
words, the theological turn is just that movement within science-and-religion that seeks to 
recognise the boundaries of scientific knowledge and reframe both nature and divine action in 
explicitly theological terms. The theological turn challenges the notion that nature’s default state 
is devoid of divine action, and its advocates would agree with theologian and philosopher 
Aubrey Moore that “a theory of occasional intervention implies as its correlative a theory of 
                                                            
36 James K. A. Smith, Thinking in Tongues: Pentecostal Contributions to Christian Philosophy, Pentecostal 
Manifestos (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 87.  
37 Taede Smedes, “Beyond Barbour or Back to Basics? The Future of Science-and-Religion and the 
Question for Unity,” Zygon 43, no. 1 (2008): 243.  
38 Smedes, “Beyond Barbour,” 253.  
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ordinary absence.”39 Indeed, while causal joint theorists debate interventionism and 
noninterventionism, both of these models presuppose the God-world model in which nature’s 
norm excludes divine activity. The theological turn, however, urges a re-examination of nature 
itself, such that “the ontology of divine action determines the understanding of the laws of 
nature, rather than the other way around.”40 In other words, the theological turn urges an 
approach to divine action in which both God’s activity and the natural world are defined 
theologically, rather than scientifically – science itself cannot define the basic ontology of nature, 
nor can it define the basic God-nature relationship.  
 
Among those in the theological turn who would critique the standard approach to divine action, 
some have begun to constructively and explicitly articulate theological models that purport to 
affirm both scientific knowledge and a robust account of divine action. I will call these 
theological models “theistic naturalisms,” as they purport to give a fuller definition of the natural 
world than does scientistic naturalism as generally understood.41 It is important to note that 
theistic naturalism, as I will use it here, is not to be confused with more deistic forms of religious 
naturalism that render divine action as subjective experience of otherwise scientifically 
explainable processes. Rather, theistic naturalism is here taken to indicate a position that affirms 
the natural world as being always involved with an immanent, active God: to be natural is to 
participate in God’s active presence. As Orthodox theologian Christopher C. Knight argues, the 
“naturalism” part of theistic naturalism works only if it is understood as being related to 
ontology (rather than an epistemology based on current scientific knowledge), which is “far more 
complex than the kind of picture favored by most who think of themselves as naturalists….What 
they call naturalism is…in fact no more than subnaturalism.”42 Indeed, “true naturalism must go 
well beyond what a subnaturalism of this kind is able to say…Only in the context of what has 
been revealed to us by God can the universe in which we live be fully understood.”43 Within 
theistic naturalism, broadly defined, nature itself can only be fully known when an account is 
                                                            
39 Aubrey Moore, Science and Faith (London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, and Co., 1889), 73. Though causal joint 
theorists do not explicitly endorse the sort of intervention envisioned by Moore, the noninterventionist model itself 
does presume the same quasi-deistic metaphysic as interventionism (this will be discussed in later chapters).  
40 Niels Henrik Gregersen, “Special Divine Action and the Quilt of Laws,” in Scientific Perspectives on Divine 
Action: Twenty Years of Challenge and Progress, eds. Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, and William R. Stoeger, S. J. 
(Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory Publications, 2008), 194. 
41 By “scientistic,” I indicate the position affirming empirical scientific methodology and practice as the 
prime, or even only, guide to reality.  
42 Christopher C. Knight, The God of Nature: Incarnation and Contemporary Science, Theology and the Sciences 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2007), 95. 
43 Knight, The God of Nature, 95. 
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given of the God-nature relationship – including, importantly, divine action. Within theistic 
naturalism, divine action is seen not as unnatural or unlawful, but as serving to make nature even 
more natural, at least in the sense of becoming more like what God has intended it to be. It is 
apparent, then, that while theistic naturalism incorporates the whole of scientific knowledge into 
its ontological picture, it draws on specific theological frameworks to understand nature and 
God’s action in nature.  
 
While there are potentially a great many different versions of theistic naturalism (as I understand 
it44), Part Two of this thesis will focus on three distinct theological versions of theistic 
naturalism, particularly as they relate to divine action in the mind. These three theological models 
involve Thomistic theistic naturalism (Chapter 7), panentheistic naturalism (Chapter 8), and 
pneumatological naturalism (Chapter 9), respectively. My goal is not to argue for one specific 
model of theistic naturalist divine action, but to demonstrate the strengths, weaknesses, and 
commonalities of these non-causal joint approaches to divine action in the mind. Namely, all 
three models reject the metaphysical premises on which the standard causal joint model is based, 
argue for a compatibilist account of divine action, and insist that physicality is utterly 
unthreatening to theology and divine action. In fact, by insisting that all physical realities are 
always and already involved and interacting with God, these theistic naturalisms are well-poised 
to embrace naturalistic accounts of the human mind. Within these models, the physicality of the 
mind is not threatening, for the immanent God is fundamentally involved with all physical 
processes to begin with. Expounding upon this meaning of “involved” will be the major task of 
Part Two of this thesis. While I will argue that theistic naturalisms do indeed face serious 
challenges (namely regarding their potential lack of real engagement with the natural sciences), I 
yet suggest that they represent a more promising direction for divine action theology than that 
offered by the dominant causal joint approach.  
 
1.5 Scope and Importance 
In sum, then, this thesis identifies and addresses a particular problem in science-and-religion’s 
dominant approach to divine action in the mind. Namely, causal joint approaches in general, and 
proposals dependent on a nonphysical, uniquely spiritual mind in particular, are both 
                                                            
44 Past and present usages of the term “theistic naturalism” will be discussed in Part 2.  
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scientifically implausible and theologically inadequate. This thesis critiques the standard model of 
divine action by applying rigorous scientific and theological scrutiny to the particular divine 
action model privileging the mind as uniquely nonphysical. In addition, the thesis explores and 
critiques various models of theistic naturalism, which promise to offer theological frameworks 
that actually welcome the physicalisation of the mind – precisely because all physical processes 
are involved with God’s active presence in the first place. This thesis’ goals can thus be 
conceptualised in the following research questions: 
1) Regarding the version of the causal joint model that locates divine action in the 
nonphysical mind: To what extent is this model scientifically plausible and theologically 
adequate? 
2) To what extent does theistic naturalism instead offer a theologically robust account of 
divine action in the naturalised mind?  
Thus, this thesis’ contribution to the science-and-religion field is twofold: 1) It applies much-
needed critique to the version of the causal joint model that privileges the mind as uniquely 
spiritual, and 2) It offers a more constructive approach to divine action in the mind by suggesting 
theistic naturalism as a theologically robust and scientifically acceptable model.  
 
Given the inherently interdisciplinary and potentially wide-ranging nature of this science-and-
religion thesis, I have had to be exceedingly selective in the topics addressed. As mentioned, very 
little attention is paid to the history of the philosophical, theological, and scientific ideas with 
which this thesis deals. This is of course regrettable, but the widely available scholarship on such 
histories would render its inclusion here unnecessary and potentially distracting. Additionally, it is 
readily apparent that a great many theologians and philosophers have been excluded from the 
scope of this thesis, particularly in the more constructive chapters of Part Two. Again, this is 
regrettable, but my hope is that sustained attention to the selected theological paradigms will be 
more helpful and demonstrative of my argument than would a cursory overview of a wider 
selection. Finally, one potential critique of this thesis is that it attempts to deal with a broad range 
of issues (e.g., divine action, consciousness, theistic naturalism), thus jeopardising the intellectual 
rigour necessary for such a work. While I have been continually aware of this danger, I maintain 
that my specific argument is inherently multifaceted, requiring a tightly-woven structure that 
involves several important threads. I have found that these various subject threads are each 
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necessary to my larger argument, and have thus attempted to be as comprehensive as possible in 
my treatment of each, given the space constraints of this project.  
 
1.6 Outline and Methodology 
This thesis is divided into two parts. The purpose of Part One is to offer a sustained critique of 
the mind-based causal joint approach to divine action. To this end, Chapter 2 examines what I 
call the “standard” causal joint model, with particular focus on three debates shaping the divine 
action conversation: interventionism/noninterventionism, compatibilism/incompatibilism, and 
prescriptive/descriptive laws of nature. The goal of this chapter is to highlight the metaphysical 
presuppositions underlying prominent divine action models, as well as the scientific 
implausibility of such models. Chapter 3 then examines Philip Clayton’s emergent mind 
proposal, which uses emergence theory to locate and constrain divine action in the uniquely 
nonphysical human mind. I argue that Clayton’s proposal is not only scientifically implausible, 
but also presupposes the same dubious presuppositions examined in Chapter 2. Chapter 4 then 
goes further into the philosophy of mind, examining and critiquing the so-called “Hard Problem 
of Consciousness.” Chapter 5 continues this sustained analysis of the mind, examining 
physicalist approaches to consciousness that, at the very least, offer alternatives to pessimistic 
conclusions about the mind’s supposed inexplicability. Overall, Part One argues that causal joint 
proposals privileging the mind are scientifically implausible, relying on unnecessary philosophical 
and theological assumptions about consciousness and the God-nature model, respectively. In 
other words, Part One uses consciousness as a test case demonstrating the insufficiency of 
standard divine action models, arguing that the mind is neither uniquely nonphysical nor 
uniquely open to divine action.  
 
Part Two of this thesis is intended to be more constructive than Part One. While Part One 
challenges Clayton’s emergent mind proposal, the Hard Problem of Consciousness, and the 
apparent necessity of a nonphysical mind more generally, Part Two explores more constructive 
ways to think about divine action in the mind. Specifically, Part Two argues that the mind need 
not be uniquely nonphysical in order for one to develop a robust account of divine action in 
human consciousness. In other words, Part Two provides a theological rebuttal to the approach 
that would privilege the human mind as uniquely open to divine action: precisely because all 
nature is inherently involved with God’s active presence, one can affirm divine action in a far 
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more expansive way than suggested by the standard model critiqued in Part One. While Part 
One challenges both the Hard Problem of Consciousness and noninterventionist, incompatibilist 
models of divine action, Part Two provides a theological argument that this naturalisation of the 
mind need not be theologically threatening. Indeed, the mind may, after all, be a site of 
particularly intense divine action, but for very different reasons than those assumed by Clayton 
and other nonphysicalists – and not to the exclusion of divine action elsewhere in nature. 
To this end, Chapter 6 introduces the complicated subject of naturalism, highlighting the various 
arguments surrounding naturalism, supernaturalism, physicalism, and the boundaries of science. 
This philosophical analysis sets the stage for Chapters 7-9, which move the discussion of 
naturalism into explicitly theological territory. These chapters form a three-part exploration of 
specific forms of theistic naturalism, identifying relative strengths, weaknesses, and 
commonalities. Chapter 7 discusses Thomistic divine action, suggesting that while it is essentially 
the “gold standard” of theistic naturalist divine action, its formulation of double agency is 
problematic. Chapter 8 highlights the panentheistic naturalism of Christopher C. Knight, which 
uses an Eastern Orthodox framework to emphasise both God’s immanence and the possibility 
of divine action through atemporal laws of nature. Chapter 9 then engages with pneumatological 
naturalism, an approach insisting that nature is what it is by virtue of the Spirit’s involvement in 
all of nature at all times. Throughout these three chapters, I also suggest ways in which theistic 
naturalism does indeed suggest the mind as a particularly vital locus of divine action, but for very 
different reasons that those assumed by causal joint theorists.  
 
In sum, this thesis challenges Saunders’ claim that contemporary theology (and, particularly, 
divine action theology) is in crisis. While the standard model of recent decades has been 
unsuccessful both theologically and scientifically, specific theological traditions offer rich 
resources with which to reframe divine action in an explicitly theological model. Such models do 
not require that the mind be more than physical in order to allow for divine-human interaction, 
for the physical itself is not unspiritual. By re-examining the concept of nature itself, science-and-
religion is freed up to become audacious in its acceptance of physicality – not in a way that 
explains away or minimises divine action, but in a way that actually allows for a more robust 




Contemporary Divine Action Theories and the Causal Joint 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In Chapter One, I introduced Nicholas Saunders’ claim that insofar as it requires an affirmation 
of ongoing divine action, Christian theology is in a “state of crisis.” On the one hand, 
contemporary science has arguably proved to be the most successful knowledge-seeking 
endeavour in human history. Scientists consistently offer increasingly nuanced explanations for 
phenomena previously considered to be inherently mysterious or even spiritual. For many, 
science is even considered the final arbiter of all truth claims about reality. At the very least, it is 
increasingly difficult and arguably unwarranted to make theological claims running contrary to 
the body of knowledge developed by the natural and social sciences. Christian theology is 
committed to certain doctrinal affirmations that may not always appear consistent, or at least 
demonstrable, with current scientific knowledge. This is perhaps most true in the case of divine 
action: the more that scientists learn about the laws of nature and physical mechanisms, the more 
difficult it becomes – for many – to affirm that God actually does things in the natural world. On 
the other hand, however, a robust Christian theology requires an account of God’s personal, 
continual interaction with not only human persons, but the whole of nature. A theological retreat 
into deism is an unsatisfactory response to scientific knowledge, insofar as it abandons much of 
what Christian theism has traditionally valued. As introduced in the previous chapter, this has led 
many in the science-and-religion field to seek ways of affirming both scientific knowledge and 
theological claims of divine action.  
 
In recent years, the focus of this traction-seeking endeavour has often been human 
consciousness. For scholars such as Philip Clayton, the human mind is considered to be 
ontologically open to divine influence, and underdetermined by physical processes. This is an 
immensely appealing proposal for science-and-religion theorists wishing to marry divine action 
theology with scientific knowledge; if the mind is ontologically open to supernatural influence, 
then we might be able to have the best of both worlds. While the specifics of Clayton’s divine 
action proposal will be examined in the next chapter, it is worth flagging up this proposal here as 
an example of what is likely the most common way of dealing with the problem of divine action: 
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appropriating poorly understood or seemingly underdetermined areas of the natural world as 
causal joints between God and the natural world.1 The causal joint has become somewhat 
infamous in science-and-religion (for reasons that will become clear), but it is a useful lens 
through which to examine and compare various divine action theories and, I suggest, a necessary 
problem to address in any approach to divine agency. Essentially, the causal joint is that 
theoretical nexus at which divine intentions meet natural processes to bring about specific 
events. If God is transcendent and independent of physical processes, then any action within the 
natural world must necessarily involve some form of interaction between created and uncreated 
realities. If nothing else, the causal joint is a useful way to understand various divine action 
theologies, whether or not individual scholars themselves would consider their respective models 
to be causal joint theories, as such.  
 
In this chapter, then, I will use the causal joint as a lens through which to understand the 
contemporary divine action scene in recent decades. I suggest that the contemporary divine 
action discussion is largely framed by three intersecting debates: interventionism versus 
noninterventionism, prescriptive versus descriptive interpretations of the laws of nature, and 
compatibilism versus incompatibilism. By examining what is at stake in each of these debates, 
one can begin to understand how the divine action debate is often framed by implicit 
metaphysical assumptions about the God-nature relationship. In particular, I argue here that 
standard divine action theories strive to be noninterventionist, are basically incompatibilist, and 
often involve a rather confused commitment to the laws of nature. This has rendered the 
standard approach to divine action as one seeking underdetermined causal joints in which God is 
“allowed” to act without contradicting Godself. In this view, Clayton’s emergentist divine action 
proposal (which privileges the mind as especially underdetermined) can be viewed as the latest 
iteration of the causal joint model. After exploring these three divine action debates, I discuss the 
classic test case of quantum divine action as an approach highlighting these three debates. After 
demonstrating the scientific insufficiencies of standard causal joint models, I highlight the 
metaphysical assumptions framing the debates in the first place. In particular, I argue that 
standard divine action theories depend on highly questionable, question-begging assumptions 
about the basic God-nature model, and are dependent on a tenuous theological commitment to a 
somewhat deistic model of God. Alternatives to these metaphysical assumptions will be 
                                                            
1 Although, as will be discussed in the next chapter, Clayton himself does not agree that he is relying on a 
“God-of-the-gaps” approach, but rather argues that his model is an extrapolation of scientifically-identifiable 
emergent processes.  
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examined in Part Two of this thesis; in this chapter, I lay the necessary groundwork by 
examining the reigning debates and uncovering the metaphysical assumptions framing the 
debates themselves. Then, in the next chapter, I demonstrate how Clayton’s model in particular 
is the latest version of the standard model critiqued here. This chapter is thus meant as an 
overview of the standard causal joint scene, and an introduction to the theological weaknesses 
that will be addressed throughout the rest of this thesis. 
 
2.2 Standard Approaches to Divine Action: Three Debates 
The science-and-religion conversation on divine action has often been focussed on the search 
for scientifically plausible causal joints in underdetermined areas of the natural world. In 
particular, theorists have targeted the areas of chaos theory, quantum mechanics, emergence 
theory, and complexity theory; the supposition has often been that such natural features involve 
ontological points of indeterminism wherein God might act without violating the laws of nature 
that God presumably established in the first place. At the heart of this divine action discussion 
has been the so-called Divine Action Project, as mentioned in Chapter 1. Its goal was to 
investigate the question of how, exactly, a transcendent God might interact with physical 
processes to bring about specific actions in the natural world – in other words, this was very 
much a causal joint project. Because of the sheer number and diversity of prominent 
contributors to the DAP, as well as its length and academic output, it is unsurprising that the 
DAP has largely defined the trajectory and parameters (philosophical, metaphysical, and 
methodological) of the divine action conversation – and perhaps the science-and-religion field 
more broadly.  
 
The DAP was optimistic in both tone and content, endeavouring to positively address concerns 
about the future of divine action theology. The idea was to evaluate specific possible points of 
contact between divine intention and the natural world, drawing upon the expertise of leaders in 
the fields involved. While there were many theological, scientific, and philosophical debates 
involved, something of a consensus approach to divine action gained prominence over time. 
This consensus approach, I suggest, is best understood in reference to three key debates: 
interventionism versus noninterventionism, the laws of nature, and compatibilism versus 
incompatibilism. As I will argue, the DAP both implicitly and explicitly sided with a 
noninterventionist, incompatibilist approach to divine action, and assumed something of a 
42 
 
reified view of the laws of nature (more on this below). Wesley Wildman affirms that many 
participants in the DAP were convinced that God would only act in a way that preserved 
“created structures of order,” and affirmed that “a noninterventionist special divine act is in 
accord with created structures of order and regularity within nature, while an interventionist 
special divine act involves abrogating, suspending, or ignoring created structures of regularity 
within nature.”2 What is striking in this consensus approach, and which will be discussed further 
below, is how these affirmations presume certain metaphysical assumptions about the laws of 
nature, the question of intervention, and the God-world relationship more broadly. Given that 
the DAP has been so influential in shaping divine action theories, it is important to understand 
and evaluate the three debates underlying the DAP’s consensus.3  
 
2.2.1 Interventionist versus Noninterventionist Divine Action 
Does God intervene in the laws of nature to act specifically in the natural world? While I will 
argue throughout this thesis that this question is ill-conceived and incorrectly framed, it remains 
one of the standard questions asked in divine action debates. In fact, this question of 
interventionism is something of a starting point for divine action debates, and one’s position 
here largely determines one’s position on the causal joint and divine action more broadly. 
Namely, a commitment to noninterventionist divine action commits one to the existence of a 
causal joint, and generally limits affirmations of divine action to identifiable areas of physical 
underdetermination. In other words, noninterventionism implies that divine actions are so 
aligned with physical processes that theoretically they could have occurred whether or not God 
was involved – they do not imply a violation of the laws of nature. It is worth noting, however, 
that it is misleading to call any divine action “noninterventionist,” insofar as the fact of divine 
action introduces a reality that would have been otherwise if God had not engaged in that action. 
Christopher Knight explains this well: “The mainstream ‘noninterventionist’ model has not, 
then, abandoned interventionism in the widest sense of the term…it is still presumed that there 
are two possible outcomes to any given situation.”4 While this may seem like a minor semantic 
                                                            
2 Wildman, “The Divine Action Project,” 38.  
3 The DAP’s consensus was not universal. There are notable exceptions to every generalisation articulated 
by Wildman and myself, respectively. Indeed, Section 2 will elaborate on some of the alternative voices in the DAP 
– namely, those that questioned the noninterventionist paradigm, queried an ontological understanding of the laws 
of nature, urged a compatibilist approach, or offered alternative models of God (e.g. panentheism). And, of course, 
the DAP does not represent all science-and-religion scholars; I highlight this project because of its immense 
influence on the divine action conversation in particular.  




point, it is important to recognise that we do not simply choose between scientifically plausible 
noninterventionist divine action on one hand, and blatantly unscientific interventionist divine 
action on the other. This is an issue of mechanism and degree, rather than an 
interventionism/noninterventionism binary.  
 
In any case, the question of intervention is pressing indeed; contemporary science has been so 
remarkably successful in providing natural explanations that one might wonder whether theists 
are warranted in affirming divine actions that seem to violate known laws of nature or what is 
commonly known as the “causal closure principle.” The causal closure principle, put simply, is 
the idea that all physical events have physical causes; put conversely, no nonphysical causes can 
cause events in the natural world. This will be discussed further, but here it can be said that at 
the very least, the causal closure principle is a methodological assumption for working scientists 
– and at most a metaphysical premise about what sorts of things are possible in the world. While 
most theologians reject metaphysical naturalism,5 methodological naturalism and the causal 
closure principle are crucial to the actual practice of science; science works only because it looks 
beyond apparent mysteries and insists upon continual theorising and testing until satisfactory 
natural explanations are available. If nothing else, scientists must at least treat all phenomena as if 
they have natural causes. Because of the efficacy of scientific methodology, it is worth 
questioning whether it makes theological sense to speak of God intervening in the known laws 
of nature. Not only might such intervention undermine scientific efficacy, but it might also be an 
inadequate response to the most successful knowledge-seeking enterprise known to humanity. 
Because of this, those in the science-and-religion field express a commitment to scientific 
knowledge as a necessary aspect of their theological reasoning – if we know that physical 
processes predictably and reliably work in a certain manner according to physical laws, does it 
make sense to promote an account of divine agency that undermines those laws of nature? A 
great many divine action theorists (including those in the DAP) would affirm Clayton’s 
“presumption of naturalism” when examining any phenomenon, dismissing interventionism as a 
theologically viable option.6 
 
                                                            
5 Nonstandard Christian models of God, such as panentheism, may allow for affirmations of metaphysical 
naturalism. See Part 2 for more on this.  
6 Philip Clayton, God and Contemporary Science, Edinburgh Studies in Constructive Theology (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1997), 171. 
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Related to these concerns regarding consistency with scientific knowledge, many divine action 
theorists have theological qualms with interventionism as well. Namely, many hesitate to affirm a 
theory of divine action that would seemingly position God in competition with the physical 
systems and laws that God established in the first place. As Smedes explains this concern:  
To argue that God works against the laws of nature, or suspends them 
temporarily, would make the concept of God inconsistent. If in general 
providence God acted continuously through the nexus of secondary causality in 
accord with the laws of nature, and if at the same time God worked against these 
laws by putting them temporarily out of order, the action would be internally 
inconsistent: God’s special action would work against God’s general action.7  
 
This, in a nutshell, is the main theological concern with interventionism. Within science-and-
religion and the DAP more specifically, it is rare for a scholar to defend interventionist divine 
action (exceptions will be noted below). The prevailing consensus in the field is that if God acts 
in nature, it must not be in opposition to the natural order established by God in Creation; 
interventionism would seem (at least on the face of it), to violate the internal coherence and 
consistency of a theistic God. Here it is important to note a crucial distinction Smedes makes in 
regards to two modes of divine action: general and special. He and most others in the field 
equate general divine action with God’s establishment and upholding of the laws of nature. Few 
would take issue with this mode of divine agency, as it is basically a deistic conception of action 
– God created the laws of nature, and is indirectly acting by faithfully preserving these laws.8 In 
addition to this minimalist mode of divine action is special divine action, or the affirmation that 
God performs specific actions to address specific situations. SDA is generally considered to be a 
different sort of divine action than GDA, and is certainly seen as more threatening to a scientific 
worldview. Perhaps surprisingly, these distinctions between SDA and GDA are generally 
assumed, and challenged only infrequently. Thus, it is helpful for our discussion of the causal 
joint and divine action to examine GDA and SDA a bit more closely. 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, within science-and-religion divine action is usually thought of 
in three categories: general divine action, special divine action, and miracles.9 GDA affirms that 
                                                            
7 Smedes, “Beyond Barbour,” 243. 
8 As will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 (namely in discussion with the work of Christopher Knight), 
some scholars deny that GDA is an insufficient description of all theistic divine action.   
9 Notably, the focus in recent decades has been conspicuously on GDA and SDA; for the most part, 
miracles were partitioned off from the stated research purview of DAP participants. Because miracles are often 
defined from the outset as occurring outside of the laws of nature (neither in accordance with or in contradiction to 
these laws), they have been largely ignored by causal joint projects seeking to align divine action theology with the 
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God is somehow behind or responsible for the physical regularities that sustain the natural 
universe and allow creation to flourish. Because GDA does not involve God acting specifically in 
nature, or in contradiction to “the way things would have been otherwise,” it is basically the case 
that science could never disprove GDA. That is, almost by definition, it would be impossible to 
prove that God was not sustaining the laws of nature. GDA simply affirms God as the source 
and sustainer of the law-governed world – hence GDA is the sort of divine action affirmed by 
deists. Thus, GDA is essentially a theological restatement of the laws of nature (as they are 
understood by contemporary science at any given time), and is often considered a relatively 
“safe” affirmation in science-and-religion. Moreover, those affirming GDA generally deny the 
need for a causal joint; because God simply creates and sustains physical laws and does not 
interact with them in “real time,” there is no need to posit a specific mechanism by which God 
acts especially within the natural world.10  
 
What most theorists mean by divine action, however, is special divine action, or intentional, 
specific, and responsive divine action that presumably departs from the “default” scenario of 
what would have occurred had God not chosen to act at a given moment. It is fair to say that 
SDA has been the main focus of divine action theories in recent decades (again, exceptions to 
this will be discussed below). Importantly, SDA is not to be conflated with miracles, which 
generally have been assigned a separate category in science-and-religion. This seems largely to be 
due to the Humean definition of miracles as violations of the laws of nature – there simply has 
not been much of an appetite in the field for rigorous discussions of a category of divine action 
that ignores science altogether.11 Rather, SDA generally refers to divine action occurring in and 
through natural processes, but in response to specific circumstances (contrary to GDA). Because 
SDA is thought to occur via natural processes, and not in contradiction to them (contrary to 
miracles), SDA requires some sort of causal joint wherein this influence might occur. Thus, the 
particular focus of the DAP was the development of proposals utilising specific, 
underdetermined areas of the natural world where God could effect change without violating the 
laws of nature. This focus stems from a dual commitment to both scientific knowledge of 
physical processes, and theological affirmations of divine action. There is thus a great deal of 
                                                            
known laws of science. Hence, miracles as such will not be discussed here – though Part 2 will question whether the 
distinctions between GDA, SDA, and miracles are necessary.   
10 However, one could argue that even GDA requires some sort of causal joint: How, exactly, does God 
sustain the laws of nature? What is the relationship between God and the basic “stuff” of the world? It seems that 
any contact between a transcendent God and the finite world must necessarily involve some sort of ontological 
relationship between the two. 
11 Wildman, “The Divine Action Project,” 38. 
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motivation to identify scientifically plausible causal joints, as this allows one to have the best of 
both worlds – credibility in both science and theology. To put this clearly: the language of SDA 
is utilised by those committed to noninterventionist divine action, and is accompanied by the 
need for specific, underdetermined causal joints. Note the implication of this – SDA theorists 
assume that science has the power to determine the purview of divine agency and the mechanisms 
by which it might occur. The noninterventionist SDA framework implicitly acknowledges 
science as the final arbiter of where and how God can interact with creation. As we will see 
below, this implicit assumption is actually a necessary conclusion of the arguable way 
noninterventionism is framed in the first place. Indeed, the distinctions between GDA, SDA, 
and miracles will be challenged throughout this thesis as potentially arbitrary and/or unnecessary. 
Meanwhile, the main idea here is to highlight that these distinctions are necessarily involved with 
noninterventionist commitments.  
 
Indeed, there is a direct relationship between SDA, the causal joint, and noninterventionism. 
Noninterventionist SDA theorists attempt to find scientifically plausible areas of nature (i.e., 
causal joints) wherein God can act without violating the laws of nature. It is evident that this 
approach privileges scientific knowledge and requires divine action to be at least congruent with 
the known laws of nature; this essentially renders the sciences as “objective arbiters of ‘the way 
things really are.’”12 It is helpful to make these relationships clearer: once one prioritises scientific 
knowledge, it is but a short step to a commitment to noninterventionism. Once 
noninterventionist divine action is affirmed, one is at least committed to the existence of a causal 
joint where God can act without intervening – whether or not this causal joint is identifiable. In 
other words, if one begins with a commitment to a noninterventionist framework, the only 
option left for an affirmation of divine action is to posit SDA through natural processes 
themselves. For DAP participants and those influenced by the Project, the goal has been to 
affirm divine action by hypothesising about the specifics of this causal joint. Another way of 
stating this logical progression is from the scientific side of things: scientists are methodologically 
committed to the causal closure principle, affirming that all physical events have physical causes. 
By prioritising scientific knowledge in divine action theologies, theorists are committing 
themselves to a form of divine action that does not violate the causal closure principle. Thus, if 
God is to act in a noninterventionist manner, this agency must be effected at a physical level 
                                                            
12 James K. A. Smith, “Is the Universe Open for Surprise? Pentecostal Ontology and the Spirit of 
Naturalism,” Zygon 43, no. 4 (2008): 885. 
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where events are ontologically underdetermined by prior physical causes. Then, one might argue, 
God can fill this causal vacuum and act, leaving the causal closure principle intact.  
 
It is evident that noninterventionism commits one to the existence of a scientifically plausible 
causal joint, and DAP participants (and those influenced by them) have put forward a variety of 
potential candidates: emergence, complexity, chaos theory, and quantum mechanics, to name 
several of the most popular options. Later in this chapter, I examine the quantum mechanics 
proposal in particular, as a representative test case of how such causal joint theories work (or do 
not work, as may be the case). What all these causal joint candidates have in common, however, is 
that their respective proponents emphasise that they are ontologically underdetermined aspects 
of nature – thus leaving causal room for God to act. Note that such theories assume that science 
itself is able to locate potential loci of divine action. This is an extremely important point: 
noninterventionist SDA theories give science significant theological authority, insofar as science 
is given the power to say where and how divine action can or cannot occur. While SDA theorists 
seek traction with science in an effort to be intellectually honest and scientifically plausible, they 
also give science the power to say where SDA is not a possibility. As will be discussed in Chapter 
3, emergence theorists have been critiqued for invoking God in high-level downward causation; 
physicist and theologian John Polkinghorne’s appropriation of chaos theory has been largely 
undermined as a misconstrual of the relevant physical processes;13 and (as we will see shortly) 
quantum mechanics proposals have been often rejected as scientifically implausible and even 
interventionist. In other words, a commitment to noninterventionist divine action renders 
theologians subject to current scientific knowledge, inviting the charge that they are committing 
the dreaded error of “God of the gaps” theorising. There is more than a hint of irony in 
noninterventionist positions: SDA theorists generally defend a strong theological affirmation of 
traditional theistic notions of divine activity in the world, but do this by making current science 
the final determinant of whether and how this activity actually occurs. Indeed, by identifying 
specific causal joints in the natural world, SDA theorists become vulnerable to the ever-
increasing specificity of scientific explanations. As mathematician and religious writer Charles 
Coulson once wrote, “There is no “God of the gaps” to take over at those strategic places where 
science fails; and the reason is that gaps of this sort have the unpreventable habit of shrinking.”14 
                                                            
13 For example, see Taede Smedes, “Chaos: Where Science and Religion Meet? A Critical Evaluation of the 
Use of Chaos Theory in Theology,” in Studies in Science & Theology 8: Yearbook of the European Society for the Study of 
Science and Theology 2001-2002, ed. Niels Henrik Gregersen, Ulf Görman, and Hubert Meisinger, 277-294. Aarhus, 
Denmark: University of Aarhus, 2002. 
14 Charles A. Coulson, Science and the Idea of God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), 32. 
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By identifying specific causal joints for SDA, noninterventionists are essentially betting that 
processes currently deemed ontologically underdetermined will not be explained otherwise by 
future scientific analysis.15  
 
While noninterventionism has certainly been the position of choice for divine action theorists, 
interventionist divine action is not without its proponents. For example, philosopher Alvin 
Plantinga argues for interventionist divine action, pointing out that noninterventionist positions 
rely on underlying assumptions about how the world must work. Plantinga rejects the causal 
closure principle, pointing out that it is an assumption, rather than a proven scientific conclusion. 
About those who presume the causal closure principle as the basis not only for science but 
divine action theology as well, Plantinga writes that “they could stop just assuming the existence 
of an unbroken causal nexus in the world, a nexus that precludes special divine action, and 
instead ask themselves whether there is really any reason to think this assumption true.”16 In 
other words, the causal closure principle assumes from the outset that all physical events have 
physical causes – and, that this is always the case. But if nonphysical causes (e.g., divine action) 
just are a part of reality, then causal closure is rendered nothing more than a methodological tool 
for practicing scientists. 
 
Indeed, scientists themselves are methodologically limited to the identification of causal chains in 
isolated, controlled contexts. Scientific methodology is simply unable to speak to causal 
possibilities for all reality. So if God (who presumably created all physical processes in the first 
place) chooses to act outside of scientifically-identifiable causal strictures, science could never 
prove or disprove this: intervention is not a scientific question. Because science is limited in what 
it can say about causal processes, intervention is thus undeserving of the pejorative connotations 
usually associated with the word. Plantinga insists that the causal closure principle is simply a 
presupposition that is unnecessarily adopted by many theologians, and which leads to insufficient 
divine action theologies. Plantinga’s interventionist position is highly contentious, not least 
because he might not fully appreciate how important the causal closure principle is for scientific 
practice. Indeed, one could argue that in rejecting the causal closure principle, Plantinga is 
                                                            
15 Moreover, there is significant debate about whether underdeterminism really “leaves room” for God in 
the first place. See Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science, as well as the subsequent section on quantum 
mechanics in this chapter.  
16 Alvin Plantinga, “What Is ‘Intervention’?” Theology and Science 6, no. 4 (2008): 373. 
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effectively rejecting any role for science in a theology of divine action. That is, insofar as the 
causal closure principle is a corollary of methodological naturalism (itself a necessary working 
assumption for science), it is difficult to discard without simultaneously discarding the role of 
scientific knowledge in divine action theories. Nevertheless, Plantinga’s position is an interesting 
one – particularly in a theological climate so hostile to interventionist divine action.  
 
In addition to his arguments regarding the limits of scientific methodology, Plantinga argues 
against common theological objections to interventionism. For example, one widespread 
assumption in science-and-religion is that interventionism “challenges the concepts of divine 
faithfulness and self-consistency: how can God uphold the laws of nature with one hand, whilst 
simultaneously overriding them by performing miracles with the other?”17 This challenge is 
reinforced by the GDA/SDA distinction: if God upholds natural regularities in general divine 
action, would it not be inconsistent for God to counteract those same regularities in special 
divine action? Plantinga notes that the force of this challenge largely arises from the legal 
language attending it. When we speak of physical regularities as “laws” and interventionist SDA 
as “violations,” we demonstrate presumptive linguistic habits that might be question-begging. 
Plantinga challenges such language, arguing that “there would be arbitrariness and inconsistency 
only if there were no special reason for taking action contrary to the usual regularities; but of 
course God might very well have such reasons.”18 If God created physical regularities in the first 
place, and if God’s intentions for creation include relationality and divine responsiveness to 
specific needs, one could thus argue that God’s consistency actually requires occasional flexibility 
in the “laws” of nature. In other words, Plantinga is arguing for a relational perspective on divine 
coherence; the most internally consistent actions God could take might well require that God act 
variously in different circumstances. This is analogous to human relationships; a parent’s love for 
his children requires treating each of them differently in unique circumstances, and altering daily 
regularities in response to specific situations that arise. While one might well reject 
interventionism, Plantinga’s point may be a helpful corrective in a conversation dominated by 
noninterventionist commitments. Moreover, as Wildman points out, some may find “the 
inconsistency of miraculous interventionism a small thing, and…the theological hubris of 
confining God to noninterventionist action a greater danger.”19 While one might assume that 
noninterventionism indicates scientific credibility, the attendant theological price is worth 
                                                            
17 Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science, 48. 
18 Alvin Plantinga, “What Is ‘Intervention’?,” 388. 
19 Wildman, “The Divine Action Project,” 38. 
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considering. My goal here is not to support interventionism (and indeed, I reject the 
interventionism/noninterventionism binary altogether), but to suggest that noninterventionism is 
not as obviously superior a choice as many might assume.  
 
2.2.2 The Laws of Nature 
The interventionist debate revolves around the potential problems of divine violation of the laws 
of nature, but what do we mean by “the laws of nature”? As mentioned above, talk of “laws” 
and “violation” implies a legally binding ontology for physical regularities. But is this the best 
way to think about the predictable and reliable processes we observe in nature and scientific 
experiments? The classic debate over the ontological status of the laws of nature is generally 
oversimplified – the distinction is made between the laws as either “prescriptive” or 
“descriptive.” Those who affirm the laws of nature as prescriptive hold a very high view of their 
ontology; the laws possess an independent, idealised status and “ontologically determine which 
possibilities are open to the world and which are not.”20 Because these prescriptive (or 
necessitarian) laws describe “certain structural physical necessities,” they are thought to delineate 
where and how divine agency might occur in the natural world.21 Conversely, a descriptive view 
of the laws of nature downgrade their ontological status to descriptive regularities that are 
contingent and nonbinding. Many science-and-religion scholars affirm this descriptive view, 
which makes sense insofar as it would seem to allow for unfettered divine agency in the physical 
world. Here, however, we discover an intriguing feature of divine action debates: in actual fact, 
the entire noninterventionist paradigm to which so many SDA theorists subscribe actually 
presumes a prescriptive view. Indeed, if so-called laws were merely descriptions of contingent 
regularities, the interventionism/noninterventionism debate would be nullified. That is, the idea 
of intervention requires an ontological, prescriptive view of physical laws; otherwise, there would 
be no laws for God to violate in the first place. This evident confusion about the laws of nature 
needs to be examined more closely. 
 
It is apparent that, as theologian Niels Henrik Gregersen notes, the prescriptive “concept of the 
laws of nature serves as a foil for shaping the idea of non-interventionist SDA.”22 There would 
                                                            
20 Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science, 66. 
21 Ibid.  
22 Gregersen, “Special Divine Action and the Quilt of Laws,” 191. 
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be no concerns about divine violation of the laws of nature if one were not presuming that those 
laws are static, idealised strictures that dictate what can and cannot happen in the world. This is 
where the issue of indeterminism becomes important. While a full discussion of determinism and 
indeterminism is impossible here, it is important to emphasise that indeterminism is a crucial 
component of noninterventionist SDA theories. If, as is evident, noninterventionism implies a 
prescriptive, ontological view of the laws of nature, then the only possibility for SDA lies in areas 
of the natural world that are underdetermined by physical laws. So, for example, quantum divine 
action theorists propose that quantum indeterminacy is an ontological feature of reality, and thus 
that no laws are violated if God acts at the indeterminate quantum level. This proposal is 
discussed and critiqued below, as it is a paradigmatic example of how noninterventionist SDA 
theorists proceed more generally: by assuming that the laws of nature are reified and closed to 
divine influence, and then identifying aspects of the causal web that seem not to be completely 
determined by constraining prescriptive laws. These areas of underdeterminism are then 
identified as potential causal joints between God and natural processes. Again, one implication of 
this is that science is given the authority to determine the parameters of noninterventionist SDA 
– it is the prerogative of the physical sciences to identify which phenomena and processes are 
underdetermined. 
 
This necessitarian view of the laws of nature is assumed by many scientists, philosophers, and 
science-and-religion scholars, and this is not without reason. After all, the success of the 
scientific method depends on the consistent repeatability, falsifiability, and verification of 
seemingly preexisting physical regularities. Given past and present explanatory success, and the 
appearance that mathematics and science are discovering (rather than inventing) underlying laws 
of nature, it might make sense to have a high view of physical laws. And indeed, DAP-style 
divine action theorists have often assumed a necessitarian model of physical laws, and sought to 
identify particular loci of underdeterminism.23 However, while divine action theorists often 
presume a necessitarian view, they often do not recognise or acknowledge that they are doing so. 
Again, the entire noninterventionist project presumes that physical laws hold a prescriptive, 
idealised status – otherwise, intervention would literally not be a possibility. Divine violation of 
physical laws is a coherent idea only if those laws are prescriptive in the first place. And yet, 
                                                            
23 Specific challenges to this method have been well-described by Saunders and others; critiques often 
highlight how divine action in underdetermined areas would actually involve intervention, and would also be 
scientifically implausible in actual fact – this is discussed below in the section on quantum mechanics. 
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many theorists endorse the view that physical laws are descriptive – and not prescriptive.24 For 
example, Russell (largely responsible for developing quantum divine action approaches) seeks to 
identify quantum processes as indeterminate and open to divine action. Yet at the same time, he 
writes, “I tend to view the laws of nature in the latter, descriptive sense.”25 This common 
tendency to presume a prescriptive view and still claim the descriptive position is one of the 
most fascinating (and confusing) aspects of divine action debates. Again, if the laws of nature 
really are mere descriptions of physical regularities, then there is no need to search for a causal 
joint in the first place. Indeed, the descriptive view would render unnecessary and even 
incoherent the theological search for underdetermined causal joints. 
 
 Theorists affirming the descriptive view find it understandably appealing, insofar as it seems to 
“incorporate enough flexibility and openness to accommodate the intentional actions of God” – 
the entire natural order would be a single causal joint.26 But what would it mean for the laws to 
be descriptive? For philosophers of science, a descriptive account portrays laws as useful 
descriptors of observed regularities, with the emphasis placed on singular events (rather than on 
any laws affecting those events). In this view, laws describe what does happen, not what can 
happen. Once again, there is plenty of room for SDA in this regularity account of physical laws, 
for “a broadly applied regularity approach will simply attempt to describe the world on the basis 
of the different singular events in it, and consequently subsume all instances of SDA.”27 If laws are 
not universally prescriptive, God could simply act in nature – though the specifics of how a 
supernatural God could affect natural processes would still be unexplained. Similarly, 
philosopher Nancy Cartwright’s “dappled world” approach is close to (but not identical with) a 
descriptive account. She recognises physical regularities, but only in localised settings; the “laws” 
are limited in scope – they comprise a so-called patchwork of regularities that holds in specific 
contexts. That is, they are “descriptions of what regularly happens, not regular associations or 
singular causings that occur with regularity.”28 Cartwright explains that “some features of systems 
                                                            
24 As Wildman notes, “It is certainly true that no theory of SDA proposed within the DAP makes use of” a 
view wherein the “laws of nature have strong ontological status, in the sense of referring to principles or deep 
structures of nature that statistically govern each individual even within an ensemble of events.” Others were willing 
to affirm an ontological view wherein laws govern “large ensembles of events but not each individual event.” 
Wildman,“The Divine Action Project,” 41. 
25 Robert J. Russell, “Quantum Physics and the Theology of Non-Interventionist Objective Divine 
Action,” in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, ed. Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 579. 
26 Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science, 49. 
27 Ibid., 62. 
28 Nancy Cartwright, The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 4. 
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typically studied by physics may get into situations where their behavior is not governed by the 
laws of physics at all. But that does not mean that they have no guide for their behavior or only 
low-level phenomenological laws. They could fall under quite a different organized set of highly 
abstract principles.”29 In this sort of model, it might be theoretically possible that God could 
affect nature through some sort of lawful process, in certain contexts – but this would likely not 
be accessible to our current scientific methodology, and it is unclear what such action would 
even entail.30 In any case, the main idea here is that anything less than a prescriptive view of the 
laws of nature would not require noninterventionist divine action – there would simply be no 
reified laws for God to violate in the first place. What we see, then, is a disjunction between the 
way many SDA theorists talk about the laws of nature at a metaphysical level, and how they treat 
them in the development of actual theories. So, for example, we see Russell affirming a 
descriptive view, but then treating physical laws as prescriptive as he seeks to locate divine action 
in quantum indeterminacy. At the very least, there is an apparent inconsistency in the way DAP-
style divine action theories have handled the laws of nature. 
 
One further distinction might help clarify the confusion surrounding the ontology of physical 
laws: this is between the laws of nature as they really are, and the known laws of science as 
currently understood. In this distinction, the laws of nature are those regularities that exist and 
function regardless of whether we currently understand them. The laws of science, then, are the 
current formulations of physical regularities as understood by science at any given point. For 
example, our current understanding of quantum laws may accurately reflect quantum realities, or 
it may reflect our currently limited knowledge of those processes. It turns out that many divine 
action theorists speak about descriptive laws of nature, but seem actually to be referring to the 
known laws of science. This would partially explain why noninterventionists necessarily presume 
that the laws of nature are prescriptive, but explicitly affirm them as descriptive. Moreover, some 
theorists actually make conscious use of this distinction between the laws of nature and the laws 
of science; they develop an “instrumentalist,” or approximationist account of physical laws. As 
astronomer and theologian William Stoeger explains, “‘our laws of nature’ are much more limited 
and uncertain than the full range of ‘the laws’ in themselves…there are also such processes and 
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relationships which are in principle beyond the competencies of the natural sciences to 
investigate and to model.”31 Stoeger thus acknowledges that the known laws of science are 
limited approximations that basically work well enough, but do not perfectly express the whole 
truth about the (presumably ontological and idealised) laws of nature. This approximationist view 
is noteworthy, as it places limits on science’s authority in regards to divine action. That is, if 
philosopher William Alston is correct that “none of our laws take account of all possible 
influences,” then current science cannot preclude the possibility of divine action.32 For example, 
divine action might occur via some sort of “higher laws” at a level of reality unknown to 
contemporary science. Of course, this would simply relegate the causal joint to a law-governed 
realm beyond the reach of scientific methodology; we would still need an account of how an 
immaterial God could interact with the laws of nature. Moreover, this approach might be too 
“easy”; an approximationist account of divine action precludes science from critiquing 
supposedly hidden causal joints or higher laws. 
 
Notably, this approximationist account of the laws of nature is compatible with both the 
descriptive and prescriptive approaches. For example, Wildman writes that “assuming God’s 
action conforms to these laws (noninterventionism), they describe not only nature’s operations 
but also God’s actions within nature.”33 Here, Wildman affirms noninterventionism and 
presumes prescriptive laws (insofar as God “conforms” to them), but also speaks of the laws as 
describing natural and supernatural events. Similarly, Stoeger writers that “God may act in a 
purely ‘natural’ way…but in a way which we see as supernatural intervention simply because we 
have not yet come to comprehend fully the relationships and regularities (the ‘higher laws’) 
which obtain.”34 Stoeger thus works with a prescriptive view of the laws of nature, and suggests 
that God’s action through those laws is simply beyond our scientific reach. Again, these 
approaches invite “God of the gaps” critiques, as they simply move the causal nexus between 
God and nature further beyond the reach of scientific explanation – they do not remove the 
need for a causal joint in the first place. In any case, the point worth noting here is that one’s 
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perspective on the laws of nature greatly shapes one’s understanding of the causal joint. While 
there is significant confusion in science-and-religion regarding the laws of nature, we can say that 
the prescriptive view is presumed by noninterventionists relying on ontologically 
underdetermined causal joints. This is true even when theorists affirm the laws as descriptive, for 
a merely descriptive account would render the noninterventionist paradigm meaningless and 
unnecessary. Approximationists occupy something of a third way in this discussion, relegating 
the causal joint to higher laws that are inaccessible to current scientific methodology (and often 
without addressing the remaining ontological gap between God and physical laws, no matter 
how “high”35). In any case, how one understands the ontology of the laws of nature significantly 
affects one’s approach to divine action.  
 
2.2.3 Compatibilism versus Incompatibilism 
A third defining debate for divine action theorists is the question of compatibilism, or whether 
one can simultaneously affirm both divine action and the causal closure principle. In other 
words, does it make sense to attribute specific events to divine agency, if there exists an 
explicable scientific account for those events? Contemporary divine action debates (particularly 
in the DAP and those influenced by the Project) often assume incompatibilism, or the position 
that an event is not an instance of special divine action if it is fully caused by identifiable physical 
processes. In other words, God and the laws of nature cannot be equally responsible for the 
same event, if that event is to be thought of as special divine action. Incompatibilists insist that “in 
order for God to act, something in the natural order has to give way – hence the active search 
for irreducible ontological gaps in the causal nexus.”36 In fact, the noninterventionist SDA 
approach generally assumes incompatibilism – especially insofar as it relies on the search for 
identifiable points of underdetermination. That is, if compatibilism were correct – if God and 
physical processes are simultaneously fully responsible for specific events – then there would be 
no need to identify underdetermined causal joints. Instead, incompatibilists adopt the position 
that special divine action involves God’s involvement above and beyond the known laws of 
nature. If one can identify precise points of ontological indeterminism where physical processes 
do not necessitate certain outcomes (e.g., chaos theory, emergence, or quantum mechanics), then 
God can be properly included as a causal factor in the natural order. Importantly, 
incompatibilism “enables one to rule out types of special divine action on the basis of our 
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scientific understanding of the laws of nature – God may only act in a special, direct way in the 
‘causal gaps’ opened by indeterminacies.”37 Here again, we see how the affirmation of 
noninterventionist, incompatibilist SDA is dependent on current scientific knowledge regarding 
spheres of physical indeterminacy.   
 
Though many supporters of noninterventionist SDA explicitly affirm incompatibilism (or 
indeed, implicitly presume incompatibilism), compatibilists are certainly active in the divine action 
conversation. Indeed, as will be demonstrated in Part Two, there has been a recent “theological 
turn” in divine action theories that privileges compatibilist approaches. For the compatibilist, 
divine action is “continuous with natural processes, present throughout the whole cosmos and 
entirely compatible with our descriptions of mathematical behaviour.”38 The paradigmatic 
expression of compatibilism comes from Thomism, and particularly from the affirmation of 
double agency: God as primary cause is fully efficacious in all events, even as created secondary 
causes (i.e., natural processes) are simultaneously fully efficacious. Aquinas expresses this by 
affirming that “God causes all action, as any active thing is the instrument of divine power 
acting.”39 God and natural processes work at different levels of reality: God sustains and acts 
through created processes, but those created processes also have full causal efficacy and even 
autonomy. That is, “the same effect is ascribed to a natural cause and to God,” and both the 
primary and secondary causes fully cause each event. They do not split the workload, as it were, 
but “the whole effect proceeds from each, yet in different ways.”40 This doctrine of double 
agency is the framework behind affirmations that God works in and through natural processes – 
but this framework is not dependent on God acting only through underdetermined natural 
processes (contrary to noninterventionist SDA, which affirms divine action in and through 
underdetermined natural processes). Thus, compatibilism is an explicitly theological 
commitment, and gives no authority to science to determine where or how God might act.  
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Compatibilism has regained quite a bit of traction in recent years (possibly in reaction to the 
DAP), and variations of this position (Thomistic and otherwise) will be examined more closely in 
Part Two. It is worth noting here, however, the key challenges to compatibilist divine action. 
Perhaps most obviously, double agency invites the question of how, exactly, God could act fully 
in natural processes, even while the natural world of secondary causes is “complete on its own 
level” and operates in a wholly law-governed manner.41 Unanimously, Thomists insist that we 
cannot know how this seemingly paradoxical double agency occurs. For the compatibilist, 
searching for a causal joint is wholly misguided – literally every created natural process is a causal 
joint of sorts. The “how” of double agency and the “what” of the causal joint are thus questions 
that can only be answered by an appeal to divine mystery. And indeed, it must surely be true that 
no divine action theory could ever explicate the full reality of God’s agency. Double agency, 
however, might seem particularly prone to unnecessary paradox. Namely, it is extremely difficult 
to ascribe a particular event both to a fully natural cause and to a divine cause – at least while 
affirming that it is a specific, special divine response to particular circumstances. As 
Polkinghorne has (infamously) quipped, double agency can seem to be “an unintelligible kind of 
theological doublespeak.”42 Of course, the Thomist might simply reply that what appears to be 
paradoxical doublespeak is, in fact, a theological reality that goes beyond the limited ability of 
finite minds to grasp (and, indeed, beyond an insufficient understanding of causation).43  
 
Nevertheless, Thomistic double agency highlights the paradox of compatibilism, a paradox that 
might not be easily glossed over by theological appeals to mystery. Similarly, compatibilism is 
notably immune to scientific challenges. Indeed, compatibilism affirms that God is acting in 
specific events even when those events seem to have sufficient scientific explanations; thus, “the 
science and the theology pass by each other without much traction.”44 For some, this might seem 
a brute fact about reality – others might hesitate to embrace a model that leaves no room for 
serious theological engagement with scientific knowledge. Thus, there are two pertinent critiques 
of compatibilist models of divine action. First, it may be unnecessarily or incoherently 
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paradoxical to affirm double agency. Second, compatibilism precludes scientific critique of divine 
action theories. In any case, noninterventionist SDA programmes have assumed (explicitly or 
otherwise) an incompatibilist framework for divine action.  
 
Of course, Thomism is an incredibly rich theological and philosophical programme that is far 
more involved and nuanced than can be done justice here – it is introduced here only as a classic 
affirmation of compatibilist divine action. As will be discussed in Part Two, there are versions of 
Thomistic (or at least compatibilist) divine action theories that may get around the challenges 
briefly highlighted here. For example, both Catholic theologian Denis Edwards and William 
Stoeger have tweaked the standard Thomistic account of double agency; they emphasise not 
double agency per se, but rather the noncoercive and participatory relationship between nature 
and God. In such an approach, “God does not override the process, nor bypass the laws of 
nature. God accepts and works creatively with the limits of creaturely processes, lovingly 
respecting the integrity of creatures.”45 Here, the emphasis is not so much on the fully distinct 
causal efficacy of both God and physical processes, but on the inherent participation of all 
nature in and with God – this will be discussed further in coming chapters. I merely highlight 
double agency to illustrate the paradoxical challenges of compatibilism.  
 
In sum, then, it is evident that the three debates discussed thus far intertwine with each other 
and shape one’s understanding of divine action. Before concluding this chapter with a brief 
critique of the binary terms of these debates themselves, it is helpful to examine a test case – this 
enables one to see how noninterventionist, incompatibilist commitments actually play out in a 
given causal joint theory. To that end, I here examine the quantum divine action proposal, as this 
offers the classic example of noninterventionist causal joint theories. The goal in so doing is to 
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2.3 Quantum Special Divine Action: A Test Case 
2.3.1 The Appeal 
Of all the potentially underdetermined causal joints sought by noninterventionist SDA theorists, 
none have been so popular (or so infamous) as those involving quantum mechanics (QM). For 
those seeking to identify a physical realm in which noninterventionist divine action might be said 
to occur, twentieth-century discoveries in quantum theory have suggested quantum theory as an 
immensely attractive option. For one thing, QM has to do with the most fundamental elements 
of physical reality, and divine action would almost necessarily involve the most basic level of 
physical reality (that is, any action at the macro-level would necessarily involve micro-level 
quantum processes). Moreover, the sheer strangeness and indeterminacy of subatomic entities 
only adds to the appeal. Not only are we dealing with the most basic “stuff” of the universe, but 
that basic stuff seems to exhibit some odd qualities indeed. In other words, QM is doubly 
appealing because it not only involves fundamental processes, but it is also possible to interpret 
the behaviour of quantum events as ontologically indeterminate, such that divine action here 
might not violate the laws of nature.  
 
Specifically, by revealing the quantum world to be probabilistic rather than deterministic, 
quantum theory seemingly addresses the problem of reductionistic determinism.46  Prior to 
quantum mechanics, causal reductionism and the deterministic laws of nature seemed to imply 
that determinism “works its way up the hierarchy of complex systems, resulting in a fully 
determined natural world”;47 this effectively precluded the possibility of divine action. If 
ontological indeterminacy is a reality, however, then divine causality would not violate physical 
laws precisely because “such laws specifically allow, and in some circumstances, invite, the 
influence of nonphysical factors.”48 In other words, the deterministic laws of nature might not 
provide a full causal explanation for some states; “law-like causality may be a pervasive feature of 
the universe…but so may be creative, non-law-like causality.”49 Thus, quantum theory has been 
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attractive to many theologians precisely because it provides a space for God to act in creation 
that is “perfectly consonant with scientific regularity.”50  
 
2.3.2 Quantum Mechanics 
In discussing the various ways in which divine action might occur through quantum mechanics, 
it is worth noting that interpretations of quantum mechanics involve numerous and differing 
mathematical formulations, models, and interpretations. In short, quantum theory is a research 
field still very much alive and hotly debated. Though much of the theological work incorporating 
quantum mechanics is dependent upon a specific interpretation of QM (i.e., the Copenhagen 
interpretation), others exist; moreover, one’s choice of interpretation is not fully determined by 
the mathematical formalisms.51 That being said, it is helpful to unpack a few of the more relevant 
QM concepts.  
 
Quantum Indeterminacy 
What exactly is quantum indeterminacy and why is it relevant for divine action? This is a crucial 
question, for the appeal of QM in divine action theories is due precisely to an assumed 
ontological indeterminacy wherein God can act within natural processes. To begin with, it is 
important to recognise that quantum theory essentially deals with the way quantum systems 
evolve over time. They are described by wavefunctions,52 which in turn are governed by 
Schrödinger’s wave equation.53 Importantly, the Schrödinger equation governing the quantum 
systems’ wavefunctions is essentially deterministic. Given the state of a quantum system, its 
evolution over time is predictable and prescribed. The indeterminism, whether ontological or 
epistemological, comes in when one attempts to obtain precise values for specific properties of 
specific quantum entities – say, both a particle’s momentum and position. The Heisenberg 
Uncertainty Principle (HUP) basically states that the more precisely a particle’s position can be 
                                                            
50 Saunders, “Does God Cheat at Dice?,” 521. 
51 This is an important point: almost all quantum SDA theories rely on the Copenhagen interpretation of 
QM. This is unfortunate, as alternative interpretations (namely, the many-worlds approach) would render very 
different perspectives on divine action. For an exploration of the implications of the many-world interpretation, see 
Simon Saunders et al., eds., Many Worlds?: Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010). 
52 Wavefunctions are probability waves denoting the probability of obtaining a certain measurement of 
certain properties for quantum entities at a given time. 
53 Saunders, “Does God Cheat at Dice?,” 131.  
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identified, the less precisely its momentum can be measured, and vice versa.54 The most 
common55 interpretation of quantum mechanics, the Copenhagen interpretation, affirms that 
quantum indeterminacy is not an epistemological deficiency to be remedied with sufficient 
technological advances, but an actual feature of basic reality.56  Thus, we are left with a situation 
in which quantum systems behave deterministically as described by the Schrödinger equation, 
but only until the point at which some particular feature of the system is measured. If a specific 
property of a quantum system is measured by some apparatus external to the quantum system 
itself, the deterministic wavefunction breaks down and ceases to be predictive. In other words, 
deterministic wavefunctions govern the evolution of a quantum system over time and describe 
the probabilities of various possible states for a quantum entity at any given time. At the point of 
measurement, however, the quantum entity ceases to exist in superposition and “resolves” (in a 
truly indeterminate manner) into a particular, measurable state.  As Saunders explains, “the key 
point is that current quantum mechanics is both extremely deterministic and potentially indeterminate.”57 
Indeterminacy is a slippery concept to define, and will be discussed further below. Here, though, 
we have seen that quantum systems evolve deterministically according to the Schrödinger 
equation, until a point at which measurement occurs. Hence, it seems that noninterventionist 
quantum divine action could only occur at points where the wavefunction collapses in a quantum 
event – that is, at measurement points.  
 
Quantum Events and Measurement 
The issue of quantum measurement is related to what, in the Copenhagen interpretation, is 
considered to be the collapse of the wavefunction. As discussed, quantum entities are described 
by probability waves whose evolution over time is governed by the Schrödinger equation. These 
waves describe the likelihood of a quantum entity having certain values for certain properties at 
any given time; and, indeed, when a large number of individual quantum entities are measured, 
the probabilities are born out with remarkable predictive accuracy. However, the behaviour of 
                                                            
54 It should be noted that the HUP does not assume measurement; it is not as if a scientist in a lab had tried 
to measure both the momentum and position of a particle, failed, and formulated the HUP. Rather, the HUP is 
mathematically derived, independent of actual attempted measurements. This is an important point for our 
discussion here; there seems to be ontological indeterminacy at the quantum level. 
55 It is perhaps more accurate to say that the Copenhagen interpretation has historically been the most 
widely discussed. In reality, there are a variety of interpretations vying for prominence. See Jenann Ismael, 
“Quantum Mechanics,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2015 edition. 
https://plato.stanford edu/archives/spr2015/entries/qm/. 
56 John J. Davis, “Quantum Indeterminacy and the Omniscience of God,” Science and Christian Belief  9, no. 
2 (1997): 131. 
57 Saunders, “Does God Cheat at Dice?,” 524.  
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any one particle can be ontologically indeterminate. According to the Copenhagen interpretation, 
the particle is in a superposition, a situation where it is both here and there, but also neither here 
nor there; it has a status altogether other than the possibilities one would assume to be possible, 
given everyday experience and Newtonian physics. However, it is also evident that when one 
observes or measures such an entity, it is seen to exhibit only one property (e.g., a specific 
location or velocity); the measurement device is never “confused” about the value of that which 
is being measured. This is why the wavefunction is said to collapse; at the time of measurement, 
it is known with 100% certainty that the particle’s properties have specific values, because this 
has been measured to be the case. This means that the wavefunction must have collapsed, and 
this is directly due to the act of measurement – at least according to the Copenhagen 
interpretation. The question then becomes one of the particular role that the observer plays in 
that collapse. What counts as an observer? What counts as a measurement? Perhaps most 
importantly, how exactly does the act of measurement cause a physical change in the quantum 
system? When theologians discuss quantum divine action, they often talk about God intervening 
in quantum mechanical events in order to bring about a desired action. Because in the standard 
Copenhagen interpretation the collapse of the wavefunction does not actually occur until the 
point of measurement, these scholars are essentially saying that God participates in the 
measurement process in order to collapse the wavefunction. But how exactly might this occur?  
 
2.3.3 Divine Action Approaches 
Advocates of quantum SDA have taken a number of different approaches in answering this 
question, the most notable of which is known as noninterventionist objective divine action 
(NIODA), formulated by Russell. According to Russell, divine action objectively occurs in 
quantum events through the actualisation of one of several potentialities; “the collapse of the 
wave function occurs because of divine and natural causality working together.”58 Importantly, 
Russell emphasises that his is not a “gaps argument” because it rests on what is known about 
nature.59 Moreover, Russell argues that if God acts in the world at all, it necessarily must be at the 
quantum level, because the “somatic enactment” of conscious will “requires lower-level 
indeterminism”; causality requires that divine action be initiated at the lowest level.60 In fact, the 
                                                            
58 Robert J. Russell, “Quantum Physics and the Theology of Non-Interventionist Objective Divine 
Action,” in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, ed. Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 586. 
59 Russell, “Quantum Physics,” 582. Of course, this is assuming that the Copenhagen interpretation of 
quantum theory and ontological indeterminism is correct. 
60 Russell, “Quantum Physics,” 580. 
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fabric of reality is such that it requires God’s action in all quantum events; we essentially have no 
idea what the world would look like without divine action.61 Philosopher and theologian Nancey 
Murphy agrees with Russell’s approach in many respects, further suggesting that God works in 
each and every quantum event, “activating or actualizing one or other of the quantum entity’s 
innate powers at particular instants.”62 Thus, quantum particles have an innate array of options 
available to them, and God selects from among these potentialities in bringing about God’s 
purposes in the world.  
 
2.3.4 Possible Mechanisms 
Within the Copenhagen model, there are several different ways in which divine agency could 
“step in,” which Nicholas Saunders has thoroughly explained, and whose argument I follow 
here.63 First, God could alter the wavefunction itself, such that the mathematical expression of a 
quantum system aligned with God’s desired action. This would theoretically involve adding an 
additional possible state to the existing superposition of probable states; God’s desired state for 
the quantum system would be factored into the existing wavefunction. This is problematic for 
both scientific and philosophical reasons. First, there are severe limitations on what quantum 
mechanics allows this desired state to be (there are very specific and narrow values involved in 
superpositions), and so divine action would be almost absurdly restrained. Moreover, such an 
alteration of the wavefunction would be an essentially interventionist action; God would be 
tampering with physical realities, thus nullifying the whole point of quantum divine action 
theories in the first place. Finally (and perhaps most importantly), altering the wavefunction 
would only make God’s desired quantum state a possibility. Note that quantum indeterminacy is 
actually indeterminate; there is no way for God to determine which potential state in a 
superposition is selected without violating quantum indeterminacy.64 To put it crudely, by 
tampering with the wavefunction God would only be increasing the odds of a certain quantum 
state; God may or may not get God’s wish regarding the resulting quantum state! 
                                                            
61 See Thomas F. Tracy, “Particular Providence and the God of the Gaps,” in Chaos and Complexity: Scientific 
Perspectives on Divine Action, ed. Robert J. Russell, Nancey Murphy, and Arthur R. Peacocke (Vatican City State: 
Vatican Observatory, 1997). 
62 Nancey Murphy, “Divine Action in the Natural Order: Buridan’s Ass and Schrodinger’s Cat,” in Chaos 
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63 While I here follow Saunders’ argument in his article “Does God Cheat at Dice?,” the same content (in 
an expanded form) can be found in his chapter of the same name, in Chapter 6 of Divine Action and Modern Science. 




The second option for quantum divine action involves God taking measurements of the 
quantum system, causing the collapse of the wavefunction. In this scenario, God would basically 
measure the quantum system at a given time. This is problematic because a measurement 
requires an actual observer (e.g., some macroscopic device such as a computer or human brain), 
and unless God has some sort of physical extension with which to make the measurement, it is 
difficult to see how this approach does anything but complicate the issue.65 Also, this approach is 
inconsistent with measurements that we, as humans, can take and observe. That is, the quantum 
measurements taken by humans are consistent with the statistical probabilities predicted ahead of 
time by quantum mechanical formalisms. Moreover, such a physical act of measurement is still 
an intervention in the natural world, insofar as natural processes would have transpired 
otherwise if God had not measured the quantum system. Here again, God’s measurement would 
still be subject to the indeterminism itself – measurement does not dictate the result of that 
measurement, but only the point in time when the superposition resolves to a definite state. If 
this is divine action, it is of a very weak form indeed. 
 
The third option is for God to alter the probabilities for any one quantum measurement result, 
essentially tipping the scales such that any probability other than God’s intended result is 
virtually nil. This option is problematic because of just how closely tied to the wavefunction a 
measurement’s result is. In other words, by changing the probabilities of getting a certain result, 
God is almost forced into changing the wavefunction itself, and so is faced with all the 
difficulties of the first option. Changing the wavefunction is not a noninterventionist way of 
acting, for the wavefunction is governed by strict probabilities and evolves deterministically until 
a point of measurement.  
 
The fourth approach is related, namely that God could simply determine the outcome of a 
quantum measurement by ignoring the probabilities altogether. In order for this action to be 
noninterventionist, however, it must be assumed that the probabilities themselves are derivative 
from the measurement and not ontologically prior.66 This position is thus connected to a 
descriptive view of physical laws – the laws simply adapt to the measurements attained, rather 
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than objectively guiding the outcome of those measurements. This means that God is essentially 
deceiving humans into thinking that probabilities have any real bearing on physical events. This 
is possible, of course, but completely undermines quantum divine action’s raison d’être; the 
whole point of such a project is to take physical processes seriously and find a natural place in 
which God might act.  
 
This brief overview is meant to highlight the relevant issues in the discussion regarding quantum 
divine action. Saunders is careful to make the point that QM is both potentially indeterministic 
and extremely deterministic; though there is apparent (and likely, ontological) indeterminacy at 
the point of measurement, the quantum event is still constrained by a specific set of potentialities 
and is also governed by deterministic equations between measurements.67 In fact, one could 
argue that relegating divine action to the realm of QM is actually too restrictive for the God of 
Christian theism, because of the limited number of probabilities possible in each quantum event. 
Along these lines, many theological approaches to quantum mechanics fail to take seriously the 
meaning of a quantum event; if “measurements are the only suitable loci for divine action” 
(which is the case in the standard Copenhagen interpretation), then God can act only when an 
observer is present to take a measurement.68 It is difficult to imagine how God could affect 
quantum systems in a noninterventionist way, without also completely shifting to an 
understanding of the laws of nature as being merely descriptive and derivative – thus nullifying 
the need for noninterventionism in the first place. And, if one simply decides to conclude that 
God does intervene at the quantum level, then the whole point of looking at specifically quantum 
divine action is undermined. The appeal of quantum divine action is that it seems to promise a 
way for God to act within the existing structure of the natural world; interventionist acts at the 
quantum level, small and minor as they may seem, are fundamentally no different in kind than an 
intervention on the macroscopic level. Locating divine action in QM merely pushes back the 
point at which God intervenes; the original dilemma remains.  
 
Physicist Richard Feynman has famously said that “nobody understands quantum mechanics,” 
and this seems still to be a fair assessment; it is true that many features of the quantum world 
seem strange and counterintuitive.69 However, it is one thing to say that quantum theory seems 
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bizarre and fundamentally “other” than everyday macroscopic processes, and a completely 
different thing to either 1) forcibly insert divine action to explain these processes or 2) sequester 
divine action to the quantum level because it seems just strange enough to accommodate God. 
In other words, while the current state of quantum theories might appropriately elicit an almost 
apophatic response (e.g., “We don’t yet know how this works.”), this should not be linked with a 
positive articulation of divine action at the quantum level. Vague references to supposedly 
indeterminate processes are easy enough to articulate; elucidating an actual mechanism for 
quantum divine action is something else altogether. This does not mean that divine action could 
not occur at the quantum mechanical level, but rather that we do not have enough knowledge to 
support this claim. It seems that theological appropriations of quantum theory often 
demonstrate a serious lack of awareness – not only of the details of quantum mechanics itself, 
but also of the theological weaknesses and implications involved. In other words, it is precisely a 
keen desire to construct a coherent, scientifically-informed understanding of divine action that 
necessitates a strong critique of misappropriations of scientific theories. Such a critique here 
serves a dual purpose: not only does it allow us to scrutinise a particular area in which many 
theologians have sought to “make room” for God’s agency, but it also acts as a case study 
demonstrating the kind of intense analysis that needs to be levied against such theological 
appropriations. 
 
2.4 Questioning the Binaries 
As demonstrated in the preceding critique of quantum divine action theories, standard causal 
joint models for SDA often fail to hold up under scientific scrutiny. This insufficiency is not 
limited to QM proposals; the next chapter offers a similar, extended critique of divine action 
proposals based on the emergent human mind. What is notable in such proposals is the way that 
they presume a commitment to incompatibilism, noninterventionism, and a reified ontology of 
the laws of nature. Once these metaphysical and theological commitments are presumed, it is a 
short step indeed to affirming specific causal joint theories such as the QM proposal examined 
above. However, such causal joint models collapse under scientific scrutiny and are theologically 
unsatisfactory (insofar as they restrict divine action to an almost absurd degree). Moreover, such 
causal joint proposals essentially render current scientific knowledge as the authority of whether 




But are these three metaphysical and theological commitments necessary? Or, as I shall argue 
throughout this thesis, might the standard frameworks for thinking about divine action 
themselves be misguided? Indeed, while noninterventionist models for divine action have been 
widely affirmed by the DAP and those influenced by the Project, other theorists now challenge 
the standard approach and its perhaps-insufficient presuppositions about the God-nature 
relationship. As I will argue in Part Two, those affirming a theological turn in science-and-
religion critique the metaphysical foundation of standard noninterventionist approaches to SDA, 
instead using various theological resources to contextualise divine action in alternative 
metaphysical frameworks. By exploring specific theological formulations of the God-nature 
relationship, these theorists are able to provide theological models of divine action that do not 
rely on scientifically identifiable points of indeterminism in which God might act. 
 
 More specifically, critics of standard SDA theories re-examine what it means to be properly 
“natural,” challenging the presumed autonomy of nature implied by noninterventionist, 
incompabilitist approaches. For example, the interventionism/noninterventionism debate is 
wholly rejected as implying a model of the God-nature relationship that borders on deism. That 
is, to debate whether God does or does not intervene in the laws of nature is to presume a 
universe in which nature is essentially self-sufficient and autonomous by default. Note that this 
applies not only to intervention, but to nonintervention as well – even to debate whether or not 
God intervenes in nature is to tacitly approve the standardisation of a “normal” natural order 
that does not include ongoing special divine action. Similarly, representatives of the theological 
turn in divine action critique the compatibilism/incompatibilism binary, seeing the relationship 
between an immanent God and physical processes as being far more participatory and involved 
than is allowed by the standard incompatibilism debate. They argue that God is always present to 
and involved with nature, and that it does not make sense to speak of nature apart from God’s 
active presence in the first place. And finally, those rejecting standard divine action models 
critique the debate over the laws of nature as being oversimplified; they instead suggest that a full 
naturalistic understanding of physical processes must necessarily include the active participation 
of God. As Gregersen explains, “the ontology of divine action determines the understanding of 
the laws of nature, rather than the other way around.”70 That is, the priority is placed on 
theological categories, rather than on scientific articulations of physical laws.  
                                                            




Basically, then, the theological turn in divine action is marked by a rejection of the standard 
assumptions that define the parameters of causal joint theories as developed under the DAP. 
Rather than relying on current scientific knowledge to determine how and where divine action 
might occur, the theological turn privileges theological frameworks that emphasise a more 
participatory, involved relationship between God and nature. Rather than identifying particular 
underdetermined causal joints in nature, critics of the standard model affirm that all nature is a 
causal joint (thus adopting a compatibilist, Thomistic position – more on this in coming 
chapters). This is a theological and metaphysical commitment that is not subject to or reliant on 
scientific knowledge (for better or for worse, it should be noted). Rather than privileging science 
as the final arbiter of all reality, the theological turn underscores that science is limited in what it 
can tell us about the ontology of nature itself, or about reality as a whole. We must look beyond 
science for a theology of how God interacts with the natural world.  
 
The theological turn will be explored in greater depth in Part Two. By examining the standard 
model of divine action, and the debates framing its commitment to noninterventionist causal 
joint theories, this chapter has laid the groundwork for two lines of argument in this thesis. First 
– and more broadly – this chapter has explored the metaphysical assumptions and reigning 
debates against which the theological turn is developed. As noted in Chapter 1, Part One of this 
thesis is largely deflationary, critical of standard causal joint theories as developed over the last 
several decades. In Part Two, however, I will offer more constructive theological alternatives to 
the standard model of noninterventionist divine action. This constructive work makes sense only 
in contrast with the metaphysical pre-commitments explored in this chapter. Second, this chapter 
outlines the framework in which one can best understand Clayton’s emergentist divine action 
thesis – the subject of the next chapter. Though Clayton himself would not affiliate himself with 
quantum divine action proposals (for example), his identification of the emergent mind as a 
uniquely spiritual causal nexus in which God might act is telling. Explicitly or otherwise, I will 
argue, Clayton’s emergent divine action thesis is the latest iteration of the same metaphysical 
framework that has long been driving standard divine action proposals. Because Clayton’s work 
is so sophisticated, it is not always clear that his proposal is indeed a noninterventionist causal 
joint model. This chapter, then, has endeavoured to provide the requisite analysis of the relevant 
debates and commitments to which Clayton is subscribing (implicitly or explicitly). With that, I 
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now turn to Clayton’s emergent divine action proposal, and its privileging of human 































Divine Action and Mind: Philip Clayton’s Emergentist Thesis 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I surveyed the current state of contemporary divine action theories in 
science-and-religion, and the role that the causal joint has played in their development. I argued 
that three key debates defining the terms and framework of the divine action conversation are 
interventionism/noninterventionism, the ontological status of the laws of nature, and 
compatibilism/incompatibilism. I argued not only that the standard model of divine action has 
been largely committed to noninterventionism and incompatibilism, but that it has also exhibited 
confusion and a lack of clarity around the laws of nature. As a representative test case, I outlined 
the debate surrounding divine action and quantum mechanics, concluding that standard divine 
action models often fail to be scientifically plausible or theologically adequate. In fact, the entire 
contemporary divine action dialogue is framed by terms and metaphysical commitments that 
may be question-begging and insufficient for Christian theism. Namely, modern divine action 
theories often presuppose a quasi-deistic God-world model that lacks a robust understanding of 
God’s immanence in, and involvement with, all Creation. This being the case, science-and-
religion has been effectively hamstrung into producing theories that either disallow any 
meaningful divine action, or confine it to specific areas of the natural world (thus committing the 
theological faux pas of “God of the gaps” thinking). Nicholas Saunders, I suggested, is not far 
off in suggesting that theology is in a state of crisis - at least, that is, so far as the standard divine 
action model is concerned. 
  
This being said, one might argue that the days of quantum divine action theories are long gone, 
and that science-and-religion has moved beyond research programs like the DAP that dominated 
the conversation for decades. And indeed, a variety of alternative divine action models have been 
presented in recent years; these will be the focus of Part Two. In this chapter, though, I suggest 
that the standard incompatibilist, noninterventionist causal joint paradigm is still alive and well – 
particularly in the theology of human consciousness. Even as quantum mechanics was once 
hailed as a scientifically plausible locus for divine action, so too is consciousness now viewed as 
an inherently nonphysical phenomenon that might be uniquely spiritual and open to divine 
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action. In particular, Philip Clayton has developed an emergentist divine action thesis suggesting 
that both the science and philosophy of emergence justify a nonphysical, nonbiological (or 
“more than biological”) understanding of the mind. Clayton then uses this nonphysical 
understanding of the mind to suggest that consciousness, as an emergent spiritual property, is 
uniquely open to noninterventionist divine action. His divine action proposal is essentially that 
“an emergentist theory of mind…opens up the possibility of divine influence at the mental or 
spiritual level that does not require an exception to any natural laws.”1 Not only is the emergent 
mind open to divine action, but it may be uniquely open to divine action: “The human person, 
understood as integrated self or psychophysical agent-in-community, offers the appropriate level 
on which to introduce the possibility of divine agency. Here, and perhaps here alone, a divine 
agency could be operative that could exercise downward causal influence without being reduced 
to a manipulator of physical particles or psychotropic neurotransmitters.”2 Clayton thus uses 
emergence theory as a framework within which to understand noninterventionist divine action, 
and locates this divine action solely in the emergent mind.  
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that emergence has enjoyed such wide appeal in science-and-religion, 
as it purports to offer naturalistic explanations for higher-level phenomena without reducing 
those phenomena to quarks and electrons. Indeed, in recent years emergence has seemed to lend 
itself particularly well to those seeking to develop noninterventionist, scientifically plausible 
divine action theories. For theologians fearing the implications of reductionistic explanations, 
emergence may seem to offer the best of both worlds: emergence can claim scientific plausibility, 
and simultaneously affirm the ontological distinctiveness of such phenomena as human life, 
conscious minds, and (perhaps) a spiritual aspect of humans. Philosopher Gregory Peterson 
suggests that “a scientifically informed worldview and an ontologically reductionistic worldview 
are not the same thing and, on some accounts, are even opposed to each other.”3 Emergence, 
then, promises to be both scientifically plausible and to offer a nonreductionistic ontology. In 
particular, emergentist theories of mind have been suggested as offering ontologically open loci 
(read “causal joints”) wherein God might act without interfering with physical processes. 
 
                                                            
1 Philip Clayton and Steven Knapp, The Predicament of Belief: Science, Philosophy, Faith (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 58. 
2 Philip Clayton, Mind and Emergence: From Quantum to Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
198. 
3 Gregory R. Peterson, “Species of Emergence,” Zygon 41, no. 3 (2006): 691. 
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Be this as it may, my argument in this chapter is that the appropriation of emergence for divine 
action theories is both scientifically and theologically inadequate. Moreover, Clayton’s 
emergentist divine action proposal presupposes that consciousness will never be explained in 
physical terms. Both of these tenets of Clayton’s theory – his use of emergence theory and his 
assumption that the mind is unexplainable in physicalist terms – fail to take seriously scientific 
methodology and success. Thus, I argue that Clayton’s emergentist divine action proposal not 
only fails to be scientifically or philosophically plausible (insofar as it borders on dualism), but 
that it is also theologically insufficient insofar as it unnecessarily confines divine action to the 
human mind. To this end, the chapter begins with an explanation of Clayton’s approach to 
divine action more broadly, and his emergentist divine action proposal in particular. This is 
followed by a brief examination of Clayton’s panentheistic framework, as this acts as the 
metaphysical scaffolding for his divine action proposal. The last section of the chapter offers a 
refutation of Clayton’s position from within emergence theory itself, as well as a theological 
critique that Clayton’s proposal is actually a “God of the gaps” causal joint approach – and 
implicitly dualistic as well. In sum, this chapter critiques Clayton’s divine action proposal as 
theologically weak and scientifically implausible, and uses this critique to demonstrate that 
Clayton’s approach is of the same fundamental character as causal joint programs in decades 
past. 
   
3.2 Philip Clayton and Emergence Theory  
Clayton is one of the more sophisticated and nuanced thinkers in science-and-religion, 
particularly in the area of divine action. He strives to be both naturalistic and nonreductionistic, 
maintaining a commitment not only to Christian theology and philosophy, but also to the 
empirical sciences. In short, he seeks maximum traction between science and religion, 
endeavouring to be scientifically engaged and grounded, while still affirming theological claims. 
Unsurprisingly, Clayton rejects interventionist conceptions of divine action, and also affirms “the 
epistemic priority of contemporary science as a source of justified explanations about the natural 
world.”4 Indeed, he recommends the “presumption of naturalism” in explaining any 
phenomenon.5 If anything, Clayton’s approach to science-and-religion might seem overly 
                                                            
4 Clayton, “Natural Law and Divine Action: The Search for an Expanded Theory of Causation,” Zygon 39, 
no. 3 (2004): 631. 
5 Clayton, God and Contemporary Science, 171. As we will see, though, the meaning of “naturalism” is highly 
contentious. Clayton’s own panentheism lends a specific connotation to “naturalism” that precludes it from 
meaning “an explanation devoid of God.” 
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naturalistic to Christian theologians; an oversimplified reading might give the impression that his 
theology is a bit anaemic, leaving God “out of a job” at times. In any case, it is clear that Clayton 
does not think of himself as a dualist (in terms of the human mind-brain, at least) – far from it. 
Thus, my argument here – that Clayton’s divine action proposal might be considered dualistic – 
needs a bit of clarification. Though I am critical of Clayton’s argument and conclusion that the 
mind is uniquely open to divine action, it is largely because I find this conclusion out of step with 
his overall naturalistic approach to science-and-religion. Indeed, I suggest that his metaphysical 
framework is robust enough to handle a much more expansive understanding of divine action 
that is not limited to the human mind, and is not dualistic. In other words, I argue that Clayton’s 
divine action theory paradoxically fails both to be naturalistic enough (insofar as it privileges the 
mind), and to be theologically adequate (insofar as it restricts divine action to human 
consciousness). 
 
The core of Clayton’s divine action proposal (and his naturalistic approach to science-and-
religion more broadly) is emergence. Emergence is notoriously difficult to define, not least 
because it is used differently in various disciplines. Indeed, this interdisciplinary aspect of 
emergence is sometimes seen as a strength; as philosophical theologian Wentzel van Huyssteen 
writes of Clayton’s approach, “I see as [Clayton’s] persistent subtext…his vision that single 
disciplines offer too narrow a perspective when it comes to understanding specific phenomena, 
even phenomena on a physical or biological level.”6 A proper understanding of emergence – and 
in particular emergent consciousness – would thus involve not only scientific observations and 
theories, but philosophical input as well. Clayton himself is reluctant to summarise emergence, 
but writes: “If forced to give a one-sentence definition, I would say that emergence is the theory 
that cosmic evolution repeatedly includes unpredictable, irreducible, and novel appearances.”7 Put differently, 
emergence is the idea that the natural world exhibits layers of increasingly complex systems, 
which produce unexpected phenomena that are irreducible to the lower levels and components 
on which they are yet dependent. Rather than being a single scientific or philosophical theory, 
emergence recognises interconnected and hierarchical levels of reality across the disciplines; 
emergence is “only an overarching rubric to describe many different research programs in many 
different sciences.”8 Sufficiently complex systems are thought to produce emergent phenomena 
                                                            
6 J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, “Emergence and Human Uniqueness: Limiting or Delimiting Evolutionary 
Explanation?” Zygon 41, no. 3 (2006): 650.  
7 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 39. 
8 Philip Clayton, Adventures in the Spirit: God, World, Divine Action, ed. Zachary Simpson (Minneapolis, MN: 
Fortress Press, 2008), 67. 
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that exhibit properties unavailable and irreducible to the lower-level components of which they 
are composed – the whole is more than the sum of its parts.  
 
Emergence has been fiercely debated and attracted a sizable body of academic literature, with 
various theorists offering competing criteria and categories for emergent phenomena.9 Clayton 
himself suggests that “emergence is the view that new and unpredictable phenomena are 
naturally produced by interactions in nature; that these new structures, organisms, and ideas are 
not reducible to the sub-systems on which they depend; and that the newly evolved realities in 
turn exercise a causal influence on the parts out of which they arose.”10  There is a lot to unpack 
in Clayton’s description of emergence, and it is worth looking at each of these criteria in turn. 
First, however, it is important to note that Clayton sees emergence as an operative framework in 
all of nature. Emergentists do not apply the theory only to seemingly mysterious phenomena 
such as consciousness, but also recognise patterns of emergence in biology, chemistry, physics, 
and psychology. Clayton does apply emergence to consciousness, but he also recognises that 
“consciousness is not the only emergent level; in one sense it is merely another in a very long 
series of steps that have characterized the evolutionary process.”11 Indeed, one of emergence’s 
appealing qualities is that it takes biology and evolution very seriously, contextualising all natural 
phenomena (including the mind) in a richly textured biological picture. At the very least, it is 
clear that Clayton intends to offer an emergentist understanding of consciousness that is wholly 
naturalistic, situating the mind within the larger web of nature. In so doing, Clayton intends to 
offer emergence as a third option between reductive physicalism and dualism: emergent 
properties involve only physical components (hence Clayton considers himself an emergentist 
monist), but they are also (somehow) more than those physical components.  
 
So then, what exactly does emergence entail? Again, theorists differ on this, but Clayton’s own 
perspective prioritises unpredictable novelty, irreducibility, and downward causation. First, 
emergent phenomena are unpredictably novel; the “higher-order whole could not have been 
predicted from an analysis of the parts independently.”12 This principle underscores the point 
                                                            
9 For a broad-spectrum examination of the intersection of emergence, science, and theology, see Philip 
Clayton and Paul Davies, eds., The Re-emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006).  
10 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, vi. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Peterson, Species of Emergence, 693.  
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that emergent phenomena exhibit properties that are distinct from the parts on which they are 
dependent. If an observed property were merely an extrapolation of existing low-level laws as 
applied to components of the whole, the property would not be emergent. The idea here is that 
something is emergent if and only if it is something of a “game changer,” exhibiting properties 
that would not have been predictable outcomes of lower-level components. Biophysicist and 
emergence theorist Harold Morowitz explains that “when such [an emergent] system is 
assembled from its components, new characteristics of the whole emerge that could not have 
been predicted from a knowledge of the constituents.”13 Fluid dynamics offers a simple example 
of this in the phenomenon of convection. Depending on temperature, a liquid’s characteristics, 
and the constraints of specific containers, self-organising Bénard cells are formed; these cells 
exhibit specific patterns of movement and order that would not be predictable without 
knowledge of the fluid system as a whole. When a system is sufficiently complex to produce an 
emergent property, that emergent property is not merely “more of the same,” but a new sort of 
thing altogether that cannot be seen as an expected result of lower-level processes. 
 
Similarly, emergent phenomena are irreducible to the lower-level systems and components on 
which they are yet dependent. Clayton explains that “to say that emergent properties are 
irreducible to lower-level phenomena presupposes that reality is divided into a number of 
distinct levels or orders.”14 This hierarchical understanding of nature is vital for emergence 
theories; each distinct level is irreducible to the lower levels involved in its functioning. When a 
system is emergent, it requires higher-order descriptions and operates with higher-order laws. 
For example, economics would be considered an emergent entity requiring description in the 
language of economics, and requiring reference to the laws of economics for full explanation. 
Economics certainly requires atoms, molecules, and the laws of physics in order to exist, but few 
would suggest that atoms and molecules themselves are sufficient to explain economics. In other 
words, emergence acknowledges the necessity of the special sciences for appropriate study of 
emergent phenomena. Economics is really real, and is not reducible to physics or chemistry – 
though physics and chemistry are required for economics to exist. In fact, one could say that “it 
is possible to be a reductionist and [an emergent] holist too,” precisely because emergent 
properties are a sort of reductionistic unit. That is, if one were to attempt reducing an emergent 
system into its lower-level components, the resulting explanation would fail to explain the 
                                                            
13 Harold J. Morowitz, The Emergence of Everything: How the World Became Complex (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 20. 
14 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 5. 
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emergent property itself. An emergent level cannot be explained solely by reference to its parts; it 
is already “reduced” and distinct on its own terms.  
 
At this point, some key distinctions in emergence theories become important. Namely, there are 
two very different versions of emergence: strong (or ontological) emergence, and weak (or 
epistemological) emergence. Weak emergentists affirm that while “it may be essential to scientific 
success to explain causal processes using emerging categories such as protein synthesis, hunger, 
kin selection, or the desire to be loved,” “the fundamental causal processes remain those of 
physics.”15 Put another way, weak emergentists recognise emergence’s usefulness as a heuristic 
tool enabling the higher-order explanations that are so important to scientific analysis; they do 
not, however, admit any causal processes in those emergent phenomena other than those of 
fundamental physics. Thus, a weak emergentist would recognise emergent phenomena as 
unpredictably novel, but only because of our epistemological limitations. In principle, emergent 
phenomena might well be predictable, if one possessed the correct knowledge of an emergent 
system’s constituent parts and the surrounding environment. Similarly, a weak emergentist would 
affirm that emergent properties are irreducible only in an epistemological sense; these properties 
are certainly difficult to explain in lower-level terms, but are still finally determined by those 
lower-level processes. Philosophers Michael Silberstein and John McGeever explain that “a 
property of an object or system is epistemologically [or weakly] emergent if the property is 
reducible to or determined by the intrinsic properties of the ultimate constituents of the object 
or system, while at the same time it is very difficult for us to explain, predict or derive the 
property on the basis of the ultimate constituents.”16 The emphasis in weak emergence is on 
epistemological limitation, heuristic usefulness, and the exigencies of scientific discourse.  
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Clayton does not restrict himself to weak emergence, as doing so would 
not “represent a genuine alternative to physicalism” at all.17 The more relevant type of emergence 
here is strong, or ontological, emergence. Strong emergentists affirm that emergent properties 
really are ontologically distinct from their lower-level substrates and constituents. In this view, 
“evolution in the cosmos produces new, ontologically distinct levels, which are characterized by 
                                                            
15 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 9. 
16 Michael Silberstein and John McGeever, “The Search for Ontological Emergence,” Philosophical 
Quarterly 49, no. 195 (1999): 186. 
17 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 10. 
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their own distinct laws or regularities and causal forces.”18 For strong emergentists, emergent 
properties are unpredictably novel – and not because we are epistemologically limited. The 
unpredictable novelty here is an “in principle” one; no amount of knowledge of lower-level 
processes could ever predict the properties emerging from them. Similarly, strong emergence 
affirms the fundamental irreducibility of emergent properties; because these properties are more 
than the sum of their parts, any reduction would render insufficient explanations. Philosopher 
Russell Manning explains that “for ontological emergence, the world is more than simply a set of 
lower-level entities or simple units continually arranged and rearranged into composite 
wholes…Rather the world is itself composed of wholes and complex systems, which can then be 
dissected into various component parts without, however, the assumption that nothing will be 
lost in the process.”19 Reduction might be possible, but not without losing an understanding of 
the “something more” that emergent realities bring. 
 
Keeping in mind this distinction between strong and weak emergence, we can now examine the 
final emergentist commitment: downward causation. Clayton identifies downward causation as 
the most definitive characteristic of strong emergence. Essentially, strong emergentists affirm 
that emergent properties are “features of systems or wholes that possess causal capacities not 
reducible to any of the intrinsic causal capacities of the parts nor to any of the (reducible) 
relations between the parts.”20 In other words, ontologically emergent properties have causal 
powers over and above those of their constituent parts. Moreover, these causal capacities of 
emergent systems actually alter the components of those systems – this is downward causation. 
As Clayton explains, downward causation is “the process whereby some whole has an active non-additive 
causal influence on its parts.”21 In other words, the components of a system are constrained and 
altered by the higher-level system of which they are a part.  
 
Downward causation is not a monolithic concept, and there is a significant difference in how 
emergent causation more generally is treated by strong and weak emergentists, respectively; “the 
natural world exhibits different kinds of properties at different levels, and different kinds of 
                                                            
18 Ibid., 9. 
19 Russell Manning, “Mere Summing Up? Some Considerations on the History of the Concept of 
Emergence and its Significance for Science and Religion,” Science and Christian Belief  19, no. 1 (2007): 41.  
20 Silberstein and McGeever, “The Search for Ontological Emergence,” 186.  
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causation are at work at the various levels.”22 Technically speaking, downward causation is a 
stronger version of emergent causation than the “whole-part constraint” affirmed by weak 
emergentists. As Clayton explains, whole-part constraint is the weak emergentist position that 
“tends to treat emergent wholes as constraining factors rather than as active originators of causal 
activity.”23 For instance, snowflakes have very specific symmetrical constraints. Obviously, a 
snowflake is composed of individual water molecules and is, in a sense, dependent on the 
molecules’ physico-chemical properties. Once a certain number of those water molecules are 
part of the larger snowflake system, though, their causal abilities are constrained and at least 
partially determined by the structure and activity of the overall snow crystal. Once the individual 
water molecules are brought together into a specific structural symmetry, the snowflake that 
emerges from those molecules causes change in those lower-level molecules. This is an example 
of the weaker form of emergent causation; the snow crystal constrains its constituent molecules 
by virtue of its symmetrical structure, and in this limited sense has causal influence over the 
molecules. The snowflake does not, however, actively cause change in the water molecules. 
 
Leading emergentist Terrence Deacon has explored whole-part constraint in great detail; he 
argues that emergent causation should be seen through the lens of systemic constraints and an 
absence of freedom. That is, he argues that “the limitation of degrees of freedom or potential 
relationships is just as causally efficacious as the ‘push and pull’ of efficient causation or 
thermodynamics.”24 In other words, what we perceive as downward causation can really be 
understood as increasingly complex systems pushing constituent parts into a certain action, 
precisely because those constituent parts can literally do nothing else. In our snow crystallisation 
example, Deacon would argue that individual water molecules seem to be acting in a certain way 
as they freeze into very specific geometric patterns, but in reality they are merely constrained by 
particular physical properties into behaving the way they do. In other words, “limitation 
constitutes a different form of causal power.”25 These lower-level instances of whole-part 
constraint apply to more complex systems as well. Importantly, weak emergentists would still 
affirm emergent causation in the mind-brain, but only within the limited framework of whole-
part constraint. The weak emergentist would say that “the large number of integrated neural 
circuits in the brain constitutes an extremely complicated whole, which thus constrains the 
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23 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 51. 
24 Zachary Simpson, “Emergence and Non-Personal Theology,” Zygon 48, no. 2 (2013): 408. 
25 Ibid., 409. 
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behaviour of its component parts and subsystems in very remarkable ways.”26 While we may feel 
as if we make conscious choices that cause our body to do certain things, we would be more 
accurate in saying that “the complexity of [one’s] central nervous system constrains [his/her] 
behaviours in a particular way.”27 The difference is not insignificant, and the point is important: 
proponents of whole-part constraint purport to be able (in principle) to explain mental causation 
without requiring strong emergence and downward causation. Deacon argues that “amazing new 
properties have been, and are being, emerged, and there is nothing new being added. There is no 
new thing. No new laws. What is ‘new and ‘more’ are new modes of not being, new forms of 
constraint.”28 
 
Contrary to weak emergentists (and Clayton would consider Deacon to be a weak emergentist), 
Clayton links strong emergence with downward or “top-down causation,” the view that in 
emergent causation “something more is at work than the constraining influence of a large 
number of components operating as a system.”29 Whereas weak emergence affirms only whole-
part constraint, downward causation introduces active change: “The crux of the argument lies in 
the notion of distinct ‘levels’ within the natural world, with each level being defined by the 
existence of distinct laws and by distinct types of causal activity at that level.”30 In science-and-
religion, downward causation is usually discussed in relationship to the mind-body relationship, 
or the God-nature relationship. But advocates of strong emergence are quick to point out 
examples of top-down causation throughout the natural world. In fact, it is vital for emergentists 
to demonstrate top-down causation in areas other than the mind-body relationship, or else “the 
resulting position would support dualism rather than emergence.”31 Unfortunately, it is much 
easier to list examples of weak emergentism’s whole-part constraint than to identify indisputable 
instances of strong emergentism’s downward causation. For example, we might say that the 
genesis of cellular life offers an example of downward causation: individual components of a 
biological cell cannot do much on their own. When brought together in the right structure and in 
the right environment, however, those components become a contained system, jumping from 
the realms of physics and chemistry into biology. The cell is a living, functioning system that has 
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causal powers over the functions of its constituent parts; strong emergentists would say that the 
cell’s agency involves more than just systemic constraints. The problem here is that a 
reductionist could simply deny that downward causation is actually happening; cellular causation 
could be understood as an instance of whole-part constraint. Weak emergentists might affirm 
top-down causation as “a useful fiction,” but nothing warranting the sort of ontological 
distinction affirmed by the strong emergentists.32 Again, there are few (or no) undisputed 
examples of downward causation, though downward causation seems obvious, for many, when 
we get to the level of mind-body interactions.  
 
In any case, strong emergentists argue that downward causation is increasingly evident the higher 
one goes in emergent levels of the natural world. For example, biology analyses the emergent 
properties of bee hives33 and ant colonies,34 and sociologists and economists examine emergent 
forces influencing individuals’ lifestyle choices at a variety of levels.35 The laws operative at lower 
levels in the natural hierarchy are distinct from the laws involved at higher levels. So, psychology 
works with different laws than does biology, which is governed by different laws than in 
chemistry, which is itself not reducible to the laws of physics. Each level is causally distinct, and 
this is not attributable to either epistemological lack or explanatory ease – this is an issue of 
ontology, not epistemology. The idea here is that examples of emergence are evident throughout 
nature; Clayton’s point is that consciousness exists in continuity with other emergent 
phenomena. Just as the snowflake constrains its constituent lower-level water molecules, so do 
mental states constrain and alter neural patterns in the brain – when I experience the mental state 
of thirst, my neural activation patterns are altered and my brain directs my limbs to walk to the 
kitchen for a glass of water.36 While mental states and snow crystals lie on extreme ends of the 
emergence spectrum, they both demonstrate the universal nature of emergent processes.  
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In embracing strong emergence,37 Clayton is keen to distinguish himself both from dualists and 
from reductive physicalists. On one hand, he is keen to distance himself from dualism, 
emphasising that emergence is a feature seen throughout the natural world - not only (or even 
primarily) in the human mind. On the other hand, however, Clayton is quick to deny that 
emergence is a physicalist position – at least insofar as physicalism implies the sufficiency and 
primacy of physics for naturalistic explanations. After all, physicalism involves a commitment to 
the causal closure of the physical, or the assertion that all physical events have physical causes. 
The strong emergentist resists such a constraint; the assertion of ontologically distinct levels of 
reality challenges the causal closure principle. And as philosopher Jaegwon Kim argues, if one 
discards the causal closure principle, then “there can in principle be no complete physical theory 
of physical phenomena…If that is what you are willing to embrace, why call yourself a 
‘physicalist’?”38 Clayton agrees with Kim here: strong emergence rejects the causal closure of the 
physical as an inappropriate requirement for naturalistic explanation, precisely because strong 
emergence asserts the causal efficacy of nonphysical properties.39  This does not mean that 
strong emergentists are not naturalists – they often are. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, 
naturalism and physicalism are not synonymous. Physicalists recognise only the basic entities and 
processes of physics, while naturalists can be open to nonphysical realities that may or may not 
interact with physical phenomena. Clayton’s strong emergence, then, is not a reductive 
physicalist position – but he considers it to be a naturalist one (whether it is truly naturalist will 
be discussed below). Clayton, then, positions his version of strong emergence squarely between 
dualism and physicalism, offering a third option that is both nonreductive and naturalistic: 
emergent monism. This emergent monism is the framework for Clayton’s approach to 
consciousness, to which we now turn. 
  
 
                                                            
37 While Clayton does embrace strong emergence, he also recognises that some phenomena are better 
described as weakly emergent – for example, crystal formations. Being a strong emergentist does not preclude one 
from identifying instances of weak emergences, but merely involves the affirmation that some phenomena are 
ontologically emergent.  
38 Jaegwon Kim, “The Non-Reductivist’s Troubles with Mental Causation,” in Mental Causation, ed. John 
Heil and Alfred R. Mele. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 209.  
39 Not all emergentists want to surrender the physicalist title, especially so-called nonreductive physicalists. 
Nancey Murphy is a notable example of one who affirms both emergence and physicalism (albeit of the 
nonreductive sort). Nonreductive physicalism will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
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3.3 Emergence and Consciousness 
Again, Clayton does not pick out consciousness as uniquely emergent, but insists that 
“understanding the relationship between mind and brain – between consciousness and its neural 
correlates – requires understanding the multi-levelled structure of the natural world. On this 
view, the appearance of mental causes is, in one sense just another case of emergence – just 
another case in which a complicated natural system gives rise to unexpected causal patterns and 
properties.”40 Consciousness is natural, inasmuch as any emergent phenomenon is natural. 
Consciousness is not physical, but then neither are other emergent properties picked out across 
the natural and special sciences. Clayton thus contextualises consciousness within the long 
history of biological evolution, rejecting the idea that the mind lies solely in the domain of 
philosophy or theology. He even affirms that “to make sure that the position is not crypto-
dualist, we must be able to discern clear and robust examples of emergence within the biological 
sciences before making any claims about an emergent theory of mind.”41 We can begin to 
understand the mind only when we recognise that it is continuous with the emergence of life 
itself and complex systems like the brain. Still, Clayton does insist that the mind is certainly an 
instance of strong emergence – and thus markedly different from the weak emergence of, say, 
snow crystal formation. Just how markedly different the mind might be (e.g., uniquely open to 
divine action) remains to be seen. 
 
Clayton rejects the idea that the mind is an object (that would be dualism), and instead finds it 
“far preferable to limit our theory of the mental to mental properties: complex, emergent 
properties ascribed to the brain as their object.”42 Mental properties do not exist independently 
of the brain, but exhibit characteristics that are irreducible to neural processes. This is a rather 
tricky point to make, particularly because emergentists maintain commitments both to physical 
processes and to the “something more” of these emergent properties. After all, “mental 
properties are so radically different in kind, it appears, from the brains that are said to produce 
them that linking the two conceptually – or causally, for that matter – seems well nigh 
impossible.”43 Clayton is here referring to the “explanatory gap,” or the so-called “Hard Problem 
of Consciousness” (HP): regardless of how many neural correlates are linked to specific mental 
states, physicalist scientific models will never be able to explain subjective, conscious experience. 
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The HP is the subject of Chapter 4 and will be critiqued there, but it is worth noting here that 
Clayton presumes something like the HP. That is, Clayton’s emergentist view of the mind rejects 
the possibility of “a definitional equivalence between brain and mind, an identity of mental states 
with brain states, lest the difference of the mental as we experience it be lost.”44 The dilemma for 
the ontological emergentist, then, is to explain how mental states are related to the brain, without 
reducing those mental states to neural processes.  
 
As a strong emergentist, Clayton claims that “conscious phenomena are properties that emerge only through 
the functioning of increasingly complex neurological systems.”45 The mind is not an isolated component of 
the brain, or a fundamental part of reality. Rather, the complex systems of the brain-body-
environment make consciousness possible; “mental properties depend on the entire natural 
history that led to the evolution of an increasingly complex brain and central nervous system, as 
well as on the physical state of the organism at a particular time.”46 Indeed, one of the main ways 
of researching the mind is through identification and analysis of the neural correlates of 
consciousness – or the specific neural activation patterns that correspond to specific mental 
experiences. There are a variety of approaches in cognitive science and neuroscience that attempt 
to explain consciousness through an integration of brain research and complex systems theories. 
For example, neurobiologist Gerald Edelman describes how neural connectivity is involved in 
mental states: “Nervous system behaviour is to some extent self-generated in loops; brain activity 
leads to movement, which leads to further sensation and perception and still further movement. 
The layers and loops…are dynamic; they continually change.”47 For Edelman and many other 
consciousness researchers, the mind just is this sort of complex interconnectivity in the brain. 
 
 Clayton, however, rejects such physicalist theories, claiming that approaches relying on neural 
correlates fail to offer anything other than third-person accounts of brain physiology. He 
concludes that “conscious states and experiences are not found in the individual neurons; they 
emerge out of the massively complex system that is the human brain.”48 Consciousness, for 
Clayton, is something more than the brain-body system. For Clayton and other emergentists, the 
Hard Problem renders physicalist explanations of consciousness insufficient. This is because 
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physicalist theories fail to address subjective, phenomenal experience; “mental properties remain 
different enough from the physiological processes that give rise to them, so that merely linking 
the two leaves the Hard Problem unsolved.”49 Whatever the relationship between consciousness 
and the brain, strong emergentists insist that it is not one of identity between the two, and that 
“[subjective experience] does not seem to be the kind of thing that could be explained in terms 
of functions or structures.”50 
 
How, then, does Clayton propose the mind should be understood? After all, he flatly rejects 
dualist conceptions as inappropriate for our scientific context, but also denies the sufficiency of 
all physicalist theories.51 An emergentist approach, then, must take into account both the 
growing body of scientific evidence that consciousness is directly involved with the brain, but 
still “save the phenomenon” of subjective experience.  The key to this, suggests Clayton, is 
supervenience theory; he explains that “in the most general terms, supervenience means that one 
level of phenomena or type of property (in this case, the mental) is dependent upon another level 
(in this case, the biological or neurophysiological), while at the same time not being reducible to 
it.”52 This is supervenience in its most basic and permissive form; Clayton follows Kim in calling 
this “weak supervenience.” Strong supervenience positions, on the other hand, posit a link 
between levels so strong that the emergent phenomena are actually determined by their 
subvenient levels. Because in this view any change at a supervenient level (say, the mental) is the 
direct result of a change in the subvenient level (say, a specific brain state), then “the ‘strong’ 
theory has to say that the subvenient level provides the real explanation for the phenomena in 
question.”53 It will come as no surprise that Clayton rejects strong supervenience, linking it with 
weak emergence: both strong supervenience and weak emergence employ emergence language 
only heuristically. The “real” explanation for mental properties is to be found in neurobiology 
and physics. Conversely, Clayton links strong emergence and weak supervenience: mental 
properties are ontologically distinct and only loosely dependent on their neural substrates. This is 
the mind-brain relationship on which Clayton builds his divine action theory.  
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Clayton rejects physicalist explanations for consciousness, and offers an emergentist framework 
that locates the mind as a strongly emergent property that is weakly supervenient on the brain. 
But what is the precise nature of the mind’s dependence on the brain? One perennial critique of 
emergence theories is that “the devil is in the details”; it can be very difficult to explain the 
relationship between mental properties and their neurobiological substrates without lapsing into 
either reductive physicalism or dualism. How can the mind be dependent on the brain, without 
being reducible to the brain? Clayton describes this dependency – or “emergentist 
supervenience” – as firmly situated in the context of evolutionary biology. In order to 
understand the mind’s supervenience on the brain, he argues, we must first understand the 
incredibly long and complex natural history of brains and central nervous systems. Indeed, “this 
evolutionary dependency is neither logical nor metaphysical – two requirements often associated 
with supervenience relations in the philosophy of mind.”54 This will be refreshing for those 
weary of overly philosophical or abstract theories of consciousness; Clayton roots his approach 
firmly in the messy and highly contingent evolutionary history of all biological life. His assertion 
that the mind is “essentially dependent on the history of biological systems…is therefore part of 
what distinguishes the emergence approach as a separate [nondualistic] ontological option in the 
debate.”55 In other words, the mind is an evolved, naturally emergent phenomenon that 
supervenes on the brain-body-environment, just as other naturally emergent phenomena 
supervene on their physical substrates. 
 
Clayton may distance himself from dualism by emphasising the mind’s dependence on 
evolutionary history, but how does his emergentist supervenience avoid physicalism? Clayton 
affirms that “an outcome of evolutionary history, mental events as we know them are 
nonetheless not reducible to the neurological systems that produce them.”56 Where does the “not 
reducible” aspect of this emergentism come in? For Clayton, mental causation is “the linchpin of 
the debate.”57 If mental properties are able to exert real causal influence on the brain-body-
environment in a manner irreducible to brain processes themselves, then the mind should be 
granted ontological status. In other words, “granting causal influence to emergent properties 
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must have some effect on one’s ontology.”58 If something is able to do things that are 
unexplainable in terms of lower-level physical processes, then there is warrant for granting 
nonphysical status to that entity. Indeed, for many emergentists, downward causation is a 
definitive characteristic of a phenomenon’s emergent status. 
 
 The question then arises, “Do mental properties have real causal power?” This is obviously an 
enormous subject area and a hotly debated topic. Clayton’s own response to this question is 
essentially an assertion that any explanation of the human subject is insufficient if it does not 
adequately account for ontologically distinct mental causation. Again, he here relies heavily on 
the assumption that physicalist explanations could never explain our perceptions of personal 
agency (more on this in coming chapters), and that there are different kinds of causation. For 
our purposes here, it is enough to recognise Clayton’s firm commitment to mental causation as 
something of a brute fact about evolved conscious beings, and to the conclusion that the mind is 
thus an ontologically distinct emergent reality. He argues that “there are genuine mental causes 
that are not themselves reducible to physical systems on which they depend.”59 Not all causes are 
physical, and this is demonstrated throughout nature; the mind is simply a more complex and 
striking example of this than the causality exhibited in chemistry, biology, and economics (for 
example). 
 
 In Clayton’s own words, “To suppose that these [mental] features will be fully understood in 
biological terms is precisely that: a supposition, an assumption, a wager on a future outcome. A 
deep commitment to the study and understanding of the natural world does not necessitate 
taking a purely biological approach to the human person; even less does it require…that all 
causes are ultimately physical causes.”60 In sum, Clayton is committed to the mind’s causal 
efficacy, and argues that this downward causation precludes the possibility of a physicalist or 
biological account of consciousness. While the mind is a wholly natural product of biological 
evolution, it is also ontologically emergent and irreducible to physical processes in the brain. 
Clayton’s goal is to “acknowledge that the one natural world is vastly more complicated and 
more subtle than physicalism can ever grasp.”61 Consciousness, as an ontologically distinct 
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emergent level or reality, could never be explained in physicalist terms – because of the emergent 
character of all reality, consciousness can only be described by “irreducibly psychological 
explanations.”62 
 
3.4 Emergent Mind and Divine Action 
Only after contextualising the mind in an emergent, evolutionary, natural framework can Clayton 
develop his divine action proposal. The mind is not uniquely emergent, but an example of the 
wider pattern of emergence found throughout nature. Clayton himself acknowledges the mind as 
fully natural and continuous with emergent phenomena throughout nature; consciousness is 
dependent on physical brain processes, but not dependent on or ontologically identical to them. 
How, then, does consciousness offer room for divine action? After all, Clayton rejects 
interventionist divine action at the physical level, arguing that “God would in a sense be 
defeating or contradicting, or perhaps just unnecessarily complicating, God’s own creative 
method by performing intentional actions at [the physical] level.”63 But if the mind is at least 
involved with physical processes (if not outright determined by them), how can Clayton say that 
an explicitly supernatural God acts in the mind? On the face of it, at least, emergence theory 
does little to explain how God could interact with the world in a noninterventionist manner – at 
least, that is, without collapsing the ontological distinction between God and nature. 
 
And yet, Clayton insists that “the theist’s task is not complete without some account of divine 
action,”64 and “theism is only viable if talk of divine action is not completely futile.”65  As noted, 
Clayton follows the noninterventionist commitments explored in Chapter 2, denying any theory 
of divine action that would require contravention of the laws of nature. While one cannot rule 
out the metaphysical possibility of God intervening in the laws of nature, Clayton argues that 
“because our knowledge of physics represents the most rigorous, most lawlike knowledge 
humans have of the world, there is never justification for assuming the falseness of physics 
except in so far as one is arguing for a new and better physics.”66 This wariness of physical 
miracles and objective divine action is very much in line with standard noninterventionist 
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models. That is, Clayton is assuming that any account of divine action must somehow align with 
the known laws of physics and methodological naturalism more generally.  
 
This is precisely the point where emergence becomes relevant for divine action: Clayton insists 
that the ontologically distinct emergent mind is compatible with naturalism and the known laws 
of physics, but also that the emergent mind is underdetermined by physical laws. As such, the 
emergent conscious agent is herself open to divine agency at the emergent level of the mental. In 
other words, it is because the mind is not determined by physical laws that God can act in 
consciousness without contravening those physical laws. As Clayton explains, “Just as no 
physical natural laws are broken when one explains the behavior of human beings in terms of 
their thoughts, will, and intentions, so also no laws are broken when one explains their behavior 
in terms that include the causal influence or ‘lure’ of certain higher spiritual values on their 
thinking and consequent actions.”67 God, then, is to be thought of as a conscious, active agent 
who is “a not-less-than-personal reality,” and who interacts with conscious beings at the 
emergent level of the mental.68 Here we come to a vital component of Clayton’s divine action 
proposal: Clayton suggests that because a God who does things must be a personal agent, then 
there must be an analogy between human and divine action.  That is, hierarchical patterns of 
emergence in nature suggest something critical about how nature relates to God. “Emergent 
causal levels,” Clayton argues, “reflecting the hierarchical structure of the natural world, help to 
elucidate the nature of divine action, though they are not identical to it.”69 The idea here is that 
our understanding of the emergent, hierarchical structure of reality says something about the 
God-nature relationship – in this sense, Clayton is working with a sort of natural theology.  
 
 This is where the emergentist emphasis on downward causation becomes important: just as 
human mentality has real causal efficacy in the natural world without contravening the laws of 
nature (or being reducible to them), so is there warrant in viewing God as a causally efficacious 
personal agent. There is thus a continuity between Clayton’s emphasis on the mind as 
ontologically open and distinct, and God’s action as a personal agent: “[Clayton] moves from 
establishing the complexity of human mental states to arguing for the plausible ontological 
openness of human mentality to establishing the possibility of divine influence at the level of 
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informational input to finite agents.”70 It is noteworthy that Clayton is here moving beyond a 
merely analogical relationship between human and divine agency. Indeed, he is strengthening 
analogy into ontology, using physically underdetermined mental agency as justification for 
affirming divine agency at the level of the mental. Clayton argues that “although thought is a 
natural phenomenon it is not determined by physical laws and is upwardly open to higher types 
of causality. It is permissible to construe divine causality as one of these higher levels of 
causality.”71 But here we have a problem: emergence deals strictly with natural phenomena, and 
while the mind may be ontologically distinct from the brain, emergence theory insists that it is 
yet fully natural. If God, as a sort of divine mentality, were to act downwardly on human minds, 
would this not render God as an emergent level of the natural world? If so, then Clayton’s model 
would lie firmly outside of Christian theism, with its emphasis on divine transcendence and the 
ontological distinction between God and nature. Some emergentist theorists have indeed 
suggested this option, but Clayton is not one of them.72 Indeed, Clayton recognises that “most 
forms of theism are (rightly) highly reticent to construe God as merely an emergent feature of 
the world.”73 The theistic emergentist may avoid mind-body dualism, but only “at the cost of 
opening up a theological dualism elsewhere in his system, namely in his conception of the 
relationship of the divine nature to the nature of the finite world.”74 Clayton thus rejects the idea 
that God is an emergent level of nature itself, but then what is the value of emergence for divine 
action theories? Moreover, if God does not exist in a directly emergent relationship to human 
minds, then why restrict divine action to human mentality in the first place?  
 
Clayton anticipates these critiques, admitting that “once one abandons the thesis that divine 
causality is an emergent product of minds, the critic might complain, there is no longer any 
reason to expect that divine causation will be operative solely at the mental level. Given 
theological dualism, why should a direct divine influence on physical systems present any greater 
difficulties than a divine influence on human thought?”75 Clayton’s response to these critiques 
refers back to the general contours of emergence theories. That is, the sciences of emergence 
demonstrate that the entire natural world is hierarchically structured and fundamentally open to 
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top-down influences. The observable natural world suggests that natural phenomena are open to 
downward causation from higher-level entities. The idea here is that emergence suggests a sort of 
reality that is always open to downward influence. Because mentality is the highest-order, most 
complex, most underdetermined natural phenomenon we know of, it makes sense that this 
would be the level at which God interacts with the natural world – or so the story goes. 
 
Clayton is essentially arguing that the level of emergent mind is the most likely and plausible 
place for divine action to occur. For example, the level of reality governed by Newtonian physics 
might be the least likely locus of interaction (or causal joint) between God and the natural world. 
This is because “we have strong reason to think that these physical processes are deterministic,” 
leaving little room for divine action to occur without contravening deterministic laws.76 The level 
of the mind, however, seems ontologically open to higher forms of influence, and 
underdetermined by physical processes in the brain. Clayton goes so far as to argue that “divine 
claims are not equally defensible at all levels of the natural world…it is more plausible to 
maintain that God influences human moral intuitions and religious aspirations than to argue that 
God fixed the broken plumbing system in one’s house.”77 Note that Clayton is not saying that 
God influences human consciousness by tinkering with individual neurons – that would clearly 
be interventionist. Rather, he is arguing that there are different kinds of causality, other than 
physical causation, at different emergent levels. The sort of physical causation involved in macro-
level Newtonian physics is distinct from the biological and psychological causation evident at 
higher levels in nature. Clayton insists on locating divine action at the emergent level of 
conscious, integrated personhood; he defines this emergent reality as “that level that emerges when an 
integrated state is established between a person and her body, her environment, other persons, and her overall 
mental state, including her interpretation of her social, cultural, historical, and religious context.”78 We see here 
the importance of not equating human mentality with neural processes. Clayton instead locates 
divine action at the higher-order, multifaceted, contextualised emergent level of human 
consciousness. The emphasis is not on the brain itself, but on the brain-body-environment 
system, which exhibits emergent levels of mentality that are irreducible to any single physical 
process.  
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How, then, does God interact with human mentality? Clayton describes this divine-human 
relationship in terms of information exchanges and a divine “lure.” He argues that “no physical 
laws are broken if there is an exchange of information between a divine source and conscious 
human agents,”79 and that “God could guide the process of emergence through the introduction 
of new information…and by holding out an ideal or image that could influence development 
without altering the mechanisms and structures that constrain evolution from the bottom up.”80 
In a sense, God capitalises on the ontological freedom afforded to emergent minds, and is 
“allowed” to interact with human thoughts and subjective experiences precisely because those 
mental states are underdetermined by physical processes in the brain. Divine action, then, should 
not be thought of as direct alteration of the physical world, but as a persuasive lure in emergent 
mentality that might lead to physical action being undertaken by specific conscious subjects. In 
other words, “God’s role becomes that of one who prepares and persuades, rather than one who 
‘brings about’ human actions…At the same time, it does continue to ascribe a crucial role to 
God in ‘luring’ humanity and encouraging certain types of actions.”81 It is worth noting here how 
very limited is this sort of divine action. While this will be discussed below, it is important to 
highlight that Clayton’s version of divine action is far more constrained and restrictive than the 
wide-ranging sorts of divine action generally affirmed by theists.  
 
3.5 Emergent Divine Action and Panentheism 
As appealing as Clayton’s emergentist divine action proposal might be for those wishing to 
affirm both naturalism and theistic divine action, it faces at least one serious objection: as long as 
consciousness is considered to be fully natural (as Clayton affirms), divine action from a 
supernatural God must surely involve some sort of intervention, if only to bridge the 
theologically necessary ontological gap between God and nature. Put differently, if the whole 
reason for locating divine action in the emergent mind is that interventionism seems so 
unpalatable, it is not clear that the explicitly nonphysical God of Christian theism could operate 
at the same ontological level as emergent human mentality – at least not without sacrificing 
something of God’s otherness, or altering physical realities. After all, even Clayton would admit 
that the mind is dependent on the brain, and operates only in intimate connection with neural 
processes. How, then, could God interact with the mind without also interacting with the 
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physical? While the scientific aspects of Clayton’s theory will be addressed in below, it is here 
necessary simply to question whether Clayton’s proposal really gets around the problem of 
intervention. As it turns out, Clayton anticipates this objection to emergentist divine action and 
introduces panentheism as a metaphysical solution, a framework of the God-world relationship 
that questions traditional natural/supernatural dichotomies and promises to ease the transition 
between divine and human mentality. Space constraints prohibit an in-depth examination of 
panentheism here, though it will be covered a bit more extensively in Part Two. For now, I will 
briefly highlight the function of panentheism in Clayton’s divine action proposal.  
 
In its most basic form, panentheism can be defined as “the view that the world is in some sense 
‘within’ God, although God is also more than the world.”82 This is a model of the God-world 
relationship that challenges the dualistic model generally affirmed by classical theism. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, much of the divine action conversation assumes something like a self-
sufficient natural world “over here,” and a supernatural God “over there”; the trick is to 
articulate a way for God to come into the natural order and effect change. Clayton rejects this 
nearly-spatial relationship between God and nature, instead arguing that all of nature exists 
(somehow) within God, without compromising God’s transcendence. As philosopher Charles 
Hartshorne expressed it, “we are truly ‘outside’ the divine essence, though inside God.”83 
Panentheists believe that their God-world model is more aligned with contemporary science and 
philosophy than is classical theism, and that classical theism is no longer a viable option for 
contemporary thinkers. More specifically, Clayton believes not only that panentheism offers a 
vital metaphysical framework for emergent divine action, but that emergence itself suggests a 
panentheistic model. Emergence, suggests Clayton, “is therefore a conceptual structure, born in 
the crucible of the sciences, that can lead to the category of divinity or spirituality as an emergent 
property in evolution. But emergence is not in the end adequate to fully explain this property. 
Emergence propels one to metaphysics, and metaphysical reflection in turn suggests a 
theological postulate, panentheism, above and beyond the logic of emergence.”84 For Clayton, 
the hierarchical, ontologically distinct levels of reality in the natural world actually suggest a 
panentheistic model, wherein the natural world (specifically the mind) is fundamentally open to 
the God in whom it exists.  
                                                            
82 Clayton, Adventures in the Spirit, 118. 
83 Charles Hartshorne, “Introduction: The Standpoint of Panentheism,” in Philosophers Speak of God, ed. 
Charles Hartshorne and William R. Reese (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 22.  




How, then, does panentheism aid Clayton’s emergentist divine action thesis? The main idea here 
is Clayton’s emphasis on the analogy between human mental causation and divine causation: just 
as human consciousness is able to downwardly affect physical processes in the brain (and 
indirectly in the wider world) without being determined by those physical processes on which it 
is dependent, so is God able to downwardly affect human mentality. In Clayton’s model, this 
analogy is strengthened into ontology – and it is panentheism that makes this so. As philosopher 
Zachary Simpson explains, “Clayton’s account of divine action requires an ontological relationship 
between human consciousness and God, if there is to be any divine influence whatsoever upon 
the world. Or, in other words: Clayton’s notion of divine agency extends what was cautiously 
extolled as an analogical relationship into an ontological relationship.”85 Because panentheism 
locates all the natural world within God, there is something of a permeable boundary between 
divine and natural realities. Just as the entire natural world exhibits ontologically distinct and 
causally irreducible emergent levels, so might the emergentist panentheist affirm God’s 
ontological distinction over and above the natural world – even while incorporating the world 
into the “body” of God, as it were. Because Clayton affirms that God must be at least personal, 
and because nature exists within God, Clayton can then affirm divine agency precisely at the 
level of the emergent, conscious person. Clayton explains that “the highest known [emergent] 
level known to us is the emergence of mind or mental properties from the most complicated 
biological structure known to us, the human body and brain.”86 The emergent mind is thought to 
be more than physical, and affirmed as ontologically distinct from physical processes. It is at this 
emergent level that Clayton suggests as an ontological meeting point between God and nature: 
“So the relationship suggests itself: the body is to mind as the body/mind combination – that is, 
human persons – are to the divine.”87 This is worth emphasising: Clayton’s emergentist divine 
action thesis only works if the analogy – God:world::mind:brain – is more than an analogy. 
Emergence theory alone does not suggest divine action, because emergent realities in chemistry, 
biology, and psychology are fully natural – as Clayton himself readily admits. As long as the 
panentheistic analogy above is simply an analogy, then there is no more reason to affirm divine 
action in the emergent mind than there is to affirm any physical instance of divine action. In 
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other words, panentheism is what allows Clayton’s emergentist divine action to escape the charge 
of interventionism he is so keen to avoid.  
 
However, panentheism faces serious critiques. By situating the entire panentheistic universe-as-a-
whole within the divine being, Clayton is able to imagine God working through emergence to 
bring about particular events in the world – but exactly how this occurs is altogether vague. 
Moreover, panentheism has serious problems as a theological model; as Aquinas scholar Michael 
Dodds concludes, “Despite its efforts to tread a middle course…panentheism seems to collapse 
inevitably into pantheism.”88 To the extent that Clayton’s emergentist panentheistic analogy 
reflects ontology, the model veers precariously close to a pantheistic metaphysic. On the other 
hand, paradoxically, to the extent that panentheism insists that God is somehow “more than” 
and not dependent on the natural world, it is unclear how it is to be distinguished from more 
traditional theism. That is, panentheism may not offer anything that is fundamentally unavailable 
to a robust theistic account of God’s immanence in nature. While panentheism is appealing 
insofar as it takes both the natural world and divine immanence very seriously indeed, there may 
be theological reasons to prefer standard theism. Of course, Clayton’s approach is not the only 
version of panentheism available, and this metaphysical option will be revisited in Part Two. 
Here it is enough to recognise that Clayton’s emergentist divine action proposal is dependent on 
a panentheistic metaphysic, and is thus vulnerable to any critiques of panentheism more generally 
– though it is also the panentheistic metaphysic that allows Clayton to affirm God-mind 
interaction.  
 
3.6 Evaluating the Emergentist Divine Action Proposal 
This, then, is Clayton’s emergentist, panentheistic divine action proposal: because ontologically 
distinct emergent phenomena are inherent features throughout the natural world, and because a 
panentheistic metaphysic allows the emergent mind to exist in ontological hierarchical 
relationship to God, a limited account of divine agency is rendered a plausible option – both 
scientifically and theologically. But does Clayton’s divine action theory stand up to scientific and 
theological scrutiny? In this section, I suggest that Clayton’s divine action proposal is lacking on 
three fronts: it is unwarranted by emergence theory itself, it threatens the ontological distinction 
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between God and nature, and it puts unnecessary theological constraints on the possibility of 
divine action. Additionally, Clayton’s entire proposal rests on the assumption that a physicalist 
understanding of consciousness is inconceivable and impossible; this will not be addressed here, 
as it is the subject of the next chapter. The cumulative effect of these critiques is to suggest that 
Clayton’s divine action proposal is, in fact, something of a God-of-the-gaps proposal not unlike 
its noninterventionist causal joint predecessors. That is, this emergentist proposal both makes 
poor use of scientific emergence theories, and assumes that a specific aspect of the natural world 
(i.e., the mind) is fundamentally unexplainable in physicalist terms.  
 
Before examining these three critiques, it is important to note that emergence theory itself can be 
critiqued. For example, one could argue that the strong emergentist’s rejection of reductive 
physicalism is basically an argument from ignorance. This is because strong emergentists deny, in 
principle, the explicability of higher-level phenomena such as consciousness in physicalist terms. 
In other words, Clayton and others affirm the mind’s ontological distinctiveness and 
unpredictability not as a science-based conclusion, but as a philosophical assumption irrespective 
of increased scientific knowledge about the brain-body system. This a priori assumption about 
the mind’s inexplicability is often framed in terms of the Hard Problem, which is the subject of 
Chapter 4. At the very least, this presumptive rejection of physicalist explanations puts 
emergentists in a rather uncomfortable position, vis-à-vis the various sciences. Second, strong 
emergentists are forced to deny the causal closure principle, because higher-order nonphysical 
phenomena are granted causal agency that is unavailable to lower-level physical components. 
Some theorists (such as Clayton) find this an acceptable and necessary price to pay. To the extent 
that an emergentist wishes to be aligned with some form of physicalism, however, her denial of 
causal closure renders her as something other than a proper physicalist (and perhaps something 
other than a proper naturalist more broadly, as will be discussed in coming chapters). In other 
words, the denial of the causal closure principle may be methodologically suspect – at least as far 
as scientists themselves are concerned. Finally, one might argue that strong emergence’s assertion 
of downward causation is a paradoxical or incoherent position. For example, Kim has argued 
extensively against the “double-counting” of downward causation. Specifically, if an emergent 
phenomenon such as the mind is to cause change in the lower-level physical substrate of the 
brain, how exactly could this happen except through those lower-level neurons themselves? As 
Kim writes, “To think that one can be a serious physicalist and at the same time enjoy the 
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company of things and phenomena that are nonphysical, I believe, is an idle dream.”89 One 
might counter that strong emergentists are happy to be excluded from the “serious physicalist” 
club, but even Clayton emphasises monism – there is only one sort of fundamental “stuff” in the 
universe. In other words, to the extent that emergentists wish to be considered physicalists or 
monists at all, they face the challenge of explaining downward causation in nonredundant, 
nonphysicalist terms. These are just a few of the critiques that could be levied against emergence 
theory itself; the real task of this section is to question Clayton’s specific application of 
emergence to divine action theory. 
 
3.6.1 Challenge #1: Scientific Critiques of Clayton’s Proposal 
First, Clayton’s emergentist divine action proposal faces scientific critiques. Namely, the 
scientific understanding of emergence theory does not allow for supernatural causation, and 
requires basic physical components (and only physical components) as the necessary substrate for 
emergent phenomena.  Clayton’s proposal is that “no natural laws are abrogated if and when the 
divine agent influences the outcomes of conscious processes – just as no laws would be broken 
if you actually come to hold some new beliefs based on reading [this] argument.”90 However, this 
assertion is wildly speculative, and wholly unsupported by emergence theories themselves. 
Examples of emergence throughout the natural world always involve a clear understanding of 
the physical mechanisms underpinning them, and even strongly emergent phenomena are still 
considered to be dependent on lower-level physical processes. Clayton’s proposal, on the other 
hand, is altogether vague on the specifics of how, exactly, God could affect the human mind 
without affecting physical mechanisms. As Manning points out, “Clayton’s account of divine 
action is by his own admission incapable of providing a comprehensive explanation ‘in human-
scientific terms how it is that God affects the person as such.”’91 While this may be an inevitable 
challenge for any theology of divine action, it is unclear why scientific emergence theories are 
uniquely well-suited to divine action theories.  
 
The emergentist divine action thesis, then, faces two scientific problems. First, scientific 
emergence theories recognise only those phenomena exhibiting clear dependence on physical 
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substrates. This means that even the emergent mind is dependent on the brain-body-
environment system – if God were to act at the level of the mental, this would presumably 
involve interaction with neural systems in the brain. After all, Clayton himself recognises the 
mind’s dependence on the brain; consciousness is not some free-floating entity that can be 
affected apart from its physical substrates. Simpson, for example, explains that “increasing 
complexity need not imply ontological openness. The increasing complexity seen from cells to 
organisms to human consciousness may indeed signal a ‘relaxation’ of certain physical 
constraints and the emergence of different forms of causation, but it does not necessarily imply 
the evolution of the type of ontological openness which Clayton’s account of divine action 
requires.”92 This is important, because an “ontological openness” is exactly what Clayton’s 
proposal requires, if divine action is to be affirmed. After all, Clayton’s theological motivation is 
to affirm divine action in a way that forgoes divine intervention in physical processes. And yet, 
“emergence does not authorize the prioritization of any particular form of agency or level, 
including God or the human mind”; how then can Clayton locate divine action in the emergent 
mind? Is this not a fatal misunderstanding of emergence itself? Simpson’s point here is that 
Clayton’s version of divine action would require a degree of ontological openness (read 
“independence from physical processes”) that is not necessarily mandated – or even allowed – by 
emergence theories. In other words, if Clayton’s divine action theory is truly noninterventionist, 
it would require an account of the mind that borders on dualism. The only way to avoid all 
interaction between God and the physical substrates of the brain is to divorce the mind from its 
neural substrates altogether – a move which Clayton clearly does not wish to make. It seems, 
then, that we are forced to make a choice: we can either acknowledge that divine action in the 
mind would require God’s involvement with neural processes, or we can admit that God 
interacts with the mind at such an ontologically distinct level that it is effectively dualistic.  
 
Second, scientific emergence theories not only do not require, but do not allow for downward 
causation from supernatural sources. As explained above, Clayton suggests “no physical laws are 
broken if there is an exchange of information between a divine source and conscious human 
agents.”93 But “information” is a precise scientific and mathematical term, and one which always 
requires a physical basis. This is not to say that some sort of interaction between humans and 
God does not take place, but that packaging this interaction in scientifically-constrained terms 
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like “information” is problematic. Similarly, Clayton himself repeatedly emphasises that the 
emergent mind is natural; emergence does not require or encourage recourse to supernatural 
explanations for mentality. That is, emergence theorists recognise the mind as naturalistically 
explainable – and this would include all our thoughts, emotions, and even religious orientations. 
The problem here, though, is that Clayton risks causal overdetermination by introducing divine 
action at the level of the mind. Because emergence theory actually purports to explain 
consciousness naturalistically, “referring to a metaphysical or theistic source of additional 
causation may be seen as causal overdetermination. For many philosophers of mind, simply 
admitting some form of downward causation is a hard pill to swallow.”94 Emergence theories – 
at least as understood by scientists themselves – are wholly naturalistic and not intended as 
scientific justification for theological claims. To suggest that a non-physically-based divine agent 
could somehow act within brain-dependent human minds is not only unwarranted by emergence 
theory, it is precluded by methodological naturalism more broadly. Again, this is not to suggest 
that God cannot act within human minds or elsewhere (this thesis argues just the opposite), but 
that scientific emergence theories should not be used to support this move.    
 
3.6.2 Challenge #2: Emergent Divine Action and the God-World Distinction 
The second critique of Clayton’s divine action thesis is that it threatens to undermine the God-
world distinction. Insofar as Clayton strengthens the panentheistic analogy 
(God:world::mind:body) into ontology, he places God and nature on an ontological par with one 
another. The internal logic of emergence theory requires a continuity between hierarchical levels. 
While each emergent level might be unpredictably novel, irreducible, and exhibit downward 
causation, each level is still dependent on and comprised of its lower-level components. Clayton 
himself is intent on contextualising consciousness in an overall naturalistic pattern of emergence; 
he recognises the messy evolutionary and biological processes that resulted in sentient beings. 
But extrapolating emergent realities to include the divine-nature relationship violates this 
naturalistic continuity evidenced by emergent phenomena throughout nature – and which 
Clayton himself affirms. Again, this is because the downward causation exhibited by emergent 
phenomena is only made possible by the lower-level components on which the emergent 
phenomena is dependent. While Clayton attempts to address this problem of divine 
transcendence by contextualising his proposal within a panentheistic metaphysic, his use of 
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emergence theory actually undermines the panentheistic affirmation that God is somehow more 
than the world. Namely, in order for emergent downward causation to occur across the God-
nature interface, God would have to be ontologically dependent on and even comprised of 
lower-level components in the natural world. Clearly, this is not Clayton’s desired conclusion. It 
is true that one could say simply that God’s relation to the natural world is like that of the mind 
to the body – but Clayton insists on transmuting that analogy into ontology. In order for his 
divine action theory to be truly emergentist, Clayton must allow for an ontological continuity 
between God and nature. Emergent levels of reality might be ontologically distinct insofar as 
they are somehow more than than their substrates and exhibit novel causal powers, but they still 
exist in ontological continuity with their lower-level substrates.  
 
3.6.3 Challenge #3: Emergent Mind and Constraints on Divine Action  
In addition to the two problems just outlined, the emergentist divine action proposal is arguably 
theologically insufficient insofar as it limits divine action. Within Clayton’s model, the only direct 
influence between God and nature occurs at the level of consciousness. If God is to act 
specifically beyond the confines of the mind, this must occur indirectly via conscious decisions 
on the part of sentient beings. As Clayton explains, “God must persuade the agent in question to 
act in a particular way for [an] event to occur…intentional agents can be convinced or 
persuaded, whereas (as far as we know) rocks cannot be persuaded to act on their own – no 
matter how good the arguments.”95 It is worth emphasising how very limited is this form of 
divine agency; this “divine causality is better understood as a form of causal influence that 
prepares and persuades” at the level of mentality.96 Beyond the inevitable tension between this 
limited account of divine action and Christian theology, tradition, and Scriptures, this model is 
also exceedingly anthropocentric. Is a theology of divine action adequate if it allows only for 
God’s interaction with recently-evolved sentient beings? Surely this stands in tension with 
theological concerns for creation more generally. Clayton is aware of these challenges, admitting 
that although “it limits the efficacy of the divine will in the world, I nonetheless believe that this 
position is sufficient to sustain a viable and scientifically acceptable form of theism for today’s 
world.”97 Still, one wonders whether Clayton’s panentheistic framework might actually allow for 
divine action beyond the mind. After all, placing the entire natural world within God goes quite a 
                                                            





long way to cross the ontological hurdles usually associated with divine action. In other words, 
once God and nature are related in a panentheistic ontology, are not the standard worries of 
intervention nullified? Perhaps ironically, it seems that Clayton is actually committed to the 
standard noninterventionist paradigm discussed in Chapter 2, when his panentheism would 
actually remove noninterventionism’s metaphysical commitments outright. Indeed, the divine 
action possibilities afforded by panentheism will be discussed in Part Two. Here it is helpful 
simply to highlight how Clayton may be unnecessarily restricting divine action. This emergentist 
divine action theory may be in line with standard noninterventionist causal joint approaches, but 
the panentheistic ontology it requires negates the need for noninterventionist models in the first 
place. It is worth asking whether such a limited account of divine action is worth the theological 
price of rejecting a theistic God-world ontology.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that standard, noninterventionist, causal joint theories of divine action 
are alive and well - namely in relation to consciousness. By examining Philip Clayton’s use of 
emergence theory in developing a causal joint proposal, I have argued that metaphysical 
commitments to a noninterventionist paradigm lead to locating divine action in poorly 
understood areas of the natural world. Just as quantum mechanics was once deemed a plausible 
locale for noninterventionist divine action, so now has the ontologically distinct emergent mind 
been identified as a plausible nexus between God and nature. And yet, just as quantum divine 
action failed to be either scientifically plausible or theologically sufficient, so is emergent divine 
action unwarranted by emergence theory itself, and overly restrictive theologically. Indeed, 
insofar as Clayton’s model specifically locates divine action in the underdetermined, emergent 
mind, it falls into the same sort of God-of-the-gaps thinking characterising noninterventionist 
causal joint models of decades past. The emergent mind may be underdetermined by brain 
processes (though not necessarily), but emergence theory yet categorises it as fully natural. Thus, 
the emergent divine action proposal misappropriates scientific emergence theories; it seems that 
Clayton “abandons a more strictly emergentist logic for the articulation and postulation of his 
theology.”98 This does not mean that God does not act in the human mind, but only that 
emergence theory itself does not allow for this theological move.  
                                                            




Moreover, Clayton’s emergentist divine action proposal presupposes that the mind is 
fundamentally unexplainable in physicalist terms. He admits that his proposal “presupposes that 
human thought will not ultimately be explained in terms of physical or biological laws.”99 This 
assumption is a remarkably common one – so common, in fact, that it has been philosophically 
codified as the “Hard Problem of Consciousness,” and attracted an enormous body of literature. 
The idea that the mind is somehow special, non-physical, and uniquely spiritual can be 
understood as an “intuitive dualism.” Insofar as this intuitive dualism is a presupposition of 
Clayton’s divine action thesis, and also an important part of subsequent chapters’ discussion of 
naturalism (theistic and otherwise), it is worth examining in detail. It is thus to this Hard Problem 








                                                            




                                        Chapter 4 
               The Philosophy and Science of the Mind 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Philip Clayton’s emergent divine action thesis is open 
to serious critique from within emergence theory itself. Specifically, the scientific understanding 
of emergence does not allow for consciousness to be viewed as uniquely spiritual or any less 
scientifically explainable than other emergent phenomena. Locating divine action in the emergent 
mind is thus an unwarranted step, scientifically speaking, and theologically insufficient insofar as 
it restricts divine action to the human mind. While Clayton does not consider himself a dualist, 
his consistent privileging of consciousness would suggest otherwise. Nevertheless, Clayton’s 
premise that the mind is somehow something more than a physical process is an intuitive one, 
and one that is widely shared – not only in the general public, but (as will become evident) in 
academia as well. Clayton is by no means alone in privileging the mind as a nonphysical aspect of 
humans that is unexplainable in physicalist terms and uniquely open to divine (inter)action. What 
we find when examining positions such as Clayton’s is that generally they are driven not by 
science, but from philosophy, intuition, or common sense. As such, arguments from science 
against the naturalisation of the mind are often ineffective. Those privileging the mind as 
uniquely nonphysical are apt to reject all scientific explanations of consciousness as insufficient, 
and as failing to actually address what has come to be known as the “Hard Problem of 
Consciousness” (or “Hard Problem,” or “HP”).    
 
In this chapter, I will examine the Hard Problem and its link to theological proposals identifying 
the mind as uniquely spiritual and open to divine action. I will then present deflationary views on 
the HP from within the philosophy of mind. Then, in the next chapter, I will highlight several 
physicalist approaches to consciousness. These draw upon not only philosophy, but also the 
cognitive and natural sciences, and address the question, “Is consciousness best understood as 
physical, immaterial, natural-but-not-physical, or something else entirely – what exactly is 
consciousness?” I will argue that the Hard Problem is essentially a placeholder for a sort of 
intuitive dualism, or the commonsense hunch that our conscious selves are in some way distinct 
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and separable from our bodies. Further, this intuitive dualism is the driver for divine action 
theories that privilege the mind. Therefore, while there is a sizable literature devoted to critiques 
of dualism, I here focus solely on the HP because it is the philosophical articulation of the 
commonsense hunch underlying theologies that privilege the mind. In sum, this chapter critiques 
the philosophical presuppositions behind theological efforts to privilege human consciousness as 
uniquely nonphysical, and argues that there is good reason to assume the “in principle” 
explicability of consciousness from within a scientific perspective. The goal here is not to defend 
any one theory of consciousness, but merely to challenge the intuition that the mind is ultimately 
distinct from physical processes, and to legitimise the question of consciousness as a proper 
scientific problem. The position taken in this chapter is thus notably out of step with much of 
contemporary theology that would privilege the mind, but it is argued that there is 
methodological and scientific warrant for this.  
 
4.2 The Hard Problem of Consciousness 
Before getting into the HP itself, some clarifying remarks on terminology are needed. Academic 
writing on the mind and brain is notoriously complicated and prone to confusion, not least 
because consciousness is such an interdisciplinary subject. When cognitive scientists, 
philosophers, theologians, psychologists, and neuroscientists are all talking about the same 
subject matter, proper definitions of key terms often remain unspoken or become confused or 
conflated. This is particularly true with the terms physical/nonphysical, and natural/supernatural 
(or non-natural). What one considers to be “natural” can vary widely, with some using “physical” 
and “natural” interchangeably, and others affirming “naturalism” but not “physicalism.”1 
Chapter 6 will be devoted to a more in-depth discussion of these distinctions, and naturalism in 
particular. For now, I will use “physical” to denote those entities or phenomena that are 
explicable wholly in the terms of physics.2 In other words, “physicalism” is used to denote the 
position affirming only those entities or phenomena explicable in terms of energy, matter, and 
the relationship between them (so electrons, protons, neutrons, electromagnetism, gravity, etc.). 
Note that physicalism does not necessarily say that it is convenient or even possible to describe 
all phenomena with the language of physics – only that no nonphysical realities are involved in 
                                                            
1 This will be discussed in Chapter 6, but also see Owen Flanagan, “Varieties of Naturalism,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Religion and Science, ed. Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).  
2 Part 2 of this thesis is devoted to challenging the idea that anything can be “just physical” – but this 
designation will be used here in keeping with dominant scientific and philosophical practice. 
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those phenomena.3 For example, physicalists would not necessarily attempt to analyse 
economics, music, or communism in the language or concepts of basic physics; most would 
recognise the expediency or even necessity of using the special sciences to fully understand these 
phenomena. Nevertheless, a physicalist would never invoke a decidedly nonphysical entity as an 
explanation. 
 
 Naturalism, on the other hand, can be conceived of more broadly than physicalism.  A naturalist 
might acknowledge other entities or forces in the natural world besides physical ones. David 
Chalmers, as we will see, is one who posits consciousness as a fundamental but ultimately natural 
component of the universe. He and other naturalistic dualists affirm nonphysical realities, while 
still excluding supernatural forces or entities from their naturalistic explanations. As will be 
shown in Chapter 6, the distinction between physicalism, naturalism, and supernaturalism can 
become quite “fuzzy.” For example, if scientists were to somehow identify a natural-but-
nonphysical substrate for consciousness, would that substrate not just be incorporated into 
physicalism? One could argue that this is exactly what has happened in the scientific discoveries 
of quantum forces, dark matter and dark energy, and even electromagnetism: none of these were 
deemed “physical” until, finally, they were. This brings up the question of what we mean by the 
term “scientific.” Almost by definition (insofar as the causal closure principle is assumed) 
modern science’s commitment to methodological naturalism precludes any nonphysical entities 
in scientific explanations. As noted, however, the list of entities deemed “physical” has been an 
ever-growing one throughout history, and so has the list of phenomena being explained in 
scientific terms. In other words, what could not be scientifically (or physically) explained two 
hundred years ago might well be explainable today. Things get a bit fuzzier when the term 
“scientific” is applied to consciousness. In theory, Chalmers’ naturalistic dualism might allow for 
scientific explanation of the mind, as long as “scientific” and/or “physical” were broadened to 
include consciousness as a fundamental component of the physical world. This will all be 
discussed further in coming chapters; for now, it is important only to note that in this chapter, I 
will use the terms “physical” and “natural” carefully. Use of the term “natural” implies that the 
more restrictive “physical” is not an appropriate label, and vice versa – “physical” is used in the 
restrictive sense, excluding nonphysical entities. “Scientific” will indicate a scientific explanation 
                                                            
3 For more on this, see Chapter 3’s discussion on strong and weak emergence. Some physicalists happily 
call themselves “reductionistic” and insist that all phenomena are in principle explainable in physicalist terms, while 
nonreductionists might assert the ontological distinction of higher-level phenomena, while still only acknowledging 
the basic constituents recognised by physics.  
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that does not utilise nonphysical entities, as currently defined in contemporary science. With that 
being said, we can now move on to the Hard Problem of Consciousness.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, Clayton’s argument that consciousness is uniquely open to divine 
action “presupposes that human thought will not ultimately be explained in terms of physical or 
biological laws.”4 This presupposition is an intuitive one; who among us finds it obvious that our 
rich mental lives are identical to scientifically explicable biological processes? Within the 
philosophical and theological traditions, this assumption of the mind’s “specialness” has been 
defended in various ways, and with varying implications. In the contemporary literature, few 
have been as influential in defending the ontological distinctiveness of the mind as David 
Chalmers. Chalmers is a philosopher and cognitive scientist whose 1996 book The Conscious Mind 
has provided an academic focus for decades of multidisciplinary thought and research on the 
mind-body problem.5 Because Chalmers’ philosophical work on the HP has been such an 
important (and controversial!) focal point in consciousness studies, it is a useful lens through 
which to analyse the philosophical assumptions driving divine action theories such as Clayton’s.  
 
Chalmers argues that “the really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. 
When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a 
subjective aspect.”6 Immediately, then, we see that Chalmers makes a distinction between 
subjective experience and brain processes; it is this key distinction that forms the basis of the HP 
and, indeed, the mind-body problem more generally. The claim is that no amount of 
neurobiological knowledge could ever explain why, as philosopher Thomas Nagel puts it, “there 
is something that it is like to be” conscious.7 It is important to note up front that in his analysis of 
the Hard Problem, Chalmers is effectively defining consciousness itself – this will become 
important in coming sections. Indeed, Chalmers defines consciousness by contrasting it with the 
physical processes from which it somehow arises. The question, he argues, is why 
neurobiological processes are accompanied by this additional element of phenomenal, subjective 
experience: “It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good 
                                                            
4 Clayton, Adventures in the Spirit, 226. 
5 David J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Philosophy of Mind Series 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
6 David J. Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” in Explaining Consciousness – the “Hard 
Problem,” A Bradford Book, ed. Jonathan Shear (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 10.  
7 Thomas Nagel, “What is it Like to be a Bat?,” The Philosophical Review 83, no. 4 (1974): 436. 
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explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner 
life at all?” 8 Moreover, “if any problem qualifies as the problem of consciousness, it is this one. 
In this central sense of ‘consciousness,’ an organism is conscious if there is something it is like to 
be that organism, and a mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in that 
state.”9 Chalmers recognises that the brain is somehow involved in conscious experience, but 
insists that subjective experience is the real core of consciousness, the really Hard Problem that 
is incapable of being addressed by the various brain sciences (at least as we now understand 
them). In other words, he argues that consciousness is not the sort of thing that could be 
addressed by cognitive science or other brain-related sciences.  
 
This needs some unpacking. Key to Chalmers’ argument is his distinction between the “hard” 
and “easy” problems of consciousness. The so-called “easy” problems “are those that seem 
directly susceptible to the standard methods of cognitive science, whereby a phenomenon is 
explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms.”10 Chalmers (and Clayton, for that 
matter) fully appreciates the crucial role that the brain plays in producing conscious experience in 
humans. In fact, Chalmers’ “easy” problems of consciousness include such phenomena as 
attention, behaviour control, an individual’s access to his/her own internal states and an ability to 
report those states, and the ability to integrate information and react to the environment. 
According to Chalmers, cognitive science is capable (in principle if not yet in practice) of fully 
explaining all these aspects of consciousness scientifically, identifying the precise mechanisms 
that make them possible. All these phenomena can be considered functions of the brain, or 
cognitive abilities. Chalmers wants to distinguish between functions and abilities on the one 
hand, and the accompanying experience of phenomenal consciousness on the other: it simply 
feels like something to be conscious, and this experience is distinct from, and additional to, the 
functional processes that are part of conscious experience. In other words, the methodology of 
cognitive science is not the sort of thing that could possibly solve the HP; “to account for 
conscious experience, we need an extra ingredient in the explanation.”11 This dilemma is commonly 
referred to as the “explanatory gap” – the idea that the relationship between subjective 
experience and scientific knowledge will always remain mysterious.  
                                                            
8 Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” 11. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 9. 




One classic thought experiment used to illustrate the explanatory gap and the need for this 
“extra ingredient” in consciousness comes from philosopher Frank Jackson. Jackson formulated 
what has come to be known as the “knowledge argument” as a refutation of physicalist 
approaches to the mind.12 He posited a scientist named Mary who knows everything about the 
science of vision and colour – but has never experienced colour herself. The thought experiment 
is best expressed in Jackson’s own words: 
Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world 
from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specializes in 
the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information 
there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use 
terms like ‘red,’ ‘blue,’ and so on. She discovers, for example, just which wavelength 
combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the 
central nervous system the contraction of the vocal cords and expulsion of air from the 
lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence ‘The sky is blue.’ [...] What will happen 
when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a color television 
monitor? Will she learn anything or not?13 
 
It would seem that Mary would indeed learn something by experiencing colour first-hand. Surely 
Mary’s own subjective experience of colour would give her a sort of knowledge that is 
fundamentally distinct from that learned from scientific methodology and explanations.  
Jackson’s point is that there is more to phenomenal experience (often referred to as “qualia” in 
thought experiments like this) than what can be described scientifically. Consciousness is not 
reducible to neuroscientific knowledge about the brain; first-hand experience is a qualitatively 
different entity. There have long been heated debates surrounding Mary and the knowledge 
argument.14 The key here, however, is that for those like Chalmers and Jackson, conscious 
experience cannot be reduced to the sorts of explanations generated by cognitive science or 
neuroscience; “you can’t explain conscious experience on the cheap.”15 Chalmers himself views 
consciousness as a fundamental part of nature, thus qualifying his approach to the mind-body 
problem as a form of naturalistic dualism. What is important for our purposes here, however, is 
                                                            
12 It is noteworthy that Jackson no longer finds this argument convincing. He writes: “Most contemporary 
philosophers given a choice between going with science and going with intuitions, go with science. Although I once 
dissented from the majority, I have capitulated and now see the interesting issue as being where the arguments from 
the intuitions against physicalism—the arguments that seem so compelling—go wrong.” Frank Jackson, “Mind and 
Illusion,” in Minds and Persons, ed. Anthony O’Hear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 251. 
13 Frank Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” Philosophical Quarterly 32, no. 127 (1982): 130.  
14 For various perspectives on the knowledge argument, see Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, and Daniel 
Stoljar, There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004). 
15 Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” 18. 
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Chalmers’ basic denial that contemporary science could ever wholly explain consciousness, at 
least in physical terms. Chalmers’ framing of the Hard Problem is an intuitive one. Nevertheless, 
Chalmers takes great pains to build a philosophical framework for his position, rendering it a 
formidable option in the philosophy of mind. While the nuances of this framework are worthy 
of detailed attention, the purposes of this chapter are served by an examination of one thought 
experiment: that of Chalmers’ philosophical zombies. 
 
 
In this thought experiment, Chalmers uses the possibility of philosophical zombies to illustrate 
the distinction between physical processes and conscious experience. According to Chalmers, a 
philosophical zombie is “someone or something physical identical to me (or to any other 
conscious being), but lacking conscious experiences altogether…This creature is molecule for 
molecule identical to me….but he lacks conscious experience entirely.”16 These hypothetical 
creatures are physically identical to conscious beings with all the same neural circuitry and even 
cognitive functioning that one might expect; this includes such capacities as information 
processing, behaviour control, awareness, cognition, sight, taste, and even the zombie’s ability to 
think that it is conscious. In short, this being would have all the abilities and functions that 
Chalmers deems explainable by cognitive science – the so-called “easy problems” of 
consciousness.  Whether or not such a being could ever exist in our actual world is beside the 
point; the emphasis here is on the mere conceivability of such a being. Evolution could have 
produced zombies, creatures physically identical to humans in every way, but lacking 
consciousness. Chalmers insists that because we can imagine a being having all the same physical 
characteristics as ourselves, but without the experience of conscious experience, then we must 
conclude that consciousness is a further fact about ourselves (and other conscious beings). 
Chalmers explains that “the fact that consciousness accompanies a given physical process is a 
further fact, not explainable simply by telling the story about the physical facts.”17 It is not like 
something to be a zombie, for they lack consciousness.  
 
                                                            
16 Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, 94. 
17 Ibid., 107. 
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Chalmers’ zombie argument is heavily philosophical, and has been fiercely debated over the 
years.18 The key point, however, is that Chalmers works with a very commonsense sort of 
intuitive dualism, and this dualism takes for granted that our ability to conceive of a 
consciousness-less being physically identical to ourselves is an ontologically significant fact. 
Chalmers builds a philosophical framework around the intuition that there is more to conscious 
beings than physical facts (including neurological facts). Again, this sort of philosophical defence 
of dualism is immune to scientific critique – this argument is not a scientific one, but a 
philosophical one that is largely dependent on pre-determined definitions and frameworks (more 
on this below). Chalmers (and other philosophically-minded dualists) fully affirms that scientific 
methodology is fully capable, in principle, of offering full explanations of all the capacities and 
functions already described. Indeed, from the outside it would be theoretically impossible to 
know whether a zombie was, in fact, a zombie. One could theoretically ask if the being if it was 
having a conscious experience, but the epistemic distance inherent in the situation would prevent 
one from ever being sure that the being was conscious. This is because phenomenal experience 
is not the sort of thing that could be identified or explained from within the various brain 
sciences.  
 
In short, then, the logical possibility of zombies supports dualism and undermines the 
explanatory power of physicalism.19 The zombie argument is an important one because it 
addresses the key question of the mind-body problem: Is consciousness explainable in physical 
terms, or is consciousness a further, nonphysical fact about humans and other sentient creatures? 
The zombie argument is intended to demonstrate the explanatory insufficiency of physicalism; 
because we can imagine a being who is physically identical to conscious humans but who lacks 
consciousness, the physical story must not be the whole story. Importantly for the larger 
argument of this thesis, however, Chalmers himself does not consider his rejection of 
physicalism to be a rejection of naturalism more broadly. These distinctions will be discussed in 
further detail in the next chapter, but here it is helpful to emphasise that Chalmers subscribes to 
a naturalistic dualism, wherein consciousness is a fundamental component of the natural world – 
there is nothing necessarily spiritual about this brand of dualism. This is worth emphasising: not 
                                                            
18 Indeed, in the philosophy of mind there has arisen something of a cottage industry surrounding zombies. 
For an introduction to the relevant arguments, see Robert Kirk, Zombies and Consciousness (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2005). 
19 I use “logical” here in the technical sense of the word. Chalmers’ argument for zombies and dualism is 
an analytical one, and this is often what legitimises it for philosophers of mind. Others, as we will see, would deny 
that a logical possibility carries any real significance for the consciousness question – especially when considering the 
“messy” realities of the evolutionary process in which consciousness evolved.  
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even dualists (or at least naturalistic dualists) would say that the mind is uniquely open to divine 
action. 
 
Nevertheless, this is the sort of argument that could be seen as lending philosophical credence to 
theological appropriation. That is, having opened the door to consciousness as nonphysical, one 
might feel justified in affirming the mind as uniquely spiritual, or even affirming an immaterial 
soul. In other words, one might be tempted to think that Chalmers has done the “heavy lifting” 
of constructing a philosophical model disproving the physicality of consciousness. How one 
positively understands consciousness, one might say, is debatable – the key issue involves the 
mind’s nonphysicality. And indeed, philosophical arguments such as Chalmers’ have been 
appropriated for theological ends in defending both the mind as nonphysical and, similarly, the 
possibility of an immaterial soul. Clayton himself endorses Chalmers’ formulation of the Hard 
Problem; indeed, one could see much of Clayton’s emergentist divine action thesis as being built 
upon a version of Chalmers’ work in this area (explicitly or otherwise).20 As Clayton describes his 
own views, “Experience…does not seem to be the kind of thing that could be explained in terms 
of functions or structures, since one could completely know the structures or functions of some 
experience and still not know what it is to have that experience.”21 Again, Clayton does not 
consider himself a dualist – but his appropriation of the HP is a decidedly dualist move. Like 
Chalmers, Clayton sees the mind as ontologically distinct from the physical substrate of the brain 
– this leads to Clayton’s emergentist proposition as discussed in the last chapter. Again, it is 
noteworthy that both Clayton and Chalmers frame their arguments such that they are immune to 
scientific critique from the outset. The basic philosophical paradigm under consideration 
precludes a scientific answer to the Hard Problem. 
 
Clayton is not the only Christian scholar to make use of the Hard Problem and its related 
thought experiments. Richard Swinburne is arguably the most influential Christian philosopher 
dealing with the mind-body problem; he is especially relevant here, insofar as he relies on the 
Hard Problem to argue for an immaterial mind/soul. Swinburne is noteworthy for being an 
unapologetic substance dualist, and he argues his position using very similar arguments to 
Chalmers. In his 2013 book Mind, Brain, and Free Will, Swinburne talks about the Hard Problem 
                                                            
20 See Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 120-125. 
21 Ibid., 133. 
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of Consciousness through his understanding of “privileged access.” Conscious beings have 
privileged access to mental properties (i.e., scientific methodology is unable to gain the same sort 
of access into the mind). He defines a mental property as “one to whose instantiation in it a 
substance necessarily has privileged access on all occasions of its instantiations” and a physical 
property as “one to whose instantiation in it a substance necessarily has no privileged access on 
any occasion of its instantiation.”22 For Swinburne, a being is conscious if and only if it has 
privileged access to mental states; there is something it is like to have a mental state, and beings 
are not conscious if they do not have that privileged access. As with Jackson’s “Mary,” no 
amount of neuroscientific analysis could ever equate with a conscious individual’s own 
experience. Moreover, Swinburne makes heavy use of conceivability arguments and thought 
experiments to argue for not only an immaterial mind, but also the Christian notion of the soul. 
After building a philosophical case that it is metaphysically possible for the conscious self to exist 
apart from the body, Swinburne writes: “Given that it is metaphysically possible that I become 
disembodied, it follows that – whether embodied or not – I need only a pure mental part, my 
soul, in order to exist. My soul therefore carries my ‘thisness.’”23 Space constraints prevent a 
more detailed analysis of Swinburne’s work; he is worth mentioning because he offers such a 
clear and unapologetic example of appropriating the Hard Problem for theological purposes 
(though Swinburne does not always use that terminology). That is, Swinburne is working with 
the same basic hunch as Chalmers that the mind is ontologically distinct from the brain – what I 
have been calling an intuitive dualism – and then using philosophical arguments to argue that the 
mind is immaterial and uniquely spiritual or soul-like. But just how compelling are all these 
intuition-driven arguments against the physicality of consciousness?  
 
4.3 Deflationary Views on the Hard Problem of Consciousness 
One of the most striking features of the Hard Problem is just how freely its advocates admit the 
role that intuition and the seemingly self-evident play in their theories. In relation to the zombie 
thought experiment, for example, Chalmers writes, “I confess that the logical possibility of 
zombies seems…obvious to me. A zombie is just something physically identical to me, but 
which has no conscious experience – all is dark inside.”24 And again, he recognises that at a 
certain point we reach “a brute clash of intuitions of a sort that is common in the discussion of 
                                                            
22 Swinburne, Mind, Brain, and Free Will, 67-68. 
23 Ibid., 170. Note that Swinburne here equates the soul with the mind. 
24 Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, 96.  
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deep philosophical questions. Explicit argument can help us to isolate and characterize the clash, 
but not to resolve it.”25 Indeed, for those affirming the strength of the Hard Problem, the 
discussion is almost always framed in such a way that consciousness is a priori assumed to be 
immune to scientific explanation. Consciousness intuitively seems qualitatively different from 
atoms and molecules, and philosophical arguments are thus constructed using the nonphysicality 
of consciousness as a sort of brute fact, or first principle.  
 
But what happens when the Hard Problem does not seem all that hard? Surely not everyone 
would find it conceivable that a being could exist that is physically identical to us in every way, 
neuron for neuron, and yet lacks consciousness. After all, the evolutionary picture of biological 
life might at the very least give one pause; might it at least be possible that consciousness is 
contingent upon the “messy” processes of natural selection and biological evolution? Or what if 
we remain unpersuaded by Jackson’s knowledge argument, sensing something “slippery” about 
the thought experiment’s intended response that conscious experience is nonphysical? What are 
we to make of the “clash of intuitions” that is sure to result as contemporary science progresses 
in brain-related research? In short, it is unclear whether the intuitions and supposedly self-
evident brute facts about consciousness are inviolable, or whether they are perhaps insufficient 
premises when used in serious argumentation. More broadly, it is unclear whether consciousness 
is the sort of thing that should be defined philosophically, or whether the mind is more properly 
a subject for the cognitive and brain sciences.  
  
Indeed, many scholars working in the philosophy of mind and other consciousness-related fields 
flatly reject the Hard Problem, or at least question its strength in the face of the contemporary 
brain sciences. Philosopher Patricia Churchland, for example, is one of the key philosophers 
critiquing Chalmers’ conceptualisation of the Hard Problem. Churchland challenges Chalmers’ 
reliance on conceivability and imagination. In her words, “Whether we can or cannot imagine a 
phenomenon being explained in a certain way is a psychological fact about us, not an objective 
fact about the nature of the phenomenon itself.”26 Churchland suggests that insofar as Chalmers 
builds his arguments on premises involving what we can conceive as being possible (e.g., 
zombies) or not possible (e.g., a scientific explanation of consciousness), he is arguing 
                                                            
25 Ibid., 167. 
26 Patricia Churchland, “The Hornswaggle Problem,” in Explaining Consciousness: The “Hard Problem,” ed. 
Jonathan Shear, A Bradford Book (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 42.  
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inadequately from intuition. Again, “that someone can imagine the possibility is not evidence for the 
real possibility. It is only evidence that somebody or other believes it to be a possibility. That, on 
its own, is not especially interesting.”27 This critique applies equally well to Clayton and other 
theorists arguing that consciousness is not the kind of thing to be explained by science; if one 
cannot “just see” the supposedly obvious premise that consciousness is distinct from brain 
processes, then all subsequent arguments fail to be convincing. 
 
 For example, Chalmers assumes that “almost everybody, it seems to me, is capable of 
conceiving of this possibility” that a being physically identical to ourselves (a zombie) could exist, 
neuron for neuron, and yet lack conscious experience.28 As will be shown, for many scientists 
and philosophers this is emphatically not a conceivable possibility. Scientists, for example, might 
emphasise the biological nature of consciousness, arguing that it is impossible to have all the 
same neural circuitry, brain activity, and brain matter as a conscious person, without, in fact, 
actually being conscious. Similarly, philosophers might argue that for zombies to be truly 
conceivable, one must first presuppose nonphysical consciousness – the very thing that the 
thought experiment is intended to prove. Indeed, arguments against a physicalist understanding 
of consciousness presuppose as fundamental the very thing they are meant to address – the 
seeming “otherness” of subjective experience. That is, Hard Problem arguments generally 
involve definitions of qualia or subjective experience that set apart conscious experience from 
the outset. By defining consciousness as the subjective experience that accompanies all the 
cognitive functions susceptible to scientific explanation (for example), such arguments so 
constrain the question of consciousness that it is almost impossible to answer – precisely because 
a proprietary definition of consciousness has predetermined which answers are valid. 
 
Philosopher Valerie Gray Hardcastle argues that Chalmers is exactly right: “Scientific theories of 
consciousness won’t explain the weirdness of consciousness to those who find the identity [of 
the mind and brain] weird” – the ‘weird’ non-physical ontology of consciousness just seems 
obvious.”29 In fact, it is worth questioning whether humans should even expect a scientific 
explanation of consciousness to “feel right” in the first place. After all, consciousness is one 
                                                            
27 Ibid., 38. 
28 Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, 96. 
29 Valerie Gray Hardcastle, “The Why of Consciousness: A Non-Issue for Materialists,” in Explaining 
Consciousness: The “Hard Problem,” ed. Jonathan Shear, A Bradford Book (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 63. 
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phenomenon that humans have little (if any) objective distance from; we use our mind-brains to 
analyse the mind-brain. As psychologist Mark C. Price points out, “even if a scientifically acceptable 
answer of some kind were staring us in the face, we may still not feel as if we had understood.”30 Our first-
person perspective effectively prohibits any real distance between ourselves and the mind that we 
wish to explain. It thus seems unwise to evaluate scientific explanations for consciousness on the 
strength of their intuitive force alone – humans are almost inevitably biased. And yet, this 
intuitive force is exactly what Hard Problem theorists use as the foundation for consciousness 
theories. The problem, it seems, is that Chalmers, Clayton, and others are arguing from a dualistic 
intuition, rather than to it. The burden of proof is assumed to lie with those who would attempt 
to explain consciousness scientifically, rather than with those denying the explanatory potential 
of contemporary science by placing intuition-driven boundaries around science’s proper sphere 
of authority.  
 
Further, arguing from a place of intuitive dualism undermines the scientific methodology (and, 
by extension, scientific success) explicitly endorsed by many Hard Problem theorists. As 
Churchland writes, “The trouble with the ‘Hard Problem’ characterization is that on the strength of 
a proprietary definition, it rejects [potential scientific explanations] as wrong.”31 That is, those 
endorsing the Hard Problem define that problem in such a way that consciousness is 
differentiated a priori from all physical processes. This is the case even though Chalmers and 
others explicitly endorse scientific methodology for explaining all cognitive functioning; they 
justify this seeming inconsistency by preemptively excluding the mind from the realm of physical 
explanation. Such theorists are essentially defining consciousness as “subjective experience which 
is necessarily immune to scientific analysis.” By defining consciousness in this way, scientific 
explanation is rendered irrelevant from the outset. By endorsing such an approach, “Chalmers’ 
initial assumption about consciousness compromises widely held methodological canons of 
scientific theory construction that he himself avows.”32 Using the Hard Problem as the basis for 
a credible theory of consciousness (or of divine action, as in Clayton’s case) is thus out of step 
with the long history of scientific methodology and discovery. Standard scientific practice does 
not “posit as fundamental that which we are seeking to explain.”33 While to many it may seem 
                                                            
30 Mark Price, “Should We Expect to Feel as if We Understand Consciousness?,” in Explaining Consciousness: 
The “Hard Problem,” ed. Jonathan  Shear, A Bradford Book (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 84. 
31 Churchland, “The Hornswaggle Problem,” 38-39. 
32 Ibid., 45. 
33 Thomas W. Clark, “Function and Phenomenology: Closing the Explanatory Gap,” in Explaining 
Consciousness: The “Hard Problem,” ed. Jonathan  Shear, A Bradford Book (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 47.  
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obvious that the mind is ontologically other than the physical processes with which it is 
somehow involved, this is not a scientific conclusion; rather, “it is an epistemological fact about 
us.”34 Philosopher David Papineau gets at this same idea when addressing the explanatory gap. 
While Papineau recognises that the explanatory gap is often taken for granted even within 
contemporary philosophy of mind, he argues that “the feeling of an ‘explanatory gap’ arises only 
because we cannot stop ourselves thinking about the mind-brain relation in a dualist way…we 
think that there is an explanatory gap only because we haven’t yet properly embraced the 
findings of science.”35 
 
Indeed, science has a long history of tackling seemingly mysterious phenomena and rendering 
them explicable in physical terms.36 Taking a mysterious phenomenon (consciousness in this 
case) as a scientifically unexplainable brute fact about reality, or requiring an “extra ingredient” in 
addition to electrons, quarks, and molecules – this is exactly the opposite response from that 
which scientific methodology is intended to elicit. Modern science has been so successful 
precisely because it requires tackling, piece-by-piece, those phenomena that seem wholly 
inscrutable at the outset. Churchland agrees that while “consciousness is, certainly, a difficult 
problem, difficulty per se does not distinguish it from oodles of other neuroscientific problems.”37 
Determining from the outset that consciousness is simply not the sort of thing that could be 
explained in physical terms is, quite simply, not how rigorous science works. As Clark explains, 
“the basic explanatory motive in science and philosophy is to incorporate heretofore inexplicable 
phenomena into an existing theoretical framework, modifying the framework only as minimally 
necessary to effect the incorporation. This motive is defeated by assuming at the very start that 
consciousness is a phenomenon that transcends the explanatory reach of existing theory.”38 This 
“basic explanatory motive” stands in stark contrast to Chalmers’ assertion that consciousness is a 
fundamental part of the universe, which would require an expansion in our understanding of the 
basic “furniture” of reality. At the very least, it seems wise to assume that the impressive history 
of scientific methodology would at least warrant the search for a scientific explanation of 
consciousness – without, that is, supposing that consciousness is fundamentally other than 
physical.  
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This brings us to the third critique of Hard Problem approaches to consciousness: the possibly 
arbitrary distinction between so-called “easy problems” of consciousness and the Hard Problem. 
It is striking to note just how many cognitive functions and abilities Hard Problem theorists cede 
to scientific explanation. Again, Chalmers readily affirms that cognitive science is, in principle, up 
to the task of explaining everything from behaviour control and focused attention to information 
integration and mental recall; these easy problems are “straightforwardly vulnerable to 
explanation in terms of computational or neural mechanisms.”39 Chalmers claims that 
consciousness is something extra, something additional to all these cognitive functions; the 
hypothetical zombie would, after all, act like a conscious human, but would simply miss the 
“extra ingredient” of phenomenal experience. It is worth noting that many of the “easy” 
problems of consciousness have not been fully explicated by cognitive science; there is a lot that 
is unknown about cognitive functioning. It is perhaps ironic that Chalmers is more optimistic 
about the various brain sciences than are many scientists themselves: as philosopher David 
Hodgson’s aptly expresses it, “the easy problems ain’t so easy.”40  
  
In fact, Chalmers cedes so much to cognitive science that one wonders if there is anything left to 
be explained once the “easy” problems are addressed. Daniel Dennett is one of the most 
outspoken scholars on this point. He argues that all the cognitive functions that Chalmers deems 
“easy” comprise, in fact, the sum total of conscious experience. He argues that “whether people 
realize it or not, it is precisely the ‘remarkable functions associated with’ consciousness that drive 
them to wonder about how consciousness could reside in a brain. In fact, if you carefully 
dissociate all these remarkable functions from consciousness…there is nothing left for you to 
wonder about.”41 This is made clearer when highlighting what these cognitive functions actually 
do: “My distraction and concentration, my unnameable sinking feelings of foreboding and my 
blithe disregard of some perceptual details…my ability to be moved to tears by a vivid 
recollection of the death of a loved one…These are all ‘merely’ the ‘performance of functions’ or 
the manifestation of various complex dispositions to perform functions.”42 If these and other 
functions are (in principle) prone to scientific explanation, what is left of the Hard Problem? Or 
                                                            
39 Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” 10. 
40 See David Hodgson, “The Easy Problems Ain’t So Easy,” in Explaining Consciousness: The “Hard Problem,” 
ed. Jonathan Shear, A Bradford Book (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 125-131.  
41 Daniel C. Dennett, “Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness,” in Explaining Consciousness: 
The “Hard Problem,” ed. Jonathan Shear, A Bradford Book (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 35.  
42 Ibid.  
118 
 
similarly, as Churchland questions, why should the line between the “hard” and “easy” problems 
be drawn where it has been?43 If science is able to uncover the mechanisms of so many of the 
functions and abilities that comprise our conscious lives, it seems at least possible that it could 
also explain why it “feels like something” to be conscious. Perhaps our intuitive dualism itself is 
a scientific problem subject to explanation.  
 
This question of the (perhaps) arbitrary distinction between the easy problems of consciousness 
and the Hard Problem brings us back to the tricky task of defining consciousness in the first 
place. As noted above, Chalmers and other dualists structure their arguments around a 
“proprietary definition” of consciousness that excludes at the outset the possibility of scientific 
explanation. And as Dennett and others have noted, it may not be clear what is left of 
consciousness once one sections off the (in principle) scientifically explainable elements of 
cognitive functions and abilities. Consciousness is a notoriously difficult concept to define: we 
generally end up defining it using our (implicitly or explicitly) preferred philosophical 
assumptions about the mind in the first place. For the dualist, consciousness is defined along the 
lines of “what it is like” to be something. For the physicalist, consciousness is defined in terms of 
the functions, cognitive abilities, or neurobiology of the brain. It is telling that many of the brain-
related sciences do not refer to consciousness at all. The Hard Problem is something of a cult 
favourite in contemporary theology (because it has been deemed so useful for preserving a 
spiritual component to humanity), but it is not a useful term in the brain sciences themselves; 
they just get on with the business of explaining those “easy” problems. For example, cognitive 
neuroscience textbooks may not contain more than a handful of references to consciousness; the 
term simply is not deemed useful for describing brain functioning or cognitive capacities.44 I 
bring this up merely as a cautionary point for science-and-theology: what may seem scientifically 
impossible (a physical explanation of consciousness) might in fact be a reflection of a felt 
theological need for dualism. In other words, we may be defining ourselves into a Hard Problem. 
Part Two of this thesis is devoted to erasing this felt need in divine action theories, and offering 
a theological framework for physicalism.  
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Thus far, I have argued that theories utilising the Hard Problem can be critiqued from multiple 
angles: they rely heavily upon intuition and conceivability, they often disregard both scientific 
methodology and the history of successful scientific explanations, and they cede so many 
cognitive functions to physical mechanisms that it may be difficult to see what is left of the Hard 
Problem. There are, unsurprisingly, many other objections to dualism. For example, one of the 
main problems with an immaterial mind is the problem of mind-body causation: how can an 
immaterial mind causally interact with the body? This challenge dates all the way back to the time 
of Descartes, when he was in dialogue with Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia. In response to 
Descartes’ presentation of mind-body dualism, she questioned “how the mind of a man can 
determine the bodily spirits in producing voluntary actions, being only a thinking substance.”45 
Indeed, the problem of causal interaction between the mind and brain is an ongoing problem for 
dualists: how can an immaterial mind affect the central nervous system such that physical change 
occurs in the world? Or, why does my subjective experience of being thirsty result in me going in 
search of a glass of water? Few would say that the immaterial mind has no causal relationship 
with the brain, but articulating the precise nature of that interaction becomes a challenge – this is 
the core mind-body problem, in fact. In any case, there exists a significant body of literature 
around this challenge to dualism – and again, there are many challenges. It is noteworthy here 
simply to highlight the sort of objections beyond the sort we have been dealing with thus far. 
 
 
The main point of this chapter has been to challenge the philosophical assumption that scientific 
explanations are, in principle, unable to address consciousness - that the Hard Problem lies 
forever outside the explanatory scope of the natural sciences. The Hard Problem is a 
philosophical articulation of intuitive dualism, and this intuitive dualism seems to underlie much 
of the science-and-theology field’s engagement with the mind. In particular, the Hard Problem a 
priori formulates the problem of consciousness to exclude a physicalist explanation, and divine 
actions theories often use this Hard Problem as philosophical justification for privileging the 
mind as uniquely spiritual. The Hard Problem and its critics have thus been a key focus not 
because this is the only relevant debate in consciousness debates (the problem of causal 
interaction is evidence that it is not), but because something like the Hard Problem seems to be a 
main driver for theological usage of the mind in divine action theories. The aim of this chapter 
                                                            
45 In Forrest E. Baird, From Plato to Derrida, Philosophic Classics Series (New York: Routledge, 2016), 417. 
120 
 
has been to argue that consciousness is not an immaterial phenomenon forever outside the 
purview of scientific explanation, but that the success of scientific methodology at least warrants 
its inclusion as a proper object of study. With this in mind, I now turn to physicalist approaches 






Physicalist Approaches to Consciousness 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The study of consciousness is a fascinating area not least because it is so inherently 
interdisciplinary. What is the proper field of study for mind-related questions? Is it philosophy, 
theology, cognitive science, neuroscience, psychology, or metaphysics? While the mind may once 
have been the exclusive domain of philosophers and theologians, Patricia Churchland notes the 
shifting academic landscape: “In general terms, the mind-body problem has ceased to be the 
reliably tangled conundrum it once was… (all the fields together and computation) have opened 
the door to an integration of neuroscience, cognitive science, and philosophy in a comprehensive 
theoretical framework.”1 As the various cognitive and brain sciences identify an increasing 
number of neural correlates for specific conscious experiences, and as philosophers of mind 
challenge various forms of intuitive dualism, the legitimacy of consciousness as a proper 
scientific pursuit is solidified. As we saw in the previous chapter, philosophical arguments about 
the mind are often based on an intuitive dualism, and there is good reason to be critical of 
arguments based on the Hard Problem. Namely, arguments against physicalist explanations of 
consciousness presume the ontological “otherness” of the mind, they rely too heavily on intuition 
and “common sense,” and they fail to take scientific success and methodology seriously enough. 
In response, many scholars in the brain-related fields now argue that the success of 
contemporary science warrants a certain methodological scepticism of theories excluding 
consciousness from the realm of physical explanation. How, then, do scientists and philosophers 
approach the scientific study of consciousness? 
 
The scientific study of the mind consists of an enormous body of literature and research, and 
only a few key approaches can be highlighted here. The goal in so doing is not to support one or 
another approach to consciousness, but to demonstrate that there is good reason to suggest that 
consciousness will be, in principle, explainable in scientific (and perhaps physicalist) terms. The 
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implication of this, and a main argument of this thesis, is that science-and-theology theorists are 
unwarranted in locating divine action in the human mind – or more specifically, confining divine 
action to the mind because of its allegedly nonphysical nature. To that end, this chapter will 
highlight three broadly physicalist positions in the relevant literature: the identity theory of mind, 
functionalism, and nonreductive physicalism. Again, these three approaches do not cover all the 
scientific and philosophical approaches to the mind; rather, they are offered as examples of three 
markedly different (but still physicalist) ways of approaching the issue. In so doing, this chapter 
argues that at the very least, there is warrant to assume that consciousness is, in principle, no less 
natural or physical than any other feature of the world. While the previous chapter challenged 
philosophical assumptions surrounding the Hard Problem, this chapter is intended to be more 
constructive – offering various models in which consciousness can be understood in a physicalist 
framework. The purpose of this is to demonstrate not only that the Hard Problem is an 
insufficient starting point for science-and-religion, but also that leading approaches to 
consciousness do not justify theories of divine action that privilege consciousness as uniquely 
spiritual.  
 
Before getting into the commonalities and distinctions between the key physicalist theories of 
consciousness, it is helpful to articulate the unified way in which they address the Hard Problem. 
According to philosopher Jaegwon Kim, physicalism is “the doctrine that all things that exist are 
entities recognized by the science of physics, or systems aggregated out of such entities. 
According to some physicalists, so-called nonreductive physicalists, these physical systems can 
have nonphysical properties, properties that are not recognized by physics or reducible to 
them.”2 Immediately, then, we see that while physicalists are committed to a certain type of 
physics-based explanation of consciousness, that explanation need not be eliminative in nature. 
Physicalists do not necessarily deny that consciousness exists, but only that consciousness is 
ultimately subject to the same sorts of physical explanations that high-level phenomena like 
economics, music, or humour are subject to. So while there is certainly an element of 
reductionism involved in all physicalist theories of consciousness (insofar as the only ontological 
constituents of reality are those recognised by physics), this does not mean that physicalists 
explain away consciousness. Rather, they generally recognise the existence of consciousness, but 
identify it in varying degrees with physical processes.  
                                                            




According to most physicalists, then, the problem with the Hard Problem is its basic formulation 
of what consciousness is. According to Hard Problem proponents, “for any physical process we 
specify there will be an unanswered question: Why should this process give rise to experience?”3 
The perennial question, for Chalmers, is “Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by 
experience?”4 Notice the language in these statements; consciousness is often portrayed as 
something “arising from” physical processes. Advocates of an immaterial or emergent mind 
consistently speak of conscious experience as an effect or product of the brain-body-
environment system. Again, though, this way of speaking can lead to an implicit dualism, and 
physicalists are quick to reject this move. Hard Problem proponents assume that consciousness 
is “an ‘effect’ of an underlying process – and it is precisely this that we must question if we are to 
find the true place of consciousness in the world.”5 Physicalists reject the idea of consciousness’ 
“extra ingredient,” as this would require the unwarranted move of either positing consciousness 
as a fundamental piece of the universe’s ontological furniture, or of relegating consciousness to 
the realm of the supernatural (as dualist theologians and philosophers such as Swinburne are 
happy to do). Rather, scientific approaches to the mind affirm that consciousness just is what it is 
to be a properly functioning brain-body-environment system. That is, physicalists often endorse 
an “argument from simplicity,” otherwise known as Occam’s Razor: if at all possible, the 
simplest explanation is to be preferred. Given the explanatory success of modern science, the 
argument from simplicity might suggest the “in principle” explicability of consciousness in 
physicalist terms. The details of this differ from theory to theory, but the general physicalist 
assumption is that consciousness is not a separate entity that is somehow produced by physical 
processes – it is those physical processes.6 
 
5.2 Mind-Brain Identity Theory 
Most everyone would agree that the mind is related to the brain in some way. It is simply the 
case that physical changes to the brain affect behaviour, personality, and subjective experience. 
This can be as dramatic as a Jekyll-and-Hyde change in personality brought about by significant 
                                                            
3 Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” 18.  
4 Ibid., 12.  
5 Clark, “Closing the Explanatory Gap,” 45. 
6 Nonreductive physicalists might be the exception to this – many in this camp do speak of the mind as 
being physically based, but emerging from physical substrates. In other words, nonreductive physicalists sometimes 
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brain trauma (as in the case of Phineas Gage), or as relatively mild as feeling a bit uninhibited 
after drinking alcohol. Brain imaging technology allows researchers to correlate even mundane 
experiences (such as seeing certain colours or feeling certain emotions) with specific neural 
patterns. Recent research even suggests that a “gut-brain axis” further links our conscious 
experience to the entire central nervous system: what we eat can significantly affect our mental 
experience.7 And we all experience the causal relationship between mental states and physical 
actions: I feel a conscious desire to see my dog, so my brain communicates with my muscles in 
such a way that I push the correct buttons on my MacBook to reach my family on Skype. There 
is even a religious dimension to this; it is clear that specific types of brain stimulation bring about 
felt religious experiences.8 The question, then, is not whether our consciousness is correlated 
with or dependent on specific brain states, but to what extent this is the case. 
 
The mind-brain identity theory suggests, quite simply, that conscious experiences are in fact 
identical to brain states. Kim defines the mind-brain identity theory, or psychoneural identity 
theory, as the position that “advocates the identification of mental states with the physical 
processes in the brain….there are no mental events over and above, or in addition to, the neural 
processes in the brain.”9 This position is correlated with the rejection of the HP described above: 
there is no need to posit consciousness as an “extra ingredient” on top of all the physical 
processes of the brain and central nervous system. Take the experience of pain, for example. We 
know that people feel pain when C-fibres fire in the central nervous system. It is common to say 
that pain “accompanies” or “arises from” the C-fibre stimulation. Psychoneural identity 
theorists, however, would say that C-fibre activation is pain – the relationship is not one of 
correlation, but identification. Note that this sort of relationship between C-fibres and the 
experience of pain is not one that could be identified by philosophical reflection; rather, this is a 
matter for empirical scientific study.  
 
What, then, are the arguments in support of the mind-brain identity theory? After all, a 
correlation between brain activity and conscious experience need not imply the identification of 
                                                            
7 For example, see Arpit Parmar, “Gut–Brain Axis, Psychobiotics, and Mental Health,” Asian Journal of 
Psychiatry 22 (2016): 84-85. 
8 Andrew Newberg, for example, has done a significant amount of work on the neurobiology of religious 
experiences. For an overview, see Andrew B. Newberg, Principles of Neurotheology, Ashgate Science and Religion Series 
(Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2010). Also see Eugene G. D'Aquili and Andrew B. Newberg, The Mystical Mind: Probing the 
Biology of Religious Experience, Theology and the Sciences (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1999). 
9 Kim, Philosophy of Mind, 98. 
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the two. One philosopher who was key to the development of the psychoneural identity thesis 
was Ullin Place, whose 1956 article “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?” was the first modern 
formulation of the identity thesis. Place argued that the statement “‘consciousness is a process in 
the brain’…is neither self-contradictory nor self-evident; it is a reasonable scientific hypothesis, 
in the way that the statement ‘lightning is a motion of electric charges’ is a reasonable scientific 
hypothesis.”10 Place did not deny that phenomenal experience was real, but only that this 
experience could not be explained as a function of the brain. In addition to Place, and in 
dialogue with him, was philosopher J.J.C. Smart. In his 1959 article, “Sensations and Brain 
Processes,” Smart largely uses an argument from simplicity to defend the mind-brain identity 
thesis. He writes:  
Why do I wish to [argue for mind-brain identity]? Mainly because of Occam's 
razor…There does seem to be, so far as science is concerned, nothing in the world but 
increasingly complex arrangements of physical constituents. All except for one place: in 
consciousness…That [conscious states] should be correlated with brain processes does 
not help, for to say that they are correlated is to say that they are something ‘over and 
above’… So sensations, states of consciousness, do seem to be the one sort of thing left 
outside the physicalist picture, and for various reasons I just cannot believe that this can 
be so. That everything should be explicable in terms of physics (together of course with 
descriptions of the ways in which the parts are put together-roughly, biology is to physics 
as radio-engineering is to electromagnetism) except the occurrence of sensations seems 
to me to be frankly unbelievable.11 
In other words, given that modern science is committed to physical explanations for observed 
phenomena, and that not identifying the mind with the brain would seem to require additional 
ontological “stuff,” we are methodologically justified in identifying the mind with the brain. 
There is a certain elegance in psychoneural identity theory, as it “brings the mental within the 
purview of physical theory, and ultimately our basic physics constitutes a complete and 
comprehensive explanatory framework adequate for all aspects of the natural world.”12 Note that 
this primacy of physics, while admittedly reductionistic, need not be accompanied by the 
negative connotations usually accompanying reductionism. Smart is not saying that everything is 
“just” electrons and quarks, but that electrons, quarks and other fundamental building blocks of 
contemporary physics are the only building blocks that exist. From these building blocks we get 
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Related to the argument from simplicity, psychoneural identity is also supported by the 
“principle of inference to the best explanation.” That is, a theory is to be preferred if it offers the 
best available explanation for given facts – in this case, the evident correlation between brain 
states and conscious experiences. As Kim notes, there are basically two explanatory arguments 
that can be used here. First, one might claim that “psychoneural identities give the best 
explanation of psychoneural correlations.”14 That is, the theory offers the best explanation for 
why I feel pain when my C-fibres are activated. Alternatively, we might say that “the identities, 
rather than explaining the correlations, explain certain other facts about mental phenomena that 
would otherwise go unexplained.”15 In this scenario, the identity theory would be the explanation 
for why we feel distressed when we are in pain – that is, why the physical feeling of pain is 
seemingly accompanied by emotional distress. In other words, by identifying the firing of C-
fibres with pain, and identifying distress with a certain brain state, “these identities help us 
explain a psychological regularity in terms of its underlying neural mechanisms.”16 Both of these 
arguments suggest that psychoneural identity theory is the best explanation for the given facts.  
 
A final argument for psychoneural identity theory, according to Kim, is the causal argument. The 
casual argument was championed by both David Lewis and David Armstrong, and Lewis 
encapsulates the position thus: “My argument is this: The definitive characteristic of any (sort of) 
experience as such is its causal role, its syndrome of most typical causes and effects. But we 
materialists believe that these causal roles…belong in fact to certain physical states. Since these 
physical states possess the definitive character of experiences, they must be experiences.”17 This 
argument can be stated in a more contemporary format. We begin with the premise that mental 
states have physical effects: I flinch when feeling pain, apologise when feeling guilty, and hug 
loved ones when I feel affection for them. The second premise is the causal closure principle: all 
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physical events have physical causes. This is a basic principle of methodological naturalism and 
integral to scientific practice. Following these premises, the conclusion is that mental phenomena 
are physical phenomena.18 In order for this not to be case, the argument goes, one would have to 
posit mental phenomena as explicitly other than physical, thus violating the causal closure 
principle. Of course, not everyone accepts the causal closure principle (more on this in Part 
Two), and some may find it acceptable that a nonphysical mind has effects on the physical 
world. Indeed, psychoneural identity may seem so unpalatable that one is willing to embrace 
epiphenomenalism - the idea that the mind exists but does not effect physical change. As Kim 
explains, “if you are unwilling to embrace psychophysical identity, you put the causal powers of 
mentality in jeopardy.”19 In other words, something has to give: one affirms that the mind is the 
brain and is thus able to have causal effect, that the mind is substantially “other” than physical 
but violates the causal closure principle (this would be Clayton’s position), or that the mind is 
nonphysical and has no effect in the physical world.  
 
Supporters of the mind-brain identity thesis recognise that the position is counterintuitive. 
Papineau admits that “we all experience an intuitive resistance to identifications of phenomenal 
kinds with material kinds. At an intuitive level, we are all implicit dualists.”20 This intuitive 
dualism is evident in the way consciousness is referred to even on a casual level: we speak of the 
brain “producing,” “generating,” or “giving rise to” consciousness, or the mind “emerging” from 
the brain. This language indicates a correlation between two distinct entities, as when fire 
“generates” smoke. This sort of language, Papineau argues, is used even by those insisting that 
they are not dualists. As he explains, “H₂0 doesn’t ‘generate’, ‘cause’, ‘yield’ or ‘give rise to’ water. 
It is water. To speak of brain processes as ‘generating’ conscious states, and so on, only makes 
sense if you are implicitly thinking of the consciousness as ontologically additional to the brain 
states.”21 This is an important point. At the very least, it is vital to recognise that linguistic 
frameworks around consciousness are implicitly dualistic, and that it is extremely difficult to 
avoid thinking in those dualistic terms.22 The upshot of this is not necessarily that the 
psychoneural identity theory is correct, but that the theory should not be rejected on the strength 
                                                            
18 Kim, Philosophy of Mind, 113. 
19 Ibid., 114. 
20 Papineau, “What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap?,” 11. 
21 Ibid., 11-12. 
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of intuition alone. Indeed, the cautions against intuition presented in the last chapter are equally 
valid here. 
 
Unsurprisingly, there are serious critiques of the psychoneural identity theory. Perhaps the most 
forceful (and likely the most important) is that consciousness is, for many, an obvious brute fact 
about the world. While the argument from simplicity argues that Occam’s razor demands the 
simplest explanation possible, one could say that consciousness just is a fundamental component 
of reality. That is, if immaterial consciousness is simply a reality to be accounted for, then 
Occam’s razor would actually require its recognition as a nonphysical entity. Simplifying any 
further would be oversimplification. This objection would reject Papineau’s analogy, “as H₂0 
=water, so does mind=brain,” for qualitative experience is self-evidently distinct from the brain. 
As for the principle of inference to the best explanation, critics of the identity theory would 
counter that the theory is not an explanation at all – let alone the best explanation. It is not clear 
that identifying brain states with subjective experiences is a satisfying explanation at all, as it 
seems to be equating two apparently distinct phenomena: brain processes and subjective 
experience. Scientific usage of the “inference to the best explanation” principle involves 
testability and an explanation about why seemingly distinct phenomena are, in fact, identical. As 
Kim argues, the explanatory argument’s weakness “is a lack of clear appreciation of just what 
role the psychoneural identities play in the explanations in which they supposedly figure…both 
arguments invoke, but misapply, the rule of inference to the best explanation.”23 In other words, 
subjective experience and brain states are being identified with each other, but there are no 
external criteria justifying this identification, and no way that the identification could ever be 
proven.  
 
Additionally, one major challenge to the identity thesis comes from the problem of “multiple 
realisability.” Put forward by Hilary Putnam as a refutation of the identity thesis, this argument 
points out that organisms with nervous systems very different from humans can experience the 
same sorts of conscious states. 24 For example, the identity thesis claims that pain is C-fibre 
stimulation. But surely animals like reptiles and insects could experience pain, even though their 
brains and overall nervous systems are largely dissimilar to humans’. Even within the human 
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species, no two brains are identical, and “highly specific brain mental states (e.g., having the 
belief that winters are colder in New Hampshire than in Rhode Island) can differ from person to 
person and may change over time even in a single person through maturation, learning, and 
brain injuries.”25 But the mind-brain identity thesis states that specific types of brain states are 
identical with specific types of mental states. Surely, for example, not everyone who believes in 
Santa Claus, for example, has the exact same neural state. In short, if a conscious state “is 
identical with a physical state, it must be identical with some particular physical state, but there is 
no single neural correlate or substrate” of these conscious states.26 This problem of multiple 
realisability is often viewed as a fatal flaw in psychoneural identity theory: surely an adequate 
model of consciousness must take into account the reality that vastly different nervous systems 
experience the same general sorts of mental events (e.g., pain, pleasure, fear). 
 
At this point in the discussion, it is helpful to highlight a distinction made in identity theory: 
namely, between “type” identity and “token” identity. A type identity indicates a scenario in 
which specific kinds of mental states (happiness, fear, hunger, etc.) are equated with specific 
neural states. This is a relatively reductionistic form of identity theory, and the one most 
susceptible to the problem of multiple realisability. For example, it is difficult to affirm the type 
identification of pain with C-fibre stimulation, when iguanas (for example) experience pain with 
an entirely different nervous system. Token identity theorists, on the other hand, would say that 
the mental experience of pain is identical to some neural state. Kim explains that token 
physicalism is “the thesis that although psychological types are not identical with physical types, 
each and every individual psychological event, or event-token, is a physical event.”27 Token 
identity theory, then, is a bit “looser” than is type identity: it merely states that all mental states 
are identical to some physical state, regardless of what that physical states turns out to be. As 
such, both an iguana and I (for example) could feel pain, but this pain would be instantiated very 
differently, depending on our respective neurobiological makeups. Perhaps unsurprisingly, token 
identity theory has been a preferred version of physicalism in the philosophy of mind. 
Importantly, however, both type and token identity theories are physicalist in nature – they both 
reject the plausibility of immaterial minds, and thus any identification of the mind as uniquely 
spiritual. This being said, identity theories are not the only physicalist option for understanding 
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consciousness. Token identity theory, in fact, is not dissimilar from functionalism, to which I 
now turn.  
 
5.3 Functionalism 
Essentially, functionalism is “the theory that mental states are distinguished from one another by 
their functional or causal roles.”28 In other words, mental states are characterised by what they do, 
rather than what they are; a mental state is defined by its job description. This is a familiar 
concept. For example, we might functionally define a heart as that entity which pumps 
oxygenated blood throughout the body. Under a functionalist definition, the heart need not 
necessarily be a biological organ of natural tissues and cells – it could be a synthetic purpose-built 
machine. Its identity would lie in its ability to perform certain causal roles. The key here is that 
the heart could be multiply realised – it could be a natural biological heart, or a synthetic plastic 
one, but it would still be a heart if it performed certain functions. The same principle would 
apply to mental states, such as the experience of pain. A functionalist might say that to be in pain 
is to be in a state that is caused by bodily harm, produces the desire for the cessation of the 
experience, and is accompanied by tissue-preserving withdrawal behaviour (e.g., pulling one’s 
hand away from a stove). With a functional definition like this, an iguana could experience pain 
no less than could a human – even though the neural instantiation of that pain would be 
biologically distinctive for each. To put this differently, “having a mind is simply a matter of 
being a system organized in the relevant sort of way.”29 This is thus a theory of mind that, while 
remaining physicalist,30 is generally seen as less reductive than psychoneural identity theory, 
which narrowly identifies mental states with specific brain states. In fact, after the identity 
theory’s popularity in the mid-20th century, functionalism’s nonreductive elements rendered it the 
model of choice for philosophers of mind – and, importantly, for the burgeoning field of 
cognitive science.31 
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Indeed, many of the most outspoken critics of the Hard Problem are functionalists. Again, 
Chalmers’ challenge to physicalism is this: “When we have explained the performance of all the 
cognitive and behavioural functions in the vicinity of experience…there may still remain a 
further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience? A 
simple explanation of the function leaves this question open.”32 Functionalists reply that 
Chalmers is flatly mistaken. As Daniel Dennett counters, “Whether people realize it or not, it is 
precisely the ‘remarkable functions associated with’ consciousness that drive them to wonder 
about [consciousness]…if you carefully dissociate all these remarkable functions from 
consciousness…there is nothing left for you to wonder about.”33 Functionalists identify mental 
states with functional roles, and in so doing bypass (or attempt to bypass) the question of the 
“extra ingredient” of subjective experience. Conscious experience just is what it is for a brain-
body-environment system to be performing all the functions typically associated with the 
concept of “consciousness.” These could include memory, attention, behaviour control, access 
to internal states, and the integration of information: again, all the functions that Chalmers labels 
the “easy” problems of consciousness. 
 
Functionalism comes in multiple varieties. The 20th century pioneer of functionalism was Hilary 
Putnam, who championed what has come to be known as “machine functionalism.” Machine 
functionalists “explicate mental states and processes in terms of abstract computational relations 
such as those that define Turing machines and other sorts of formal automata.”34 When one 
thinks of consciousness as the “software” running on the “hardware” of the brain, it is a version 
of machine functionalism with which one is working. Consciousness just is the state of the brain 
that maps certain inputs to certain outputs.  Speaking of pain as a conscious state, Putnam 
explained his position thus: “I shall, in short, argue that pain is not a brain state, in the sense of a 
physical-chemical state of the brain (or even the whole nervous system), but another kind of state 
entirely…[P]ain, or the state of being in pain, is a functional state of a whole organism.”35 When 
our nervous systems receive the inputs of painful stimuli, the appropriate mental state of “pain” 
leads to an output: jerking a hand away from the stove. Note that machine functionalism also 
addresses the problem of multiple realisability, as many different types of physical systems could 
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realise the computational programming we think of as consciousness. In fact, this is part of the 
foundation of artificial intelligence.  
 
On the other end of the functionalist spectrum is teleofunctionalism.36 Teleofunctionalists 
criticise machine functionalism for being too liberal; according to the machine functionalist, any 
appropriately complex system should be considered conscious, even when this seems not to be 
the case.37 In other words, if machine functionalists have explained consciousness, then why is 
my MacBook not conscious? Machine functionalism’s strict commitment to multiple realisability 
renders it implausible, for many – it seems unlikely that any sufficiently complex system would 
be conscious in the same way that humans are. Teleofunctionalism moves away from this 
computational theory of mind, to an appreciation of the biological nature of sentient beings. This 
view takes evolution seriously, emphasising that mind-brains seem to have evolved over long 
periods of time in accordance with natural selection to enhance the biological likelihood of 
species survival. In short, “the basic purpose of minds and of particular mental structures is to 
enhance the successful engagement of organisms with their worlds.”38 If this is the case, then 
mental “functions” are akin to the functions of other biological systems. Just as the function of 
the heart is to pump blood throughout the body (thus keeping the organism alive), so is the 
function of, say, memory to archive and access memories necessary for the biological wellbeing 
of the organism. This is not mere computation; teleofunctionalism introduces the concept of 
“purpose” into the functionalist account. One benefit of teleofunctionalism is that it moves 
theory of mind away from philosophical abstractions and grounds it in a broader evolutionary 
and biological framework. That is, teleofunctionalism says that consciousness is just what it is to 
have evolved into a functioning brain-body, and this brain-body is the product of a long history 
of natural selection. An evolutionary view of the brain leaves no room for an “extra ingredient” 
in consciousness. Though not a functionalist himself, philosopher Ned Block agrees that an 
adequate theory of consciousness must be profoundly biological. He writes, “It is hard to avoid 
the impression that the biology of the brain is what matters to consciousness – at least the kind 
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we have.”39 Insofar as humans are continuous with other animals and composed of the same 
basic stuff as all evolved life forms, identifying consciousness with the functioning of the evolved 
biological brain may seem a warranted conclusion.  
 
There are other versions of functionalism,40 but they all characterise consciousness by its 
functions, rather than identifying it with a specific brain state. For a functionalist, to be conscious 
is to have a working brain-body that is able to perform cognitive functions. As Kim summarises, 
“to be in pain is to be in a state that plays pain’s causal role.”41 It is important to remember that 
functionalism is not the same as the psychoneural identity thesis: functionalists do not say that 
every mental state is identical to, or reducible to, a specific neural state.42 Rather, the mind is the 
sum total of its functional capacities at any given point, regardless of its distinctive physical 
substrates. This being said, functionalists generally consider themselves physicalists as well. That 
is, subjective experience is not something extra on top of cognitive functions; it is the state of an 
organism engaging in these functions. Thus, we see here that functionalism is actually compatible 
with token identity theory, which basically just states that every conscious state is identical to some 
physical state. In any case, functionalism is generally considered less reductive than mind-brain 
identity theory, even though both approaches should be considered physicalist: the mind has no 
ontological status distinct from a physical organism. 
 
 Naturally, functionalism has its critics, who often ask why some functional systems seem to be 
conscious (humans), while others do not (my MacBook). That is, according to functionalism, 
“consciousness is characterized by an abstract structure that does not include the messy details 
of neuroscience.”43 If neurons were replaced with electric fuses in exactly the same organisational 
network, would that “brain” be conscious? Because functionalism endorses multiple realisability, 
it is vulnerable to the charge that it fails to adequately explain the stark difference between 
conscious experience and a computer programme. This critique became famous in Ned Block’s 
“China brain.” In this thought experiment, we are asked to imagine that all the people in China 
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are reordered in such a way that they collectively mimic the organisation of the brain’s neural 
connectivity. Then, we imagine that each human “neuron” is given a radio with which to 
communicate to its neighbours – this “China brain” would have functional capacities and an 
organisational structure that were identical to a human brain. But would this “brain” be 
conscious? Perhaps - but if not, as Blocks argues, then a major weakness of functionalism has 
been exposed.44 Beyond this critique, unsurprisingly, functionalists still face the question of the 
Hard Problem. Chalmers would argue that functionalists have failed to explain subjective 
experience, and that consciousness is not the sort of thing that could be described in functional 
terms. Again, Chalmers would have no problem affirming that cognitive science can indeed 
explain the functions of the brain – but consciousness is not a function for dualists. Still, 
functionalism remains a dominant framework in consciousness studies and, indeed, provides 
something of a philosophical framework for cognitive science.  
 
5.4 Nonreductive Physicalism 
A third approach to consciousness, and likely the most popular in science-and-religion, is 
nonreductive physicalism.45  In terms of the study of consciousness, nonreductive physicalism 
“denies the existence of a nonmaterial entity, the mind (or soul), but does not deny the existence 
of consciousness… In brief, this is the view that the human nervous system, operating in concert 
with the rest of the body in its environment, is the seat of consciousness (and also of human 
spiritual or religious capacities.”46 This is essentially a statement against reductionism, rather than 
a positive statement about what nonphysical higher properties actually are. Another way of 
explaining the position is to say that nonreductive physicalists affirm the distinctiveness of 
certain properties (i.e., consciousness), without positing any extra ingredients in addition to the 
basic “stuff” of the universe. In other words, “the psychological properties of a system are 
distinct from, and irreducible to, its physical properties.”47 Thus, nonreductive physicalism 
maintains two commitments: it is nonreductive insofar as it refuses to reduce consciousness to 
brain activity, and it is physicalist insofar as it denies an immaterial “something extra” in 
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consciousness. Philosopher Tim Crane explains that “a non-reductive version of physicalism 
which is worthy of the name, then, must be committed to the completeness of physics.”48 But 
how can nonreductive physicalism have it both ways? Is nonreductive physicalism a coherent 
position, or is this a classic case of wanting to “have one’s cake, and eat it too”? 
 
In addressing this question, it is first helpful to highlight the motivations behind nonreductive 
physicalism, as well as its basic tenets. Given the intuitive force of the Hard Problem, as well as a 
general growing appreciation for nuanced complexity in mind-brain discussions, it is hardly 
surprising that the “nonreductive” in nonreductive physicalism is so appealing.49 As Kim notes, 
“the word ‘reductionism’ seems by now to have acquired a negative, faintly disreputable flavor – 
at least in philosophy of mind,”50 and “many of us have the feeling that there is something rigid 
and narrow-minded about reductionist strategies. Reductionisms, we tend to feel, attempt to 
impose on us a monolithic, strait-jacketed view of the subject matter.”51 Few would suggest that 
economics, humour, music, or culture could be reduced to explanations in physical terms alone; 
rather, there is a general recognition that these higher order phenomena require their own special 
sciences in order to be analysed adequately – and so with the mind. Yet, even as these strictly 
nonphysical phenomena are distinct, in a sense, from the language of physics, many would deny 
that a full description of them requires reference to nonphysical “stuff.” The question then 
becomes one of how, exactly, to understand the relationship between physical processes and 
nonphysical realities.  
 
Nonreductive physicalists take as their starting point the rejection of both reductionism and the 
psychoneural identity thesis. At the very least, multiple realisability shows that conscious states 
are not identical to specific physical states; and, “if entities are not identical, then they are 
distinct, however else they may be related. There are two kinds of thing, not one: this is dualism, 
like it or not.”52 The question is what kind of dualism we are talking about. Nonreductive 
physicalists are quick to reject substance dualism – otherwise, they would not be physicalists. 
Rather, they subscribe to property dualism, or the idea that “one may associate different 
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properties, e.g. mental and physical, with one and the same owner, the brain as physical 
substance…There is only one substance, the physical body, which may have two properties, 
mental and physical.”53 That is, conscious beings do not possess an immaterial mind or soul in 
addition to their physical bodies, but consciousness is no less real for that. The mind is a high 
level, emergent reality that is ontologically significant on its own terms, in spite of its dependence 
on the physical substrate of the brain. If all this sounds remarkably familiar from the previous 
chapter, it is because emergence theory is arguably the dominant nonreductive physicalist 
approach to the mind. As emergence was discussed in detail in relation to Clayton’s divine action 
proposal, I will not discuss it further here. The same descriptions and critiques found in Chapter 
3 can, broadly speaking, be applied to nonreductive physicalism more generally. Still, it is helpful 
to go over some of the details in this context.  
 
Philosopher Nancey Murphy is one of the most prominent nonreductive physicalists working in 
science-and-religion and, as seen above, she affirms that “the human nervous system, operating 
in concert with the rest of the body in its environment, is the seat of consciousness.”54 But what 
does it mean to say that the nervous system is “the seat of” the mind? What is the precise 
relationship between the brain-body system and the subjective experiences of conscious beings? 
Broadly speaking, nonreductive physicalists explain this by relying on the concept of 
supervenience, or the idea that the mind is so closely related to, and dependent on, the brain that 
changes in one correspond to changes in the other. There are a variety of technical definitions 
for this, and several subtypes of supervenience.55 One simple definition is this: “A supervenes on 
B when there is no difference in A without a difference in B…or, in other words, physical 
duplicates must be aesthetic duplicates too.”56 Again, there are many shades of nuance in the 
debates over supervenience, but the key is that it indicates a relationship between the mind and 
brain that is more than mere correlation, but less than outright identification. The exact nature of 
this supervenience relationship is hotly debated.57 For nonreductive physicalists, the brain-body 
is the “seat” of consciousness because it is the physical substrate that instantiates mental activity. 
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But how, then, do nonreductive physicalists defend their rejection of the psychoneural identity 
thesis? Thus far, it is not clear how the mind can (or should) be differentiated from the brain, or 
what it means for the brain-body to be the “seat of” (read “something different from”) 
consciousness.  
 
Murphy recognises that this is a difficult issue, and begins her explanation by first clarifying what 
nonreductive physicalists are arguing against. The “nonreductive” part of nonreductive 
physicalism needs clarification. After all, nonreductive physicalists are ontological reductionists, 
insofar as they reject immaterial minds. That is, we need not invoke anything other than basic 
physical components to explain consciousness, even though we recognise that consciousness is 
no less “real” than the electrons and protons on which it is dependent. The real threat, Murphy 
argues, is causal reductionism; this is “the view that the behavior of the parts of a system 
(ultimately, the parts studied by subatomic physics) is determinative of the behavior of all higher-
level entities.”58 That is, what nonreductive physicalists reject is the idea that the mind is nothing 
but the activity of neurons, that all of our hopes, fears, and desires are causally reducible to the 
firings of neurons. What Murphy is getting at, then, is the problem of mental causation. She sees 
consciousness’ causal role as something of a litmus test for the mind; if we are to avoid 
descending into “nothing buttery,” we must find a way to preserve the mind’s causal 
independence from bottom-up processes.  If causal reductionism is true, then the mind does not 
actually exert any causal influence; our mental states do not lead us to laugh, make dinner 
choices, go to the movies, or pray. Indeed, one of the prime reasons for rejecting the identity 
thesis is that it would seem (for many) to undermine mental causation (in the way that we usually 
think of it, at least).59  
 
Nonreductive physicalists reject causal reductionism, and instead affirm that “one has to take 
account of causal influences of the whole on the part, as well as of the part on the whole.”60 
Variations on this idea include “downward causation,” “whole-part constraint,” “top-down 
causation,” etc.61 Downward causation is the affirmation that the higher-level system of 
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consciousness has effects on lower-level neural processes, even as it is dependent on those 
neural processes. Nonreductive physicalists thus reject causal reductionism in favour of systems-
based thinking. Philosopher Robert Van Gulick explains that “the whole is not any simple 
function of its parts, since the whole at least partially determines what contributions are made by 
its parts.”62 Again, this is familiar from our discussion of Clayton’s emergence thesis in Chapter 
3. Nonreductive physicalists want to retain the physicalist label by affirming that the brain-body 
is the physical substrate on which the mind remains dependent. The idea here is that the mind 
can effect downward causation on the brain itself precisely because the mind is not an additional 
substance. That is, the mind is not so much causing change on an altogether separate entity (the 
brain), but acting upon its own physical substrate. Van Gulick again explains that “higher-order 
patterns can have a degree of independence from their underlying physical realizations and can 
exert what might be called downward causal influences without requiring any objectionable form 
of emergentism by which higher-order properties would alter the underlying laws of 
physics.”63 The distinction between the mind and the brain may thus seem slight, but it is a vital 
one. Whether or not downward causation requires the denial of the causal closure principle is up 
for debate.64  
 
But is nonreductive physicalism a coherent position? Some would say not. Jaegwon Kim, for 
example, has been an outspoken critic of nonreductive physicalism. He argues that physicalists 
have only two options: eliminativism and reductionism. That is, “if you have already made your 
commitment to a version of physicalism worthy of the name, you must accept the reducibility of 
the psychological to the physical, or, failing that, you must consider the psychological as falling 
outside your physicalistically respectable ontology”; that is, you must call yourself a dualist.65 
These are strong words; why does Kim feel justified in making this claim? One of the most 
critical challenges to nonreductive physicalism is the problem of mental causation. As just 
described, nonreductive physicalists hold that the mind is able to causally influence the physical 
brain (and thus other events in the natural world) through downward causation, or a systems-
based whole-part constraint. But the causal closure principle states that all physical events 
(including neural events) have physical causes. If mental properties are distinct from physical 
                                                            
62 Robert van Gulick, “Who’s in Charge Here? And Who's Doing All the Work?” in Mental Causation, ed. 
John Heil and Alfred Mele (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 251. 
63 Ibid., 252. 
64 See David Papineau, “The Causal Closure Principle and Naturalism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy 
of Mind, ed. Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter (Oxford: Clarendon, 2009). 
65 Kim, “The Myth of Nonreductive Physicalism,” 32. 
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processes, then for them to cause neural change would be to contradict the causal closure 
principle. And, as Kim writes, “If nonreductive physicalists accept the causal closure of the 
physical domain…they have no visible way of accounting for the possibility of psychophysical 
causation.”66 One might opt for another metaphysical position (a form of dualism, for example), 
but physicalism is not an option. 
 
 Murphy would counter that her position is more subtle than Kim lets on. That is, she is not 
suggesting that there is an immaterial mind at all. While she does argue that “consciousness and 
religious awareness are emergent properties, and they have top-down causal influence on the 
body,”67 she simultaneously affirms that “the neural system performs all of the functions once 
assigned to [immaterial] mind (and soul).”68 Nonreductive physicalists do affirm that 
consciousness has top-down influence on the brain, but that consciousness is an emergent 
property of the physical brain-body-environment system. Following Kim’s line of argumentation, 
though, one might question whether Murphy’s nonreductive physicalism is coherent. If 
consciousness is physical, what does it mean for it to be an “emergent property” as Murphy 
suggests? Even these emergent properties must only effect causal change at the level of neurons, 
molecules, and electrons - and as neurons, molecules, and electrons - if this is to be a truly physicalist 
position.69 Indeed, one fascinating aspect of nonreductive physicalism is how easily it slips into 
dualistic metaphors on one hand, and affirmations of the “mind as the physical brain” on the 
other. Any talk of the brain as “the seat” of consciousness, or of consciousness as an “emergent 
property” of the brain, immediately moves us out of the realm of physicalism proper and into 
the realm of dualism – at least linguistically. And yet, nonreductive physicalists insist that they 
truly are physicalists, working only with physical components in their theories.  
 
It is understandable that nonreductive physicalism is such a popular option for not only 
philosophy, but science-and-religion in particular. Nonreductive physicalism paves the way for 
positions like Clayton’s emergentist thesis, which in turn make possible the affirmation that 
human minds are uniquely spiritual, and that God interacts with those minds in a very real way. 
Yet, as Kim argues, “currently popular middle-of-the-road positions, like…nonreductive 
                                                            
66 Ibid., 47. 
67 Murphy, “Physicalism Without Reductionism,” 555. 
68 Ibid., 555. 
69 See Chapter 3 for an extensive discussion of emergence.  
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physicalism, are not easily tolerated by robust physicalism. To think that one can be a serious 
physicalist and at the same time enjoy the company of things and phenomena that are 
nonphysical, I believe, is an idle dream…Physicalism cannot be had on the cheap.”70 
Nonreductive physicalism may be a popular option, but it may be inevitable that we need to 
make some difficult choices about reductionism and physicalism. It is worth questioning whether 
the “nonreductive” of nonreductive physicalism really adds anything meaningful, or if it rather 
serves to confuse the issue. At the very least, we need to be very careful and precise in explaining 
wherein lies the “nonreductive” aspect of this approach. And, as we will see in Part Two, it is 
worth asking why a more reductive physicalism has seemed so threatening to science-and-




The last two chapters have offered an extended examination of issues surrounding the Hard 
Problem, as this is a crucial aspect of the “divine action in the mind” discussion. While I have 
merely been able to skim the surface of existing debates in consciousness literature, this chapter 
has focussed on those aspects most relevant to the question of divine action in consciousness. In 
particular, I have focussed on three issues: 1) the intuitive appeal of the Hard Problem, 2) 
deflationary perspectives on the Hard Problem, and 3) prominent physicalist approaches to the 
mind. I began in the last chapter by discussing the intuitive dualism that is at the heart of so 
much work in science-and-religion (and divine action theology in particular), and recognising the 
commonsense appeal of dualism. I drew upon current thinking in the philosophy of mind and 
the various brain sciences to argue against the Hard Problem, and suggested that our difficulty in 
imagining a satisfying scientific explanation for consciousness is not ontologically significant. 
Then, in this chapter, I presented several prominent physicalist approaches to consciousness: the 
psychoneural identity theory, functionalism, and nonreductive physicalism. While each of these 
has its own strengths and weaknesses, they share a common commitment to physicalism. This, it 
must be emphasised, is the key. The leading theories of mind are explicitly and wholly physicalist 
– or at least they purport to be.71 They do not leave room for positing the human mind as 
uniquely spiritual, or as uniquely open to divine action. Of course, a dualist like Chalmers would 
argue that these physicalist theories are dodging the Hard Problem: “A theory that denies the 
                                                            
70 Kim, Mind in a Physical World, 120. 
71 As noted, whether or not nonreductive physicalism is a coherent position is debatable.  
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phenomenon ‘solves’ the problem by ducking the question.”72 As we have seen, however, there 
are very good reasons to question our intuitive dualism, and to opt for some form of physicalist 
approach to the mind. We have every reason to believe that there is a naturalistic explanation for 
consciousness that is describable in scientific terms, even if those scientific terms are not 
reductionistic. 
 
 This ends the deconstructive part of this thesis. My overall argument in these last several 
chapters has been that standard theories of divine action are inadequate, and that this is 
especially true of Clayton’s “divine action in the mind” thesis. I began in Chapter 2 by examining 
the current state of divine action theories, particularly highlighting the role that (perhaps 
insufficient) metaphysical presuppositions play in science-and-religion. More specifically, I 
suggested that contemporary divine action theories generally rely on a noninterventionist 
framework, which is an ironically deistic basis for divine action theories. In Chapter 3, I 
presented Philip Clayton’s emergentist divine action thesis, which argues that the mind is likely 
the only natural space in which God can act in a noninterventionist fashion. Clayton uses 
emergence theory to support his divine action thesis, and I argued that his use of this theory is 
actually incompatible with, and unwarranted by, emergence as it is used in the scientific and 
philosophical literature. Indeed, I concluded that Clayton’s proposal suggests a mild form of 
dualism, and is essentially a nuanced version of “God of the gaps,” and thus subject to the same 
critiques presented in Chapter 2. After critiquing Clayton’s consistent privileging of 
consciousness, I argued in Chapter 4 that the intuitive dualism underlying his proposal is a 
common – but fallacious – position from which to build a divine action theory. I argued this by 
examining the Hard Problem of Consciousness, which is essentially a philosophical articulation 
of intuitive dualism. Deflationary perspectives were thus offered, and it was suggested that 
logical arguments and commonsense intuition are potentially fallible when it comes to the 
evolved, biological realities of consciousness. While it might seem self-evident that the mind is 
something other than physical processes in the brain-body-environment system, the explanatory 
success of science (and its attendant methodological naturalism) would at least warrant a healthy 
scepticism toward the Hard Problem. Chapter 5 is a logical progression from Chapter 4, and I 
have here offered several physicalist ways of understanding the mind. In other words, the 
argument is not simply that we should hold out hope for a physicalist understanding of 
                                                            




consciousness, but that there are several potentially viable approaches already being debated by 
scholars across the brain sciences and philosophy of mind. In sum, Part One has challenged 
existing assumptions in divine action theories, particularly those involving human consciousness.  
 
So then, are we at an impasse? If consciousness is not uniquely nonphysical, is there hope for 
divine action in the human mind (or, for that matter, divine action in general)? Part One has 
been deconstructionist in emphasis, and deflationary in tone. The chapters herein have provided 
various reasons for rejecting a nonphysicalist understanding of the mind, or at least for 
questioning our theological motivations in seeking uniquely spiritual or “open” aspects of the 
natural world. Thus, while I have been intentionally critical of current divine action theories, 
intuitive dualism, the Hard Problem, and even nonreductive physicalism, this has been necessary 
groundwork for developing a stronger, more robust, and scientifically acceptable framework for 
divine action. In Part Two, I re-examine our foundational assumptions in science-and-religion 
and divine action theories more specifically, suggesting that physicalism is not something to be 
feared in Christian theology. That is, by developing (or rediscovering!) a properly robust 
understanding of the God-nature relationship, physicalist understandings of the mind cease to be 
threatening. In turn, this paves the way for an expansive approach to divine action that allows 
one to affirm God’s action in the naturalised mind – and within the natural world more broadly. 
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Chapter 6  
 Naturalism(s) and the Theological Turn  
 
6.1 Introduction to Part Two 
Part One of this thesis can be considered largely deflationary, insofar as it offers critiques of 
contemporary divine action theories and, in particular, those theories privileging the human mind 
as a uniquely spiritual nexus for divine action. I began in Chapter 2 with an examination of the 
standard divine action “scene.” More specifically, I analysed the three debates shaping various 
approaches to the causal joint; I ultimately concluded that science-and-religion has been 
dominated by noninterventionist, incompatibilist commitments involving rather confused 
understandings of the laws of nature. I further argued that the fundamental debates themselves 
are questionable and need to be re-examined in light of their evident metaphysical 
presuppositions. In Chapter 3 I presented Philip Clayton’s emergentist divine action proposal as 
a contemporary instantiation of the standard causal joint models critiqued in Chapter 2. 
Moreover, Chapter 3 highlighted the problems with locating divine action primarily, or even 
solely, in human consciousness. The question of the ontology of consciousness was then the 
focus of Chapters 4 and 5: Chapter 4 presented and critiqued the so-called Hard Problem of 
Consciousness, while Chapter 5 examined physicalist alternatives for understanding the mind. 
My overall goal in Part One was to argue two broad points. First, noninterventionist divine 
action theories presuppose questionable metaphysical commitments and are both scientifically 
flawed and theologically inadequate. Second, while theologians overwhelmingly privilege the 
mind as ontologically unexplainable in scientific terms or as being uniquely spiritual, we have 
good reason to assume that a fully naturalistic explanation for consciousness is (in principle) 
available. In sum, I argued that standard divine action theories in general are insufficient, and 
particularly that this is the case insofar as one locates divine action in the supposedly nonphysical 
human mind.    
 
In Part Two, I shift from this sustained critique to a more constructive approach to divine action 
in the mind. While I argued in Part One that standard approaches to divine action (particularly 
Clayton’s emergent mind proposal) are scientifically implausible and theologically insufficient, in 
Part Two I explore theological and metaphysical alternatives that challenge the approaches 
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highlighted in Part One. Specifically, I examine what I will call the “theological turn” in divine 
action theories (and science-and-religion more broadly), which focuses on theological models of 
the basic God-nature relationship – rather than using science to identify where and how divine 
action might occur. To that end, in this chapter I examine the question of what it means to be 
properly natural, and demonstrate how some scholars have critiqued the sort of metaphysical 
framework implicit in noninterventionist, incompatibilist divine action theories. Specifically, I 
argue that standard divine action theories ironically presuppose a sort of scientistic naturalism – 
even while more theologically robust naturalisms may be available. Then, the following three 
chapters highlight how the theological turn is worked out in specific theological frameworks: 
Chapter 7 highlights theistic naturalism(s) through the lenses of Thomism, Chapter 8 examines 
panentheistic naturalism, and Chapter 9 focuses on varieties of pneumatological naturalism. I 
argue that what these approaches share in common is a critique of standard divine action 
models, and a commitment to theological frameworks emphasising God’s immanence and 
interactive presence with human minds (and other aspects of nature) as a normative feature of 
what it means to be fully natural. In other words, proponents of the theological turn shift the 
divine action conversation away from an emphasis on scientifically-identifiable causal joints, and 
toward theological approaches challenging the metaphysical assumptions of noninterventionist, 
incompatibilist divine action. While the theological turn can certainly be critiqued (as I will do in 
the following chapters), I suggest that it is an appropriate corrective to standard divine action 
theories – and one that potentially allows for a theologically robust understanding of divine 
action in the human mind (and elsewhere!).  
At this point, it is important to explicitly restate the relationship between Parts One and Two of 
this thesis. Specifically, one might wonder how Part One (with its sustained focus on the science, 
philosophy, and theology of the mind) contributes to Part Two (which could be seen as 
focussing almost exclusively on theological frameworks for divine action), and vice versa. Is Part 
One’s emphasis on standard divine action theories and the mind necessary for Part Two’s 
argument regarding theistic naturalist approaches to divine action? And conversely, what is the 
relevance of Part Two’s exploration of theistic naturalisms for Part One’s proposal that the mind 
should be considered fully natural and perhaps even physical? These are valid questions, answers 
to which will be evident as the argument continues to unfold. Nevertheless, it is helpful here to 
explicitly foreground and restate this argument. This thesis’ main argument is that while it is 
theologically and scientifically implausible to confine divine action to the human mind or, more 
broadly, to privilege consciousness as uniquely nonphysical or spiritual, this does not mean that 
Saunders is correct in his conclusion that “theology is in crisis.” On the contrary, I will argue that 
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it is certainly possible for science-respecting theologians to affirm divine action – and that it is 
likely that the mind is a particularly intense locus for divine action after all – but only if one 
moves beyond the insufficient metaphysical assumptions implicit in what I have called the 
“standard” model of divine action. As noted, Part One of this thesis is largely deflationary, 
intended to deconstruct the noninterventionist, incompatibilist assumptions of DAP-style divine 
action theories, as well as to challenge the legitimacy of the Hard Problem of Consciousness. I 
concluded that there is reason to assume a fully natural, perhaps physical, understanding of the 
human mind. In Part Two, I explore constructive theological possibilities for understanding 
divine action, which in turn render theologically unnecessary approaches to divine action that 
privilege the mind. In other words, even though Part Two of this thesis does not address 
consciousness in the same intense manner as did Part One, it is essential to the thesis’ single, 
overall argument. That is, by arguing that theistic naturalism (broadly construed) redefines nature in 
theological terms such that all physicality is inherently involved with God’s active presence, Part Two removes the 
theological need to privilege the mind as the spiritual part or aspect of a person. In other words, Part Two 
could be considered a theological rebuttal of the Hard Problem of Consciousness, a rebuttal that 
simultaneously invites a physical understanding of the mind precisely because physicality itself 
does not indicate a lack of involvement with divine presence or activity. While Part One 
demonstrates the scientific, philosophical, and theological insufficiency of privileging the mind as 
uniquely spiritual or open to divine action, Part Two offers constructive theological frameworks 
that actually embrace the naturalisation of the mind, precisely because the physical itself is always 
and everywhere intimately involved with divine agency. Thus, Part Two is intended to refute and 
replace both the standard model of divine action and the felt theological need for a nonphysical 
mind. Moreover, as will be discussed in brief, broad theistic naturalism may, after all, privilege 
the mind as an intense locus of divine activity, though not because consciousness is in any way 
nonphysical. This is not to say that theistic naturalisms lack weaknesses of their own – they 
certainly do face challenges, as will be discussed. However, I argue that they offer an important 
step in the right theological direction, in a manner that is at least superior to the standard 
approach discussed in Part One.  
 
In any case, before examining these explicitly theological approaches to divine action, I first turn 
to the subject of this chapter: naturalism and the implicit metaphysical assumptions of standard 
divine action models. I begin by challenging the binaries evident in standard approaches to 
divine action: interventionism/noninterventionism, compatibilism/incompatibilism, and (to a 
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lesser extent1) prescriptive/descriptive laws of nature. In so doing, it becomes clear that standard 
models of divine action presume a metaphysical framework for the God-nature relationship that 
may be theologically insufficient. This is made clearer in the next section, where I discuss 
naturalism; it will become evident that standard divine action theories implicitly adopt 
theologically problematic versions of naturalism, even while theologically robust naturalisms may 
be available. Namely, divine action theories often presume an autonomous natural world that 
excludes divine involvement in physical processes (except, of course, in supposedly 
underdetermined areas that function as metaphysical loopholes for divine agency). However, 
theistic varieties of naturalism are championed by those in the theological turn, and may provide 
a better way of understanding divine action.  
 
6.2 Questioning the Binaries 
My goal in this chapter is to highlight the underlying problems with standard approaches to 
divine action (as exemplified by Clayton’s emergent mind proposal), mainly by examining the 
metaphysical foundations and naturalistic frameworks on which these theories rest. As we will 
see, the theological turn in science-and-religion suggests a re-examination of naturalism, which in 
turn problematises the standard questions framing divine action debates. As demonstrated in 
Chapter 2, three debates framing the divine action conversation involve intervention, 
compatibilism, and the laws of nature. Science-and-religion has been dominated by attempts to 
locate specific causal joints for divine action in underdetermined areas of the natural world. Such 
attempts are driven by a commitment to noninterventionism and incompatibilism: God must act 
in a way that does not contravene the (presumably prescriptive) laws of nature, and this divine 
action can occur only in places where this is “room” for God to act in addition to regular 
physical processes. Clayton’s emergent mind proposal, I argued, exemplifies these same 
commitments. The problem with Clayton’s approach (and others like it: quantum mechanics, 
chaos theory, etc.) is two-fold: it is theologically insufficient insofar as it limits divine action to 
human consciousness, and it is scientifically inadequate insofar as we have reason to assume and 
expect a fully naturalistic explanation for consciousness. In other words, if the unstated 
theological goal of Clayton’s model is to defend the scientific plausibility of noninterventionist 
                                                            
1 While challenging the first two binaries will have an effect on how one understands the laws of nature, it 
is not particularly helpful to focus on the laws of nature here. There is much confusion surrounding the laws of 
nature, and one’s perspective on them is often determined or presupposed by one’s commitment to 
noninterventionism and incompatibilism. Thus, for the sake of clarity, the discussion here will focus mainly on 
metaphysical assumptions undergirding noninterventionism and incompatibilism.  
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divine action in the emergent mind, that goal is not met. Clayton’s emergent divine action 
proposal, then, becomes the latest such theory to invite “God of the gaps” charges and expose 
the problems with allowing science to dictate the possibility and parameters of divine action. 
 
But what if standard approaches to divine action conceptualise the problem in an unhelpful way? 
As Lydia Jaeger suggests, it might well be the case that instead of providing a scientific account 
of divine action, we instead “discover that the question was badly framed.”2 As theological and 
scientific problems with specific DAP-style causal joint theories have become evident, many in 
the divine action conversation have indeed begun questioning the authority of scientific 
knowledge in understanding God’s action in the world. These representatives of the theological 
turn ask questions such as: What sort of God-nature relationship is implied by 
noninterventionism? What does it mean to be properly natural in the first place? Does 
incompatibilism presume an erroneous God-nature relationship? Is science not limited in what it 
can say about the possibility of divine action? By using theological resources to address these 
questions, those in the theological turn have begun reclaiming divine action as a properly 
theological question – rather than one ultimately to be answered by the most current scientific 
knowledge. In this view, it is problematic that the success of modern science has resulted in a 
situation where “science no longer pertains solely to the material world…it guides our attitude 
toward reality in general.”3 Whereas standard causal joint theories rely on noninterventionism 
and incompatibilism, explicitly theological models tend to be compatibilist and to reject the 
interventionism/noninterventionism binary altogether. As will be discussed, these theories also 
tend to reject the GDA/SDA distinction: once the noninterventionist, incompatibilist paradigm 
is discarded, the distinction between general and special divine action is called into question. The 
upshot of all this is that those in the theological turn are often able to affirm a more expansive 
and far-reaching account of divine activity in the world – precisely because this activity is no 
longer dependent on current gaps in scientific knowledge, but a theological model that affirms an 
inherent interactive relationship between God and all the natural world. The suggestion is that “if 
God is the Creator of the universe, his action in it is not a problem to be figured out, but a reality 
to be acknowledged.”4 In short: a full account of the natural world must necessarily include a 
theological account of God’s active presence.  
                                                            
2 Lydia Jaeger and Michael L. Peterson, “Against Physicalism-Plus-God: How Creation Accounts for 
Divine Action in Nature’s World,” Faith and Philosophy 29, no. 3 (2012): 305. 
3 Smedes, “Beyond Barbour,” 242. 





Before getting to the question of what it means to be natural (according to both nontheistic and 
theistic naturalists), it is helpful first to highlight the precise assumptions implicit in standard 
divine action theories. First, and most importantly, the standard approach to divine action adopts 
noninterventionism, in explicit opposition to divine intervention in physical processes. Few in 
science-and-religion would suggest that the notion of God violating laws of nature is a desirable 
affirmation to make; and indeed, “the majority of science-and-religion scholars…abandon the 
notion of interventionism, or God’s suspension of the laws of nature.”5 In fact, interventionism 
and noninterventionism themselves have become value-laden concepts in science-and-religion; 
“‘intervention’ and ‘interventionism’ are never used neutrally but only pejoratively. Intervention 
is equated with transgression, manipulation…and violation.”6 But what is perhaps equally 
problematic is the God-nature relationship presupposed by the 
interventionism/noninterventionism paradigm in the first place. Yes, incompatibilist 
noninterventionists reject the idea that God intervenes in the laws of nature, but their causal 
joint responses to interventionism assume the same autonomous, self-sufficient, law-governed 
world as do interventionists.7 In this sense, incompatibilist interventionists implicitly validate the 
nearly spatial God-nature model that interventionism assumes: a model in which the natural 
world’s default state is one of autonomous, prescriptive natural laws, and in which divine action 
is anomalous and foreign to natural processes. In other words, incompatibilist 
noninterventionists might reject the idea that God overrides the laws of nature – but they then 
look for ontologically underdetermined causal joints wherein God can lawfully enter the created 
order through a sort of underdetermined back door, as it were. Thus, even though 
noninterventionists reject the notion of God occasionally overriding laws of nature, they give 
tacit approval to the God-nature relationship this notion  assumes – one in which the natural 
world’s default state is law-governed and autonomous without God’s active presence. It seems 
that the only real difference between interventionists and noninterventionists is that 
noninterventionists find creative (albeit scientifically implausible) ways to circumvent the laws of 
nature: the image of a self-contained, autonomous natural world remains intact.  
                                                            
5 Smedes, “Beyond Barbour,” 244.  
6 Owen C. Thomas, “Chaos, Complexity, and God: A Review Essay,” Theology Today 54, no. 1 (1997): 75. 
7 Strictly speaking, compatibilists are also noninterventionists, insofar as compatibilist divine action does 
not require intervention in the laws of nature. Thus, it is important to clarify the type of noninterventionist I am 
referring to here. However, compatibilists often do not self-identify as noninterventionists, as noninterventionism 




Indeed, a commitment to noninterventionist divine action presupposes a law-governed universe 
that is entirely autonomous of divine agency and involvement in the first place. As Alan Padgett 
puts it, “the picture of God and the world which ‘intervention’ evokes, rhetorically, is already 
theologically deficient. It assumes a deistic notion of God and the world.”8 That is, by even 
refuting the idea of intervention and opting for noninterventionist SDA through natural 
processes that are underdetermined by physical laws, one still affirms an essentially deistic 
worldview – which, presumably, is theologically problematic. By attempting to use science to 
locate specific causal joints wherein God might act (e.g., in the emergent mind), one is assuming 
that normal, regular physical processes do not involve divine agency in the first place – the 
default position is one in which God does not act specially in nature (including in human minds). 
And again, Knight notes that noninterventionist SDA is a misleading concept; it still refers to 
God’s action in nature that brings about a state of affairs that would not have occurred 
otherwise. Indeed, “the mainstream ‘noninterventionist’ model has not, then, abandoned 
interventionism in the widest sense of the term...it is still presumed that there are two possible 
outcomes to any given situation…In this respect, the ‘noninterventionist’ model has just 
replaced one mode of interference – that in which the laws of nature are set aside – with 
another.”9 Moreover, the same somewhat deistic model is at play in noninterventionism: it is 
assumed that the default naturalistic account of things is one that does not include divine action. 
Hence when Aubrey Moore wrote that “a theory of occasional intervention implies as its 
correlative a theory of ordinary absence,” his critique could be applied equally well to 
noninterventionists. As we will see, the noninterventionist view suggests a debatably insufficient 
account of the natural world. What is needed (and as will be explored in more detail in coming 
chapters) is a stronger theological account of what it means to be properly natural.  
 
6.2.2 Incompatibilism 
Similarly, the common commitment to incompatibilist divine action presumes an ontology that 
may be implausible or theologically inadequate. Incompatibilists assume that “acts of God make 
sense only if there are realms of physics where the behavior of bodies is not determined by 
physical law: then and only then is there room for objective acts of God…Attributions of an 
                                                            
8 Alan G. Padgett, “God and Miracle in an Age of Science,” in The Blackwell Companion to Science and 
Christianity, ed. J.B. Stump and Alan G. Padgett (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell), 535. 
9 Knight, “Theistic Naturalism and ‘Special’ Divine Providence,” 534. 
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event to an act of God and to deterministic explanation by physical law are taken to be mutually 
exclusive.”10 This is why causal joint theories attempt to identify areas of physical indeterminism: 
if, for example, the emergent mind is inherently underdetermined by brain processes, then there 
is causal room for God to act. The incompatibilist assumption is that either the laws of nature 
determine a certain outcome, or God acts through processes where the laws of nature seem not 
to determine specific outcomes – but not both. In a sense, incompatibilism results in an almost 
combative relationship between God and physical laws; it seems as if God must constantly “get 
around” physical laws. Notably, incompatibilist theories are perpetually vulnerable to advances in 
scientific knowledge. Areas that seem inherently underdetermined are subject to further clarity as 
specific sciences advance in understanding of previously mysterious phenomena.  
 
But even if there are natural outcomes that are ontologically undetermined by the laws of 
physics, is incompatibilism really the best way to view God’s interaction with the natural world? 
To be clear: by using science to determine where and how God might act, the incompatibilist is 
saying something about God – and specifically, God’s immanence and transcendence. That is, 
the incompatibilist assumes that “immanence can only work by pushing aside a part of the 
intramundane to make room for the immanent presence of transcendence.”11 In other words, 
incompatibilism restricts the active presence of God to processes that science deems 
underdetermined by physical laws (more on immanence and transcendence later – I mention 
these here only by way of introduction). Indeed, it is important to remember that 
incompatibilism gives science the power to determine the parameters of divine action; Smedes 
suggests that “it seems as if the participants [in divine action conversations] have turned to 
science to answer a theological question…Science not only has become our sole heuristic 
instrument to tackle questions that relate to our world but has extended its reach to deal with 
theological questions.”12 In this sense, noninterventionist incompatibilists ironically adopt a sort 
of working scientism; they assume the priority of scientific methodology and knowledge in 
deciding what is theologically possible. This critique applies not only to the entire DAP project, 
but to Clayton’s emergent divine action thesis. That is, Clayton’s proposal limits divine action to 
the emergent mind, precisely because Clayton sees science as suggesting that the mind is 
ontologically underdetermined – God might act only in the mind, because the emergent mind is 
                                                            
10 Porter, By the Waters of Naturalism, 4. 
11 Ibid., 41. 
12 Smedes, “Beyond Barbour,” 245. 
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a high level of reality not accounted for in terms of physical law. In other words, Clayton’s divine 
action proposal is as incompatibilist as are other standard DAP theories.  
 
More broadly, the important point here is that incompatibilism assumes a God-world model in 
which God is essentially competing with physical laws to effect change in the world. As Lydia 
Jaeger writes, “There is one unchallenged assumption in most current models of divine action: it 
has to comply with the picture which science, and more specifically physics (perhaps suitably 
perfected in the future), offers us of the world.”13 There has been little appetite for the idea that 
divine action could work through ontological physical laws, instead of requiring underdetermined 
gaps in those laws.14  As we will see in coming chapters, this presumed incompatibility between 
divine agency and the laws of nature is at odds with key tenets of Christian theology. As Smedes 
argues, incompatibilism “ignores the categorical distinction between God and the world (that is, 
God’s transcendence). God is the Creator of the universe and therefore of a different order than 
the creaturely.”15 In other words, incompatibilism misunderstands the basic theological 
framework for understanding the relationship between God and nature; it assumes that a full 
account of the natural world is possible without reference to God’s continued, active presence. 
Those representing the theological turn in divine action theology make just this point: we will get 
divine action wrong so long as we base our theories on science. Incompatibilism presupposes an 
affirmation that science is the final arbiter of where divine action occurs, and in so doing makes a 
category mistake: it presupposes that “divine action is to be treated as a scientific problem rather 
than as a theological or existential one…In their attempts to understand divine action, [such 
theorists] are looking in the wrong direction and thereby not taking theology seriously.”16 
 
The next three chapters will explore various theological frameworks in greater depth; my goal 
here is primarily to highlight incompatibilism’s implicit assumptions in the first place. More 
broadly, both incompatibilism and noninterventionism are rejected by those supporting a 
theological turn in science-and-religion. Instead of asking how noninterventionist, 
incompatibilist divine action can occur through natural processes not determined by physical 
                                                            
13 Jaeger and Peterson,“Against Physicalism-Plus-God,” 304.  
14 That is, there has been little appetite for compatibilist theories in the last several decades, and particularly 
in the relatively new field of science-and-religion. As we will see in the next chapters, Christian theology in fact has a 
long and rich history of compatibilist approaches to divine action.  




laws, the theological turn instead explores the basic ontology of nature itself. What does it mean 
to be natural? Surely, they suggest, the natural world does not exist autonomously and self-
sufficiently; would not a full account of the natural world necessarily include an account of 
God’s active presence in and with natural processes? These are significant and complex 
questions, and are not pertinent to science-and-religion alone. Indeed, the question of what it 
means to be natural is a much-debated topic in the philosophy of science, and there is a vast 
literature exploring various perspectives on naturalism. While a full exposition of naturalism is 
not possible here, several of its key debates and distinctions are helpful as we move forward into 
explicitly theistic approaches to the question of what it means to be natural. To that end, the 
remainder of this chapter explores key themes and debates surrounding naturalism(s). This 
serves to lay the philosophical foundation for the specific theological approaches to naturalism 
highlighted in the following chapters.  
 
6.3 Naturalism(s) 
 David Papineau has famously quipped that “nearly everybody nowadays wants to be a 
‘naturalist,’” but what does that mean?17 It is true (at least in the sciences and philosophy) that it 
is difficult to be taken seriously if one does not claim to be something of a naturalist. But 
naturalism turns out to be a notoriously slippery concept to define, and is often taken to mean 
whatever a particular writer wishes it to. At a very general level, one could say that to be a 
naturalist is to believe that the world can be explained in fully natural terms – or, more to the 
point, without reference to supernatural agents. But such a definition is hopelessly tautological: 
how do we define “natural,” “world,” or even “supernatural”? When we speak of the natural 
world, do we mean the physical universe, or something stronger, like “all reality”? These are the 
sorts of questions that plague philosophical discussions of naturalism, and I cannot do them 
justice here. Nevertheless, they are important to our discussion of divine action and what it 
means to be fully natural, and so the rest of this chapter will present some of the more pertinent 
key distinctions and debates.  
 
 
                                                            




6.3.1 The Problem of Terminology and Categories 
More than simply being difficult to define, how one defines naturalism can actually commit one 
to a certain view of reality – or at least reveal one’s existing understanding of reality. In other 
words, in attempting to define what it means to be natural, or to think naturalistically, it is easy to 
define naturalness in terms of what one already believes to be true about, say, God and the 
supernatural. For example, in “Varieties of Naturalism,” philosopher Owen Flanagan lists just 
some of the things one might mean by naturalism: “philosophical questions are not distinct from 
scientific questions,” “both science and philosophy are licensed only to describe and explain the 
way things are,” “there is no room, or need, for the invocation of immaterial agents or forces or 
causes in describing or accounting for things,” “what there is, and all there is, is whatever physics 
says there is,” “naturalism is a thesis that rejects both physicalism and materialism; there are 
natural but ‘non-physical’ properties,” and “naturalism is, first and foremost, an ontological 
thesis that tells us about everything that there is.”18 The list could go on, but it is clear from these 
contradicting definitions that there is no single, agreed-upon definition of what naturalism is.  
 
This being said, there do seem to be at least two core beliefs amongst naturalists. First, 
naturalists tend to agree that “the sciences of nature are the best (in some versions, the only) 
guides to what there is, what it is like, and why.”19 That is, when we are faced with competing 
truth claims about how the world works, explanations from the natural sciences – or, at least, 
utilizing scientific methodologies and thinking – are to be preferred. In other words, one can say 
that “naturalists take the view that we should start with our well-developed science and build our 
philosophy from there.”20 This position is close to methodological naturalism, or the working 
assumption that scientists (and likely philosophers21) should always assume an “in principle” 
natural explanation for observed phenomena. Methodological naturalism is generally assumed to 
                                                            
18 Flanagan,“Varieties of Naturalism,” 431-432.  
19 Brendan Larvor, “Naturalism,” in The Wiley Blackwell Handbook of Humanism, ed. Andrew Copson and A. 
C. Grayling (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015), 37.  
20 Jack Ritchie, Understanding Naturalism: Supervenience (New York: Routledge, 2014), 196.  
21 There is some confusion about methodological naturalism. While it is commonly stated that 
methodological naturalism is a necessary commitment for all practicing sciences, it has a slightly different meaning in 
philosophy. That is, philosophers will often claim that “methodological naturalists think that the methods of science 
should be as far as possible adopted by philosophers.” These differing meanings need not be laboured here, but are 
worth noting: in philosophical usage, methodological naturalism is taken to mean that philosophy is continuous with 




be a necessary presumption of scientific practice, whether or not individual scientists are 
naturalists in the metaphysical sense; it is also understood by philosophers to mean that 
philosophical knowledge should be continuous with scientific knowledge. Related to this 
commitment is a second (and stronger) core belief shared by many (though not all) naturalists: 
that there are no supernatural realities, or if there are, such entities have no interaction with the 
causally closed natural world. This is metaphysical naturalism, the idea that “there is nothing 
supernatural, nothing ‘spooky’ in the world.”22 These dual commitments – to the primacy of 
scientific knowledge in determining reality, and to the exclusion of supernatural entities that 
interact with the natural world – are expressed well by philosopher Willem Drees. His 
metaphysical naturalism23 can be expressed thus: “The natural world is the whole of reality that 
we know of and interact with; no supernatural or spiritual realm distinct from the natural world 
shows up within our natural world, not even in the mental life of humans.”24 Drees’ definition is 
especially relevant to this project, as it explicitly mentions the question of divine action in human 
consciousness. For Drees and other naturalists, the whole of known reality can be described, in 
principle, in scientific terms, without reference to any supernatural beings. Supernatural beings 
might exist, but have no interaction with the space-time reality in which we exist; because there 
could never be any knowledge of, or interaction with, a supernatural reality outside of the 
physical universe, one might as well say that no supernatural entities exist at all.  
 
Even here, however, we run up against problems of terminology: what does it mean to be 
natural or supernatural? Saying that naturalism is basically a rejection of supernaturalism falls into 
circularity, and is thus unhelpful. How do we know what a supernatural being could even be, if 
our definition of naturalism precludes it from the outset? Indeed, “the category of the 
supernatural is no clearer and no less controversial than the category of the natural.”25 Moreover, 
for the metaphysical naturalist the prohibition against supernatural realities is unfalsifiable: any 
proposed supernatural entity is assumed to have a naturalistic explanation from the outset. It is 
very easy for metaphysical naturalism to slip into tautologies: the natural world is all there is, and 
all that exists is natural. This becomes even more problematic when one remembers that the 
concept of the supernatural is an ever-shifting one. A great deal of phenomena have been 
                                                            
22 Larvor, “Naturalism,” 37.  
23 This is actually a relatively weak form of metaphysical naturalism, as Drees acknowledges that God could 
exist – but not interact with the natural world. In other words, he admits a certain epistemic limitation when it 
comes to what exists outside of our space-time reality.  
24 Willem B. Drees, Religion, Science and Naturalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 12. 
25 Mario De Caro and David Macarthur, “Introduction: The Nature of Naturalism,” in Naturalism in 
Question, ed. Mario De Caro and David Macarthur (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 2. 
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considered supernatural over the centuries, only to be given perfectly natural explanations as 
scientific knowledge has progressed. Various culture groups have long attributed natural 
phenomena to supernatural causes, and the progression of science has brought naturalistic 
explanations for the origin of life, evolutionary processes, and now human cognition (if not 
phenomenal consciousness per se). There are endless specific examples of naturalistic 
explanations dispensing with the need for supernatural entities. As one concrete example, take 
the historical case of Scottish witchcraft trials in the 17th century.  While prosecution of witches 
was rampant in Scotland for a time, it seems that a growing awareness and appreciation for 
modern science was at least partially responsible for the marked decline and eventual end of 
witch hunts in Scotland. As one scholar writes, “the doubt concerning evidence [that witches 
were using supernatural powers] was being inspired by what we call the ‘scientific revolution,’ 
and especially – but not exclusively – the mechanical world view that was associated with it.”26 
As scientific methodology and thinking became more widespread, people became increasingly 
reticent to attribute any effects of supposed witchcraft to supernatural forces.  
 
This is just one example of a long trend of supernatural ideas being replaced by scientific 
explanations. In this sense, the boundaries of scientific knowledge and the natural world are 
always expanding. As scientific knowledge increases, the number of supposedly supernatural 
phenomena and entities decreases proportionately. For the metaphysical naturalist, in fact, all 
observable phenomena should be considered explainable in naturalistic terms from the outset. 
Again, however, it is worth noting that when one adopts a definition of naturalism that excludes 
the reality of supernatural entities, one has chosen an epistemological lens that would prohibit 
one from recognising supernatural realities even if they did exist. For example, if God does exist 
and chose to, say, part the Red Sea, a metaphysical naturalist would never be able to recognise 
this as the case – precisely because she is committed to finding a naturalistic explanation to fit 
the (albeit unusual) phenomenon. In other words, one’s definition of naturalism shapes the way 
one sees reality. This becomes important for the divine action conversation, and particularly 
regarding incompatibilism: even if God as primary cause did act through ontological laws of 
nature as secondary causes, the metaphysical naturalist would never be able to accept anything 
                                                            
26 Michael Wasser, “The Mechanical World-View and the Decline of Witch Beliefs in Scotland,” in 
Witchcraft and Belief in Early Modern Scotland, ed. Julian Goodare, Lauren Martin, and Joyce Miller, Palgrave Historical 
Studies in Witchcraft and Magic (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 206. It is particularly fascinating to 
note that so-called witches may well have been experimenting with folk medicine and physical healing in a manner 
that would now be recognised as proto-scientific. For more on this, see Rebecca Laroche, Medical Authority and 




but the naturalistic side of the account. Importantly, this commitment to metaphysical naturalism 
is not itself necessitated by science; naturalism is a metaphysical framework that a priori 
prioritises scientific knowledge as the best, or only, way of knowing reality. Metaphysical 
naturalism prioritises science in determining what is real – in this sense, it is apparent that 
noninterventionist, incompatibilist divine action theories are ironically presuming a God-world 
relationship similar to metaphysical naturalism. At least, the presumed metaphysic is similar to 
the relatively weaker version of metaphysical naturalism that admits the possibility of 
supernatural realities, but rejects the idea of supernatural realities interacting with the natural 
world. That is, the search for causal joints in underdetermined aspects of the natural world 
demonstrates a felt need to find loopholes in nature for divine action to occur – there is a felt 
need to make divine action as un-supernatural as possible. In any case, metaphysical naturalism 
(understood as basically excluding the supernatural) is not the only variety of naturalism 
available. As we will see, because the question of naturalism is not one to be answered by science 
itself, theological considerations can play a legitimate part in determining the version of 
naturalism one commits to. As theistic naturalists will insist, it might well be the case that the 
natural world always and already exists in active relationship with God; they argue that a 
naturalism that excludes God’s active presence is not a full naturalism at all. 
 
Before moving on to theistic naturalisms, though, more clarification is needed in regard to 
standard, nontheistic naturalism. Above, I briefly touched on the distinction between 
methodological and metaphysical naturalism. Methodological naturalism is just the affirmation 
that only natural causes should be invoked in explanations about the natural world. One could 
easily be a methodological naturalist and a religious believer – in fact, one would likely need to be 
a methodological naturalist in order to be a good scientist.27 Because methodological naturalism 
does not imply metaphysical naturalism (and thus has little to say to questions of ontology), I will 
set it aside for the remainder of this thesis. Metaphysical naturalism, again, is the stronger claim 
that the natural world is all there is. A weaker form of metaphysical naturalism is evident in 
Drees’ definition above, and expressed by Flanagan when he writes, “What I do think is 
warranted, all things considered is a form of ontological naturalism about this world – for all we 
know and can know, what there is, and all there is, is the natural world.”28 This weaker definition admits a 
                                                            
27 For an interesting argument suggesting that methodological naturalism is not, in fact, metaphysically 
neutral (and should thus be viewed cautiously by Christians), see the forthcoming article: Andrew Torrance, “Should 
a Christian Ever Adopt Methodological Naturalism?,” Zygon 52, no. 3 (2017). 
28 Flanagan, “Varieties of Naturalism,” 438. 
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certain amount of epistemic humility, acknowledging the difficulty in speaking of possible 
realities outside of our space-time reality.  
 
Whatever metaphysical naturalism is, it is opposed to supernatural realities; as philosopher Barry 
Stroud writes, “Naturalism on any reading is opposed to supernaturalism…By ‘supernaturalism’ 
I mean the invocation of an agent or force which somehow stands outside the natural world and 
so whose doings cannot be understood as part of it.”29 By this definition, it is fairly clear that 
metaphysical naturalism excludes the possibility of God’s existence – or at the very least, it 
excludes the possibility of divine action in the natural word.30 But is this negative definition 
sufficient? As Flanagan argues, defining the natural world by what it is not is akin to “a political 
leader who, when asked about her political position, says: ‘Well, I really can’t say what my view 
is, but, rest assured, it is not communism.’”31 In other words, given that supernaturalism is such a 
difficult concept to define (and thus problematic as a negative definition), might we do better in 
giving a positive definition of what it means to be natural? Metaphysical naturalists share a 
commitment to the natural sciences as the best guide to knowledge of reality, but what does this 
commitment entail? Answering this question requires a further distinction, namely between 
naturalism and physicalism. 
 
6.3.2 Naturalism versus Physicalism? 
Setting aside questions of terminology for the moment, it is fair to say that metaphysical 
naturalism is the doctrine that “the natural world is the whole world.”32 More specifically, 
metaphysical naturalism “takes nature in a definite way as identical with reality, as self-sufficient 
and as the whole of reality. And by nature is meant the space-time-causal system which is studied 
by science and in which our lives are passed.”33 Sellars’ definition indicates that it is also fair to 
say that naturalists generally affirm scientific methodology as the best way to understand that 
natural world. How, then, does the natural world correspond to the physical world? Is there a 
                                                            
29 Barry Stroud, “The Charm of Naturalism,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical 
Association 70, no. 2 (1996): 44. 
30 At least, that is, it excludes the possibility of incompatibilist divine action. Compatibilists could affirm 
the causal closure principle (see below), as their understanding of divine action does not render divine agency as 
mutually exclusive with a physicalist account of events. 
31 Flanagan, “Varieties of Naturalism,” 435. 
32 Jaegwon Kim, “From Naturalism to Physicalism: Supervenience Redux,” Proceedings and Addresses of the 
American Philosophical Association 85, no. 2 (2011): 109. 
33 Roy Wood Sellars, “Why Naturalism and Not Materialism?,” The Philosophical Review 36, no. 3 (1927): 217. 
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difference between naturalism and physicalism, the doctrine that “everything, including prima 
facie, nonphysical stuff, is physical”?34 This is a complicated question and an area of intense 
debate. To begin with, it seems clear that physicalism is a subset of naturalism; few would argue 
that the physical world is not a natural world, and so physicalism would seem to entail 
naturalism. The reverse is not true, however: on the face of it, it seems perfectly reasonable for 
one to be a naturalist without also being a physicalist. As Jaegwon Kim explains, “We expect 
physicalists to be naturalists, while allowing naturalists to opt out of physicalism, or at least not 
to take a stand for it.”35 This is because physicalism is generally associated with – or even equated 
with – reductionism. Reductionism is almost always spoken of pejoratively in philosophy and 
science-and-religion, and physicalism is often taken to imply that even the most complex 
phenomena (music, spirituality, economics, etc.) are essentially nothing but the interaction of 
atoms, particles, and forces as described by physics. Insofar as one wishes to maintain a healthy 
distance from reductionism’s “nothing buttery,” one might wish to be a naturalist without being 
a physicalist – more expansive versions of naturalism will be addressed below. 
 
Alternative versions of naturalism notwithstanding, there is still a clear path from naturalism to 
physicalism. A commitment to metaphysical naturalism entails the affirmation that “no part of 
our nature consists of something supra-natural, something that is in principle hidden from the 
scrutiny of science.”36 Thus, there is a presumption that the entire natural world is subject to 
explanation by scientific methodology. Once scientific methodology is acknowledged as 
fundamental to naturalism, the crucial link between naturalism and physicalism becomes evident: 
the causal closure principle, otherwise known as the “completeness of physics” premise. As 
described previously, the causal closure principle is the idea that “causes of events in the natural 
world are themselves events in the natural world.”37 Or, as David Papineau describes the link 
between naturalism and physicalism, “The crucial premise [for physicalism] is the completeness of 
physics, by which I mean that all physical effects are due to physical causes. And the argument is 
then simply that, if all physical effects are due to physical causes, then anything that has a 
physical effect must itself be physical.”38 In other words, if the causal closure principle is true, 
then all events in the natural world have physical causes.  
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To summarise, then: metaphysical naturalism affirms that the space-time-causal world described 
by science is all that exists, and physicalism affirms that all that exists is physical. In order to get 
from naturalism to physicalism, one must also affirm the causal closure principle, which states 
that all physical events have physical causes. If all that exists is the space-time-causal world 
accessible to science, and all physical events in the space-time-causal world have physical causes, 
then one might say that to be a naturalist is to be a physicalist. While one might certainly 
challenge the causal closure principle, Papineau and others would suggest that this premise is not 
only a metaphysical assumption, but a reasonable conclusion drawn from centuries of success for 
scientific methodology: “This consensus [regarding the completeness of physics] is not just a fad, 
but a reflection of developments in empirical theory…there is now good reason to believe the 
empirical thesis that all physical effects are due to physical causes.”39 Likewise, Kim suggests that 
the causal closure principle is a reasonable conclusion – rather than an unquestioned premise – 
when derived from supervenience theory.40 This is an important point, especially as it has 
become rather trendy in science-and-religion (and theology more broadly) to argue that causal 
closure is an unnecessary assumption.41 That is, while rejecting the causal closure principle as an 
unnecessary metaphysical option might seem to open the door for divine action (i.e., if not all 
events have physical causes then God can act in any manner so willed), there may be good 
reason to affirm the causal closure principle as a reasonable conclusion – given everything we 
know about how the physical world works. Or, as philosopher Brendan Larvor explains, 
naturalism is “the conclusion of a historical argument that does not assume naturalism,” rather 
than an unmoored (and ultimately disposable) presupposition.42 
 
At this point, it is helpful to distinguish physicalism from reductionism. Many of the fears 
around physicalism stem from the assumption that to be a physicalist is to affirm a sort of 
“small-ism” in which literally everything is reducible to fundamental physics. As Kim writes, 
“reductionism of all sorts has been out of favor for many years,” and so equating physicalism 
                                                            
39 Ibid., 32.  
40 See Kim, “From Naturalism to Physicalism,” 133. 
41 See, for example, Plantinga, “What is Intervention?”  
42 Larvor, “Naturalism,” 50. Larvor also makes a fascinating argument that history actually poses a serious 
challenge to metaphysical naturalism (even while many use the history of science as support for the position).  
Larvor suggests that “the best argument for the superiority of the scientific worldview over its rivals is the history of 
its rise to dominance – but this is a historical argument,” rather than a scientific one. Thus, he argues (also on page 
50 of the cited work): “It therefore presents a counter-example to the claim that natural science is the only source of 
knowledge and explanations worthy of the name.”  
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with reductionism is bound to problematise physicalism from the outset.43 However, many 
physicalists reject reductionism, affirming the existence of various levels of reality, while still 
recognising only the basic fundamental particles and forces acknowledged by physicists. At the 
very least, physicalists generally reject explanatory reductionism, affirming with Drees that “the 
description and explanation of phenomena may require concepts which do not belong to the 
vocabulary of fundamental physics, especially if such phenomena involve complex arrangements 
of constituent particles or extensive interactions with a specific environment.”44 That is, one can 
affirm that the only basic “stuff” in the universe is the stuff studied by physicists, while still 
affirming that complex phenomena are properly studied by specific fields with their own internal 
vocabularies and methodologies. It might well be true that a full explanation of money or art 
requires fields of study other than particle physics – even while acknowledging that money and 
art are still dependent on physical substrates for their existence. This being said, there is debate 
about whether or not admitting this explanatory pluralism is truly a nonreductionistic move – 
recognising the need for nonphysical language is not necessarily the same thing as an ontological 
pluralism, and may simply reflect humans’ epistemic limitations. In other words, it might just be 
very difficult to explain money and art in physicalist language, and not impossible in principle. 
 
Nevertheless, it is possible to affirm physicalism without affirming reductionism; indeed, 
“physicalism today clothes itself in various subtler shades.”45 Nonreductive physicalists, as 
discussed, deny that all things reduce to physics, yet without admitting any basic stuff besides the 
fundamental particles and forces recognised by physics (weak emergentists would fall into this 
category as well). Nonreductive physicalists claim that higher-order realities (such as the mind) 
supervene on physical substrates, such that “supervenient properties are in some sense 
dependent on, or determined by, their subvenient, base properties and yet, it is hoped, 
irreducible to them.”46 Supervenience theories are notoriously complex and hotly debated, and 
are tangential to this chapter’s argument. Therefore, I here note only that nonreductive 
physicalism’s reliance on supervenience faces challenges: insofar as supervenient properties are 
dependent on physical substrates such that physical substrates determine those properties, those 
properties veer into reductionism. On the other hand, insofar as supervenient properties are 
irreducible to physical substrates, those properties veer into dualism. Kim explains that “if a 
                                                            
43 Kim, “The Myth of Nonreductive Physicalism,” 31.  
44 Drees, Religion, Science, and Naturalism, 12.  
45 Papineau, “The Rise of Physicalism,” 4.  
46 Kim, “The Myth of Nonreductive Physicalism,” 39.  
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relation is weak enough to be nonreductive, it tends to be too weak to serve as a dependence 
relation; conversely, when a relation is strong enough to give us dependence, it tends to be too 
strong – strong enough to imply reducibility.”47 Kim concludes that nonreductive physicalism is 
an untenable position; the supervenience theory on which it is based inevitably falls into 
reductionism or dualism. Again, the focus of this chapter is theological engagement with 
metaphysical naturalism as it pertains to divine action; supervenience is not directly relevant to 
the God-nature relationship of importance here. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note how the 
mind-body debates about physicalism and dualism mirror, or are analogous to, debates about 
physicalism and theological dualism – that is, the relationship between God and the natural 
world.  
 
Setting aside sub-debates within physicalism, we can now return to the question of what it means 
to be natural. As will be discussed shortly, there are versions of naturalism that are much broader 
than the reductive physicalism often associated with naturalism. But supposing for the moment 
that naturalism can be equated with physicalism, what then? Is the confusion about what it 
means to be natural made any clearer when one asks what it means to be physical? Just as the 
bounds of naturalism have been expanding for centuries, so has the understanding of what might 
be deemed truly physical. For example, 300 years ago the important concepts at the heart of 
quantum theory would likely not have seemed physical. If one were to describe, say, the counter-
intuitive realities described by the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, or the “spooky action at a 
distance” of quantum nonlocality (as famously described by Einstein), it is unlikely that 
scientifically-minded scholars of the day would have had the conceptual resources to incorporate 
such ideas into existing naturalistic frameworks.48 As the theories, tools, and accepted body of 
scientific knowledge have continued to progress over the last centuries, however, the scientific 
community has developed a theoretical framework that is more than capable of incorporating 
the findings of quantum theory. Far from being considered spooky or even supernatural, 
scientists now consider quantum theory to be vital for a full physicalist account of the universe. 
This is similar to the way scientific understandings of brain function and consciousness have 
progressed over time. As demonstrated in previous chapters, it once seemed obvious (and 
admittedly, still does so to many) that the mind is inherently spiritual and decidedly nonphysical. 
                                                            
47 Ibid., 40. 
48 My use of “scientific” here is anachronistic. Such conversations would have been had under the auspices 
of natural philosophy, but my point remains the same. For more on quantum entanglement and nonlocality, see 
John G. Cramer, The Quantum Handshake: Entanglement, Nonlocality and Transactions (New York: Springer International 
Publishing, 2015).  
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Now, however, the consensus view is changing, such that it is (at the very least) acceptable to 
assume an “in principle” physicalist explanation for human mentality. The point here is that what 
is considered physical – what is considered to be within the purview of scientific methodology – 
is constantly shifting. Papineau expresses this problem in the following way:  
How exactly is physics to be understood…? An awkward dilemma may seem to face 
anyone trying to defend…the completeness of physics. If we take physics to mean the 
subject matter currently studied in departments of physics, discussed in physics journals, 
and so on, then it seems pretty obvious that physics is not complete. The track record of 
attempts to list all the fundamental forces and particles responsible for physical effects is 
not good, and it seems highly likely that future physics will identify new categories of 
physical cause. On the other hand, if we mean, by physics, the subject matter of such 
future scientific theories, then we seem to be in no position to assess its completeness, 
because we don’t yet know what it is.49 
While Papineau’s observation is noteworthy in regards to the debate about the causal closure 
principle, it is particularly interesting here as it highlights how seemingly impossible it is to 
determine, at the outset, what should be deemed properly physical. Things that seem nonphysical 
have a way of being proven otherwise. Here, I should address the obvious theological problem 
with this observation: If the boundaries around what is physical are continually expanding, does 
this have metaphysical implications for our discussion of divine action and, more importantly, 
the God-nature relationship? While it may be the case that all instances of divine action do 
indeed have physical explanations, compatibilists do not find this theologically problematic (as 
will be demonstrated in the next three chapters). The larger worry about physicalism, it seems, is 
that its ever-expanding purview might seem to threaten the idea of an immaterial, uncreated 
God. It is not my intention to suggest this; a theistic metaphysic requires there to be an 
ontological distinction between God and the created universe. Thus, while some versions of 
naturalism might be equated with physicalism, a theist will presumably not accept an account of 
physicalism that claims as its rightful territory “all that is.” 
 
Here we come to an important distinction, as we move into an account of broad naturalisms. 
Namely, naturalism and physicalism can be variously affirmed or rejected, depending on the 
subject in question. For example, one argument of this thesis is that to be fully natural is to be 
inherently involved in active participation and interaction with God (more on this in the next 
three chapters). At the same time, theists must necessarily reject the claim that naturalism is equal 
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to the naturalistic subcategory of physicalism, at least so long as physicalism is taken to indicate a 
reality comprised only of atoms, particles, and the fundamental forces of physics.50 Importantly, 
however, one can accept a broad naturalism, reject physicalism insofar as God is concerned, and 
simultaneously accept physicalism when discussing all things not God. For example, this thesis 
accepts physicalist approaches to the mind-brain, while still arguing that to be fully natural, the 
physical world must be fundamentally involved with God. In other words, the overall argument 
of this thesis has been that the mind is not uniquely spiritual or necessarily nonphysical, but that 
this does not preclude God’s action in the mind-brain (or any other aspect of the natural world) 
– if, that is, one has a theologically expansive understanding of what it means to be natural. Here, 
it is worth examining such nonphysicalist approaches to naturalism. 51 
 
6.4 Nonphysicalist Naturalisms 
As discussed above, metaphysical naturalism is committed to the rejection of supernatural 
entities – or, at the very least, a rejection of supernatural interaction with the world (weak 
metaphysical naturalism might admit the possibility of supernatural realities outside our space-
time system). Also as discussed, many naturalists are also physicalists – there is a fairly 
straightforward route from naturalism to physicalism, given naturalism’s prioritisation of 
scientific methodology for obtaining knowledge of what is real. However, not all naturalists are 
physicalists, and there are various reasons for this. First (and extremely relevant to this thesis’ 
focus on consciousness), many naturalists reject physicalism because of their views on the mind. 
That is, there are many card-carrying naturalists (i.e., individuals who reject supernatural 
explanations for observed phenomena) who insist that consciousness is an immaterial, 
nonphysical phenomenon. These naturalists are those discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, who argue 
that once all the physical facts are known about the brain and cognitive processes, something 
extra is still needed to explain the subjective experience of phenomenal consciousness. They 
deny that the mind is supernatural (hence, they really are naturalists), but they assert that the 
mind is a nonphysical, extra piece of ontological “furniture” in the natural world. There are 
various ways to defend this. For example, Frank Jackson is an epiphenomenalist: he argues that 
the mind overlays physical processes in the brain, but does not interact with those physical 
                                                            
50 Although, as I have noted, it is very difficult to predetermine the limits of physicalism. One must make a 
theological decision to exclude God from physicalist explanations.  
51 I use the term “nonphysicalist” not to suggest that this position rejects physicalist explanations, but to 
indicate that the position is not confined by physicalist strictures as generally understood. That is, I use 
“nonphysicalist” not as a rejection of physicalist explanations, but in opposition to physicalism as a metaphysical 
position that reduces all reality to physical processes.  
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processes.52 David Chalmers, on the other hand, is something of a panpsychist: consciousness 
exists everywhere in the universe, and as philosopher Jack Ritchie explains, “everything is a little 
bit conscious.”53 Subjective experience is somehow real (both Jackson and Chalmers have 
sophisticated models to defend this claim), but it does not influence the physical world. Thus, 
these are naturalistic positions that also do not violate the causal closure of the physical.54 For the 
nonphysicalist naturalist, not all things are physical – but on the other hand, divine action is 
certainly disallowed from the ontological picture. One exception to this is Philip Clayton. While 
he would consider himself something of a nonphysicalist naturalist (and indeed, strong 
emergentists are often among the chief proponents of nonphysicalist naturalisms), Clayton still 
argues that the mind is uniquely open to divine action – something most naturalists would reject. 
And indeed, my argument throughout this thesis has been that Clayton’s privileging of the mind 
contradicts the scientific methodology and naturalistic framework he purports to affirm.  
 
In any case, however, nonphysicalist naturalisms relying on an immaterial mind are rather 
irrelevant for this chapter. After all, I have argued against nonphysicalist approaches to the mind; 
such approaches privilege consciousness as being uniquely nonphysical, in a way that is perhaps 
unwarranted and unnecessary. As Ritchie notes, naturalists who insist on a nonphysical mind 
tend to agree “with the physicalist about everything except the place of consciousness in the 
world.”55 For all the reasons discussed in previous chapters, it is worth questioning whether the 
mind should be so distinguished, especially given the rapid progress in the cognitive sciences and 
deflationary perspectives from the philosophy of mind. Moreover, it is an odd and problematic 
feature of metaphysics that debates about metaphysical naturalism and physicalism often get tied 
up with debates about the mind-brain. As Ritchie argues, “The grand old labels materialism and 
dualism and the newer shinier one physicalism appear to designate very general metaphysical 
views. They purport to tell us how everything is. Those who are engaged in disputes in the 
philosophy of mind have a much narrower focus…It would be better for everyone if this were 
                                                            
52 See Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia.”  
53 Ritchie, Understanding Naturalism, 139.  
54 However, the causal closure principle is not a requirement of naturalism. A dualist could also be a 
naturalist, simply claiming that the mind is nonphysical but still a natural part of the universe that interacts with 
physical processes. The dualist would deny the causal closure principle, but justify this by pointing out that causal 
closure is a metaphysical assumption – not a scientific conclusion. Indeed, this is exactly the tack taken by 
Swinburne and Plantinga, respectively (as outlined in previous chapters). This being said, all naturalists would 
presumably need to have their own versions of the causal closure principle: even if they do not affirm that 
everything is physical, they would need to have some boundary around what it is natural. Otherwise, naturalism 
would become a virtually meaningless statement that to be natural is to be real.  
55 Ritchie, Understanding Naturalism, 148. 
167 
 
made clear.”56 Indeed – one’s approach to the ontology of consciousness often becomes, I 
suggest, a misleading litmus test for one’s overall approach to the natural world. In any case, 
versions of naturalism that rely on an immaterial mind are unpersuasive in this context, as I have 
already argued that the mind is potentially explainable in physicalist terms.  
 
More interesting, perhaps, are naturalisms that question the ability of physics and other natural 
sciences to authoritatively determine the parameters of the physical world (and, by extrapolation, 
the parameters of the entire natural world). For example, Nancy Cartwright argues against the 
universality of physical laws, suggesting instead that “nature is governed in different domains by 
different systems of laws not necessarily related to each other in any systematic way.”57 Thus, 
Cartwright argues against the physicalist assumption that the entire natural world is intelligible 
via physics – or at least physics as we now understand it. It might well be the case that many 
natural phenomena just are not governed by the sorts of regularities and laws described by 
modern physics, but instead operate under different sorts of regularities than those recognised by 
physics. Cartwright’s approach to naturalism (she calls herself an empiricist, but her approach to 
metaphysics is basically naturalistic) therefore rests upon a sort of epistemological humility. 
Recognising that the laws of fundamental physics do not seem adequate for the task of 
explaining all the complex phenomena we observe in reality, Cartwright concludes that to 
presume the universality of physical laws is to make a sort of fundamentalist faith claim. Instead, 
she suggests “metaphysical nomological pluralism,” or “the doctrine that nature is governed in 
different domains by different systems of laws not necessarily related to one another in any 
systematic or uniform way; by a patchwork of laws.”58 While it is not clear that Cartwright’s 
approach can be used to make sense of divine action – nomological pluralism is essentially 
naturalistic – her model demonstrates that there is more than one way to be a naturalist and to 
reject physicalism. At the very least, Cartwright makes the important point that to assume the 
universality of physical laws is to overstep what is warranted by scientific practice. As Ritchie 
(himself a nonphysicalist naturalist) explains, “Physics, and science in general, is a messy 
business. There is no general metaphysical picture that our best science supports…the best 
attitude a naturalist can take may be one of metaphysical agnosticism.”59 While this conclusion 
                                                            
56 Ibid., 156. 
57 Cartwright, The Dappled World, 31. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ritchie, Understanding Naturalism, 159. 
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does not necessarily get us any closer to a theory of divine action, it does appropriately challenge 
erroneous assumptions about what naturalism is and is not.   
 
Epistemological humility aside, there are more positive nonphysicalist approaches to naturalism. 
As mentioned, emergentists often fall into this category. While strong emergentists assert that 
emergence is an inherent feature of the natural world, they also reject reductive physicalism. 
Having discussed emergence in detail in Chapter 4, I will not go over the details again here. 
However, it should be noted that emergentists often do affirm nonphysical realities in the natural 
world – and these are not limited to the mind. Indeed, strong emergence recognises many levels 
of ontological reality that are not describable by physics. Rather, emergent levels are more than 
the physical substrates on which they yet depend; higher emergent levels are ontologically 
distinct from their physical substrates, while still continuous with physical processes. As Clayton 
writes: 
Reality is ultimately composed of one basic kind of ‘stuff.’ Yet the concepts of physics 
are not sufficient to explain all the forms that this stuff takes…The one ‘stuff’ apparently 
takes forms for which the explanations of physics, and thus the ontology of physics (or 
‘physicalism’ for short), are not adequate. We should not assume that the entities 
postulated by physics complete the inventory of what exists. Hence emergentists should 
be monists but do not need to be physicalists in the sense that physics dictates their 
ontology.60 
It should also be noted that not all emergentists reject physicalism. For example, Terence 
Deacon provides an emergentist framework that is still basically physicalist. He does argue that 
genuinely new things emerge in nature and that “a critical shortcoming of methodological 
smallism, despite its obvious successes, is that it implicitly focuses attention away from the 
contributions of interaction complexity.”61 Nevertheless, Deacon’s emergentist framework 
remains physicalist – not in the sense of reducing everything to fundamental physics, but in the 
sense of affirming that all emergent phenomena are complex products of “ratcheted up” physical 
processes at simpler levels. Still, emergentism as a whole might be welcomed by those wishing to 
embrace naturalism without the more stringent commitment to physicalism.  
 
                                                            
60 Philip Clayton, “Conceptual Foundations of Emergence Theory,” in The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The 
Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion, ed. Philip Clayton and Paul Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), 2.   




Perhaps the most comprehensive and theism-friendly philosophical approach to nonphysicalist 
naturalism comes from Fiona Ellis. In her book God, Value, and Nature, Ellis develops a 
metaphysical framework that not only challenges standard naturalistic assumptions, but offers a 
rationale for incorporating theism (and even Christianity) into a model that could still be 
considered naturalism. Because of this, Ellis is a helpful methodological example of how one 
might make the philosophical move from reductive physicalism to a more expansive naturalism. 
While the theistic naturalisms explored in coming chapters do not directly presuppose Ellis’ 
work, it is worth examining her expansive naturalism here, insofar as this chapter is devoted to 
philosophical understandings of naturalism.  
 
Ellis makes the claim that “the relation between the natural and the supernatural has been 
distorted [in scientific  naturalism],” and rejects the view in which “the supernatural is said to 
denote a dimension of reality which involves God and His action, and the natural includes man 
as he exists in this world ‘sustained by the forces of nature.’”62 In short, Ellis is suggesting exactly 
the sort of theistic naturalism supported by those in science-and-religion who reject the standard 
model of divine action. More specifically, Ellis rejects “scientific naturalism,” in which “the limits 
of nature are to be circumscribed by the limits of scientific investigation,” and considers a series 
of increasingly expansive versions of naturalism.63 In so doing, Ellis focuses on the question of 
values; namely, she accepts the very real existence of values, and evaluates various naturalisms by 
how well they allow for a robust understanding of values.64 Her suggestion is that by requiring 
naturalistic frameworks to conform to observed, irreducible phenomena (e.g., values), we can 
affirm an expansive form of naturalism that is compatible both with scientific practice and 
theological affirmations. Ellis’ position regarding her proposed “enchantment of nature” can be 
summarised thus: 
This is no recommendation to retreat into the realm of pre-scientific superstition. On the 
contrary, the envisaged enchantment of nature is intended to be compatible with the 
findings of modern science, and acceptable to those who take seriously the scientific 
worldview…[I]t is a matter of allowing that there are things in the world – values – 
which are compatible with the findings of science, and which are irreducible to the things 
it can explain. The further claim is that there is a perfectly satisfactory ontology and 
                                                            
62 Fiona Ellis, God, Value, and Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 90.  
63 Ibid., 10. 
64 One possible critique of Ellis’ framework is that she seems to assume that values are an irreducible brute 
fact about reality. She writes that “values are part of the natural world, and…they are different from other things 
with which we are acquainted…they are irreducible to properties which form the focus of scientific interest.” This 
understanding of values is arguable, particularly given theories from evolutionary biology purporting to account for 
perceived values as a product of natural selection. Ibid., 58. 
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epistemology for these things provided that we resist the lure of scientism, and that we 
succumb to this restriction only at the cost of courting a conception of nature for which 
there is no good philosophical or scientific justification.65 
This needs some unpacking: How exactly does Ellis use value to move from reductive scientific 
naturalism to a version of naturalism that allows for God? As noted, Ellis begins by rejecting 
scientific naturalism, claiming that it does not fully account for phenomena like values. She then 
describes expansive naturalisms, which recognise value as a natural part of the world – but which 
are irreducible to physical mechanisms describable by science. Ellis then makes an intriguing 
move, taking the expansive naturalist’s ability to affirm value as an irreducible reality and using 
that as a template for allowing other nonphysical realities. Just as an expansive naturalist can 
accept value as an ontologically distinct natural phenomenon, so does a theistic naturalist accept 
God as a nonphysical reality; “[the theistic naturalist’s] account of our relation to God proceeds 
via our relation to value.” 66 Thus, the uniqueness of Ellis’ approach lies in her emphasis on 
method, rather than content. That is, just as expansive naturalists accept nonphysical realities like 
value as part of the natural world, so are theistic naturalists warranted in accepting God as part 
of a fully naturalistic account (and, indeed, Ellis suggests that this acceptance of God occurs via a 
relation of value). If one is able to make the conceptual move from scientific naturalism to 
expansive naturalism, thus admitting the possibility of nonphysical naturalism, then one has 
already grasped the same sort of conceptual trajectory required to get to theistic naturalism.  
 
Moreover, as Ellis explains, “we ourselves, qua natural beings, are already open to God. The 
supernatural – which here embraces both God and His communicative action - is not a spooky 
superstructure, extrinsic or added on to a nature which is complete in itself. Rather, it is a quality 
or dimension which enriches or perfects the natural world. This grants us the right to allow that 
man can be inwardly transformed by God.”67 This is an important quote, as Ellis here 
incorporates divine action (and even divine action in the mind) into a naturalistic framework. 
Yes, of course more restrictive forms of naturalism would reject the idea of a theistic, or even 
Christian, naturalism. But then again, many of those same naturalists recognise irreducible, 
nonphysical phenomena like value as a part of reality. As one reviewer of Ellis’ book God, Value, 
and Nature explains, “In general, then, defenders of the more restrictive views [of naturalism] see 
defenders of the more expansive views as needlessly positing spooky entities, whereas defenders 
                                                            
65 Ibid., 89. 
66 Ibid., 136. 
67 Ibid., 91. 
171 
 
of more expansive views see defenders of the more restrictive views as committed to ontologies 
that cannot adequately account for moral values.”68 Ellis’ main point, it seems, is that once one 
has allowed for nonphysical realities at all, there is a rational, legitimate (though not necessary) 
progression to theistic naturalism. Just as atheistic naturalists can allow for ontologically real 
value because it makes sense of the phenomenon, and theistic naturalists allow for God for the 
same reason, so does the Christian naturalist suggest that a Christian framework “makes for a 
more satisfactory conception of God.”69 This is not to say that Ellis has proved Christianity; 
indeed, she would not claim this as her goal. Rather, her more modest point is that “there may 
yet be room for allowing that belief in God is intellectually respectable, and that there is sense to 
be made of the idea that the natural world is divinely enchanted.”70 Still, there are potential 
problems with her approach. For example, some might argue that value is wholly explainable in 
scientific terms, perhaps as suggested by evolutionary biology.71 Additionally, Ellis’ argument can 
be vague at times – it is unclear, for example, how God might actually cause change in the 
natural world. As with most versions of theistic naturalism (discussed in the following three 
chapters), the details of divine interaction with the world remain fuzzy, at best. Nevertheless, 
Ellis’ model is the sort of expansive naturalism on which representatives of the theological turn 
in divine action depend. Ellis’ approach to expansive naturalism is not necessary for the theistic 
naturalisms explored in the next three chapters, but it is a helpful approach demonstrating the 
conceptual pathway from reductive physicalism to expansive naturalisms that might include an 
account of divine action. Ellis thus offers an example of the sort of philosophical moves 
theologians might take in developing explicitly theological models of divine action.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
I began this chapter by examining the sort of God-nature metaphysical model implied by 
standard divine action theories. It is evident that noninterventionist, incompatibilist models 
presume (ironically) a sort of working naturalism that precludes divine interaction with nature as 
part of what it means to be natural. In other words, standard models of divine action privilege 
scientific method and knowledge in determining where and how divine action might occur. This 
approach presumes an understanding of the natural world that does not include a necessary 
                                                            
68 Erik J. Wielenberg, “Fiona Ellis, God, Value, and Nature,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78, 
no. 1 (2015): 134. 
69 Ellis, God, Value, and Nature, 179. 
70 Ibid., 84. 
71 For example, see Robert Wesson and Patricia A. Williams, eds., Evolution and Human Values, Value 
Inquiry Book Series (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1995). 
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relationship between nature and God; divine action is treated as being anomalous, and as 
something to “fit in” to scientific knowledge of law-governed physical processes. 
  
However, this presumption that divine agency is somehow extraneous to the existence and 
ongoing processes of nature is highly questionable. As demonstrated in this chapter, there are 
many forms of naturalism, many different understandings of what it means to be natural in the 
first place. My intention in this chapter has not been to argue for one particular version of 
naturalism – expansive, physicalist, or otherwise – but to highlight how complex and nuanced 
debates about naturalism can be. Far from assuming that the natural world necessarily exists and 
functions outside of dynamic relationship with a supernatural God, divine action theorists should 
recognise that there are far more robust options in naturalism than those that privilege 
reductionist, physicalist, or scientistic commitments.  
 
My purpose in this chapter has been to show how standard divine action theories assume a very 
specific God-world model that is far from the only metaphysical option in discussions of 
naturalism. Once we have “loosened up” the metaphysical foundations of divine action theology, 
we can then begin to look at specific, contextualised theological approaches to divine action. The 
next three chapters, then, will explore the various ways that those in the theological turn have 
worked with versions of theistic naturalism to develop theologically rich and nuanced accounts 
of divine action. What is evident, I suggest, is that the Christian theological tradition has far more 
robust resources for understanding divine action than is evidenced by standard 











Theistic Naturalism Part One: Thomistic Divine Action 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I brought the standard noninterventionist, incompatibilist model of 
divine action into conversation with naturalism. I argued that causal joint theories ironically 
presuppose a version of scientistic naturalism in which divine action is rendered anomalous and 
extraneous to the normal state of affairs in the natural world. In response to this theological 
capitulation to scientistic naturalism, I then discussed the differences between various versions of 
naturalism. Naturalism, I argued, is not a necessarily reductionist, physicalist, or monolithic 
metaphysical framework, but includes nuanced and expansive perspectives on what it means to 
be natural. Finally, I highlighted the expansive naturalism of Fiona Ellis, as it provides the sort of 
philosophical methodology that is helpful in moving from nontheistic naturalism to one that of 
necessity includes an account of divine action. Not only might naturalism accommodate an 
account of divine action, but such a claim need not entail a rejection of scientific knowledge or 
methodology.  
 
In this and the next two chapters, I explore versions of theistic naturalism within the context of 
the theological turn in divine action theology. While Part One of this thesis was largely 
deflationary in its critique of divine action theories privileging the mind as uniquely spiritual, and 
Chapter 6 examined the philosophical possibilities surrounding naturalism, Chapters 7-9 
constructively explore explicitly theistic approaches to naturalism and divine action. My 
argument in these chapters is that while the noninterventionist, incompatibilist approach to 
divine action – the “standard model” – is scientifically implausible and theologically insufficient, 
theistic naturalisms may offer a metaphysical framework that allow one to affirm both scientific 
knowledge and divine action in the mind (and elsewhere). My overall goal in these three chapters 
is not to argue for a specific version of theistic naturalism, but to highlight commonalities in the 
various approaches, and identify potential weaknesses in each. In so doing, I argue that there is a 
common core to these versions of theistic naturalism, and that this common core offers a 
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theologically robust framework for understanding divine action. In this chapter, I explore theistic 
naturalism through a Thomistic lens. Chapter 8 then examines Christopher Knight’s 
panentheistic naturalism, and Chapter 9 highlights pneumatological naturalism. In these three 
chapters, I will also reintroduce the human mind into this discussion on divine action, when 
appropriate, and even suggest that the mind may be an enhanced locus of divine action after all – 
though for very different reasons than those suggested by standard causal joint theorists. My 
overall goal in these last chapters is not to present an entirely new divine action theology, but to 
tentatively suggest a basic form of theistic naturalism as an approach to divine action that not 
only escapes the critiques examined in Part One, but is also compatible with a range of specific 
theological traditions. While it is likely that the most significant contribution of this thesis lies in 
its critique of divine action theories privileging the mind as uniquely spiritual and nonphysical, it 
is intended that these constructive chapters will provide a tentative framework for divine action 
that embraces scientific knowledge, naturalism, and a robust theology of divine action in the 
mind.    
 
7.2 The Theological Turn and Theistic Naturalism 
What is theistic naturalism, and how does it relate to the theological turn in divine action 
theories? As discussed in previous chapters, the theological turn in divine action refers to those 
approaches that reject the standard, noninterventionist, incompatibilist divine action models 
exemplified by the Divine Action Project, and more particularly the metaphysical assumptions 
presupposed therein. Representatives of the theological turn argue that noninterventionist, 
incompatibilist causal joint theories presuppose a model of the God-world relationship that is 
insufficient, insofar as such theories locate divine action in scientifically-identifiable points of 
underdeterminism. In short, the theological turn rejects divine action theories that subject 
theological affirmations of divine action to current scientific knowledge. Contemporary science, 
it is argued, should not be the final arbiter of what is and what can be, for science is a bounded 
and highly provisional endeavour that is limited in what it can say about reality. The theological 
turn thus emphasises the importance of theological and metaphysical frameworks in divine 
action theories, rather than looking to science to identify ontologically underdetermined gaps in 




Theistic naturalism is one approach used by those in the theological turn as an alternative to the 
standard model of divine action critiqued in Part One, and is the approach I here promote as a 
promising direction in divine action theories. As will be argued, theistic naturalism not only 
insists on a God-world model in which nature is inherently involved with God’s active presence, 
but it also offers a way of thinking theologically about divine action that gets around some of the 
key weaknesses of the standard model critiqued in Part One. Just as naturalism more broadly is 
notoriously difficult to define, so is theistic naturalism an ambiguous term. It seems to have been 
coined by Willem Drees, who has used it to describe “a scheme of primary and secondary causes, 
with the transcendent realm giving effectiveness and reality to the laws of nature and the material 
world governed by them.”1 This definition is helpful insofar as it highlights theistic naturalism’s 
commitment to compatibilism, and to the inherent involvement of all nature with God. Another 
definition has been used by Arthur Peacocke, who writes that “the processes revealed by the 
sciences are in themselves God acting as Creator, and God is not to be found as some kind of 
additional influence or factor added on to the processes of the world God is creating. This 
perspective can properly be called ‘theistic naturalism.’”2 Peacocke’s definition is helpful, as it 
indirectly emphasises divine immanence in nature (including a compatibilist account of divine 
action) as a crucial part of what makes the natural world what it is. That is, Peacocke seems to 
envision the natural world itself as always existing in interactive relationship with God; there is 
no self-sufficient natural world apart from God’s active presence in the first place.3 As Nancey 
Murphy explains Peacocke’s theistic naturalism, “It is opposed to accounts of God as apart from 
the world altogether, as in Deism, or as occasionally intervening, as in many forms of 
supernaturalism. His emphases are on a metaphysics that recognizes only God and the natural 
world and on a theology in which God is immanent and active in the whole of creation.”4 
Nevertheless, Peacocke’s definition of theistic naturalism above might fail to be congruent with 
                                                            
1 Willem B. Drees, “Thick Naturalism: Comments on Zygon 2000,” Zygon 35 (2000): 851. 
2 Arthur R. Peacocke, Paths from Science Toward God: The End of All Our Exploring (Oxford: OneWorld, 2001), 
138. 
3 Peacocke develops his theistic naturalism and divine action theory within a panentheistic framework, 
writing: “The ontological “interface’ at which God must be deemed to be influencing the world is, on this model, 
that which occurs between God and the totality of the world…, and this may be conceived of panentheistically as 
within God’s own self. What passes across this ‘interface,’ I have also suggested, may perhaps be conceived of as 
something like a flow of information—a pattern-forming influence.” Peacocke views his model as being fully 
naturalistic, then, and not requiring God to “step in” from the outside in order to act. Still, he seems to still retain 
the classic idea of “special” divine action, in which it is conceivable that nature’s “default” setting does not include 
divine activity. In this sense, then, Peacocke should be differentiated from Knight, who is discussed below. Arthur 
R. Peacocke, The Palace of Glory: God’s World and Science (Adelaide: ATF Press, 2005), 115. 
4 Nancey Murphy, “Arthur Peacocke’s Naturalistic Christian Faith for the Twenty-First Century: A Brief 
Introduction,” Zygon 43, no. 1 (2008): 70.  
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his actual divine action model, which is based on whole-part constraint. As Peacocke explains 
divine action in relation to his theistic naturalism: 
Mediated by such whole–part influences on the world-as-a-whole…God could bring 
about the occurrence of particular events and patterns of events – those which express 
God’s intentions. These would then be the result of ‘special, divine action,’ as distinct 
from the divine holding in existence of all-that-is, and so would not otherwise have 
happened had God not so intended…such a unitive, holistic effect of God on the world 
could occur without abrogating any of the laws (regularities) which apply to the levels of 
the world’s constituents. This influence would be distinguished from God’s universal 
creative action in that particular intentions of God for particular patterns of events to 
occur are thereby effected; inter alia, patterns could be intended by God in response to 
human actions or prayers.5 
In other words, Peacocke affirms a distinction between general providence and special divine 
action which actually does require a causal joint; Peacocke provides this causal joint by positing 
whole-part constraint, and divine influence that “may perhaps be conceived of as something like 
a flow of information – a pattern-forming influence.”6 Because of Peacocke’s perhaps 
inconsistent understanding of theistic naturalism, Knight refers to Peacocke’s approach as “weak 
theistic naturalism.”7 In any case, theistic naturalism has not been widely developed in science-
and-religion; Knight is likely the scholar who has worked most consistently with the term itself. 
Knight’s work will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, but here it is helpful to note that he 
sees his own theistic naturalism as denying “any mode of divine causality other than that in the 
general providence inherent in the design of the universe.”8 This is a stronger version of theistic 
naturalism than that envisioned by Peacocke, and a bit more restrictive (definitionally speaking) 
than the working definition I will adopt here. Though my understanding of theistic naturalism 
would include Knight’s model, I define it sufficiently broadly so as to encompass all three 
theological models surveyed in the next several chapters.  
 
Broad theistic naturalism, as I use it here, is the theological affirmation that a full account of 
nature would necessarily include an account of God’s active, immanent involvement in nature: 
one might say that for nature to be fully natural, it must be involved with, or participate in, God. 
                                                            
5 Arthur R. Peacocke, “Emergence, Mind, and Divine Action: The Hierarchy of the Sciences in Relation to 
the Human Mind–Brain–Body,” in The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion, 
edited by Philip Clayton and Paul Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 274-275. 
6 Ibid., 275. 
7 See Christopher C. Knight, “Emergence, Naturalism, and Panentheism: An Eastern Christian 
Perspective,” in All That Is: A Naturalistic Faith for the Twenty-First Century, ed. Philip Clayton, Theology and the 
Sciences (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2007). 
8 Knight, “Theistic Naturalism and ‘Special’ Divine Providence,” 536.  
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A naturalistic account that excludes divine presence and activity would thus be insufficient, 
lacking an important ontological context for nature – this is thus a theological recontexualisation 
of nature, affirming that a full account of the natural world would necessarily include an account 
of God-world interactions. It is the idea that we lose something of what it means to be natural if 
we exclude divine action and presence. This view is truly theistic insofar as it refers to a 
transcendent God whose ontology is distinct from that of the world. Thus, theistic naturalism is 
to be distinguished from religious naturalism, which is a position that may affirm religiosity – but 
not God as traditionally conceived in Christian theology. Theistic naturalism is also truly 
naturalistic, in two distinct ways. First, theistic naturalisms affirm the explanatory power of the 
natural sciences, arguing that God is somehow involved with the natural world at a different 
ontological level than that available to the sciences. They can agree with Drees that “naturalists 
wholeheartedly accept the findings of the natural sciences, more or less as the scientists 
themselves understand their results.”9 Theistic naturalists do not seek ontologically 
underdetermined areas of physical openness wherein God might act; instead, they affirm 
compatibilism. In fact, theistic naturalists can affirm that even if God were to act specifically and 
responsively in the natural world, there would still be (in principle) a scientific account available 
for that action. Their compatibilist commitments allow for a full affirmation of scientific 
accounts of all events, while simultaneously affirming divine agency in those same events. The 
second way in which theistic naturalism is naturalistic has less to do with the natural sciences and 
more to do with philosophy and metaphysics. Theistic naturalists can consider themselves 
naturalistic because of the way they understand naturalism in the first place: theirs is an explicitly 
theological framework that is, they argue, neither supported nor challenged by the natural 
sciences. In other words, theistic naturalists argue that science itself cannot prove, for example, 
metaphysical, scientific naturalism. For that, one must step outside of scientific methodology 
itself and make a metaphysical claim – as discussed in the previous chapter. Theistic naturalists 
recognise this inherent limitation of the natural sciences, and then make a metaphysical claim 
that is the mirror image of scientific naturalism: the natural world as understood by science is 
reality, but not full reality. The key claim of theistic naturalism is that a full description of the 
natural world necessarily includes not only observable phenomena subject to scientific 
explanation, but also the relationship and interaction between the physical world and God.  
 
                                                            
9 Drees, “Thick Naturalism,” 850.  
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One objection to theistic naturalism as described above is that it potentially expands the 
boundaries of naturalism to such an extent that “anything goes.” Have theistic naturalists simply 
redefined naturalism in such a way that anything could potentially fall under its rubric? That is, if 
theologians can simply assert that supernatural involvement with the physical world is natural, 
naturalism might cease to have any real meaning. Conversely, theists may be concerned that 
theistic naturalism threatens God’s transcendent otherness, insofar as it defines the natural at 
least partially in terms of divine involvement. In response to the first critique, it is helpful to 
reemphasise the naturalistic component of this approach. Theistic naturalism does not simply 
affirm that supernatural realities intervene in natural processes in a scientifically unexplainable 
manner. On the contrary, this position fully affirms scientific explanations for all natural 
phenomena. It is on a “deeper” or “higher” ontological level that divine engagement with the 
natural world is said to occur (more on this below). In response to the second concern regarding 
divine transcendence, it is important to emphasise that theistic naturalism does not say that God 
is part of, or even continuous with, the natural world. Theistic naturalism is not pantheistic, nor 
necessarily panentheistic (though it can be). This is a one-sided naturalism: a full explanation of 
the world as we know it requires an account of creaturely involvement with God. The reverse is 
not affirmed, however: God is not dependent on the world.  
 
All of this is by way of introduction to theistic naturalism. There are many justifiable concerns 
with the oversimplified model outlined above. However, at this point it is helpful to move 
beyond the vague generalities of a metaphysical position, and engage with specific theological 
frameworks that can be understood as theistic naturalism, broadly conceived. In this chapter, I 
engage specifically with Thomistic divine action. While Thomistic scholars might not embrace 
theistic naturalism as a label, I suggest that their respective approaches to divine action do indeed 
fit with theistic naturalism as I have described it.  
 
7.3 Thomistic Divine Action 
It would be misleading to suggest that Thomism in any way offers a new divine action theory or, 
more specifically, a faddish response to the noninterventionist, incompatibilist paradigm 
represented by the DAP. Indeed, Thomistic divine action is something of a “gold standard” in 
divine action theology (and theology more generally, of course); in the historical context of the 
Christian tradition, it is what I have been calling the standard model that is indeed anomalous. 
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Moreover, it is also misleading to assume that there is a single, univocal Thomistic perspective 
on divine action; Thomism is a broad tradition containing drastically different voices. One might 
even observe that most everyone in Christian theology wants to claim Aquinas in support of his 
or her own respective position. All this is to say, from the outset, that I do not intend to provide 
a comprehensive or authoritative account of Thomistic theology, and could not do justice even 
to the tradition of Thomistic thought devoted to divine action. Thus, in what follows I do not 
attempt a historical analysis of Thomistic thought, but instead focus only on Thomistic divine 
action in the context of this thesis’ argument. This caveat aside, a discussion of Thomistic divine 
action theories is necessary here. While many Thomists would reject the naturalistic label – and 
even the more qualified theistic naturalism category – I suggest that Thomism is at least 
compatible with theistic naturalism as discussed above.  
 
Key to the Thomist’s understanding of special divine action is the distinction between primary 
and secondary causality.10 The problem with contemporary divine action debates, Aquinas 
scholar Ignacio Silva insists, is that they “assume that it is necessary to affirm a lack of natural 
powers to find a space for God to act in the created order.”11 That is, the standard approach to 
divine action often assumes incompatibilism, wherein natural causes and divine causes cannot be 
seen as effecting the same event. Either an event is caused by natural processes, or it is caused by 
divine action through ontologically underdetermined aspects of the natural world – but not both. 
Thomists, on the other hand, address divine action by challenging the incompatibilist position 
and affirming Aquinas’ distinction between God as a primary cause on one hand, and created, 
secondary causes on the other: “God causes all action, as any active thing is the instrument of 
divine power acting.”12 Thomists argue that by working with an insufficient understanding of 
causation, the contemporary divine action debate terminally undermines itself. As Silva explains, 
“It is the univocal notion of causality which is assumed in the whole debate about divine action 
that prevents any metaphysical elasticity to distinguish God’s causality from natural, created 
                                                            
10 Aquinas himself did not speak of special divine action, but providential action and miracles. Miracles are 
discussed later in this chapter. Thomists in science-and-religion tend to treat providence as special providence, thus 
mapping loosely onto the contemporary debate’s category of special divine action. See, for example, Silva, 
“Revisiting Aquinas,” particularly page 287. However, while Silva distinguishes between GDA and SDA, other 
Thomists would be happy to do away with this common distinction. For example, Denis Edwards writes that 
“general divine action is accomplished through particular divine acts. The proposal here is that divine acts are always 
specific to the particular entity or process. In this sense, they are always special.” Edwards, How God Acts, 57. 
11Ignacio Silva, “Divine Action and Thomism: Why Thomas Aquinas’ Thought is Attractive Today,” Acta 
Philosophica 1, no. 25 (2016): 69. 
12 Aquinas, The Power of God, 3.7. 
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causality.”13 In seeking natural areas of underdetermined openness in which God might act, 
incompatibilists betray their assumption that God can only act in the same manner as do the 
physical (secondary) causes that are subject to scientific analysis.  
 
The Thomistic principle of double agency affirms that God and natural agents work on different 
levels: God as primary cause creates, sustains, and acts through all secondary causes, but these 
secondary causes also have their own causal agency. So, “the same effect is ascribed to a natural 
cause and to God,” and fully so: God and secondary causes do not “share the workload.”14 
Rather, both the natural agent and God are fully efficacious causes. Indeed, it is “not as though 
part were effected by God and part by the natural agent: but the whole effect proceeds from 
each, yet in different ways.”15 So, for example, one may receive prayer for healing from cancer, 
and subsequently experience total eradication of the disease. A Thomist might say that God had 
indeed acted in response to specific prayer, but also that the secondary causes involved were also 
fully causal (i.e., the doctors, chemotherapy, or even simply the patient’s own bodily processes 
were fully causal). To put the point even more clearly: not only is God as primary cause 
responsible for the general existence and agency of all created beings and processes, but “the key 
feature of this doctrine is that everything that the secondary cause is and does is caused by the 
primary cause.”16 While Aquinas outlines numerous ways in which primary causation might be 
said to occur through secondary causes,17 the important point here is that Aquinas insists all 
natural events are truly caused both by secondary causes and God.  
 
Because of this emphasis on double agency, the Thomist insists that any search for a causal joint 
is wrongheaded and presupposes an insufficient God-world model; everything is a causal joint. The 
search for ontological gaps and a causal joint presupposes that divine action must be effected on 
the same level as physical causation as it is understood in contemporary science. “If there is only 
one brand of causality,” Aquinas scholar Michael Dodds explains, “God must subscribe to it and 
so be a univocal cause alongside of creatures. If such a God acts in the world, there must be a 
                                                            
13 Ignacio Silva, “A Cause Among Causes? God Acting in the Natural World,” The European Journal for the 
Philosophy of Religion 7 no. 4 (2015): 107. 
14 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles 3. 70. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Silva, “Revisiting Aquinas,” 280. 
17 A full discussion of causation is beyond the scope of this thesis. For an overview of the various types of 
causation (material, formal, efficient, and final), see Silva, “A Cause Among Causes?” 
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point where his causality intersects with that of the creature – the now famous ‘causal joint.’”18 
But Thomists have theological issues with the idea that God could ever act as a mere “cause 
among causes,” as will be discussed below. Causal joint programs fail because, as theologian 
Elizabeth Johnson asserts, “in principle there are no gaps in the universe, which is complete on 
its own level.”19 The world of created causes operates on an entirely different level from God, 
whose agency works in and through natural processes in a way that respects the integrity and 
completeness of that natural level. As William Stoeger argues, the causal joint is the “active, 
richly differentiated, profoundly immanent (because it is transcendent) presence of God in 
created beings and their relationships.”20 Note that one implication of this perspective on the 
causal joint is that “on the natural level, one can describe what happens in the world entirely in 
terms of causes that are open to the investigation of empirical science.”21 This is an extremely 
important point, and underscores what was mentioned above regarding theistic naturalism more 
broadly: theistic naturalists affirm divine action, but deny that divine activity could ever be 
recognised as such through scientific methodology. In other words, even God’s personal, 
providential responses to petitionary prayer would be effected through secondary causes and be 
fully explicable in naturalistic terms. This is quite different from the standard approach to divine 
action in recent decades, which says that God is restricted to acting in physical processes that are 
not determined by other physical factors.22  
 
Unavoidably, the principle of double agency raises the question of how, exactly, God could act 
not through a causal joint, but through the material world of secondary causes that is already 
“complete on its own level.” Thomists are unanimous in responding to this: we cannot ever 
understand how God acts through secondary causes. Aquinas affirmed that “God is the cause 
which is hidden” from every human being.23 As Denis Edwards explains, we can know the effect 
of divine action in “the universe of creatures we find around us, with the relationships between 
them and the laws that govern them,” but “a theology of divine action not only should not spell 
out how God acts, but should insist that this is something we cannot know.”24 This debate about 
                                                            
18 Dodds, Unlocking Divine Action, 107. 
19 Johnson, “Does God Play Dice?,” 8. 
20 William R. Stoeger, “Epistemological and Ontological Issues Arising from Quantum Theory,” in 
Quantum Mechanics: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, ed. Robert J. Russell, Philip Clayton, Kirk Wegter-McNelly, 
and John Polkinghorne (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory Publications, 2001), 97. 
21 Dodds, Unlocking Divine Action, 187. 
22 This is not to say that those in the DAP would say that SDA is scientifically identifiable – most would 
not.  
23 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, 3. 101.  
24 Edwards, How God Acts, 63. 
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double agency will be picked up below; the important point here is that Thomists simultaneously 
affirm both divine (primary) and natural (secondary) agency, rejecting the incompatibilist 
assumptions of causal joint theorists. Indeed, the notion of a single, underdetermined causal joint 
runs wholly contrary to the Thomistic metaphysic and presupposes a God-world model that 
Thomists would flatly reject. That is, for the Thomist, all of nature is something of a causal joint; 
to pinpoint one particular aspect of nature as open to divine action is erroneous. It is in this 
sense that Thomists would also reject the noninterventionist paradigm as it is generally construed 
– not because Thomists affirm intervention, but because they deny the God-world model in 
which intervention would even be a metaphysical possibility. Because divine agency is always and 
everywhere active, the debate about intervention and nonintervention borders on the incoherent.  
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the doctrine of double agency has provoked endless debate. Moving into 
specific objections to double agency, it is first worth looking at Aquinas’ motivations for what 
might be considered a seemingly paradoxical approach. Aquinas was not oblivious to the fact 
that attributing one effect to two ontologically distinct causes might seem superfluous or 
paradoxical; in a particularly striking understatement he writes that “some find it difficult to 
understand how natural effects are ascribed to God and to the activity of nature.”25 Indeed. 
Aquinas, however, also wanted to affirm two things: divine transcendence and the integrity of 
created causes. Thomists in general are wary of contemporary causal joint theories, as they 
threaten to render God a mere “cause among causes.” To equate divine action with something as 
physical as the collapse of a wavefunction, for example, is to undermine God’s fundamental 
distinction from creation. For God’s action to be primary, rather than secondary, means that “his 
action is one with his being, and no disposition or ‘connecting link’ stands between God and his 
action in creatures.”26 It is vitally important, Thomists say, to distinguish God’s action from 
anything that could ever be scientifically studied or measured. Regardless, then, of the standard 
assumption that science precludes the possibility of divine action unless it occurs through 
underdetermined areas of nature, Thomists find it theologically problematic to affirm a causal 
joint approach.   
 
                                                            
25 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, 3. 70. Indeed, Michael Dodds admits that this may be one of Aquinas’ 
“greatest understatements.” Dodds, Unlocking Divine Action, 207. 
26 Dodds, Unlocking Divine Action, 169.  
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Moreover, Aquinas has a very high view of the integrity and agency of natural processes, in a way 
that might seem prophetic in light of contemporary views regarding the laws of nature. As 
Johnson notes, Aquinas “is so convinced of the transcendent mystery of God…that he sees no 
threat to divinity in allowing creatures the fullest measure of agency according to their own 
nature.”27 For Aquinas, then, it is “a measure of the creative power of God” for creatures to exist 
and exercise creative agency.28 By affirming that God acts through created, secondary causes, 
Thomists see themselves as upholding a dual commitment to transcendence and immanence: 
“nearness to God and genuine creaturely autonomy grow in direct rather than inverse 
proportion.”29 This dual commitment to the most profound immanence and transcendence can 
be seen as a motivation for the doctrine of double agency. For the Thomist, affirming that God 
acts as genuine primary cause through also genuinely causal secondary causes is a way to affirm 
both the interiority of God in all creatures, as well as the insurmountable fundamental difference 
between these analogical causal levels. This understanding of causality is so important for 
Thomism that Johnson can affirm that “in this system of thought it is incoherent to think of 
God as working in the world apart from secondary causes…God acts wholly through and in the 
finite agents that also act wholly in the event. As a result, the one effect issues from both primary 
and secondary causes simultaneously.”30 I have reiterated this point in various ways merely to 
affirm that the Thomist really means to say what she seems to be saying: Thomistic divine action 
(at least as it has traditionally been conceived) does not let one “off the hook,” as it were, by 
allowing a sort of shared causality for any single event. Rather, the Thomist finds it theologically 
necessary to affirm this perhaps paradoxical model of causality; without it God is reduced to a 
cause among causes, and that is theologically unacceptable. God is not “simply a bigger and 
better secondary cause.”31 
 
At this point, a word about miracles is necessary. While I have bracketed off miracles in this 
thesis and chosen to focus explicitly on models of divine action prioritising God’s action in and 
through natural processes (e.g., special divine action or, in some usages, providential divine 
action), an account of Thomistic divine action is not complete without noting Aquinas’ view on 
miracles. Aquinas himself actually acknowledges the possibility of miracles, affirming that a 
                                                            
27 Johnson, “Does God Play Dice?,” 11. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 12. 
30 Ibid. Although, as will be noted, Aquinas’ account of miracles may be an exception to this. 
31 Ibid., 13. 
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miracle is “something difficult and unusual, surpassing the capabilities of nature,”32 and not 
requiring secondary causes at all. Aquinas writes that God “can act apart from the given order, 
producing, for example, the effects of secondary causes without them or some effect that 
surpasses the powers of these causes.”33 It is fairly clear that Aquinas wished to affirm 
miraculous divine action in the sense of it being an action beyond the abilities of normal natural 
processes (though not, importantly, in direct intervention of those processes).34 What, then, are 
we to make of this, given Aquinas’ emphasis on creaturely integrity and independence? A 
detailed discussion of this question is beyond the scope of this project, but it is interesting to 
note that many Aquinas scholars have begun working creatively with a Thomistic model, such 
that double agency is stretched to include what we perceive as miracles. As Edwards writes, 
“God’s respect for the integrity of secondary causes…may mean that even in miracles, God acts 
in and through the known and unknown laws of nature.”35 For example, if one understands the 
laws of nature not as reified prescriptions but as limited, descriptive models of reality, then in 
miracles “God might be working through all the unknown or partly known possibilities of the 
natural world that far surpass what we already know and model.”36 In other words, the category 
of miracle may be a human construction stemming from our incomplete knowledge of the way 
the laws of nature function in reality. We might not be able to imagine how a seemingly dramatic 
miracle could be a result of “normal” double agency, but that could simply reflect our 
incomplete knowledge of the laws of nature. In any case, it is interesting to note how 
contemporary Aquinas scholars in science-and-religion often minimise Aquinas’ affirmation of 
miracles, instead subsuming them into the category of double agency: “It may well be that God 
is acting in and through secondary causes that we do not fully understand.”37 
 
7.4 Challenges to Thomistic Divine Action  
The Thomistic conception of divine action has much to commend it, and (as will be discussed in 
the next section) it is perhaps the paradigmatic example of theistic naturalism: God is inherently 
involved in each and every natural event, albeit at a separate ontological level from the realm of 
secondary causes. However, there are challenges to Thomistic approaches to divine action. 
                                                            
32 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1. 105. 7.  
33 Ibid., 1. 105. 6. 
34 As Dodds writes, Aquinas “sees miracles not as a violation of nature or against (contra) nature, but rather 
‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ (praeter) nature.” Dodds, Unlocking Divine Action, 248. 
35 Edwards, How God Acts, 84. 
36 Denis Edwards, “Toward a Theology of Divine Action: William R. Stoeger, S.J., on the Laws of 
Nature,” Theological Studies 76, no. 3 (2015): 501. 
37 Edwards, How God Acts, 89. 
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Thomists ultimately appeal to divine mystery when it comes to the actual “how” of double 
agency and the “what” of the causal joint. But even if all divine action theories inevitably reach a 
point of mystery beyond which they cannot go, the Thomistic version of this mystery might 
seem particularly susceptible to challenge. First, the Thomistic dismissal of the causal joint 
problem could be premature. Put simply, the causal joint problem is this: If God is transcendent 
(ontologically distinct from creation) and has specific purposes to be enacted in the natural 
world, then at some point the divine will must meet physical processes to bring about something 
that would not have happened had God not acted in that particular time and place. There must 
come a point when spiritual realities meet material processes and somehow effect physical 
events; otherwise it is difficult to see how divine action could ever be specific or “special.” In 
other words, while the principle of double agency might make theological sense in explaining 
God’s general, universal divine action in sustaining physical processes “from a distance,” it may 
not be as effective in making sense of special, responsive divine action that results in material 
changes. Thomists reject the causal joint by affirming divine agency in all natural events, but this 
approach may begin to break down when applied to instances in which God is said to act 
specially in such a way that the course of nature is actually altered in some way. Special divine 
action, as typically construed, requires a causal joint, and it is unclear whether double agency is 
well-suited to this task. Moreover, rejecting the causal joint may ironically threaten divine 
transcendence. That is, in order to avoid pantheism, there must be a clean ontological break 
between God and nature, but this leaves us with an ontological gap between the divine will and 
physical processes – the now-infamous causal joint problem. If one rejects the causal joint 
altogether but still affirms special divine action, then one is in danger of conceptualising divine 
agency as being of a part with the rest of the natural world. Obviously, Thomism is not 
intentionally pantheistic. However, it is difficult to see how Thomism can affirm special divine 
action without admitting that in some way, God must somehow cross that ontological divide and 
specifically interact with physical processes. At the very least, I would suggest that the causal 
joint issue is a bigger problem than Thomists generally let on.  
 
A second challenge to Thomistic divine action has to do with double agency, and has been 
briefly discussed above. It is easy to see why double agency (and compatibilism more broadly) is 
so attractive; as philosopher Frank Dilley explains (somewhat tongue-in-cheek), it allows those 
committed to both science and religion to affirm that “both theological and naturalistic 
explanations are true, religion and science do not interfere with each other, there is no problem 
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of miracles yet there is activity of God, and everyone can be happy.”38 Compatibilist double 
agency promises the best of both worlds, theological and scientific. However, it may be quite 
difficult to affirm that a specific, single event occurring in the physical world has both a fully 
efficacious natural (secondary) cause and a fully efficacious divine (primary) cause. As John 
Polkinghorne expresses the problem (perhaps hyperbolically), double agency may seem like “an 
unintelligible kind of theological doublespeak.”39 Explaining Polkinghorne’s critique, Silva writes 
that Polkinghorne thinks double agency “becomes a fideistic solution to the problem of divine 
action, which turns out to be more of an evasion than a solution.”40 Similarly, Joseph Bracken 
admits to seeing “major problems in proposing that two ontologically independent 
subjects…each wholly produce one and the same finite effect”; this is because “two agents can 
each wholly produce the same effect only if one of them is strictly instrumental to the purpose of 
the other.”41 Again, Aquinas was clear on double agency, insisting that “the whole of the one 
same effect is ascribed to the instrument [secondary causes], and again the whole is ascribed to 
the principal agent [God as primary cause].”42 So Aquinas affirms that events are fully caused by 
God, simultaneously with the secondary cause acting in its full, free capacity. But given the 
apparent sufficiency of these secondary causes, the assertion of primary causation can seem 
superfluous. If natural processes are fully causal in, say, a person’s healing from cancer (as 
Thomism insists), how can God be said to be acting responsively in that same event? Put 
another way, Thomists have to do theological gymnastics to avoid falling into deism on one 
hand (insofar as they are eager to affirm the integrity of secondary causes), and theological 
determinism or occasionalism on the other (insofar as God is acting in every event). Another 
way of putting this is to note that double agency can handle general divine action fairly easily, but 
special divine action is more problematic. As Silva explains the issue: 
For if all the natural actions that occur are just what occur according to the order of 
nature, then God would not seem to exercise any more guidance over nature than does 
the God of deism. On the other hand, if some of those events are outside the ordinary 
course of nature, then Aquinas’s view seems to entail that God cannot influence the 
world without acting against its order.43 
                                                            
38 Frank Dilley, “Does the ‘God Who Acts’ Really Act?,” in God’s Activity in the World: The Contemporary 
Problem, ed. Owen C. Thomas (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983), 55-56.  
39 John Polkinghorne, The Faith of a Physicist: Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker, The Gifford Lectures for 1993-
4 (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1996), 81-82.  
40 Silva, Divine Action and Thomism, 80.  
41 Joseph A. Bracken, “Response to Elizabeth Johnson's ‘Does God Play Dice?’,” Theological Studies 57, no. 
3 (1996): 723.  
42 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles 3. 70. 
43 Silva, “Revisiting Aquinas,” 286. 
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That is, if God is acting specifically through secondary causes in every single event, how are the 
secondary causes anything more than a puppet for primary causation? If God is acting specially 
in every single event, occasionalism would seem to hold true – for God would be determining 
the outcome of every single event, and in contravention of the law-governed course of natural 
events. This seems incompatible with Aquinas’ emphasis on creaturely integrity. On the other 
hand, if no divine action alters the functioning or direction of specific natural processes, how is 
this to be distinguished from deism? In other words, double agency runs the risk of reducing 
special divine action to a deistic form of general divine action: “If God acts exclusively as the 
absolute ontological ground of all events, and never acts directly to affect the course of history, 
can we say that God responds to the dramas of human history…?”44 Merely asserting the full, 
simultaneous efficacy of both natural and divine causes may not, in fact, make it so.  
 
Again, Thomists have theological reasons for affirming double agency, and view this doctrine as 
theologically good. Hence, Johnson and others can embrace divine mystery in affirming that 
“God’s providential guidance is accomplished in and through the free working of secondary 
causes.”45 Though these statements might seem paradoxical, the appeal to transcendent mystery 
is advocated as a necessary good – rather than a theological problem which needs to be 
examined. As Edwards writes, “We have no direct access to God’s creative act…so a theology of 
divine action not only should not spell out how God acts, but should insist that this is something 
we cannot know.”46 That is, the appeal to mystery is theologically important because it 
emphasises the ontological and epistemological gap between humans and God. This, in my view, 
is one of the chief problems with the Thomistic approach to divine action: an appeal to 
transcendent mystery is affirmed even when the statements at hand seem to be contradictory – 
when, for example, it is affirmed that God specifically acts to bring about physical changes in the 
world, even as physical causes also fully cause those same events. In fact, challenges to double 
agency can often seem strikingly succinct, as noted with Polkinghorne above. It does not take a 
great deal of philosophical nuance to see the potential challenge to Thomistic divine action: it 
simply seems redundant, to many, to affirm that both God and secondary causes are fully active 
in specific events, as when Johnson writes that “providential guidance is accomplished in and 
                                                            
44 Thomas F. Tracy, “Special Divine Action and the Laws of Nature,” Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action: 
Twenty Years of Challenge and Progress, ed. Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, and William R. Stoeger, S. J. (Vatican 
City State: Vatican Observatory Publications, 2008), 255. 
45 Johnson, “Does God Play Dice?,” 15. 
46 Edwards, How God Acts, 63. 
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through the free working of secondary causes.”47 This is not to say that an affirmation of divine 
mystery is never called for. Quite to the contrary, I would suggest that any account of divine 
action will eventually run up against mystery, insofar as created beings cannot see “behind the 
curtain” of physical realities into the transcendent being of God. An acceptance of mystery or 
the inherent opacity of divine action is not the problem; the issue, in my view, lies in the possible 
incoherence that might arise upon examination of the specific details of double agency and the 
causal joint. However, these issues might be at least partially mitigated by acknowledging other 
aspects of Thomistic theology: namely, participatory ontology.48  
 
7.5 Participatory Ontology and Thomism as Theistic Naturalism 
Parallel with Aquinas’ explication of double agency is a related, but distinct theme: participatory 
ontology, or the affirmation that all created things participate necessarily and inherently in and 
with God. As Johnson explains Aquinas’ participatory ontology, “This notion of participation 
affects the understanding of both God and the world…the life-giving Spirit of God is in all 
things not as part of their essence but as the innermost source of their being, power, and action. 
There is, in other words, a constitutive presence of God at the heart of things.”49 This, in my 
view, is an immensely undervalued aspect of Aquinas’ thought when it comes to divine action, 
though it has been explicitly articulated in recent years by Denis Edwards,50 Joseph Bracken,51 
Elizabeth Johnson,52 and others.53 There is an enormous body of literature on every aspect of 
Aquinas’ thought, and I cannot do justice to participation ontology here. However, a few things 
are worth noting. First, a holistic reading of Aquinas would suggest that his account of double 
agency is incomplete without an appreciation of his insistence on the intimate relationship 
between created things and God: “God must exist, and exist intimately in everything.”54 And 
                                                            
47 Johnson, “Does God Play Dice?,” 15. 
48 There are other challenges to Thomistic divine action – most notably in regards to the problem of evil. If 
God is fully causal in every event, and even able to bring about special divine providence through double agency, 
theodicy becomes an enormous challenge. It might seem that “God is ultimately responsible for the evil resulting 
from secondary causes.” Thomistic responses to the problem of evil are beyond the scope of this project; for one 
interesting approach (involving kenosis), see Craig A. Boyd and Aaron D. Cobb, “The Causality Distinction, 
Kenosis, and a Middle Way: Aquinas and Polkinghorne on Divine Action,” Theology and Science 7, no. 4 (2009): 397.  
49 Johnson, “Does God Play Dice?,” 11. 
50 See Edwards, How God Acts. 
51 See Joseph A. Bracken, The One in the Many: A Contemporary Reconstruction of the God-world Relationship 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001). 
52 See Johnson, “Does God Play Dice?” 
53 Participation theology is quite conducive to panentheism, insofar as it stresses the ontological 
relationship between God and nature. Catholic panentheists in general may thus find participation ontology a 
helpful concept, especially considering participation’s status as relatively orthodox, at least in comparison with 
panentheism.   
54 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1. 8. 1. 
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more to the point of divine action, Aquinas writes that “God acts interiorly in all things…for all 
things God is properly the cause of esse, which is innermost in all things.”55 I would even suggest 
that Aquinas’ double agency formula may be an attempt to codify the intuition and affirmation 
that God’s immanence in creation is the most “real” thing about creation. That is, participation 
in and with God is what it means for creatures to exist, or at least to be most fully natural. Denis 
Edwards puts it thus:  
If one accepts the idea that God is interiorly present to the whole creation and to every 
part of it, nearer to it than it is to itself, as the very ground and source of its existence, 
enabling and empowering it at every moment, then clearly God is never apart from or 
outside of creation. Divine transcendence does not make God distant. It enables God to 
be more interior to things than any creature could ever be. God never breaks in upon 
creation because God is already there. God never becomes present because God is not 
absent. God never comes from outside because God is always inside.56 
By saying that God is “interiorly present” to and “enabling and empowering” all natural 
processes, Edwards is putting something of a participatory spin on double agency. Edwards’ 
description of participatory double agency feels quite different from the relatively clinical 
terminology of Thomistic causation. Interestingly, Michael Dodds has actually suggested 
replacing “causation” terminology with “participation” for exactly this reason. As he explains, “If 
‘causation’ tends to arouse images of interference, the word ‘participation’ seems to imply 
cooperation rather than intrusiveness. And if ‘causation’ raises the imagined need for a ‘causal 
joint’ in which cause and effect can somehow interface, ‘participation’ raises no such spectre 
since it accents the true intimacy which characterizes the action of God in the creature.”57 
Participation, it could be argued, is the ontological core of Thomistic divine action, while 
articulations of double agency are relatively insufficient representations of creaturely participation 
with the immanent God. If Johnson is correct in asserting that “divine perfection is ultimately a 
perfection of relationality and love rather than of self-sufficiency and control,”58 then perhaps 
this participatory ontology can help us make sense out of the paradox of double agency.  
 
It is worth noting here that Aquinas’ concept of participation actually comes from Neoplatonic 
and Augustinian philosophy, rather than from the Aristotelian tradition that provided the 
                                                            
55 Ibid., 1. 105. 5. 
56 Edwards, How God Acts, 46. 
57 Michael Dodds, “The Doctrine of Causality in Aquinas and The Book of Causes: One Key to 
Understanding the Nature of Divine Action,” Lecture given at the Summer Thomistic Institute, University of Notre 
Dame, IN, July 14–21, 2000. https://maritain.nd.edu/jmc/ti00/dodds.htm. 
58 Johnson, “Does God Play Dice?,” 17. 
190 
 
framework for Aquinas’ various types of causation.59 This, one could argue, has led to an 
apparent tension within Thomistic thought pertaining to divine action. On one hand, Thomists 
affirm the explanatory sufficiency of science in all secondary causes; the entire web of 
interrelated secondary causes is, in principle, explainable on the level of secondary causation, 
while God somehow works as primary cause on an entirely different level. Participation 
ontology, on the other hand, affirms that all creatures (secondary causes) exist and act only 
insofar as they participate dynamically in God. As Johnson writes, “God is everywhere present 
and active, continuously interacting with the world to implement divine purpose while granting 
creatures and created systems a full measure of being and efficacy.”60 But here the question at 
hand becomes even clearer: Is there a real difference between creaturely participation in, and 
cooperation with, God, or is this sort of participatory divine influence basically reducible to the 
primary/secondary scheme of standard double agency? One might ask, for example, whether 
Edwards is convincing in his description of double agency: 
God is always present, in the Word and in the Spirit, always breathing life into the 
process, always engaged, always responsive, and always achieving the divine purpose of 
creating a world of creatures to which God will give God’s self in love… And divine love 
involves divine respect for the independence and integrity of the creature and the 
creaturely processes involved in the emergence of life on Earth. God does not override 
the process, nor bypass the laws of nature. God accepts and works creatively with the 
limits of creaturely processes, lovingly respecting the integrity of creatures. 61 
Edwards speaks here of God being “engaged,” “responsive,” and “work[ing] creatively” with 
physical processes in double agency. On the face of it, the participatory flavour of Edwards’ 
approach would seem to be much more dynamic and relational than double agency as 
traditionally understood. However, one might wonder whether this is anything more than a 
particularly eloquent example of what Polkinghorne called “theological doublespeak.” That is, 
while Edwards argues that God “works creatively with the limits of creaturely processes,” it is 
unclear how any resulting action would escape the critiques of double agency explored above. 
Specifically, if God were “lovingly respecting the integrity of creatures” and allowing them full 
“independence” (e.g., not intervening in the laws of nature), how then could God still effect a 
specific change through those independent creatures? Though theologians such as Dodds might 
be correct that replacing causal language with participatory language might make double agency 
more palatable for some, it is not clear that this approach is substantially different from the more 
traditional conception of double agency. Nevertheless, and as will be discussed in the next 
                                                            
59 Dodds, Doctrine of Causality 
60 Johnson, “Does God Play Dice?,” 14.  
61 Edwards, How God Acts, 66. 
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chapter, there may be ways to think of participatory divine action that lessen the potential 
challenges of double agency.   
 
Critiques notwithstanding, I suggest that Thomistic divine action is a paradigmatic example of 
theistic naturalism. Not only does Thomism affirm God’s involvement in all natural processes 
(hence the theistic qualifier), but it also affirms the simultaneous explicability of all events in 
natural terms – thus passing the naturalism litmus test.62 Thomism is thus a wholly compatibilist 
approach to divine action that rejects the standard approach’s obsession with 
noninterventionism. Thomists reject noninterventionism not because they affirm 
interventionism, but because they question the noninterventionist presumption that God is 
somehow uninvolved with the natural world in the first place. Aquinas writes that “God alone is 
being by His essence, while all others are beings through participation.”63 To be an actual being – 
or, perhaps, to be fully natural – is to participate in the divine life. However, I suggest that 
double agency remains problematic for Thomistic divine action, as does its dismissal of the 
causal joint problem. Moreover, it is worth noting that this approach is wholly immune to 
scientific critique – precisely because of double agency. That is, Thomists are compatibilists and 
fully affirm a scientific explanation of events in the natural world – even while attributing those 
same events to divine agency. Thus, there is literally nothing that the scientific community could 
say that would challenge Thomism; Thomistic divine action is framed in such a way that it 
automatically incorporates all scientific knowledge. This may or may not be problematic, 
depending on one’s approach to the science-and-religion field. Still, it is worth noting that this 
extremely successful knowledge-seeking enterprise – modern science – is from the outset 
precluded from saying anything meaningful about divine action. As Silva sums up the main 
critiques of double agency: “The doctrine of primary and secondary causality 1) leaves the whole 
problem of divine action in the world shrouded in mist; 2) it does not solve the issue of 
particular divine actions; and 3) it promotes occasionalism.”64 In any case, it is helpful now to 
examine another theistic naturalist, who similarly rejects the standard divine action model, but 
without utilising Thomistic double agency. 
                                                            
62 Again, miracles would be an exception to this, but Thomistic scholarship has largely been committed to 
associating SDA with Aquinas’ framework of providence and double agency. 
63 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles 3. 66. 



























Theistic Naturalism Part Two: Panentheistic Naturalism 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Rather than approaching the divine action debate in abstract philosophical terms, Part Two of 
this thesis has been devoted to exploring theologically-specific versions of theistic naturalism 
representative of the theological turn in science-and-religion. To that end, this chapter focuses 
on what I will call “panentheistic naturalism” – and particularly on the work of Orthodox 
theologian Christopher C. Knight. As Knight himself recognises, many of those who debate 
questions in the science-and-religion dialogue fail “to recognize fully the way in which the 
distinctive perspectives of particular theistic traditions might affect the answers given to those 
questions.”1 Hence, analogously to the previous chapter on Thomism, I here engage with Knight 
precisely because his model is firmly based on a specific theological framework – that of Eastern 
Orthodoxy. While I will not attempt a full explication or analysis of Eastern Orthodoxy here, 
this chapter will highlight the ways in which Knight’s divine action model is influenced by the 
Eastern tradition. Specifically, this chapter highlights Knight’s critique of the standard 
noninterventionist, incompatibilist divine action model, and engages with his fully theistic, fully 
naturalistic approach. While this model does not affirm special divine action in the way it is 
usually conceived, Knight argues that “there is, at a philosophical level, a fundamental flaw in the 
widespread belief that a strong theistic naturalism entails a very limited scope for divine 
providence.”2 That is, Knight argues that a panentheistic naturalism approach allows for an 
affirmation of robust, non-deistic general divine action. Indeed, Knight’s thesis is that the 
expression of such divine activity actually makes nature more natural, rather than less. 
 
I should note at the outset that Knight himself does not refer to his overall model as 
“panentheistic naturalism.” At various stages of his writing, and in the varying contexts of 
specific theological arguments, Knight has referred to his approach as “incarnational 
                                                            
1 Christopher C. Knight, “An Eastern Orthodox Critique of the Science-Theology Dialogue,” Zygon 51, no. 
3 (2016): 573.  
2 Knight, The God of Nature, x. 
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naturalism,”3 “pan-sacramental naturalism,”4 a “teleological-christological” model,5 and “strong 
theistic naturalism.”6 Because these various terms are context-specific and aid the development 
of various strands of Knight’s theology, I will not spend time here on the possible conceptual 
distinctions between these labels – Knight’s core theological argument is of most interest here. 
Knight’s main concern, as I see it, is to distinguish his model from a deistic form of naturalism in 
which God is assumed to be removed from, and uninvolved with, nature in the first place – i.e., 
not bringing about what is typically referred to as “special” divine action. On the contrary, 
Knight consistently affirms panentheism; this panentheism is an important theological element 
(though not the only one) of Knight’s non-deistic claim that “strong theistic naturalism can, in 
principle, be constructed in such a way that the scope of divine action is not limited in the way 
that the deists assumed.”7 Thus, I will here refer to Knight’s position as “panentheistic 
naturalism,” bearing in mind that this is to refer only to Knight’s model in particular. In what 
follows, then, I begin with an overview of Knight’s model of divine action in the context of his 
particular understanding of theistic naturalism, largely drawing upon his book The God of Nature: 
Incarnation and Contemporary Science. In subsequent sections, I examine the theological 
underpinnings of this model, as well as the specific ways it addresses the causal joint and divine 
action. I will also briefly describe how Knight’s model could be used to think theologically about 
divine action in the mind, more specifically. My overall argument here is that panentheistic 
naturalism offers a promising model of divine action that may address key weaknesses of the 
Thomistic approach discussed in the previous chapter – though not without potential challenges 
of its own.  
 
 
                                                            
3 See Chapter 13 of The God of Nature. Knight speaks of incarnational naturalism as an expanded version of 
pansacramental naturalism. 
4 Christopher C. Knight, “Theistic Naturalism and the Word Made Flesh,” in In Whom We Live and Move 
and Have Our Being: Panentheistic Reflection on God’s Presence in a Scientific World, ed. Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), 56. 
5 Knight, The God of Nature, 119.  
6 Knight seems to have opted for this terminology in response to Peacocke’s usage of theistic naturalism 
(see Peacocke, All That Is), to which Knight does not adhere. Knight expresses concern that Peacocke “still speaks 
of ‘providential’ action over and above what he sees as God’s ‘creative’ action, and understands this providential 
action in causal-joint terms… he is very far removed from the sort of ‘strong’ theistic naturalism in which it is 
assumed that divine providence is to be understood solely in terms of God’s upholding of the ‘fixed instructions’ 
that God has built into the world.” Knight, The God of Nature, 27. Interestingly, Peacocke is – like Knight – happy to 
adopt a panentheistic model. However, Knight challenges Peacocke’s acquiescence to the distinction between 
general and special divine action – Knight sees his own model as removing the need for the sort of temporal, special 
divine action that Peacocke still seems to affirm.   
7 Knight, The God of Nature, 116. 
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8.2 Divine Action in the Context of Theistic Naturalism 
At the heart of Knight’s divine action model is an affirmation of theistic naturalism. Specifically, 
Knight argues that nature’s inherent involvement with God is a vital part of what it means to be 
natural: what is generally considered to be naturalism – that is, a position denying the influential 
presence of supernatural realities in the natural world – is “in fact no more than 
subnaturalism…Only in the context of what has been revealed to us by God can the universe in 
which we live be fully understood.”8 That is, Knight insists that an understanding of the natural 
world is insufficient if it excludes a priori an account of divine immanence and activity in nature. 
A naturalism that excludes the involvement and presence of God in nature is therefore 
fundamentally incomplete. Importantly, this version of theistic naturalism has more to do with 
ontology than epistemology; while humans may never attain scientific knowledge of full reality 
(including divine action), one can still make an ontological claim that complete knowledge of 
nature would necessarily include an account of divine involvement with the natural world. Thus, 
this version of naturalism is “far more complex than the kind of picture favored by most who 
think of themselves as naturalists.”9 Knight’s is therefore an explicitly theological model, though 
one that is intended to be compatible with scientific knowledge. That is, this approach does not 
negate the success of scientific methodology, but it does constrain the ontological conclusions 
reached via its use. As a naturalistic approach, this model affirms the value of scientific 
knowledge about the seemingly law-governed world, but insists that “there may be 
insurmountable epistemological limitations to our grasp of [its] ontology.”10 That is, as discussed 
in previous chapters, the natural sciences themselves may not be the sort of thing that could 
definitively explicate a full ontology of reality as a whole – the sciences speak only to phenomena 
and processes that are empirically verifiable. In any case, Knight’s model fits the criteria I have 
been using to describe theistic naturalism; it insists that nature is always involved with God’s 
active presence, and that the standard model of divine action presumes erroneous metaphysical 
claims about the God-world relationship (revealed in its expressed commitment to 
noninterventionism and incompatibilism). While his theological model is based on an Orthodox 
panentheism instead of the Thomistic model described in the previous chapter, it is not 
dissimilar from Thomism in its affirmation that a full account of the natural world must 
necessarily include an account of nature’s inherent involvement with God’s active presence.  
                                                            
8 Knight, The God of Nature, 95.  
9 Ibid.  




It is against this backdrop of theistic naturalism that Knight’s divine action model is constructed. 
Given his panentheistic understanding of the God-world relationship, it is unsurprising that 
Knight rejects what I have been calling the standard model of divine action – i.e., the 
noninterventionist, incompatibilist approach favoured by the DAP and other causal joint 
theorists. Notably, Knight emphasises that even so-called “noninterventionist” divine action is, 
in fact, conceptualised in such a way that some sort of divine interference has occurred. “The 
mainstream ‘noninterventionist’ model has not,” Knight argues, “abandoned interventionism in 
the widest sense of the term…[I]t is still presumed that there are two possible outcomes to any 
given situation: the one that will be brought about if nature is simply sustained in being by God, 
and the different one that will come about if God chooses to respond to the situation in a way 
that goes beyond [general providence].”11 Causal joint models simply locate divine action in 
seemingly underdetermined areas of the natural world, and consider this to be noninterventionist 
because no laws are apparently broken. The prevailing God-world model implied in 
noninterventionism (and in interventionism, for that matter12), however, remains one in which 
the normal state of natural affairs excludes God’s active presence. As Knight argues, “a 
‘noninterventionist’ causal-joint scheme gives the illusion of having abandoned divine 
interference with the world when it has done nothing of the sort.”13 That is, noninterventionism 
still presumes that there are two conceivable outcomes in any situation: one in which nature is 
essentially left alone, and one in which God somehow acts to alter an outcome, albeit in a 
“lawful” manner. Not only is noninterventionism something of a misnomer, Knight argues, but 
it also betrays an arguably suboptimal model of the God-world relationship.  
 
In Knight’s model, conversely, “questions about how God acts ‘on’ the world – as if from 
outside – are rendered meaningless, since the model rejects the conceptual picture of what the 
cosmos can do ‘on its own.’”14 Knight understands divine action not as God somehow breaking 
into the natural world from the outside, but rather as “something that the Eastern Christian 
tradition has often stressed: a ‘breaking out’ of something that is always present in the world, 
albeit in a way that is usually hidden from us.”15 This model, then, stresses divine immanence to 
                                                            
11 Knight, “Theistic Naturalism and ‘Special’ Divine Providence,” 534. 
12 Knight, “An Eastern Orthodox Critique,” 584-585. 
13 Knight, The God of Nature, 26. 
14 Ibid., 122.  
15 Knight, The God of Nature, 95.  
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such an extent that it becomes meaningless to speak of a purely natural world apart from God in 
the first place. Divine activity is intrinsic – or perhaps even necessary – in nature, resulting from 
God’s active presence that is never absent from nature to begin with. Referencing Orthodox 
theologian Vladimir Lossky, Knight writes that the Eastern tradition “knows nothing of ‘pure 
nature’ to which grace is added as a supernatural gift. For it, there is no natural or ‘normal’ state, 
since grace is implied by the act of creation itself.”16 Knight argues that this Orthodox 
understanding of nature and grace stands in contrast to the Western tradition. He argues that 
“for Orthodox theology there is no separation of grace and nature of the kind that medieval 
Western theologians (with the exception of Duns Scotus) saw as almost axiomatic.”17 It might 
seem counterintuitive to say that divine action is innate to the natural world – does this not erode 
the distinction between God and the natural world? This will be discussed further below in 
relation to “higher laws” and “fixed instructions,” but one point is worth clarifying here: this 
approach to divine action affirms that nature is made more natural as it participates in God’s 
active presence, and not that nature itself is divine or uncreated. In any case, Knight’s Orthodox 




At this point, a brief discussion on panentheism becomes necessary. Panentheism – the idea that 
the created world exists in God, but God is yet more than the world – has generated a great deal 
of discussion in science-and-religion, and I cannot do justice to this discussion here. Thus, I will 
focus this section on the direct relevance of panentheism for divine action, and the specifically 
Orthodox ways in which Knight incorporates panentheism into his divine action model. 
Arguably, Knight’s model of divine action depends on a panentheistic metaphysic: nature cannot 
be considered as a discrete entity apart from the active, immanent presence of God because 
nature is inherently in God to begin with. Panentheism is not a single view, but contains a 
spectrum of positions ranging from the basic assertion that God is the ground of all being (but 
that creation is contingent), to the extreme view of process theologians that God is dependent 
on the cosmos.18 Indeed, one could even say that “the concept of panentheism is not stable in 
                                                            
16 Knight, “An Eastern Orthodox Critique,” 584. Knight is here referencing Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical 
Theology of the Eastern Church (Cambridge: James Clarke, 1991), 101. 
17 Knight, “An Eastern Orthodox Critique,” 584. 
18 For a helpful overview, see Michael W. Brierley, “Naming a Quiet Revolution: The Panentheistic Turn in 
Modern Theology,” in In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being. Panentheistic Reflections on God’s Presence in a 
Scientific World, ed. Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004). 
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itself.”19 That being said, the common thread running throughout panentheistic views is that 
“they all share the intuition of a living two-way relation between God and world, within the inclusive reality of 
God.” 20 Many science-and-religion scholars are finding that something like panentheism is simply 
the most natural metaphysical framework arising from engagement with both Christian theology 
and contemporary science.21  
 
While the body of literature surrounding panentheism is sizable indeed, the broad strokes of this 
approach are worth highlighting. The core of panentheism is its insistence that divine 
immanence is internal to all created things, because all created things exist within God. It is the 
idea that it is incoherent to speak of God “breaking into” the natural world, for the entire world 
exists within God in the first place. Panentheism is not to be confused with pantheism, for 
panentheism is equally insistent on both divine immanence and transcendence: God exists 
beyond the natural world and is not to be equated with nature itself. Arthur Peacocke expresses 
this tension by suggesting that we need a “model for expressing the closeness of God’s presence 
to finite natural events, entities, structures, and processes and to their very existence; and we 
need it to be as close as possible without dissolving the necessary distinction between the 
Creator and what is created.”22 Panentheists argue that this need is made all the more acute as 
contemporary science renders increasingly insufficient the Western understanding of God’s 
relationship to the world. That is (and as discussed in previous chapters), as science explicates 
lawlike natural processes for more and more phenomena, it becomes increasingly theologically 
problematic to conceptualise God as intermittently acting on the world from the “outside,” as it 
were. Knight, for example, critiques “the notion – common in Western philosophical theism – 
that the world is intrinsically separated from God.”23 Panentheism promises a God-world model 
that rejects the claims of scientific naturalism – claims that depict nature as existing wholly apart 
from God’s active presence, claims which (as already discussed) are ironically and implicitly 
presumed by standard noninterventionist models. Indeed, panentheism insists that “there is no 
‘place outside’ the infinite God in which what is created could exist. God creates all-that-is within 
                                                            
19 Niels Henrik Gregersen, “Three Varieties of Panentheism,” in In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our 
Being: Panentheistic Reflections on God’s Presence in a Scientific World, ed. Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), 19. 
20 Gregersen, “Three Varieties of Panentheism,” 22.     
21 Though I here focus on reasons from within science-and-religion to take panentheism seriously, others 
have been attracted to this position for a myriad of philosophical, ethical, and theological reasons. For a helpful 
overview, see Clayton, Adventures in the Spirit, 120. 
22 Peacocke, All That Is, 21. 
23 Knight, The God of Nature, 31. 
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Godself while remaining ontologically distinct.”24 This God-world model thus has very 
significant implications for divine action debates.  
 
Indeed, panentheism has become a metaphysic of choice for representatives of the theological 
turn in divine action. Specifically, panentheism would seem to provide a theological alternative to 
noninterventionist causal joint models, which might themselves be deemed unsatisfactory for all 
the reasons discussed in previous chapters. As Peacocke explains the panentheistic divine action 
model, “God is the immanent Creator creating in and through the processes of the natural 
order….This means we do not have to look for any extra supposed gaps in which, or 
mechanisms whereby, God might be supposed to be acting as Creator in the living world.”25 
Panentheism thus fits very well with theistic naturalisms, offering a God-world model that allows 
for affirmations of divine action in and through natural processes themselves, circumventing 
charges of intervention precisely because God is immanent in all natural processes to begin with. 
Moreover, panentheism acts as a replacement for causal joint models seeking to locate divine 
action in underdetermined natural processes, for panentheism rejects the God-world model on 
which such causal joint theories are based. Rather than requiring a scientifically-identifiable 
causal joint, panentheism seems “to allow for direct divine participation in purely natural 
processes in a way that classical philosophical theism does not.”26 While there is disagreement 
about how best to conceptualise this,27 panentheists suggest that there is some sort of ontological 
connection between God and nature, such that there does not need to be a theoretical causal 
joint. By insisting that the world exists within God in the first place, panentheists affirm that 
God-nature interaction is inherent to nature, rather than an intrusive affair involving violation of 
natural processes.28 Indeed, the key to panentheistic divine action is its affirmation that God’s 
active immanence in nature is a crucial component of what makes nature fully natural.  
 
                                                            
24 Peacocke, All That Is, 22. 
25 Ibid., 19. 
26 Knight, “Theistic Naturalism and the Word Made Flesh,” 51. 
27 Clayton and Peacocke, eds., In Whom We Live is essentially an extended debate on just this question.  
28 It is interesting to note here that Philip Clayton is also a panentheist. This is a striking and somewhat 
puzzling feature of Clayton’s work, because his emergentist divine action theory is essentially a causal joint 
approach. Because panentheism affirms divine action at a basic, fundamentally natural level (because all nature exists 
within God in the first place), it is interesting that Clayton opts for a causal joint model that actually limits the scope 
of divine action. Moreover, Clayton insists that the emergent mind involves “a level of reality that breaks the bond 
of naturalism,” which would seem at odds with the naturalistic framework of panentheism, being more aligned to 
the standard noninterventionist model. Philip Clayton, “On the Value of the Panentheistic Analogy: A Response to 
Willem Drees,” Zygon 35, no. 3 (2000): 699. 
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Of course, the looming question plaguing panentheism is what, exactly, it means for nature to 
exist in God; in Peacocke’s words, “much turns on the sense of the en/“in” of panentheism.”29 
The great promise of panentheism is that it offers a God-world model that neither equates 
nature with God, on the one hand, nor locates nature wholly outside and independent of God, 
on the other. This means, however, that everything hangs on what it means for nature to be “in” 
God, with God also being more than (and not identical to) the world. I will not attempt to 
engage with all the ways panentheists have described the panentheistic model; a sizable literature 
exists around this.30 Rather, it is helpful to highlight the way that Knight addresses this from 
within the Eastern tradition – namely, by engaging the Eastern tradition’s Logos cosmology. 
 
Knight is aware that Christian theologians have often been wary of naturalism in all its forms, 
mainly because it would seem to threaten the necessarily supernaturalist components of a 
Christian worldview. However, he suggests that Orthodoxy’s emphasis on the divine Logos, the 
Word, serves to support a fully theistic naturalism without undermining divine transcendence. 
Engaging largely with Maximos the Confessor, Knight explains that “Maximos perceives the 
Logos of God not only in the person of Jesus, but in the words – logoi – of all prophetic utterance, 
and in the logoi – in the sense of underlying principles – of all created things from the 
beginning.”31 The suggestion there is that Jesus, as second person of the Trinity, is not only 
incarnate but is somehow involved in the fundamental substructure of nature.32 Knight draws 
upon the Fourth Gospel here, emphasising that “it was not only through the Word – made flesh 
in Christ – that ‘all things came to be’ in the beginning. In addition, ‘all that came to be was alive 
with his life’ (John 1:1-4)…In some sense, the Word that ‘came into’ the world in the person of 
Jesus had not previously been absent from it.”33 Jesus, as the divine Logos, is intimately involved 
with the logoi in all created things. In fact, Maximos himself went so far as to say “the one Logos is 
                                                            
29 Arthur Peacocke, “Introduction: ‘In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being’?,” in In Whom We 
Live and Move and Have Our Being. Panentheistic Reflections on God’s Presence in a Scientific World, ed. Philip Clayton and 
Arthur Peacocke (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), xxi. 
30 See Clayton and Peacocke, eds., In Whom We Live;  Peacocke, All That Is;  Clayton, Adventures In the Spirit; 
John W. Cooper, Panentheism, the Other God of the Philosophers: From Plato to the Present (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academic, 2013); and David Ray Griffin, Panentheism and Scientific Naturalism: Rethinking Evil, Morality, Religious 
Experience, Religious Pluralism, and the Academic Study of Religion, Toward Ecological Civilization Series (Claremont, CA: 
Process Century Press, 2014).  
31 Knight, “Theistic Naturalism and the Word Made Flesh,” 57. Italics added.  
32 This is consonant with “cosmic Christ” theology, and particularly involving the Fourth Gospel. See 
Keith Ward, Christ and the Cosmos: A Reformulation of Trinitarian Doctrine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2015), particularly Chapter 8.  
33 Knight, The God of Nature, 32.  
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the many logoi, and the many logoi are the one Logos.”34 The underlying principles of all nature 
participate in the divine Logos. As Andrew Louth explains, “Everything in the universe has its 
meaning in its own logos, or principle, but…all these logoi form a coherent whole, because they all 
participate in the one Logos of God.”35 In this Orthodox perspective, we see an affirmation of the 
fundamental relationship of all created things to the Godhead; there is an innate connection 
between God and nature that is, in some sense, the most natural thing about its status as 
“created.” 
 
It is the Logos, then (at least in part), that makes the “en” in panentheism a reality. As Knight 
explains, “the divine aspect of the person of Jesus represents, in this understanding, not 
something essentially alien to the natural world – a supernatural intrusion – but rather the 
coming to fullness of something present in it from the beginning.”36 In this approach, then, 
panentheism is not merely a metaphysical abstraction, but a God-world model finding support in 
the Eastern tradition’s prioritisation of the Logos’ universal implications.37 Nature, in this model, 
is inherently involved with the Word: “This affirms not simply that in the person of Jesus the 
Logos became flesh, but also – in a way that is underdeveloped in most Western theology – that 
this same Logos is active throughout creation both as its source and its final purpose.”38 The logoi 
of all created, natural things are inseparable from the divine Logos; there is a fundamental, 
dynamic relationship between nature and the Word that is absolutely basic. At the very least, this 
is quite a different picture than the seemingly deistic model implied by noninterventionist causal 
joint models. Much more could be (and has been) said about panentheism, the Eastern tradition, 
and specifically Logos theology and cosmology.39 My goal here is not to provide explanation or 
                                                            
34 Particularly found in Maximus the Confessor, Ambiguum 7, translated in St Maximus the Confessor, On 
the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ, trans. Paul Blowers and Robert Louis Wilson (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s 
Seminary Press, 2003). 
35 Andrew Louth, Introducing Eastern Orthodoxy (London: SPCK, 2013), 42. 
36 Knight, “Theistic Naturalism and the Word Made Flesh,” 58. 
37 Knight, “An Eastern Orthodox Critique,” 583. 
38 Knight, “Theistic Naturalism and the Word Made Flesh,” 59. Italics added. 
39 For example, while Knight’s Orthodox emphasis focuses mainly on Logos cosmology, much work has 
also been done on the Eastern distinction between God’s essence (ousia) and energies (energeia). As Orthodox 
theologian Kallistos Ware explains, “In his essence God is infinitely transcendent, utterly beyond all created being, 
beyond all understanding and all participation from the human side. But in his energies – which are nothing else 
than God himself in action – God is inexhaustibly immanent…While present in created things, these energies are 
not themselves created but uncreated and eternal.” Kallistos Ware, “God Immanent Yet Transcendent: The Divine 
Energies According to Saint Gregory Palamas,” in In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being. Panentheistic 
Reflections on God’s Presence in a Scientific World, ed. Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
2004), 160. In this approach, there is something of God that is intrinsic to every created thing. Such a theological 
emphasis might remind one that the Eastern tradition actually embraces the ontological links between God and 
nature, rather than fearing them (as is more common in Western theism).  
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analysis of panentheism or Orthodox Logos cosmology, but merely to show how Knight’s divine 
action model arises from a specific theological tradition, and how certain theological emphases 
impact one’s understanding of theistic naturalism and divine action.  
 
Within Knight’s panentheistic naturalist framework, then, divine activity is seen as normative – 
dynamic participation of nature in the divine life enhances the naturalness of nature itself. In 
other words, nature’s participation in God is inherent to nature’s ontology – a standard 
scientistic naturalism would thus offer an incomplete ontological picture. Here, it is important to 
note that the Eastern tradition does not make a strict distinction between “natural” and 
“supernatural” realities, but rather between “created” and “uncreated.” This may seem like a 
semantic difference, but it has important conceptual implications.40 After all, much of the debate 
around naturalism and divine action has to do with a reluctance to admit the influence of 
supernatural causal influences on nature. For Orthodoxy, however, divine action in created 
entities is not focused on the supernatural at all, but on the inherent relationship between the 
uncreated God and the created natural world that exists within God. The difference may seem 
subtle, but it does soften the natural/supernatural dichotomy – which often hardens into a 
“natural versus supernatural” binary. This is especially true when one takes the Logos/logoi into 
account, as mentioned above; there is a sort of necessary connection between the logoi of all 
created things and the divine Logos. Knight notes that the patristic writers did actually refer to 
seemingly extraordinary divine acts – but without framing them in a natural/supernatural binary:  
When Eastern patristic writers did at times use the term hyper physis – meaning literally 
‘above nature’ but usually translated as supernatural – what they envisaged was something 
subtly different to what Western authors usually mean when they speak of supernatural 
events. Because, for Orthodoxy, there is no ‘pure nature’ to which grace is added as a 
supernatural gift, events that are ‘above nature’ are not seen as supernatural in the 
technical Western sense.41 
In this panentheistic approach, then, it is misleading to speak of divine action as being 
supernatural; it is far more appropriate to an Eastern context to speak of the divine acts as being 
above, or higher than, natural processes as generally conceived. Put another way, one might say 
that the logoi of all created things continually participate in the divine Logos, with varying effects 
                                                            
40 So, for example, the boundary line between the created and uncreated falls in an interesting place for the 
Orthodox tradition. As Knight writes, “in Western writing angels were seen as falling on the same side of the 
natural-supernatural divide as God does, while, in terms of the Eastern distinction between uncreated and created, 
they were seen as falling into the other side of the divine to that which is appropriate to God.” Knight, “An Eastern 




that are sometimes mislabelled as being supernatural. Far from being aberrant, creaturely 
participation in the divine Logos is thus seen as enhancing the naturalness of nature itself.  
 
Indeed, Knight suggests that divine action “may be seen as an anticipation of our restoration to a 
‘natural’ state from our present ‘subnatural’ one.”42 This idea – that divine action transforms 
nature into a more natural state – is an important one. A full exploration of Orthodox 
eschatology is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is noteworthy that Knight’s theological 
approach has a distinctly eschatological dimension – one that frames divine action as drawing 
nature teleologically into its intended state. Knight argues that what we usually think of as natural 
does not actually reflect God’s original or ultimate intention for nature. Instead, “the world as we 
now usually experience it is seen as being in some sense unnatural…or – perhaps better – 
subnatural.”43 If what we mean by natural excludes divine activity, or refers to a state that is not 
God’s ultimate intention for the world, then we are not referring to true naturalism. What might 
seem supernatural to us is, in fact, “simply that which is in accordance with a truly natural state. 
The state that it is ‘above’ is only our present subnatural one.”44 In a sense, this model challenges 
theologians to rethink the relationship between divine activity, eschatology, and normativity. 
That is, rather than viewing divine action as aberrant and inordinate, it is at least possible to 
entertain the possibility that divine activity might legitimately alter and enhance our baseline 
conceptions of what is “normal” in an eschatological perspective. Within this model, “when the 
universe ‘changes’ so as to bring about events of special providence, it is a sign and foretaste of 
what is to be when all the purposes of God have been fulfilled…Created things are, in the 
deepest sense, simply becoming themselves as they are in the intention of God….so that nature 
becomes “natural” once more.”45 This eschatological emphasis is a vital one for Knight’s model, 
and serves to highlight how explicitly theological this approach is. That is, panentheistic 
naturalism has no use for the standard model’s prioritisation of science in determining what is 
true about nature as a whole. Or, rather, the value of science is recognised – but also 
contextualised in a theologically-defined metaphysic in which the eschatological intentions of 
God have real implications even for physical events and empirical processes.   
 
                                                            
42 Ibid., 586. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Knight, The God of Nature, 94.  
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8.4 Panentheism, General Divine Action, and the Causal Joint 
Having discussed the theological framework of Knight’s panentheistic naturalism, I now turn to 
the difficult questions surrounding divine action and the causal joint. How does divine action 
actually work in Knight’s Orthodox model? It is clear that this model attempts to address the 
causal joint problem at a theological level (per the theological turn in divine action theory), but 
the causal joint problem remains. If God is to bring about a specific event in the world, at some 
point and in some way divine intention must meet the natural processes of the space-time-causal 
world with which we are familiar. This is true even if one accepts panentheism; if the distinction 
between creator and created (i.e., transcendence) is to be preserved, there must be some 
theoretical meeting point between the two. To address this, Knight begins by addressing – and 
rejecting – the common distinction between general and special divine action. Namely, it would 
seem that the GDA/SDA dichotomy presupposes the deistic model of God that I have argued 
against in previous chapters, and which Knight also challenges (as discussed above). While I have 
argued against standard causal joint models for philosophical and broadly theological reasons, 
Knight argues these causal joint approaches “may also be seen as irrelevant if one abandons the 
distinction between ‘general’ and ‘special’ divine action in the way that aspects of Orthodox 
theology suggest is possible.”46 That is, once one has adopted a model in which the natural world 
is intimately and inherently involved with God at all levels and at all times – indeed, existing 
somehow within God – the distinction between God’s general, sustaining activity and special, 
specifically responsive activity becomes unnecessary and problematic. It is unnecessary because 
(at least in Knight’s model) God’s general activity is sufficient to account for all the experiences 
many would consider to require special, temporal divine responses to unique circumstances (and, 
indeed, miracles). The distinction is potentially problematic as well, insofar as it serves to 
reinforce the quasi-deistic model of the God-world relationship presumed by standard 
noninterventionist models of divine action.  
 
This is not to say that Knight does not recognise the difficulties posed by the causal joint 
problem, which SDA theorists attempt to address. Rather, Knight argues that standard SDA 
theories do not address the causal joint problem well. As he notes, “an adequate model of 
‘special’ divine action requires more than an account of what is sometimes called the ‘basic 
action’ of God.’”47 That is, if God is to “step in” and act specially in nature, there must be some 
                                                            
46 Knight, “An Eastern Orthodox Critique,” 575.  
47 Knight, The God of Nature, 26.  
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account of how the divine will results in a physical, observable event – this is the causal joint 
problem. Knight, however, argues that “in the causal-joint schemes that have been suggested 
within the dialogue of science and theology, any such understanding is conspicuously absent.”48 
That is, causal joint theories do not actually “connect the dots,” as it were, between the being of 
God and the eventual physical manifestation of experienced divine action. Knight’s own model, 
however, begins by collapsing the distinction between GDA and SDA; in so doing, Knight can 
envision a single, unified model of general divine action that purports to address the causal joint 
problem at a theological level. Again, Knight insists that a proper understanding of general divine 
action can legitimise an affirmation of specific divine action that is experienced as special and 
responsive; this is not a rejection of one’s experience of special divine action, but rather an 
expansion and enhancement of general divine action.  
 
How, then, does an emphasis on general divine action address the causal joint problem? After 
collapsing the distinction between special and general divine action, Knight approaches the 
causal joint by positing “higher laws.” Specifically, the suggestion is that “there may be laws of 
nature about which we know nothing scientifically but that nevertheless occasionally have 
significant effects.”49 That is, within the panentheistic naturalism framework, the known laws of 
nature currently acknowledged by the natural sciences represent only one piece of a much thicker 
causal picture. A full ontological description of nature would necessarily include an account of 
divine immanence and influence on nature; thus, the known laws of nature do not allow us to 
say with certainty what can or cannot happen within a naturalistic framework. In this model, “the 
laws of nature that can be investigated through the scientific method represent only a ‘low-level’ 
aspect of the way in which God’s presence in the world allows God’s will to be accomplished.”50 
This distinction between lower and higher laws is not a new idea, and is very much a part of the 
wider Christian tradition. Knight references Augustine in particular: 
In Augustine’s framework for the discussion of miracles, there is a clear implication that 
highly unusual events are able to occur because there is, over and above the natural law 
that we are able to understand, a ‘higher’ lawlike framework that the cosmos also obeys 
but that is in practice beyond our understanding. If there are simple systems that are 
susceptible to human understanding in terms of the ‘lower’ law, this is, Augustine seems 
to suggest, only because the threshold has not yet been reached at which the influences 
of this ‘higher’ component of natural law are significant in their effects.51 
                                                            
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid., 39.  
50 Ibid., xi.  
51 Ibid., 36. Also see Augustine, Of the Advantages of Believing 34.  
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This is an important quote, as it suggests that what typically passes as SDA (or, indeed, as 
miraculous) can plausibly be considered a natural phenomenon. In other words, Knight is not 
suggesting that God is intervening in the laws of nature at a level inaccessible to science 
(analogous to, say, SDA in quantum processes), but rather that divine action is, in principle if not 
in practice, fully explicable in naturalistic terms. Indeed, one could say that theologically 
speaking, divine action represents laws of nature that are more fully natural – in an eschatological 
sense – than the lower laws accessible to science. As Knight notes, “patristic perspectives 
occasionally point towards an understanding of miracles, not in terms of natural laws being set 
aside, but in terms of what we might call ‘higher laws of nature’ becoming operative.”52 We see in 
this emphasis on higher laws the eschatological tone running through much of Knight’s work. 
His model stresses the Orthodox tradition’s emphasis on a “breaking out” in divine action of 
something that is always present. Knight explains his position thus: “There are, I believe, some 
laws of nature that can – if only under very unusual circumstances – bring into effect what we 
can describe theologically as a realization of the world’s eschatological potential.”53 It is possible, 
then, that these higher laws could produce effects that seem abnormal or unlawful in scientific 
terms – but that are actually fully lawful from a higher perspective that takes the whole God-
world context into account. If divine action seems unnatural from a scientific perspective, this is 
not “because it is not susceptible to a naturalistic understanding. Rather, it is because its 
manifestation depends on something that cannot be replicated under laboratory conditions: the 
faithful response to God of those who recognize him as their creator and redeemer.”54 Knight 
fully acknowledges that this sort of requirement (e.g., “the faithful response to God”) might be 
impossible to replicate; it is possible that divine action is repeatable in principle, but “cannot be 
straightforwardly reproduced, because the conditions that are necessary for their occurrence are 
either unknown or cannot, practically, be repeated.”55 Thus, this model’s eschatological 
dimension allows a sort of lawful, natural space for dynamic interaction between God and 
creaturely responses, even if the resulting divine activity is impossible to replicate.  
 
In panentheistic naturalism, then, even seemingly dramatic instances of divine action are not “the 
result of divine interference with the world. Rather, they are reflections of an aspect of the true 
nature of the world…they may be seen as manifestations of ‘laws of nature’ that reflect, more 
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53 Knight, The God of Nature, 39.  
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., 36.  
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fully than those laws of nature that are scientifically explorable, God’s presence in all things.”56 
Chapter 2 of this thesis discussed various views on the laws of nature, one of which was the 
approximationist approach. On my reading of Knight, the suggestion of higher laws fits well 
with such an approximationist view: the laws of nature acknowledged by contemporary science 
do indeed correspond to reality at a relatively low level, but do not fully account for all lawlike 
activity that might occur at a higher level. One objection to this is that particularly dramatic 
experiences of divine action could not possibly be affirmed as being lawlike. After all, almost all 
accounts of the laws of nature insist that these regularities are just that: regular, testable, 
repeatable, and predictable. How, then, could seemingly singular events perceived as being 
supernatural (for example, a dramatic physical healing after petitionary prayer) still be considered 
natural, at least by scientifically-minded critics? For this, we need to examine another key element 
of Knight’s model: what he calls “fixed instructions.”  
 
8.5 Higher Laws, Time, and Fixed Instructions 
According to Knight, one conceptual failing of standard noninterventionist divine action 
theories is their insistence on God’s temporal responsiveness to creaturely needs and situations. 
On one level, a theological insistence on divine responsiveness seems important for a theory of 
divine action: Christian theology has consistently emphasised the dynamic relationship between 
God and creation, and particularly highlighted the relational element of the God-nature 
relationship. To diminish divine responsiveness would seem to indicate a retreat into deism. 
However, Knight argues that responsiveness should not be conflated with temporality; indeed, 
he suggests that causal joint models fail to appreciate the relationship between God and time. 
Knight rejects “the scheme implicit in the causal joint model (and often explicitly defended by 
that model’s advocates): one in which a ‘temporal God’ makes ‘responses’ to situations in the 
world.”57 In other words, the standard model assumes that in divine action, God is choosing to 
respond to creaturely needs in “real time” – or at least in what we perceive as being real time. 
Knight, however, suggests that this perspectival prioritisation is theologically insufficient. The 
“Orthodox understanding of God’s relationship to time,” he argues, “is much closer to 
traditional Western understandings of God’s eternity – as found, for instance, in Aquinas – than 
it is to the scheme implicit in the causal joint model.”58 In other words, if God’s actions are not 
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constrained by the arrow of time in the way that creaturely actions are constrained, then other 
ways of understanding divine causation become possible. If God exists and acts outside of time, 
then it is as least possible for divine actions to be “set” at the beginning of our space-time 
universe, while still being experienced as temporal responses to specific situations in time.  
 
In this model, what we perceive as being a temporal response to petitionary prayer (for example), 
might actually have been “‘built into’ [the] world from the beginning by its creator.”59 That is, the 
higher laws discussed above could have been built into the natural order as “fixed instructions” – 
just as with any other law of nature. As Knight explains, the created world “with its inbuilt ‘fixed 
instructions,’ is far more subtle and complex than our present scientific understanding 
indicates….we cannot preclude the possibility that the cosmos obeys not only the laws that can 
be identified [scientifically], but also other ‘fixed instructions’ that are not straightforwardly 
susceptible to this investigative methodology.”60 This approach to divine action, Knight argues, 
circumvents the intervention problem faced by all causal joint theories. That is, while causal joint 
theories must constantly find ways to insert God into preexisting laws of nature, “fixed 
instructions” for responsive divine action would have been built into the proverbial fabric of the 
universe at the moment of creation. Just as deists have no trouble affirming that God created 
and sustains the laws of nature – but does not subsequently interfere with them – so can Knight 
affirm that special divine responses to specific situations have been woven into the tapestry of 
laws instituted in a “single act” of creation.  
 
How, then, are we to think of specific divine actions as fixed instructions understood within the 
framework of general divine action? After all, it is difficult to see how divine action could be 
personal and specific if it is not intentionally enacted in direct response to individual 
circumstances. Knight, however, argues that personal, specific action can be conceived of in 
various ways, and that “even human providential action can, in principle, be planned in any one 
of three ways.”61 To explain this, Knight asks readers to imagine the case of university students 
being financially supported by their parents. In this scenario, there are three ways that the 
parents could arrange for their child’s financial support. Knight explains: 
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209 
 
1. It can be entirely unmediated: ‘Here’s your regular allowance – and some extra cash 
for the repairs that your car needs.’ 
2. It can be entirely mediated – for example through fixed instructions to a bank: 
‘Transfer such-and-such an amount every month to my daughter’s bank account, 
and, in addition, if she provides invoices for repairs to her car, transfer to her 
account the amount necessary to cover those repairs.’ 
3. Depending on circumstances, it can be either mediated or unmediated: ‘The money 
that comes automatically into your bank account will cover only your everyday 
expenses, so here’s some more for your car repairs.’62 
In this analogy, the third option is most congruent with the standard causal joint model: God has 
created and sustains laws of nature (GDA), but is also directly responsive to needs as they arise 
(SDA). It is highly unlikely that the parents would choose the second option involving fixed 
instructions, as this would presumably require an impossibly extensive ability to imagine each 
and every contingency requiring parental assistance. The parents presumably would “recognize 
that their wisdom is limited, that they are unable to generate a set of ‘if…then’ statements that 
could cover all possible circumstances in which extra support would be appropriate.”63 Thus, for 
necessarily limited human beings, thinking of providential action in a more unmediated manner 
(“here is some cash for the mechanic”) is an understandably intuitive way of thinking about 
personal, responsive action. God, however, is presumably not limited in the same way: “An 
infinite wisdom – which is what we attribute to God – is surely quite capable of setting up ‘fixed 
instructions’ in such a way that there is no need to supplement the general providence that they 
provide.”64 In other words, it is at least possible that God created laws (i.e., fixed instructions) to 
take into account each and every eventuality that might occur as the universe unfolds. Within 
this model, there could be higher laws that become efficacious in certain scenarios (for example, 
when a certain type of person is praying in a certain context), which would then result in divine 
action that is experienced by the individual as being a specific response to him/her – even 
though that action was a result of specific, higher laws of nature that were “fixed” when God 
created the universe. True, these fixed instructions are “far more subtle and complex than our 
present scientific understanding indicates,” and might never be susceptible to scientific analysis; 
however, our inability to analyse such higher laws need not undermine their plausibility.65 Knight 
highlights the Orthodox aspect of this approach: 
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The laws of nature perceptible to the scientist may be seen, theologically, as one 
manifestation of the logoi of created things, but not necessarily the only one…there may 
be other ‘logical’ or ‘law-like’ aspects of the functioning of the logoi that are beyond the 
scientist’s perception, so that the kind of naturalism that we usually speak of may be seen 
as only a component of a deeper or ‘enhanced’ naturalism that is not fully accessible to 
scientific investigation.66 
Knight’s model thus challenges the assumption that divine action necessarily forces a choice 
among 1) temporal intervention in the laws of nature, 2) temporal special action through 
underdetermined causal joints, or 3) only a sort of general divine action that is impersonal and 
unresponsive to specific situations. Knight instead argues that “there is no fundamental reason 
to insist that [even seemingly miraculous] events cannot be ascribed to the regularities of the 
natural world that have been ‘built into’ that world from the beginning by its creator. A strong 
theistic naturalism can, in principle, be constructed in such a way that the scope of divine action 
is not limited in the way that the deists assumed.”67 These fixed instructions can presumably 
cover each and every experience of divine action, regardless of how dramatic or even seemingly 
miraculous. Even events that seem inexplicable in scientific terms can thus be considered natural 
in the truest sense, being initiated by the atemporal God as a proper law of nature.  
 
It is important to remember here that this “single act” of divine action is not to be thought of as 
occurring in the past; to do so is to assume a potentially erroneous relationship between God 
and time. As Knight explains, “when considered in relation to the classical view of divine 
eternity…[a naturalistic model of divine providence] may also be understood as representing no 
more than the temporal manifestation of God’s eternal action.”68 Thus, one need not think of 
general divine action as occurring in a far distant past – rather, it is eternal and being subjectively 
experienced within temporal constraints. This may also help to address the charge that this 
divine action model is, after all, deistic. Indeed, one might object that this approach de-
personalises the God-nature model, rendering unnecessary or implausible any real relationship 
between God and creatures. This is an understandable concern, as general divine action conjures 
images of distance – ontological and temporal; a God who acts only by upholding the laws of 
nature may seem incompatible with the responsive God of Scripture. Knight, however, insists 
that this divine action model be contextualised within the panentheistic framework already 
discussed. He counters such concerns by affirming that “if God is in everything, then God can 
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hardly be absent from the world in the way assumed in deism.”69 Thus, it is Knight’s two-
pronged emphasis on panentheism and the potential eternality, or timelessness, of God’s “single 
act” that distinguish this model from deism.  
 
8.6 Discussion 
Knight’s divine action model represents, in my estimation, one of the more compelling 
theological alternatives to standard causal joint theories. This approach is a strong representative 
of the theological turn in divine action theory, rejecting the noninterventionist causal joint 
framework and viewing divine action solely from a theological perspective. Thus, this model 
does not subject divine action itself to scientific inquiry; scientific methodology alone cannot 
determine the parameters of divine action, because divine actions themselves are built into 
higher laws of nature. In this sense, then, panentheistic divine action is a rejection of 
incompatibilism – but in a slightly different way than is Thomism. While Thomism affirms the 
full agency of both natural causes and divine causes in each and every event, the emphasis of 
Knight’s model is on viewing divine actions as higher laws of nature. In other words, this model 
is not necessarily incongruent with Thomism, but its compatibilism is fleshed out quite 
differently. Knight himself notes that there are possible points of convergence between an 
Eastern approach and Thomism, explaining that “there has been an attempt to use scientific 
perspectives to understand divine action in a way that uses the Western scholastic conception of 
primary and secondary causation but also…transcends the old Western distinction between 
general and special modes of divine action.”70 For Knight, divine actions are compatible with the 
laws of nature because they are laws of nature; while this Orthodox-informed approach may not 
necessarily be at odds with Thomistic double agency, its panentheistic theological framework 
renders it a distinct alternative to Thomism.71  
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Similarly, Knight’s answer to the causal joint problem is perhaps uniquely promising. That is, by 
expanding the category of general divine action to include even those events generally attributed 
to special divine action, Knight escapes “God of the gaps” charges. In other words, the model 
does not envision divine action as a competitor with the laws of nature – divine responses to 
specific situations have been built into the laws of nature in the single event of creation. Thus, 
the causal joint becomes unnecessary in much the same way that a causal joint is unnecessary for 
deists affirming that God creates and sustains, say, the law of gravity. This is particularly true 
given the atemporal emphasis of Knight’s model; while causal joint theories insist on God 
stepping into the natural order at specific moments in time, this model removes divine action 
from temporal considerations. Thus, there is no point at which divine intentions meet temporal 
physical processes. God’s providential actions have been built into the lawlike fabric of the 
cosmos, thereby invalidating the charge that divine action must necessarily interrupt an otherwise 
autonomous natural world. Knight’s emphasis on atemporal fixed instructions offers, I suggest, 
an intriguing solution to the causal joint problem, and one which may be superior to the 
Thomistic affirmation of double agency.  
 
Beyond being an intriguing solution to the causal joint problem and double agency, Knight’s 
model has important implications for divine action in the naturalised mind. Within this 
approach, the mind-brain is no more or less “open” to divine action than any other aspect of the 
created world – precisely because the entire physical world exists in God, and because God’s 
fixed instructions would seem to be applicable within the mind. In other words, this approach to 
divine action in general renders the particular case of the Hard Problem theologically irrelevant. 
That is, while consciousness might be a particularly thorny problem for the biological and brain-
related sciences, theologians need not be invested in identifying the mind as ontologically 
nonphysical or spiritual. There is nothing to be gained, theologically speaking, by arguing 
alongside Clayton that the mind is somehow “more than” physical.  The difference between 
Knight and Clayton, then, is that Knight does not require the mind to be nonphysical in order to 
be a locus of divine action. Because his model does not frame the ontology of nature as being in 
any way autonomous from God in the first place, Knight should have no theological motivation 
for insisting that the mind be nonphysical. Thus, divine action in the mind becomes normative, 




As with any divine action theory, there are potential challenges to the Orthodox, panentheistic, 
naturalistic model. The first involves the idea that all divine action is general divine action, 
instantiated within the laws of nature in a single act of creation. Indeed, the very idea that makes 
Knight’s model a persuasive answer to the causal joint problem is the same one that brings 
potential challenge. Put simply, one might argue that such a model of divine action is too far 
removed from the personal, relational, responsive God of Scripture, tradition, and human 
experience. One could perhaps go so far as to say that Knight’s model is essentially deistic, but 
with a more nuanced account of the laws of nature and God’s providence in general divine 
action. For example, take the analogy used to describe the various ways in which parents could 
provide financially for their children. The option that is supposedly analogous to Knight’s divine 
action model is expressed in the following way: 
[The financial support] can be entirely mediated – for example through fixed instructions 
to a bank: ‘Transfer such-and-such an amount every month to my daughter’s bank 
account, and, in addition, if she provides invoices for repairs to her car, transfer to her 
account the amount necessary to cover those repairs.’72 
Setting aside the fact that it would be practically impossible for parents to provide for every need 
in this way (as Knight indicates, God is not cognitively limited in the way that humans are), one 
might still wonder if this level of care is sufficient to sustain the sort of parent-child relationship 
one would presumably desire. In other words, if the only parental response to the child occurred 
via a bank mandate, this might be problematic. I would suggest that something important and 
relationally necessary occurs when a parent and child have a truly interactive, less mediated 
encounter – even if the end result (e.g., the car bill gets paid) is the same in either case. This 
concern is made especially pertinent given the particular focus of divine action which I have 
been considering in this thesis: the mind. As I have been arguing, divine action in the mind (a 
sense of God’s presence, an experience of revelation or grace, a response to prayer that is 
experienced mentally, etc.) are just as “dramatic,” in the sense that real physical processes are 
involved, as any other instance of divine action. Divine action in the mind is often experienced 
as being fundamentally relational and personal. As such, it may seem insufficient to say that 
those experiences of divine action are, in fact, pre-programmed natural responses arising from 
higher laws of nature (although, I admit, such a statement does mesh well with the growing body 
                                                            
72 Knight, “Theistic Naturalism and ‘Special’ Divine Providence,” 538.  
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of research on the evolutionary psychology of religion, as well as the cognitive science of 
belief).73  
 
It is true, as noted above, that in this model it is erroneous to think of general divine action 
occurring in the past – rather, it should be seen as atemporal or eternal. Moreover, Knight is not 
saying that human experience of divine action is impersonal or nonrelational. On the contrary, 
and as noted above, Knight affirms that general divine action can be subjectively experienced as 
personal, responsive, and temporal. The question, in my view, is whether this understanding of 
God’s relationship to temporal creatures is adequate. Of course, however, it may well be the case 
that one’s discomfort with an idea has no relation to its validity; uneasiness with a God who does 
not act responsively in time could be merely a psychological response reflective of limited 
experience and imagination. As Knight himself insists, we must be wary of embracing an idea 
(special divine action) that “is based on a notion of divine ‘personhood’ that derives from 
projecting onto God notions of personhood derived from the human experience of being 
persons.”74 Moreover, Knight responds to potential critiques that his model is deistic by referring 
back to panentheism. Specifically, “it is important to recognize that a panentheistic account of 
God’s relationship to the cosmos takes us immediately beyond the absentee-landlord concept 
because, if the world is in some sense ‘in God’…God can hardly be a distant observer.”75 This is 
true – Knight’s specifically Orthodox version of panentheism would seem to alleviate much of 
the concern that his model portrays a God who is distant and unresponsive. After all, if all of 
nature participates in God’s radical immanence, and the logoi of all created things are in some way 
intimately involved with the divine Logos, then concerns about deism would seem to lessen.  
 
However, panentheism itself is another point of challenge for Knight’s model, insofar as it draws 
concern that the God/nature distinction is not being preserved (it is perhaps ironic that Knight 
could potentially be accused of being both a deist and a pantheist!). The debate surrounding 
panentheism is a complex one, and beyond the scope of this chapter. Also, it is important to 
note that any critique of the panentheistic aspect of this model is not specific to Knight’s model 
                                                            
73 That is, those studying the cognitive science of religion analyse the various evolutionary, biological, and 
cognitive mechanisms that, in a sense, “pre-programme” humans for religious belief. Justin Barrett is a key figure in 
this field; while he does not deal explicitly with Knight’s higher laws, there is room to draw a theoretical connection 
between the two. See Justin Barrett, Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God?, Cognitive Science of Religion Series 
(Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press, 2004). 
74 Knight, “An Eastern Orthodox Critique,” 578. 
75 Knight, “Theistic Naturalism and ‘Special’ Divine Providence,” 541.  
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itself; those who reject panentheism for any reason will likely struggle with Knight’s model.76 
This being said, there are significant critiques of panentheism that could be applied. For example, 
one might question whether panentheism is significantly differentiated from a traditional theistic 
model.77 Supporters often argue that panentheism places a stronger emphasis on divine 
immanence than does traditional Western theism – but does it? Niels Henrik Gregersen, for 
example, argues that “this claim is unwarranted, for classical theism…entails a very strong 
doctrine of divine immanence.”78 Indeed, there is a long theological history affirming God’s 
ever-presence in an all created things. Aquinas, for example, insists that God must “exist 
intimately in everything,”79 and even acknowledges that “one does use the bodily metaphor and 
talk of everything being in God inasmuch as he contains them.”80 It seems plausible, then, that the 
question of immanence is not the key issue here, nor is the question of nature metaphorically 
existing in God. As Gregersen puts it, “the real demarcation line between panentheism and 
classic philosophical theism is neither the immanence of God nor the use of the metaphor of the 
world’s being ‘in’ God.”81 Rather, what distinguishes panentheism from classical theism is that 
panentheism stretches metaphor into ontology. For the panentheist, nature exists within the real 
being of God – however one interprets that. That, for some, might make it difficult to 
distinguish panentheism from pantheism. In other words, as long as the “point” of panentheism 
is to emphasise the relationship between God and nature, or the intimate presence of God in all 
things – then classical theism might be equipped to do this. If the “point” of panentheism is to 
move beyond a strong emphasis on immanence, then it may become difficult to avoid 
pantheism. As Michael Dodds argues, “despite its efforts to tread a middle course… 
panentheism seems to collapse inevitably into pantheism.”82 Dodds’ conclusion may or may not 
be an overstatement; the point here is merely that if one takes issue with panentheism, then 
Knight’s particular divine action model may be susceptible to critique for the same reasons.83 
 
                                                            
76 Moreover, Knight seems to suggest that his model is “workable” even outside of a panentheistic 
framework. As he writes, “a strong theistic naturalism, even before its deistic overtones are removed through a panentheistic 
expansion, is not incompatible with a belief in divine providence that goes well beyond the deistic understanding of 
that term.” Emphasis added. Knight, “Theistic Naturalism and ‘Special’ Divine Providence,” 541. 
77 For a helpful examination of panentheism’s complicated relationship with theism and pantheism, 
respectively, see Ryan Mullins, “The Difficulty with Demarcating Panentheism,” Sophia 55, no. 3 (2016): 325-46. 
78 Gregersen, “Three Varieties of Panentheism,” 23.  
79 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1. 8. 1. 
80 Ibid. Italics added. 
81 Gregersen, “Three Varieties of Panentheism,” 24.  
82 Dodds, Unlocking Divine Action, 167. 
83 This being said, one could argue that Eastern Orthodoxy offers a uniquely compelling version of 




This chapter has focused on Knight’s panentheistic naturalism, and the Orthodox-influenced 
model of divine action resulting from it. In its rejection of what I have been calling the “standard 
model” of divine action, panentheistic naturalism fits well in the theological turn I have been 
discussing in Part Two of this thesis. It is particularly interesting to note the ways in which 
differing theological frameworks (e.g., Thomism and panentheistic naturalism) produce such 
different divine action models – while still, I suggest, remaining firmly within the bounds of the 
theological turn. That is, while the Thomist insists upon double agency and Knight explores a 
different version of primary/secondary causality, both reject the casual joint, incompatibilism, 
and noninterventionism. In so doing, both approaches shift the divine action debate away from 
the use of science in determining the parameters and possibilities for divine action, insisting 
instead that divine action occurs at an ontological level beyond the reach of scientific 
methodology. One possible lingering concern about both approaches, then, involves the relative 
exclusion of science from divine action theology. One might argue that Knight’s model deflates 
the role of scientific methodology to accurately identify and articulate the laws of nature and the 
empirical mechanisms underlying observable phenomena. Insofar as one views science-and-
religion as a field inviting scientific insight into theological discussions, the model may seem to 
inappropriately grant theology immunity from scientific knowledge and practice. However, this 
challenge is not unique to panentheistic naturalism, but is a potential issue for theistic naturalism 
more broadly. In any case, I continue to agree that the theological turn is far superior to the 
standard approach to divine action, and that the varieties of theistic naturalism surveyed thus far 
offer real promise for the field. This being said, I now turn to the final version of theistic 





Theistic Naturalism Part Three: A Pneumatological Assist 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines what can be called “pneumatological naturalism,” and concludes this 
three-part section on theistic naturalisms and divine action in the mind. The goal of Part Two of 
this thesis has been to explore the various ways in which specific versions of theistic naturalism 
render different approaches to divine action and what it means to be natural – these models then 
serve as theological frameworks for understanding divine action in the naturalised mind. My 
argument in Part Two so far has been that while these varying theological approaches differ in 
their respective emphases and methods of handling the causal joint problem, they hold in 
common a similar understanding of the God-nature relationship (and, indeed, the God-mind 
relationship), at least insofar as divine action is concerned. More specifically, it is argued that 
Thomism, panentheistic naturalism, and pneumatological naturalism share an affirmation that 
God’s active, immanent presence is inherent in any fully naturalistic account. Put differently, 
these theistic naturalisms reject standard causal joint models of divine action because of these 
models’ arguably deistic presumptions that nature is, by default, autonomous, self-sufficient, and 
devoid of divine activity. Theistic naturalisms instead offer models of divine action in which 
natural processes – and particularly the mind, as will be discussed below – are not seen as 
competing with divine action, but as participating with God in a fully natural manner.  
 
This chapter, then, focuses on pneumatological naturalism, and particularly on the work of two 
leading advocates of this approach to divine action:  James K. A. Smith and Amos Yong.1 In this 
                                                            
1 While I here focus on Smith and Yong, they are not the only scholars to bring pneumatology into direct 
conversation with theistic naturalism and divine action. Wolfhart Pannenberg is perhaps the most notable example; 
he was a theistic naturalist to the extent that he considered the presence and action of the Spirit in Creation as 
integral to nature. Pannenberg was remarkably bold in his pneumatology, somewhat infamously positing the Spirit as 
a sort of force field. He writes that “the Spirit of God can be understood as the supreme field of power that 
pervades all of creation. Each finite event or being is to be considered as a special manifestation of that field, and 
their movements are responsive to its forces.” Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology: Volume 1, trans. G. 
Bromiley, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991), 382. Controversially, Pannenberg seems to take this idea of the 
Spirit as “field” beyond that of mere metaphor, drawing heavily on Einstein, Michael Faraday, and the concepts of 
force and energy. Rather than conceding that such language is metaphorical, Pannenberg instead attempts to 
spiritualise all of physics itself: “I rather think that the modern conception of fields and energy went a long way to 
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chapter, I also bring this thesis’ overall argument full circle by highlighting the role of the mind-
brain in divine action and theistic naturalism more broadly. My argument is that while not 
without its weaknesses, pneumatological naturalism may provide a helpful theological framework 
for divine action that affirms both divine action and the importance of the embodied, naturalised 
mind, while avoiding the weaknesses inherent in approaches (e.g., Clayton’s) that privilege the 
mind as uniquely spiritual and nonphysical. Pneumatological naturalism is a version of theistic 
naturalism that sees the Spirit’s presence and influence in nature as normative – it is natural for 
nature to participate in, and experience the influence of, the Spirit. Within this framework, even 
seemingly dramatic divine action is seen as an almost expected phenomenon in a Spirit-infused 
world. The emphasis in pneumatological naturalism is on creaturely participation with the Spirit, 
which serves to underscore the importance of the human mind as a particularly intense locus of 
human participation in God. In what follows, I first examine Smith’s metaphysical and 
theological framework for what he calls “enchanted naturalism,” which serves as the 
philosophical infrastructure for a pneumatological model of divine action. While this enchanted 
naturalism is consistent with theistic naturalism more broadly and potentially helpful for divine 
action theology, it also fails to adequately address the causal joint problem. Thus, I then turn to 
the work of Amos Yong, whose “pneumatological assist” serves to expand Smith’s metaphysical 
framework, using this framework to develop a more full-fledged divine action model and 
specifically address the causal joint problem. I then bring this pneumatological model of divine 
action into direct conversation with the naturalised mind, showing how the model helps to make 
sense of why divine action seems to occur with varying intensity in different places and 
circumstances. That is, some natural spaces (e.g., the mind) seem to draw more of a divine 
response than others, and pneumatological naturalism uses its participation ontology to address 
this. This discussion is followed by a brief critique of pneumatological naturalism’s potential 
weaknesses, as well as potential challenges to theistic naturalism more broadly. Finally, I use this 
chapter to draw together the threads of various theistic naturalisms, suggesting that while they 
face significant critiques, theistic naturalism may offer a theologically robust and scientifically 
compatible approach to divine action in the mind, relatively speaking. While acknowledging the 
                                                            
‘spiritualise’ physics.” Wolfhart Pannenberg, “Theological Appropriation of Scientific Understandings: Response to 
Hefner, Wicken, Eaves, and Tipler,” in Beginning With the End: God, Science, and Wolfhart Pannenberg, ed. Carol Rausch 
Albright and Joel Haugen (Chicago: Open Court, 1997), 429. Pannenberg has been roundly criticised for his ideas 
about the Spirit and force fields, and so I will not engage his work here. However, it is worth noting that the sort of 
thing Pannenberg was attempting to do is on the right track: seeking to develop a theistic naturalism that recognises 
the importance of affirming the naturalness of creation’s engagement with the Spirit. For a fuller discussion of these 
issues, see: Timothy Harvie, “God as a Field of Force: Personhood and Science in Wolfhart Pannenberg’s 





notable differences between the models surveyed, I argue that their common commitment to a 
“grace-infused” natural world offers a much-needed rebuttal to standard causal joint programs. I 
conclude that while the naturalisation of the mind might seem theologically threatening to some, 
this need not be the case – at least when one sees the entire natural world as participating in the 
immanent, active God who is always and ever drawing creatures into a fuller participation in true, 
full naturalism.  
 
9.2 Pneumatology and James K. A. Smith’s “Enchanted Naturalism” 
In the science-and-religion field in general, and in divine action discussions in particular, 
sustained attention to the person and work of the Holy Spirit has been limited at best. This is 
perhaps understandable, as the Spirit can be notoriously more difficult to talk about than God 
the Son or God the Father, respectively. Insofar as Jesus is a concrete, relatable human, 
Christology might be seen as relatively more accessible than the immaterial, mediated person and 
work of the Holy Spirit.2 Likewise, theologies of God as creator are easily brought into 
conversation with philosophical abstractions that may seem appealing to Western academic 
discourse. Talk of a disembodied Spirit in the natural world, on the other hand, can sound 
uncomfortably primitive in the West, where the “tradition has experienced a sustained period of 
demythologization in which true knowledge is limited to a naturalized, empirical, material 
world.”3 Because of the linguistic difficulties of “Spirit language,” the demythologised worldview 
of Western intellectual history, and our subsequently constrained ability to develop frameworks 
for interacting with God as “Spirit” in creation, it could be said that “a spirit-world is close to – 
if not altogether – an intellectual impossibility.”4 And yet, Scripture speaks consistently (though 
variously and ambiguously) of the Spirit as the immanent, active God in the natural world.5 
When the Spirit is taken seriously, implications for divine action become quickly apparent, while 
also raising significant challenges to the standard God-world, natural-supernatural dichotomies 
generally assumed in SDA conversations.  
 
One scholar attempting to bring pneumatology into a conversation with science and divine 
action is philosopher James K. A. Smith, whose “enchanted naturalism” insists upon a 
                                                            
2 Daniel Castelo, Pneumatology: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 6. 
3 Ibid., p. 3. 
4 Ibid., p. 4. 
5 Ibid., Chapter 2. 
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theological ontology that normalises ongoing participation of nature in and with the Spirit – 
sometimes to dramatic effect. Smith’s dual commitment to both rigorous philosophical method 
and a pentecostal worldview make him a fascinating conversation partner in this discussion on 
divine action and pneumatology. It should be noted at the outset that Smith’s pentecostalism is 
not denominationally specific, but rather meant to refer to all Christians who adopt “a position 
of radical openness to God, and in particular, God doing something differently or new.”6 One 
might counter that such a position is basically characteristic of Christianity in general, and Smith 
would acknowledge this – to an extent. That is, Smith extends this position of radical openness 
to include an emphasis on embodiment and expressiveness; pentecostal openness to God is 
bound up with an acceptance of the role that physicality plays in human participation with the 
Spirit. As Smith explains, “the reason why pentecostal worship is so affective, tactile, and 
emotive is because pentecostal spirituality rejects ‘cognitivist’ pictures of the human person that 
would construe us as fundamentally ‘thinking things.’”7 (Incidentally, and as we will see below, 
this affirmation of full embodiment – including the mind-brain – is what makes pneumatological 
naturalism particularly well-suited to a theology of divine action in consciousness. The 
pneumatological naturalist does not lose anything, theologically, by affirming that the human is 
wholly physical – precisely because the physical itself is bound up with the Spirit.) In any case, 
while Smith’s emphasis on the “affective, tactile, and emotive” might discourage some from 
accepting this label, in what follows I treat his understanding of pentecostalism as “radical 
openness to God” to apply, in principle, to all Christians. Because of this, and for the sake of 
clarity and inclusion, I will use “pneumatological” synonymously with “pentecostal.” 
 
Smith seeks to go beyond natural/supernatural dichotomies (not only as employed by 
nontheistic naturalists, but DAP-style noninterventionists as well) and offer a pneumatological 
model of the God-world relationship that normalises the active presence of the Spirit in creation. 
Similarly to Knight, Smith begins from the theological affirmation that all nature is inherently 
involved with God, and this “dynamic, participatory ontology refuses the static ontologies that 
presume the autonomy of nature.”8 Like Knight, Smith refuses the God-world model implied by 
noninterventionist causal joint schemes, instead emphasising divine immanence and the 
normativity of God’s active presence in nature. Where Smith differs from Knight is his 
pneumatological focus – both in his pneumatological naturalism framework more broadly, and in 
                                                            
6 Smith, Thinking in Tongues, 12.  
7 Ibid., 71.  
8 Smith, “Is the Universe Open for Surprise?,” 890.  
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his approach to divine action. Whereas Knight draws on the panentheistic metaphysic of Eastern 
Orthodoxy and his own theory of God’s atemporal “fixed instructions,” Smith distances himself 
from panentheism while using pneumatology to support a version of participatory, “en-Spirited” 
theistic naturalism that affirms temporal divine action. Indeed, one can say that Smith’s use of 
pneumatology performs the same metaphysical function as does panentheism: softening the 
natural/supernatural dichotomy and rendering theologically incoherent the notion that it is 
possible for nature even to exist apart from God’s active presence. Rather than assuming that the 
default position for nature is to be law-governed, regular, and devoid of special divine action, 
Smith affirms a bias toward ongoing divine action: the experience of God’s responsive activity is 
theologically normative as nature participates in the Spirit, in varying degrees.  
 
This participatory ontology is crucial to Smith’s enchanted naturalism, and here it is worth noting 
its connections to Radical Orthodoxy (RO). Radical Orthodox is a postmodernist theological 
and philosophical movement (largely originating in the Anglican tradition but also drawing upon 
its close theological cousin, the Catholic nouvelle théologie) that essentially seeks to restore theology 
to its former role as the “queen of the sciences.”9 In regards to science-and-religion and divine 
action more specifically, proponents of RO tend to reject secular (read: scientistic) articulations 
not only of the laws of nature and physical events, but of naturalism more broadly. That is, RO 
advocates insist that it is theology (and not science) that has the final say of what is true about 
nature. While a full discussion of Radical Orthodoxy lies beyond the purview of this thesis, it is 
useful to highlight Smith’s dependence on its leaders’ formulations of participation and nature, 
respectively. Noting that his model’s ontology is akin to that of Henri de Lubac, Smith writes the 
following:  
By eschewing the simple distinction between discrete realms of nature and supernature, 
de Lubac struggled to articulate a paradoxical phenomenon: that nature is oriented to the 
supernatural and that this orientation to the supernatural is natural (that is, constitutive of 
creaturehood)…Creation is (and nature is) insofar as it participates in and is indwelled by 
God, in whom we live and move and have our being (Acts 17:28)…Thus the shape of de 
Lubac’s blurring of the natural/supernatural distinction finds a more detailed ontological 
articulation in Radical Orthodoxy’s participatory ontology…, which provides a dynamic 
sense of the God-world relation that would eschew both naturalism and 
supernaturalism…It affirms that matter as created exceeds itself and is only insofar as it 
participates in or is suspended from the transcendent Creator, and it affirms that there is 
a significant sense in which the transcendent inheres in immanence. ‘Things,’ then, and 
the created order in general, do not have any kind of ‘sheer’ or autonomous existence, as 
                                                            
9 See Smith’s Radical Orthodoxy for a helpful introduction to the movement, as well as to Smith’s own 
philosophical commitments.  
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if possessing some kind of inalienable right to be. Rather, being is a gift from the 
transcendent Creator such that things exist only insofar as they participate in the being of 
the Creator.10 
 
Here, then, we see Smith’s connection to theological movements that privilege the language of 
participation, insisting that to be natural is to participate in God. The Spirit, for Smith, is actually 
“constitutive of creaturehood.” Instead of understanding the natural world as an essentially 
autonomous creation in which God can act only through “gappy” underdetermined areas, Smith 
emphasises the Spirit’s immanence in creation. The Spirit’s presence and action (as attested to in 
Scripture and tradition) should be considered fundamental to a full explanation of reality. As 
pneumatologist Daniel Castelo puts it, “Spirit-matters are the most natural things there are. Or to put 
another way: Nature is Spirit-graced to its core so that what is fundamentally characteristic of nature is that it 
is Spirit-related.”11 It is in this sense that Smith’s position can be called “naturalistic,” for nature is 
inherently involved with and saturated by the Spirit. As Smith puts it, “nature, in a sense, is 
‘suspended’ in the Spirit of creation; or we might say that creation is ‘charged’ with the Spirit’s 
presence. Nature, then, is always more than ‘the natural.’ It is suffused with something more; 
there is always more than meets the naturalizing eye’” – unless, of course, that “naturalizing eye” 
includes the Spirit’s immanence and activity in its purview.12 To the extent that naturalism 
indicates commitment to the fullest explanation of reality (whether currently explicable or not), 
then it can, in principle, be expanded to include nature’s participation in the Spirit. Immediately, 
then, it is apparent that Smith distances himself from the more acquiescent naturalistic impulses 
pursued by some in science-and-religion. As Smith critiques, “It is this primary concern of 
acceding to the naturalism of science that motivates the growing commitment to naturalism by 
theologians engaged in the theology/science dialogue. I would describe this as a ‘correlationist’ 
project: a theological project that cedes the ‘truth’ of a particular sphere to a ‘secular’ and 
supposedly neutral, rational science and then seeks to ‘correlate’ theological claims to conform to 
the standards established by the secular.”13 Such a correlationist project is not what Smith has in 
mind with his naturalistic paradigm: rather than ceding theological control to imperialistic 
                                                            
10 Smith, “Is the Universe Open for Surprise?,” 889.  
11 Castelo, Pneumatology, 74. 
12 Smith, Thinking in Tongues, 40. 
13 Ibid., 94. 
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scientistic naturalisms (or “wilt[ing] before scientific knowledge”14), Smith’s pneumatological 
naturalism resituates science itself in a theological, metaphysical framework.15  
 
Before going any further, there is one important component of Smith’s pneumatological 
naturalism that is particularly pertinent to this thesis’ argument. Namely, Smith’s theistic 
naturalism is not one that ignores the importance of physical processes – though this could 
plausibly be a critique of all theistic naturalisms. That is, insofar as theistic naturalisms expand 
the notion of what it means to be natural, critics might argue that such an expansion amounts to 
little more than a redefinition of terms, a language game that moves away from the scientific 
priority of empirical, observable realities. Smith, however, insists that embodiment and 
corporeality are vitally important for his enchanted naturalism. The affirmation of “‘nature’ as 
always already inhabited by the Spirit” 16 does not minimise the importance of brute physical 
realities – just the opposite. Smith notes that “pentecostal worship and practice are characterized 
by a kind of gritty materiality as space for work of the Spirit” – far from minimising physicality, 
pneumatological naturalism elevates the physical, insofar as the physical participates in the Spirit.17 
This has significant implications for this thesis’ argument that the mind is not uniquely 
nonphysical or spiritual: because this model “does not reduce human identity to thinking or a 
disembodied mind,” even a physical mind-brain need not be threatening.18 That is, Smith’s 
enchanted naturalism “perceives the material creation as ‘charged’ with the presence of the 
Spirit,” and this includes a “nondualistic affirmation of embodiment and materiality.”19 Because 
the immanent “Spirit is always already at work in creation, animating (and reanimating) bodies,”20 
there is no theological need to insist that the human mind is nonphysical. In any case, while 
                                                            
14 Ibid., 95.  
15 Smith particularly notes Polkinghorne’s penchant for adopting this correlationist model, using a striking 
choice of words: Polkinghorne wrote that he intended to “find room” for theology in a cosmological, scientific 
picture. Smith writes that Polkinghorne “concludes that ‘the scientific picture’ is ‘open to’ the possibility of the 
Spirit’s presence in the world. But on this picture, it is ‘science’ that tis the gatekeeper and bouncer…in short, 
theologians are motivated to accede to naturalism because that is the price of admission for scientific respectability.” 
Ibid., 95. Smith draws from John Polkinghorne, “The Hidden Spirit and the Cosmos,” in The Work of the Spirit: 
Pneumatology and Pentecostalism, ed. Michael Welker (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006). 
16 Smith, Thinking in Tongues, 88. 
17 Smith’s prioritisation of physicality in his pneumatological perspective may seem surprising, insofar as 
pentecostal traditions generally are not known for their embrace of material culture. Smith recognises this, and his 
book Thinking in Tongues is as much a critique of “standard” pentecostalism as it is scientistic naturalism. In other 
words, Smith argues that while pentecostal practice may often veer into a dismissal of the physical world, proper 
pentecostal theology actually values and prioritises the physical.  
18 Smith, Thinking in Tongues, 57.  
19 Ibid., 12.  
20 Smith, “Is the Universe Open for Surprise?,” 890.  
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Smith emphasises the Spirit’s immanence in creation, it is important to recognise the implications 
this has for how we think about physical processes themselves.  
 
One way of understanding Smith’s enchanted naturalism is to examine the way his model 
handles the relationship between the natural world and the supernatural. Smith is quite critical of 
metaphysical, reductionistic naturalism, and also notes the lack of clarity surrounding 
articulations of naturalism. As he writes, “the essence of naturalism often is less defined by an 
articulated conception of nature and more by an opposition to supernaturalism. Naturalism isn’t 
quite sure what it is, but it is absolutely certain what it is not…”21 This simple opposition to 
supernaturalism, though, does little to explain the actual ontology of nature – and theology has a 
role to play in articulating this ontology. As Castelo argues, “Rather than making the 
‘supernatural’ peripheral, the task requires putting it at the center, thereby problematizing not 
only the place of privilege that regnant naturalisms enjoy but also calling into question the way 
the terms have traditionally been defined.”22 In other words, pneumatology might have 
something constructive to say about what it is to be properly natural – namely, that participation 
in the Spirit is integral to nature’s ontology. In fact, Smith has concerns about the “super” in 
supernatural language, as it almost inevitably conjures a dualistic metaphysic in which the 
supernatural is understood only by what it is not – and vice versa. Moreover, the 
natural/supernatural binary may be construed in an unhelpful way, suggesting that supernatural 
realities are alien to, or unnecessary for, nature to be what it is. As he explains his view, “one 
might say I’m articulating a supernatural materialism. As such, it contests the 
natural/supernatural distinction.”23 At the same time, though, abandoning “super” language 
threatens divine transcendence. Indeed, there can be no immanence without transcendence; 
without transcendence, “immanence” collapses into pantheism. Thus Smith opts for a third way 
that, “rather than being described as a noninterventionist supernaturalism, might be better 
described as an “enchanted naturalism” or an “en-Spirited naturalism.”24 Smith understands this 
enchanted naturalism to be “unique with respect to all the other [metaphysical models] precisely 
because it rejects the notion of an ‘autonomous’, self-sufficient ‘world’ that runs on its own 
steam, as it were.”25 Nature is what it is only by virtue of its continued involvement with the 
                                                            
21 Ibid., 884.  
22 Castelo, Pneumatology, 74.  
23 Smith, Thinking in Tongues, 99.  
24 Ibid., 96. 
25 Ibid., 97. Again, it is ironic that panentheists don’t often pursue the implications of their own 
metaphysical model. As I have argued, Clayton restricts himself (perhaps unnecessarily, in my view, given the 
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Spirit. This enchanted naturalism “would refuse to see the natural as ‘opposed’ to the 
supernatural (and vice versa). In fact, it would argue that “one can only have a robust ‘nature’ 
insofar as it is charged by grace.”26 One could say that “matter as created exceeds itself and is only 
insofar as it participates in or is suspended from the transcendent Creator.”27 Smith’s naturalism 
thus insists upon the ontological necessity of nature’s involvement with God.28   
 
Smith’s model is not intended to be a naïve, interventionist supernaturalism, and he suggests that 
the very language of naturalism and “supernaturalism is a kind of deistic hangover” that presumes 
a faulty worldview from the outset.29 In fact, while Smith is critical of reductionistic naturalism, 
he is equally critical of the way many theists (including nonreductive naturalists) implicitly 
assume the same deistic, natural/supernatural dichotomy as do reductionistic naturalists – this 
will be familiar from Chapter 6.30 On one hand, interventionist theists affirm that God violates 
the laws of nature, stepping in from the “outside” to achieve specific purposes. This view, argues 
Smith, presumes exactly the wrong sort of relationship between God and nature: “The 
ontological framework that is assumed by interventionist supernaturalism mitigates against the 
pentecostal experience of the Spirit as natural. Part of the genius and uniqueness of pentecostal 
experience is precisely that one does not see the Spirit’s care and activity as exceptions or 
interruptions of the ‘normal’ ordering of the universe.”31 On the other hand, noninterventionist 
theists often attempt to find ways for God to lawfully act within nature’s processes; but this 
model assumes the same God-nature model adopted by deists and interventionists alike. To label 
something “noninterventionist” is to presume a relationship between God and the world in 
                                                            
panentheist emphasis on immanence) to a notion of divine action that ironically utilises the very sort of causal joint 
method that is the hallmark of so many noninterventionist approaches he challenges.  
26 Ibid., 98. 
27 Ibid., 100. 
28 There is one important point to make here. One major concern with pneumatological naturalism will be 
that it threatens the transcendence of God. Because I have been arguing that a fully natural description of the world 
would necessarily include divine presence and activity, it is understandable that one might fear that this model 
renders God as a feature of creation, panentheistic or even pantheistic as a result. This is not the case. The argument 
here is that a fully natural account of the created world will necessarily include the Spirit’s activity as part of a full 
description of that created world. The reverse does not follow; a full account of God, in this model, would not 
require an explanation of the natural world. This is a one-sided ontology; this naturalism is completely perspectival. I 
deny the assumed deistic autonomy of the created world, but not the ontological autonomy of God. Contra 
pantheism, the world is not God; contra panentheism, the world is not a part of God or located within God. Rather, 
the Spirit is present to and active in the created world, and the world would not exist apart from the Spirit’s continued 
and continual presence and activity.  
29 Ibid., 87. 
30 For example, Smith writes that “both of these naturalisms (reductionistic and nonreductionistic) seem to 
be rejecting the same ‘supernaturalism,” what we’ll call an ‘interventionist supernaturalism. (My enemy’s enemy is my 
friend!) In fact, one might suggest that what defines both of these sorts of naturalisms is only their rejection of any 
supernaturalism.” Ibid., 91.  
31 Ibid., 98.  
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which intervention is a theoretical possibility in the first place – as discussed in previous 
chapters. As Smith argues, “This model – that God and the world are discrete – is shared by 
both naturalists who reject such interventions and supernaturalists who claim such interventions. 
Both basically see nature as an autonomous system…such an assumption rests on a theology of 
creation that is problematic because it is devoid of any sense of the essential, constitutive, 
dynamic presence of God the Spirit in creation.”32 For Smith, then, the “dynamic presence” of 
the Spirit in creation is a necessary aspect of the natural world. While pneumatological naturalism 
recognises that the Spirit is transcendent and uncreated, it is unhelpful to think of nature as 
existing in ontological opposition to God. An ontological distinction necessarily exists, but the 
relationship between God and nature is not exactly a binary; pneumatological naturalism thus 
“eschews the dualistic opposition of the ‘natural’ and the ‘supernatural.’”33 
 
Smith’s approach to divine action follows from (or is perhaps entailed by) his model of 
enchanted naturalism, stressing the “the elasticity of nature as always already inhabited by the 
Spirit.”34 Because Smith rejects both interventionism and noninterventionism as presuming the 
same deistic God-world model, he is uncomfortable with aligning himself with standard models 
of divine action. Rather, his model is thoroughly of the theistic naturalist sort: “Because nature is 
always already inhabited by the Spirit, it also is primed for (and not merely open to) special or 
unique singularities. These will not be anti-nature, because nature is not a discrete, autonomous 
entity.”35 That is, just as theistic naturalism more generally can accept seemingly “special” divine 
action because nature itself is never devoid of God’s involvement with all creation, so does 
Smith’s enchanted naturalism see the Spirit’s activity as actually enhancing nature’s “natural-
ness.” As noted above, Smith’s divine action model does not fit neatly into either interventionist 
or noninterventionist paradigms, even though the latter posits an “open” universe that would 
seem to invite divine action in underdetermined areas. Smith is “somewhat cautious about 
adopting the language of an ‘open’ creation, because this still seems to presume a picture of 
nature as basically autonomous.”36 As I have argued throughout this thesis, even the 
noninterventionist causal joint paradigm “assumes a picture of the world, and of the God-world 
relation, that cedes autonomy to the natural order akin to Deism.”37 There is thus an ironic 
                                                            
32 Smith, “Is the Universe Open for Surprise?,” 890.  
33 Smith, Thinking in Tongues, 99.  
34 Smith, “Is the Universe Open for Surprise?,” 881.  
35 Ibid., 892. 
36 Ibid., 890.  
37 Ibid., 890.  
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connection between noninterventionist theists, interventionist theists, deists, and metaphysical 
naturalists: all presume that nature’s default ontology is one that excludes divine action.  
 
Enchanted naturalism, however, refuses these problematic categories altogether, affirming that 
the Spirit acts in nature (sometimes dramatically), and that this activity is properly natural. 
Significantly, Smith does not deny the apparent regularities of natural processes, asserting that “it 
is important to assert that a pentecostal worldview does not require rejecting a sense of a steady, 
faithful presence of the Spirit in creation.”38 It is important to note that while Smith seems to 
loosely adopt the common distinction between general and special divine action (though, as 
discussed, such a distinction is often discarded by Thomists and panentheistic naturalists such as 
Knight), he does not strictly distinguish between GDA, SDA, and “miracles.”39 Miracles, for 
him, seem to refer to events that are intensified, comparatively more dramatic manifestations of 
God’s activity. They are not, in principle, of a different ontological variety than more mundane 
physical events – precisely because God is involved in all physical processes to begin with, 
regular or irregular. As Smith explains, “a miracle is not an event that ‘breaks’ the ‘laws’ of 
nature, since nature does not have such a reified character; rather, a miracle is a manifestation of 
the Spirit’s presence that is ‘out of the ordinary’; but even the ordinary is a manifestation of the 
Spirit’s presence.’40 While insisting that nature is always open for “surprises” (i.e., seemingly 
miraculous divine action), Smith thus still insists that his position should “honor the 
overwhelming success of science predicated on the predictability of nature’s lawlike regularity.”41 
Pneumatological naturalism seems to have no problem with simultaneously affirming divine 
action on one hand, and advocating “a healthy dose of minimal disenchantment and 
methodogical naturalism” on the other.”42 In other words, “the affirmation of the Spirit’s 
dynamic presence in creation is not opposed to…God’s steady, sustaining care of the universe 
along the lines of what seem like ‘laws.’”43 Laws are not rigid, autonomous determinants of 
reality, but descriptions of the Spirit’s more regular activity. Indeed, all physical events – lawlike 
and seemingly miraculous – hold the same ontological status; what was previously considered 
                                                            
38 Ibid., 891.  
39 I here put “miracles” in quotes because Smith seems to be using the term rather loosely. Unlike many in 
the divine action conversation, Smith does not strictly distinguish between GDA, SDA, and miracles. Miracles, for 
him, seem to refer to events that are experiences are intensified, comparatively more dramatic manifestations of 
God’s activity. They are not, in principle, of a different ontological variety than more mundane physical events – 
precisely because God is involved in all physical processes to begin with, regular or irregular. 
40 Smith, Thinking in Tongues, 105. 
41 Smith, “Is the Universe Open for Surprise?,” 890.  
42 Ibid.  
43 Smith, Thinking in Tongues, 103. 
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impersonal general divine action is now construed as “the steady, faithful presence of the 
Spirit.”44  
 
For Smith, the key to understanding miracles (or special divine action) is to understand them as 
intensifications of the same divine presence and activity already inherent in creation. This 
perspective sees miracles as instances of focussed, mutual participation of creatures in the divine 
life. In other words, “there are sites and events that exhibit a more intense participation,” such 
that “phenomena that might be described as ‘miraculous’ are not instances of God ‘breaking 
into’ the world, as if God were outside it prior to such events; rather, they are instances of a 
unique and special mode of participation that always already characterizes creation.”45 So then, 
there are no ontological distinctions between the general providence long affirmed by classical 
theism and the more seemingly abnormal and rare occurrence of miracles. As Smith argues, “the 
work of the Spirit is not the provision of new content, but instead the gracious granting of 
‘access.’’’46 Divine action is not to be seen as ontologically distinct from what has always been 
present and active in the natural world, but a fuller awareness of, access to, and interaction with 
the Spirit. However, all this this brings us to an important question: How, exactly, does Smith 
handle the causal joint, especially considering that he wants to affirm methodological naturalism 
and lawlike natural processes? He himself critiques interventionist models that “punt on 
questions about the mechanics of intervention,”47 but does pneumatological naturalism fare any 
better? Smith’s own version of pneumatological naturalism – enchanted naturalism – does not 
directly address the details of how God might interact with physical laws and processes. For that, 
it is helpful to examine the “pneumatological assist” offered by Amos Yong, as Yong attempts to 
more directly address this causal joint problem.   
 
 
                                                            
44 Those familiar with the divine action debate may sense that Smith’s position here veers into 
occasionalism. That is, if the laws of nature themselves are God’s actions, it may be difficult to get around the 
charge that God is essentially determining each and every event that occurs. Smith himself does not address this 
concern, perhaps partially because his work does not function within standard divine action frameworks that employ 
concepts like “occasionalism.” Nevertheless, as will be discussed, one critique of Smith is that his understanding of 
the laws of nature is utterly unrecognisable to practising scientists. 
45 Smith, Thinking in Tongues, 102. 
46 Ibid., 68. 




9.3 Amos Yong and a Pneumatological Assist 
Pentecostal theologian Amos Yong not only writes on the subjects of science and pneumatology 
generally, but has also engaged directly with Smith’s enchanted naturalism and approach to 
divine action.48 Whereas Smith’s science-and-religion work focuses on naturalism and the God-
nature relationship, Yong more specifically brings pneumatology into conversation with the 
“mechanics” of divine action. Yong’s model thus serves to flesh out the details of the more 
metaphysical approach taken by Smith, and to address the causal joint problem in a more direct 
way than does Smith. Specifically, Yong’s pneumatological account of divine action understands 
the laws of nature as constantly evolving “habits” that can only be understood in an 
eschatological, Trinitarian framework. More specifically, Yong argues that the Christ event had 
(and has) ontological implications for not only the relationship between God and humans, but 
between God and the laws of nature. Yong suggests that “the future is non-extrapolatable from 
the currently known laws of nature...the resurrection gives us good reason to question 
nomological universality, at least in the far-off future, and grants us insights into God’s 
intentions to restructure (re-create) the laws of nature infected by sin.”49 For Yong, then, divine 
action occurs by way of the laws of nature, which are themselves evolving and continually 
shaped by the Spirit in light of the eschatological implications of the incarnation.  
 
Before getting into the specifics of Yong’s treatment of the laws of nature, it is helpful to 
highlight his understanding of the God-nature relationship, vis-à-vis Smith. Like Smith, Yong 
embraces a pneumatological naturalism (though he himself does not use that term), as evidenced 
by his insistence that nature be “revisioned in pneumatological terms so that the chasm between 
transcendence and creation is overcome theologically.”50 To be natural, according to Yong, is to 
be involved with the Spirit. Also like Smith, this affirmation of nature’s participation in the Spirit 
involves the prioritisation of physical embodiment. Because all of nature is involved with the 
Spirit, physicality is theologically important: “At the core of the Pentecostal experience is a 
                                                            
48 See Amos Yong, “Radically Orthodox, Reformed, and Pentecostal: Rethinking the Intersection of 
Post/Modernity and the Religions in Conversation with James K. A. Smith,” Journal of Pentecostal Theology 15, no. 2 
(2007): 233-50. 
49 Amos Yong, “The Spirit at Work in the World: A Pentecostal-Charismatic Perspective on the Divine 
Action Project,” Theology and Science 7, no. 2 (2009): 131. 
50 Amos Yong, “Radically Orthodox, Reformed, and Pentecostal,” 247.  
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palpable, tangible, and kinesthetic encounter with the living God.”51 Yong suggests that increased 
attention to “the Pentecost narrative of the Spirit’s outpouring on ‘all flesh’ (Acts 2.17a)” 
provides pneumatological naturalism with “additional biblical and theological resources for the 
kind of participatory or creational ontology advocated by Smith.”52 An oversimplified way of 
distinguishing between Smith and Yong (at least in regards to divine action) is to highlight 
Smith’s reliance on participatory ontology (as understood in Radical Orthodoxy), and Yong’s 
dependence on biblical narratives. In other words, Smith and Yong focus on different 
pneumatological emphases, but in such a way that they complement one another well.  
 
At the heart of Yong’s divine action theology is a prioritisation of Christological eschatology. He 
argues that “the life, ministry, death, and resurrection of Jesus are pneumatologically constituted 
events that signify the coming era, proleptically announcing and providing a foretaste, in the past 
(and present), of the eschatological future of God.”53 The incarnation, then, should be seen as 
having universal implications not only spiritually, but for the natural world itself. All discussion 
of divine action and the laws of nature must, in a pneumatological view, be held against the 
backdrop of the incarnation’s “pneumatologically constituted events,” which fundamentally 
change the structure of nature. Yong argues that “God’s action in a scientific and lawful world 
can be profitably illuminated when conceived in terms of the Holy Spirit, and that this suggests 
that divine activity occurs, in a sense, ‘from the future,’ especially in anticipation of the coming 
kingdom.”54 Rather than viewing seemingly miraculous events as interventions or aberrations, 
these “(miraculous) ‘interventions’ in the world’s processes should now be reformulated in both 
pneumatological and eschatological perspectives.”55 The incarnation and Pentecost together, 
then, become the pivotal events that substantially alter nature. Because Yong insists that nature 
itself is always involved with the Spirit, he can further assert that nature is substantially changing 
and evolving in response to the Spirit. Instances of divine action, then, become “proleptic 
anticipations of the world to come,”56 making “present the risen Christ and the hidden God” and 
providing “a foretaste of the transfiguration of the created order.”57 Essentially, Yong’s 
                                                            
51 Amos Yong, The Spirit of Creation: Modern Science and Divine Action in the Pentecostal-Charismatic Imagination, 
Pentecostal Manifestos (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011), 74. 
52 Yong, ““Radically Orthodox, Reformed, and Pentecostal,” 247.  
53 Yong, The Spirit of Creation, 90.  
54 Ibid., 102.  
55 Ibid., 90. 
56 Ibid., 93.  
57 Ibid., 94.  
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pneumatological naturalism asserts that eschatological realities allow for the evolution of the laws 
of nature toward eschatological ends, so that specific divine actions result.  
 
Yong’s treatment of the laws of nature requires more discussion, not least because his model 
insists on a complete revision of how the laws of nature are generally understood. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, interpretations of the laws of nature can be categorised as prescriptive, descriptive, 
and approximationist. Yong’s pneumatological model would seem to be incongruent with a 
prescriptive view of the laws of nature, as his model suggests that the laws of nature evolve and 
are responsive not only to divine action, but also to human response to God (more on this 
below).58 In fact, Yong’s work echoes my argument in Chapter 2 that many theists (particularly 
interventionists) unwittingly presume a prescriptive, view of the laws of nature: “Supernaturalism 
actually requires a fairly robust view of nature governed by physical laws to begin with since 
without this all-encompassing framework, divine signs, wonders, and miracles would not stand 
out from such laws.”59 Neither is Yong’s model a good fit with an approximationist view, as such 
a view assumes an in-principle set of static laws, though our limited knowledge allows only for 
partial awareness of these laws. Instead, it seems that Yong’s model is working with a descriptive 
view of the laws of nature (Yong himself calls his position a “regularist” one), in which “the laws 
of nature are statements that describe what usually or regularly happens in the world.”60 For Yong, 
then, the laws of nature are not necessary determinants of what happens in nature, but are 
identifiable patterns that describe the way physical processes usually occur – they are habitual 
tendencies, but not ontologically static.  
 
Yong’s descriptive view of the laws of nature, however, is only one aspect of his divine action 
model. Perhaps more importantly, Yong insists that the laws of nature “can now be understood 
as habitual, dynamic, and general but nevertheless real tendencies through which the Holy Spirit 
invites and empowers free creatures to inhabit the eschatological presence of God.”61 In other 
words, while the laws are indeed “habitual tendencies,” they evolve and develop proleptically in 
                                                            
58 However, because Yong sees the laws of nature as evolving, it is possible to understand the laws as 
prescriptive in a sense. That is, one could say that the laws of nature are binding at any given time, but that those 
binding laws change over time. This is not unlike recognising that a nation’s laws are binding as a whole, but are also 
subject to amendment and evolution over time. In any case, Yong’s interpretation of the laws of nature may not 
necessitate the descriptive label in quite the way he assumes. 
59 Ibid., 76.  
60 Ibid., 107.  
61 Ibid., 129.  
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light of the eschatological realities instantiated by Christ.62 Interestingly, Yong draws on the work 
of cosmologist George F.R. Ellis in his discussion of the laws of nature – this is notable given 
Ellis’ important contributions to the DAP. Rather than assuming, like many of his DAP 
collaborators, a prescriptive view of the laws of nature, Ellis’ work seems to agree with Yong’s – 
namely, that the life, death, and resurrection of Christ might be seen as a sort of eschatological 
prototype, “the first instance of the kind of transformation that awaits the entire cosmos.”63 In 
this view, the laws of nature themselves are responsive to spiritual realities; divine action is never 
interventionist, precisely because the laws of nature do not have independent, static authority 
apart from divine influence in the first place. For Yong, the laws of nature are “sufficiently 
flexible so that they can be miraculously redeemed to usher in the patterns and habits of the 
coming world.”64 In a sense, one might well posit that physical processes and the laws of nature 
themselves are, in some sense, spiritual – or, at least, never independent of spiritual realities. As 
philosopher Keith Ward suggests, “It is better to construe miracles as such transformations of 
the physical to disclose its spiritual foundation and goal than to think of them as violations of 
inflexible and purposeless laws of nature.”65 Instead, a pneumatological naturalism insists that the 
laws of nature are directed toward eschatological ends, and that this is somehow proper to their 
ontology. 
 
It would seem that for Yong’s pneumatological naturalism, the causal joint should be located in 
the laws of nature themselves – given the discussion above.66 That being said, Yong suggests that 
“it is in principle impossible on scientific terms to conclusively identify such a causal joint.”67 
Indeed, pneumatological naturalism insists that “the workings of the Spirit of God are 
identifiable or discernible only through the eyes of faith…in anticipation of the kingdom to 
                                                            
62 Ibid., 124.  
63 George Ellis, “Ordinary and Extraordinary Divine Action,” in Philosophy, Science and Divine Action, ed. F. 
LeRon Shults, Nancey C. Murphy, and Robert J. Russell, Philosophical Studies in Science and Religion, vol. 1 
(Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2009), 338.  
64 Yong, The Spirit of Creation, 131.  
65 Keith Ward, “God as a Principle of Cosmological Explanation,” in Physics, Philosophy, and Theology: A 
Common Quest for Understanding, ed. Robert John Russell, William R. Stoeger, S. J., and George V. Coyne, S. J. 
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66 However, it also worth noting that, at times, Yong suggests that God acts through information input: 
“There is room for thinking about the Spirit’s role of ‘inputting’ information into the causal fabric of the world…we 
may not be able to identify the how of the Spirit’s (energetic?) action in the world…But we will still be able to 
specify, in faith, that the Spirit’s action has made such and such a difference in the world (at least in terms of the 
input of information), and thus can affirm divine intervention in this eschatological sense.” It is unclear how this 
this idea connects to Yong’s more sustained treatment of the laws of nature as a sort of causal joint. Yong, The Spirit 




come.”68 Not only this, but even seemingly miraculous events are in principle susceptible to 
scientific explanation. Yong insists that “even scientifically verified healings…however 
statistically improbable, are not arguments for divine action. Science cannot make those 
claims.”69 This is a significant assertion, and one that firmly locates Yong in the theistic 
naturalism camp. That is, Yong effectively argues for a compatibilist divine action model in 
which the laws of nature themselves are ever and always amenable to the Spirit’s action – thus, 
any instance of divine action would presumably have an explanation in terms of those laws of 
nature. Indeed, “it is the work of the Spirit to remain ‘hidden’ amidst the natural processes of the 
world, all the while shaping the evolutionary history of the world according to the final 
intentions of God.”70 Divine action, in this view, is identifiable only theologically and in faith, 
and never through scientific methodology. Rather, this “pneumatological logic” would recognise 
divine actions as “actions of the Spirit that are proleptic anticipations of the world to come…the 
proleptic aspect of the charismatic presence and activity of the Spirit points not to some future 
understood in linear terms as being ahead of us, but to the qualitative in-breaking of God’s 
‘future’ into ‘present’ human (and natural) history.”71 In short: the Spirit and incarnation make an 
ontological difference to the laws of nature precisely because all of nature itself participates in 
God, but this ontological difference is recognisable only through eyes of faith.  
 
9.4 Pneumatological Divine Action and the Mind 
For both Smith and Yong, pneumatological naturalism relies heavily on the idea that all nature 
participates in and with God. Unlike Thomistic double agency, in which all events are wholly 
caused by both primary and secondary causes simultaneously, pneumatological naturalism 
emphasises the dynamic, responsive relationship between God and nature, which results in 
varying intensities of experienced divine action. As Smith asserts, “While all that is participates in 
God through the Spirit, there are sites and events that exhibit a more intense participation,”72 and  
“this does not mean that all participates in the same way or to the same degree.”73 Yong similarly sees 
seemingly miraculous events as intensifications of the Spirit’s universal presence: “We can think 
                                                            
68 Amos Yong, “How Does God Do What God Does? Pentecostal-Charismatic Perspectives on Divine 
Action in Dialogue with Modern Science,” in Science and the Spirit: A Pentecostal Engagement with the Sciences, ed. James 
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69 Yong, The Spirit of Creation, 100. 
70 Ibid., 135.  
71 Yong, “The Spirit at Work in the World,” 133.  
72 Smith, Thinking in Tongues, 102.  
73 James K. A. Smith, “The Spirit, Religions, and the World as Sacrament: A Response to Amos Yong’s 
Pneumatological Assist,” Journal of Pentecostal Theology 15, no. 2 (2007): 256. 
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of these special, miraculous manifestations of the Spirit’s presence in creation as more intense 
instances of the Spirit in creation, or as ‘sped-up’ modes of the spirit’s more regular presences.”74 
Moreover, this model affirms that nature itself has a part to play in the expression of divine 
action; creaturely response to God is an important part of the Spirit’s instantiation of 
eschatological realities. Divine action should not be thought of as God stepping in from the 
outside to do something to creation, but rather God working with creation in a dynamic manner; 
creaturely agency is a vital component of divine purposes being effected in the natural world. As 
Smith further argues, “It is structurally the case that all that exists participates in the divine, but 
not all that exists is properly ordered or directed to the divine; to participate properly in the Creator 
is to also be directed to the Creator.”75 Divine action, then, is not unilateral in the way often 
conceived by noninterventionist models, but an outcome of divine-nature interaction. In keeping 
with the larger themes of theistic naturalism, Smith also suggests that human participation in 
God “actually represent[s] a restoration of what it means to be properly human, not some sense 
of being ‘super’-human.”76 Participation in the Spirit is not theologically abnormal, but is instead 
indicative of humanity being more or less properly natural. Yong goes so far as to say that “in 
the vast majority of cases involving the charisms of the Spirit, human agency is involved. Thus 
SDA must not only be compatible with but also preserve personal human agency in all of its 
integrity.”77 Note the difference between this approach and, particularly, standard conceptions of 
double agency. Whereas double agency is generally thought to affirm the fully causal agency of 
both God and creatures, this pneumatological, participatory model emphasises response and 
dynamism. It is not so much that God and secondary causes are simultaneously causing any 
specific action, but that secondary causes respond to God in varying degrees, to varying effects. 
In other words, because pneumatological naturalism reframes physicality itself as being somehow 
spiritual and always in dynamic relationship with the Spirit, physical processes (or secondary 
causes) can somehow respond to the eschatological “call” or “vision” that is held out to them. 
Whereas double agency insists that God is fully and sufficiently causal in all natural events, 
pneumatological naturalism would see the relationship between God and nature as more 
dynamic and collaborative – creaturely response is necessary for divine purposes to be enacted. 
As Yong argues, “God’s covenants are never deterministic grids…Rather, they constitute God’s 
general, albeit eschatological, intentions, suggested to human creatures, yet whose final shape and 
realization depend, at least in part, on creaturely response.”78 Divine action, then, is less about 
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75 Smith, “The Spirit, Religions, and the World as Sacrament,” 256.  
76 Ibid., 257.  
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God doing something to or through nature to achieve a specific result, and more about 
creaturely response to the Spirit. 
 
Pneumatological naturalism thus – and perhaps ironically, in the context of this thesis – 
privileges the human mind in its emphasis on human participation in the Spirit and the Spirit’s 
activity. As theologian Thomas J. Oord argues, “creaturely response plays a central role in 
determining how effective God is in the world.”79 Insofar as human mind-bodies possess 
relatively more creaturely freedom, imagination, and the ability to respond to God in complex 
ways than do less complex organisms – to that extent the human mind may be more receptive to 
divine action, or more able to participate with the Spirit in bringing divine action about. George 
Ellis goes even further, suggesting: 
Within the laws governing the behavior of matter, there is hidden another domain of 
response of matter to life than usually encountered: matter might respond directly to 
God-centered minds through laws of causal behavior, or there may be domains of 
response of matter encompassed in physical laws, but they are seldom tested because 
such God-centered minds are so seldom encountered…[wherein] the right ‘spiritual 
conditions are fulfilled.’80  
While Ellis’ suggestion might seem speculative, it is interesting to note how seriously he takes the 
idea of matter’s participation in God, and of the importance of “God-centered” minds in 
effecting divine action. Yong seems to agree with Ellis here, explaining that “Ellis is striving for 
language that is ultimately comprehensible only within an explicitly pneumatological frame of 
reference. The right ‘spiritual conditions’ were fulfilled first and foremost, but not only, in the 
life of Jesus Christ, the one anointed by the Holy Spirit.”81 In other words, Yong and Ellis seem 
to be contextualising human minds in an eschatological framework, such that the human mind-
brain can participate in the Spirit’s presence and activity in such a way that real physical change is 
effected. Note that because pneumatological naturalism embraces embodiment and physicality, 
the naturalised (and even physicalised) mind would not be any less spiritual than the soul (as 
traditionally conceived). In other words, because the entire physical world participates with the 
Spirit to varying degrees, the physicalised mind-brain (being immensely complex and possessive 
of relatively more freedom than other creatures) may be relatively more able to both experience 
divine action, and to influence the efficacy of divine activity.  
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So then, pneumatological naturalism may in fact privilege the mind in regards to divine action – 
but for very different reasons than those argued by Clayton. Clayton restricts divine action to the 
emergent mind precisely because he finds it to be the only ontologically nonphysical sphere in 
which divine action could occur without violating natural laws. And yet, as discussed, this 
argument essentially boils down to a causal joint approach that presumes the deistic God-world 
model that has been challenged throughout this thesis. In pneumatological naturalism, however, 
divine actions are conceived as variously intense manifestations of the Spirit who is always 
present to begin with. The intensity of these manifestations may be largely influenced by the 
attention, response, and disposition of creatures participating in and with the Spirit. While this is 
largely speculative at this point, one could imagine that the brain’s immense complexity would 
enable humans to naturally respond to and cooperate with God in a more intense manner than 
would, for example, a pine tree.82 In prayer, worship, liturgy, teaching, meditation, appreciation 
of the natural world, etc., theists have long reported felt experiences of divine presence and 
activity; pneumatological naturalism might provide a theological rationale for this. While this 
conjecture leaves much to be developed, it is at least interesting to note the congruence between 
a pneumatological naturalism, the mind-brain, and intensifications of divine action. The point 
here is that consciousness may well be a somewhat special focus of divine action, though not 
because the mind exists in an ontologically distinct category from other natural phenomena. 
Rather, the remarkable complexity of the human mind-brain may simply allow for a 
comparatively enhanced ability to participate in the Spirit and be affected by God in a way that 
may seem miraculous. Crucially, however, this model would not limit divine action to the human 
mind (as argued by Clayton), and presumably all aspects of nature (sentient or otherwise) are 
capable of responding to and participating in the Spirit in a manner appropriate to their 
respective abilities. Rather, pneumatological naturalism would simply suggest that given the 
mind-brain’s characteristics, one should not be surprised if the mind-brain were a locus of 




                                                            
82 This is not to say that the whole of creation is not able to fully respond to God in various ways 
appropriate to the physical makeup and complexity determining each organism’s abilities.  
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9.5 Discussion  
Pneumatological naturalism as described here has much to commend it as a version of theistic 
naturalism, in my view. This model shares with Thomism and panentheistic naturalism a 
commitment to the idea that all of nature is inherently involved with God – to be natural is to 
participate in God’s active, immanent presence. Like panentheistic naturalism, pneumatological 
naturalism holds a somewhat progressive, malleable understanding of what it is to be natural: 
true naturalness is no longer a static ontological category that excludes divine presence or 
activity, but an eschatological state in which nature can progressively participate. As one 
participates more or less in the Spirit, one becomes more or less natural – “natural” is defined 
eschatologically, as a state defined not only by currently-understood physical laws, but also by 
nature’s participation in and with the Spirit. Thus, this approach embraces an explicitly 
theological framework for naturalism. Like all theistic naturalisms, then, pneumatological 
naturalism portrays divine activity not as something extraneous to nature, as if God steps into 
the natural order to act, but as something almost to be expected as nature participates in and 
with God. Where pneumatological naturalism differs from panentheistic naturalism is in its 
reliance on pneumatology – rather than on panentheism or fixed instructions. While Yong and 
Smith do seem to understand God as working through (flexible) laws of nature, this is portrayed 
as occurring temporally and responsively, as creatures orient themselves towards or away from 
God. Similarly, pneumatological naturalism does not rely on panentheism, for the Spirit’s 
immanence in the world (including the Spirit’s influence on the laws of nature) is seen to be 
doing the same metaphysical “heavy lifting” as does panentheism. In other words, 
pneumatological naturalists insist that all of nature is inherently involved with the Spirit at all 
times, because of the Spirit’s immanence. Thus, there is no need to speak of God operating on 
the world from the “outside,” as this would presume an insufficient God-world model. If, then, 
one (for whatever reason) takes issue with panentheism, pneumatological naturalism’s 
participatory ontology claims to offer an alternative. Moreover, because of this model’s emphasis 
on the intimate relationship between God and natural processes, it is potentially resistant to 
“God of the gaps” charges. In other words, pneumatological naturalism is not really a causal 
joint model (unless, that is, one views the laws of nature themselves as a causal joint) – it does 
not seek out poorly understood or seemingly underdetermined areas of the natural world in 
which God is “allowed” to act. Rather, God is always involved with, and active in, natural 
processes, altering the laws of nature themselves toward eschatological ends. Rather than relying 
on science to identify where and how divine action occurs, pneumatological naturalism (and 
indeed, all theistic naturalisms as I define them here) suggests itself as a fully compatibilist 
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approach – divine action is not to be identified scientifically, but only theologically and through 
eyes of faith.  
 
As a version of theistic naturalism, then, the pneumatological model has much to commend it. 
However, there are still significant challenges to this approach – some specific to 
pneumatological naturalism, and others applicable to theistic naturalism more broadly. One 
possible critique that is particular to the pneumatological model has to do with how the model 
conceives of the laws of nature. Specifically, this model posits the laws of nature not as 
scientifically identifiable determinants of physical events, but as habitual-yet-flexible patterns that 
are responsible to the Spirit’s activity. In short: the Spirit actually alters the laws of nature – 
resulting in seemingly miraculous divine action, but not in such a way that it can be identified as 
such through scientific methodology. Even the most dramatic experience of divine action should 
be expected to have a wholly lawful explanation, with an underlying physical cause that is in 
principle explicable in scientific terminology. The problem with this, quite simply, is that few in 
the scientific community would take seriously such an understanding of the laws of nature. After 
all, it at least appears that scientists are continually discovering law-governed processes that are 
reliable, testable, and explicable in universally-recognised scientific and mathematical 
“languages.” For a theologian to step into such a scenario and claim that a particularly 
extraordinary event was caused because the Spirit literally altered a law of nature – this would 
seem preposterous to many empirically-minded individuals. One could not quite claim that such 
a model is interventionist – because pneumatological naturalism denies the God-nature 
relationship implied by both interventionism and noninterventionism – but it is quite unlikely 
that scientists themselves would feel comfortable allowing something so seemingly empirical as a 
law of nature to be revisioned as malleable and changeable.  
 
Indeed, it is not quite clear what it would even mean for God to alter the laws of nature. Saying 
that God simply changes the laws of nature, one might argue, does not absolve one of the 
difficulties surrounding divine action, for the laws of nature might not be the metaphysical 
constructs that this model seems to assume – they may be inextricably bound up with matter 
itself.83 Of course, representatives of pneumatological naturalism are aware of this problem. 
Smith himself is well aware of the dangers in asserting a theological priority in discussions about 
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science or divine action. He writes that such a contribution “to the science/theology dialogue 
would be inevitably gauche precisely because it would transgress an unspoken taboo in the parlor 
of the science/theology conversation, namely, that one not question the ‘science’ side of the 
conversation, and in particular, one not ruin the party by calling into question the governing 
naturalistic assumptions of science.”84 Even so, Smith and Yong would argue, theologians have 
something positive and constructive to say about the metaphysical frameworks applied to 
concepts like the laws of nature. They would insist that nature just is involved with the Spirit, 
though they flesh this out a bit differently: while Smith can affirm divine action by prioritising 
the dynamic, responsive participation of all nature in the Spirit, Yong more explicitly posits that 
the malleability of the laws of nature is something of an eschatological brute fact – though one 
that can be acknowledged only from a faith perspective. This being said, one could argue that 
Smith and Yong each face different challenges to their divine action models. That is, on the one 
hand, Smith claims that all creatures are more or less oriented to God, and divine action occurs 
through the active participation of physical processes in the Spirit. However, Smith does not 
offer a satisfying response to the causal joint problem, and readers are left to puzzle over how, 
exactly, such an account envisions the mechanics of this divine-nature participation taking place 
(after all, God and nature are still affirmed as being ontologically distinct). On the other hand, 
Yong’s model treats the laws of nature as a causal joint of sorts, though Yong might not admit 
this to be the case. The problem with this approach, however, is that it threatens to veer into 
occasionalism: if God alters the laws of nature themselves, one might argue that God is actually 
determining all physical events (insofar as all physical events are subject to the laws of nature). 
 
More broadly, pneumatological naturalism faces the same challenges as do other versions of 
theistic naturalism. Namely, the model is self-admittedly unfalsifiable and untestable. It is 
theoretically able to handle all new and existing scientific theories and data, incorporating them 
into a larger, thicker description of the natural world that always and already participates in the 
immanent God – but theistic naturalism is wholly immune to scientific critique. While this may 
well be a perfectly acceptable, necessary, and even obvious feature of reality (i.e., that scientific 
methodologies cannot prove the reality of an all-encompassing divinity or of divine action in and 
through the laws of nature), it also has the potential to frustrate honest dialogue between the 
scientific and theological communities. Put differently, science itself might never lead one to 
embrace a theistic naturalism, with its emphasis on the relationship between God and physical 
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processes. These are models that are likely only to be embraced for theological reasons. This may 
seem like an advantage (insofar as scientific discoveries cannot disprove the model in the way 
that has happened to causal joint theories), but it is also a liability. While the theistic naturalism’s 
strictly theological nature renders it expansive and independent of any particular causal joint, this 
feature also divorces the approach from any sort of robust testing or evaluation. Indeed, insofar 
as theistic naturalisms are compatibilist (affirming that both theological and scientific 
explanations for an event can simultaneously be true), one might well suggest that theological 
accounts of scientifically explainable phenomena are actually redundant. That is, given a 
seemingly sufficient physical account of a particular event, how and why is one justified in 
attributing that same event to an unseen, untestable divine presence? Yong admits this tension, 
writing that “this is a specifically theological form of divine action and, hence, of 
explanation…Each level of explanation is appropriate as far as it goes.”85 In any case, the entire 
science-and-religion field is presumably devoted to exploring connections between science and 
religion; it can thus seem frustrating if the most one can hope for is a theological overlay to 
scientific descriptions of the natural world. A broad theistic naturalism, in my view, is at least a 
helpful conceptual tool and metaphysical model for dealing with dual commitments to scientific 
knowledge and theological commitments. It will not, however, recommend itself to those 
without a preexisting theological commitment.  
 
9.6 Conclusion 
In Part One of this thesis, I examined and critiqued the standard model of divine action, which 
has been incompatibilist, noninterventionist, and presumptuous of prescriptive laws of nature. In 
order to move beyond broad, philosophical debates about divine action, I particularly examined 
Philip Clayton’s “divine action in the emergent mind” thesis. While recognising the seeming 
importance of the mind as a locus of divine action, I critiqued Clayton’s argument that the 
emergent mind is nonphysical and uniquely open to divine action. Clayton’s causal joint 
approach, I suggested, is both theologically insufficient and scientifically implausible. Moreover, 
there are both philosophical and scientific reasons to at least consider the possibility that the 
mind is wholly natural and even physical. Throughout Part Two of this thesis, I have been 
exploring theological alternatives to the standard causal joint model of divine action, with 
particular reference to divine action in the mind – namely, these theological alternatives render 
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the Hard Problem theologically irrelevant. This exploration has focused on variations of theistic  
naturalism, which share a commitment to compatibilist divine action – and reject the 
metaphysical assumptions undergirding noninterventionist, incompatibilist models – precisely 
because all nature is seen as being necessarily and ontologically involved with God’s active 
presence at all times. My basic argument has been that theistic naturalism, in some form, offers a 
much more theologically robust and scientifically acceptable approach than that offered by, for 
example, many of the causal joint theories put forth in the DAP. I agree with Smith that, quite 
often, “the natural sciences are taken to be objective arbiters of the ‘way things really are,’ and 
theology (and religious communities) are expected to modify and conform (correlate) their 
beliefs and practices to the dispensations of the scientific magisterium…In short, theologians are 
motivated to accede to naturalism because that is the price of admission for scientific 
respectability.”86 The question is, then, how much of this scientific oversight is necessary, and 
how much should be contested as lying outside the bounds of science proper? After highlighting 
the philosophical options surrounding naturalism, I examined three related (though distinct) 
versions of theistic naturalism: Thomism, panentheistic naturalism, and pneumatological 
naturalism. Each of these approaches has much to commend it, and I have highlighted their 
relative strengths and weaknesses throughout these last several chapters. Thomism, it seems, 
offers the paradigmatic, classic example of theistic naturalism, stressing the inseparability of 
natural processes from divine activity. The Thomistic account of divine action, however, may be 
lacking insofar as it is reliant on a paradoxical account of double agency. Christopher Knight’s 
panentheistic naturalism, on the other hand, offers a theistic naturalism that addresses the causal 
joint problem by framing divine actions as atemporal fixed instructions. This Orthodox model, 
Knight argues, is not deistic, precisely because an Eastern panentheistic metaphysic posits a 
God-nature relationship that is marked by immanence and an inseparability between God and 
nature. Panentheistic naturalism, however, can be critiqued on the basis of its God-nature model; 
some find that panentheism collapses into pantheism upon close scrutiny. Pneumatological 
naturalism, as articulated by James K. A. Smith and Amos Yong, respectively, is able to avoid 
panentheism by emphasising the Spirit’s immanent, temporally active presence in all of nature at 
all times. That is, the pneumatological model suggests that traditional theism does, after all, have 
the theological resources (e.g., the Spirit) to do the same metaphysical work as panentheism. The 
pneumatological model also offers a privileged account of the human mind, insofar as its 
participatory ontology allows for varying intensities of divine action as humans actively respond 
to, and orient themselves toward, God. However, pneumatological naturalism faces challenges as 
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well, and these are largely shared by all theistic naturalisms: specifically, these models are 
apparently wholly immune to scientific critique, and lack any real traction with the various 
sciences.  
 
While these three versions of theistic naturalism are obviously diverse and unique to their 
historical, cultural, and theological contexts, my suggestion has been that their commonalities are 
more significant than their differences. At the heart of theistic naturalism is a three-fold 
commitment involving 1) a denial that nature is, by default, an autonomous, self-sufficient entity 
apart from divine presence and action, 2) an affirmation that all of nature is inherently involved 
with God at all times – though perhaps in varying intensities and with varying physical effects, 
and 3) an affirmation that physicality itself is to be affirmed, rather than feared (in the mind-brain 
and elsewhere), precisely because the physical itself participates in God. This shared core of 
broad theistic naturalism, I suggest, may offer a theologically robust and scientifically compatible 
model of divine action. Theistic naturalism is particularly appealing in the context of the first half 
of this thesis, insofar as this overall model may prioritise human consciousness as a locus of 
divine-human interaction after all – though for very different reasons than those posited by 
Clayton. Future work in this area will face the challenge of articulating a model of divine action 
that is theologically robust, while still engaging with the sciences in a meaningful way. Indeed, the 
lack of real engagement between theistic naturalism and the sciences is the most problematic 
aspect of this otherwise promising theological trend. As science-and-religion goes forward, 
important questions will need to be asked, such as: Does theistic naturalism solve the causal joint 
problem? What does it mean to be natural? What is the nature of the physical itself? What role 
should scientific knowledge play in divine action theologies? Given the possible physicalisation 
of the mind, how might divine action theology constructively (rather than defensively) engage 
with the various brain-related sciences? While I have begun exploring these questions in this 
thesis, divine action in the mind remains something of a frontier in science-and-religion, and 









My overarching goal in this thesis has been to critique the causal joint model of divine action that 
privileges the mind as uniquely nonphysical, and to suggest that the theological turn’s theistic 
naturalisms offer helpful theological frameworks affirming divine action in embodied – perhaps 
physical – human consciousness. This project has thus been necessarily multifaceted, involving a 
sustained critique of the standard divine action model, an analysis of the philosophy and science 
of the mind, and an exploration of various forms of theistic naturalism. In particular, the two 
research questions framing this project have been: 
1) Regarding the causal joint model that locates divine action in the nonphysical mind: To 
what extent is this model scientifically plausible and theologically adequate? 
2) To what extent does theistic naturalism instead offer a theologically robust account of 
divine action in the naturalised mind?  
 
In response to the first question, Part One of this thesis argued that causal joint models in 
general, and particularly Philip Clayton’s privileged use of the mind in his divine action theory, 
are scientifically implausible and theologically inadequate. Chapter 2 began by highlighting the 
metaphysical presuppositions forming the metaphysical basis of standard causal joint models, 
and argued that these presuppositions are neither germane nor necessary for a theistic 
worldview. Chapter 2 also examined the test case of quantum divine action theories, 
demonstrating the scientific insufficiencies that become evident when causal joint theories are 
closely examined. Chapter 3 moved into a discussion of mind-based causal joint approaches, 
specifically analysing Philip Clayton’s emergent mind thesis. I argued in this chapter that 
Clayton’s model is not only unwarranted by scientific emergence theories themselves, but – 
theologically speaking – it is also unduly restrictive on divine agency, at least insofar as it limits 
divine action to the human mind. In Chapter 4, I examined the philosophy of mind more 
generally, focussing on arguments for and against the so-called “Hard Problem of 
Consciousness.” My argument in Chapter 4 was that while prominent formulations of the Hard 
Problem carry a certain intuitive force, they are overly reliant on an appeal to ignorance, and 
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methodologically suspect insofar as they prematurely delimit the explanatory power of the 
natural sciences. Chapter 5 is a logical extension of Chapter 4, highlighting several physicalist 
theories of consciousness that offer plausible alternatives to the idea that the mind is inherently 
nonphysical and immune to scientific explanation. Thus, Part One as a whole offers a sustained 
critique of standard approaches to divine action, and a rigorous scientific and philosophical 
analysis of the consciousness debate. Via this sustained analysis, it became clear that theological 
appropriations of the mind as a uniquely nonphysical causal joint are scientifically and 
philosophically unwarranted, and that we have every reason to affirm the “in principle” 
possibility of a physical explanation for consciousness.  
 
In response to the second research question, Part Two of this thesis offered an analysis and 
exploration of naturalism and, more specifically, particular versions of theistic naturalism that 
purport to offer models of divine action in the naturalised mind that are both theologically 
robust and not incompatible with scientific knowledge. I argued that while the standard causal 
joint model is heavily reliant on a noninterventionist, incompatibilist framework that presumes a 
prescriptive interpretation of the laws of nature, theistic naturalisms offer divine action models 
that assume a more theologically robust account of the God-nature relationship and, indeed, the 
ontology of nature itself. Chapter 6 explored the complexities surrounding the terminology and 
concepts involved with the question of what, exactly, it means to be properly natural. This 
chapter argued that standard divine action theories implicitly adopt theologically problematic 
versions of naturalism, presuming an autonomous natural world that excludes divine 
involvement in physical processes. Indeed, divine action theorists often (perhaps unwittingly) 
adopt scientistic versions of naturalism in an effort to be scientifically credible, even though 
more expansive versions of naturalism are available – theistic or otherwise. 
 
 After this philosophical argument, Chapters 7-9 present three distinct versions of theistic 
naturalism that go beyond philosophical abstractions, offering theologically specific frameworks 
that insist upon the normalisation of divine action. Chapter 7 explores Thomistic divine action, 
as it is something of a “gold standard” among theistic naturalisms. The Thomistic model 
emphasises the distinction between primary and secondary causes; because God as primary cause 
is immanent, and because nature always exists in intimate connection to, and dependence on, 
God, both God and natural processes are fully responsible for all natural events – this is the 
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doctrine of double agency. I argued that while Thomism offers the classic compatibilist 
formulation of divine action in the natural world, its particular emphasis on double agency is 
potentially incoherent and paradoxical. However, I suggested that the sort of thing Thomism 
achieves should be the aim of all theistic naturalisms: offering an account of God’s ever-present, 
ever-active involvement with all of nature at all times. Chapter 8 then examined the panentheistic 
naturalism of Christopher Knight, which uses an Eastern Orthodox panentheistic framework to 
revision what is generally understood as properly “natural.” Knight argues that God’s action in 
the world serves to transform the world from a sort of sub-nature to true nature; an account of 
divine immanence (including divine action) is actually required for a full understanding of nature, 
and for nature to be what it is intended to be. Knight critiques the common distinction between 
GDA, SDA, and miracles, arguing that all divine action can be understood as manifestations of 
atemporal laws, or “fixed instructions,” which are specific and responsive enough to account for 
all instances of divine action. Finally, Chapter 9 explored pneumatological naturalisms, which 
insist that creaturely involvement with the immanent, ever-present, ever-active Spirit is inherent 
to nature. James K. A. Smith, for example, argues that all of nature participates in the Spirit at all 
times, but with varying intensities. This pneumatological participation model performs the same 
metaphysical function as does Knight’s panentheism, normalising divine action by emphasising 
the fundamental, ontological connection between nature and God. While Smith himself does not 
offer a specific causal joint, pneumatologist Amos Yong argues that the Spirit actually changes 
the laws of nature within an eschatological framework, such that all instances of divine action are 
evidence of the Spirit changing nature into its eschatological reality.  
 
One important aspect of the pneumatological approach is that it accounts for varying intensities 
of experienced divine action. That is, because of its participatory ontology, pneumatological 
naturalism acknowledges that certain sites and aspects of the natural world will experience more 
intense manifestations of divine action, depending on the ability and will of the relevant creatures 
to respond to the Spirit. Thus, pneumatological naturalism may, in fact, privilege the mind in its 
account of divine action, insofar as the human mind is particularly (though not uniquely) 
complex, will-full, relational, and volitional. In other words, given the immense complexity and 
power of the mind-brain, it might well be the case that the human mind is an extremely 
important locus of divine action. However, the human mind might not be ontologically different 
in kind from the rest of creation (as argued by Clayton), but could instead simply be a more 
complex, responsive, and relational feature of the natural world than are other physical 
246 
 
processes. The mind, then, could be seen as of a piece with the rest of the physical world, but 
also acknowledged as a site of particular importance for God-nature interaction. This idea – that 
the mind is a particularly intense locus of divine action because of its remarkable complexity and 
relational and volitional capabilities – is one worth exploring further. Indeed, the need for more 
research on the theological import of the physicalised mind is a clearly perceived need arising 
from this thesis. Similarly, the pneumatological model’s focus on varying intensities of divine 
action raises fascinating questions about divine action elsewhere in nature. How might other 
conscious animals respond to, and participate in, God? Does God act in animal mind-brains? 
How do non-sentient beings respond to God or even “experience” God? These are the sorts of 
unanswered questions arising from a participatory, pneumatological account of divine action.  
 
While the three versions of theistic naturalism surveyed in this thesis are admittedly distinct, I 
argued that they share several key commonalities in their approach to divine action. First, 
Thomism, panentheistic naturalism, and pneumatological naturalism all reject noninterventionist 
divine action – not because they affirm interventionism, but because they reject the deistic 
presuppositions presumed by noninterventionist models. Second, they can all be considered 
compatibilist models, as they do not consider divine action to be in competition with the laws of 
nature. Each version of theistic naturalism conceptualises this differently: Thomists use double 
agency to affirm the full causality of both God and natural processes in all events, Knight’s 
panentheistic naturalism frames divine actions themselves as instantiated in actual laws of nature, 
and pneumatological naturalists either 1) see natural processes as participating in and with the 
Spirit to achieve a specific outcome, or 2) affirm that the laws of nature themselves are 
susceptible to alteration within an eschatological framework. Finally, the most important 
affirmation shared in common by theistic naturalists is that nature is always and everywhere 
involved with the active presence of the immanent God. To be natural is to be involved with 
God; the standard model’s presumption of an autonomous natural world is theologically 
inadequate. For the theistic naturalist, nature itself is to be understood theologically; science itself 
is self-admittedly limited in what it can say about the ontology of nature, divine action, or the 
God-world relationship. Theistic naturalists insist upon a God-nature relationship in which 
nature is always and everywhere fundamentally susceptible to divine action, influence, and 
relationship. My intention in Part Two has not been to put forward one particular version of 
theistic naturalism as superior, but to demonstrate how the core features shared in common 
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address the question of divine action in a far more theologically adequate way than does the 
standard model.  
 
While I have argued that some version of theistic naturalism (or, perhaps, a hybrid model of 
various versions) is far superior to standard causal joint models of divine action, theistic 
naturalisms share in common one significant weakness. That is, because they are all explicitly 
theological models, they are essentially unfalsifiable and immune from scientific critique. This, of 
course, might well be considered one of the advantages of theistic naturalism: such models are 
not subject to the ever-changing tides of scientific research or academic consensus. In fact, 
theistic naturalisms can be seen as theological models reclaiming the title of “queen of the 
sciences” – it is theology that defines the ontology of nature and the boundaries of science, 
rather than the sciences determining the scope and parameters of theological affirmations such 
as divine action. Some may be happy with this shift, and welcome the chance to affirm 
theological models of divine action as necessarily and properly independent of scientific critique. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that science-and-religion is meant to insist upon actual engagement 
between the sciences and theology, it is not always clear how theistic naturalisms might achieve 
this. For example, critics might argue that theistic naturalisms still have not adequately addressed 
the causal joint problem.  
 
Indeed, both Knight and Yong address the causal joint by reframing divine action as truly natural 
manifestations of the laws of nature – for Knight, these laws are atemporal fixed instructions, 
while Yong envisions temporal laws being altered by God toward eschatological ends. Some 
might argue that this reworking of the laws of nature is alien to the actual practice of working 
scientists, whose understanding of the laws of nature arise from empirical observation, falsifiable 
theories, and repeatable testing. Even more problematic is the participatory ontology of Smith 
and the double agency of the Thomist, respectively. Neither of these models even attempts to 
answer the causal joint question, but instead they reframe all of nature as a sort of perpetual 
causal joint. In the case of Thomism, both God and nature are full causes of all events – but, 
then, how can any particular action be specific, special, or truly responsive to creaturely needs? 
Ironically, double agency can seem simultaneously over-deterministic (insofar as God is the 
cause of all events) and overly distant or unspecific (insofar as natural processes are full causes of 
all events). In the case of Smith’s participatory ontology, the relationship between God and 
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nature is more dynamic and responsive than Thomism, with variably intense instances of divine 
action occurring when creatures respond to, or participate in, God. But how, exactly, does this 
participation occur? Where is the dividing line between natural and supernatural? If there is no 
clear dividing line or causal joint (as seems to be the case), then we are once again face-to-face 
with deism – or pantheism. Needless to say, scientists (at least in their role as scientists) would 
have little to say to either the Thomistic or participatory model – there is simply no room for 
scientific inquiry in these models, at least regarding divine action. While, as I have argued, theistic 
naturalisms do seem to offer the most promising route for divine action research (and they are 
certainly superior to causal joint theories, if one is committed to compatibilism), I would suggest 
that the causal joint problem remains. This may simply be an epistemological limitation of the 
field (necessary or otherwise), but it remains one of the most significant problems in science-
and-religion. In fact, it is difficult to imagine what real progress in this area would even look like 
– after all, addressing the causal joint problem was the precise aim of the DAP, which I have 
strongly critiqued. In any case, more creative research on the causal joint problem is a potential 
area of needed attention.  
 
At the conclusion of this thesis, it is useful to highlight once more its particular contributions to, 
and impact on, the science-and-religion field. This contribution is twofold, being both 
deflationary and constructive. First, this thesis could potentially affect the way that science-and-
religion scholars (as well as theologians) think about human consciousness. More specifically, I 
have hoped to provide a sound refutation of arguments that would privilege the mind as 
nonphysical and, especially, uniquely spiritual. So long as theological doctrines are dependent on 
nonphysicality – for example, an immaterial soul or divine action in the nonphysical mind – the 
relationship between science and religion will be one of competition and defensiveness. This 
thesis’ argument that the mind is at least fully natural – and potentially even physical – is thus 
theologically audacious and may allow for further, nondefensive theological postures in the face 
of scientific research on the mind-brain. Second, and related to the first contribution, this thesis 
points toward a way forward in divine action theology – namely in regards to theistic naturalisms. 
Theistic naturalisms, I argued, reframe the divine action conversation in such a way that the 
physical itself is involved with God’s active presence. In other words, theistic naturalisms offer 
theological frameworks that remove the need for defensiveness or theological anxiety in the face 
of scientific, physicalist explanations. Thus, not only is the mind-brain not nonphysical, but 
theologically speaking it does not need to be more than physical. A theistic naturalist stance allows 
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not only for a full affirmation of robust divine action in the human mind, but it also actively 
encourages scientific explanations for the mind – precisely because physicality does not stand in 
dichotomous relationship to God. A neural, biochemical, physical picture of the mind need pose 
no threat to dynamic interaction with God – if indeed it is true that “in him we live and move 
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